Proximate Cause

Question 1

Proximate Cause

Answer 1

Proximate cause acts to limit to liability and one of the most important tools to limiting liability in a negligence action

Question 2

Policy

Answer 2

Judicial efficiency by limiting liability.

Not imposing ruinous liability upon a D when the harm is no longer the natural resultant harm suffered by P.

Question 3

ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
V.
DANIELS

Answer 3

Limitations or the bounds of liability are arbitrarily set out at a proximate or natural stopping point beyond which a court will not & should not look to impose liability upon a D

Question 4

RYAN V. NEW YORK CENTRAL R.R. CO. (UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES CASE)

Answer 4

•D is responsible for the ordinary natural consequences of their negligence but not things that are too remote.

•Fairness Argument(s):
oNot imposing liability on things beyond Ds control

•Intervening causes/events:
(things that come into play that are out of Ds control)
oWind, environment, temperature

Question 5

BARTOLONE V. JECKOVICH (UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES CASE)

Answer 5

• D is liable for all injuries, even if a pre-existing condition makes the injury more significant.
• D must take P as he finds him & may be liable for aggravation of a pre-existing illness.

Question 6

BARTOLONE V. JECKOVICH

Answer 6

The thin skull triggered only if the injury is physical

•Most courts include both:
oThe fragile psyche &
oThe fragile skull as a pre-existing condition allowing P to recover.

Question 7

IN RE ARBITRATION BETWEEN POLEMIS & RURNESS, WITHY & CO. LTD. (FOCUSED ON DIRECTNESS)

Answer 7

Prof. Mullally’s Verbatim Rule:

As long as D was negligent, Polemis held that he or she would be liable for even unforeseeable consequences as long as those consequences are directly traceable to the negligent act and not due to the operation of independent causes having no connection to the negligent act.

Question 8

IN RE ARBITRATION BETWEEN POLEMIS & RURNESS, WITHY & CO. LTD. (FOCUSED ON DIRECTNESS)

Answer 8

oUnder Polemis, there needs to be an unbroken sequence without an intervening efficient cause.

•Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial so long as it is directly traceable to Ds act.

Question 9

IN RE ARBITRATION BETWEEN POLEMIS & RURNESS, WITHY & CO. LTD. (FOCUSED ON DIRECTNESS)

Answer 9

•The rule from Polemis provides that as long as it’s an unbroken sequence or there is not intervening cause, the remoteness of the harm suffered or the unforeseeability of the harm suffered is immaterial

Question 10

Synthesis

Answer 10

The rule in Ryan v. NY Rail-Road is reiterated by the court in Polemis. Ryan provides that D is liable for the proximate or natural result of their negligent acts so long as they are not remote. Bartlone v. Jeckovich provides that one must take the P as he finds them and is thusly liable to P for the resultant harms caused by their negligent acts or omissions. The rule announced by Polemis provides that there must be an unbroken sequence without an intervening cause; however, the remoteness of the harm or the extent of the damage is not rebutted simply because it was not foreseeable.

Question 11

OVERSEAS TANKSHIP LTD. V. MORTS DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. LTD. “WAGON MOUND NO.1”

Answer 11

D should be held liable for the NATURAL or NECESSARY or PROBABLE harms caused by their negligent acts or omissions because they are foreseeable.

Question 12

OVERSEAS TANKSHIP LTD. V. MORTS DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. LTD. “WAGON MOUND NO.1”

Answer 12

Natural, necessary or probable results are those that are reasonably foreseeable

Question 13

OVERSEAS TANKSHIP LTD. V. MORTS DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. LTD. “WAGON MOUND NO.1”

Answer 13

•The natural consequences rule is overruled and reasonable foreseeability test to an ORP is adopted & then look at the injuries suffered by P are on the list of reasonably foreseeable consequences.

Question 14

OVERSEAS TANKSHIP LTD. V. MORTS DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. LTD. “WAGON MOUND NO.1”

Answer 14

•The rule announced by the court in Polemis (=that D should be held liable for the resultant harm suffered by P so long as is a direct consequence of Ds acts or omissions then D should be liable regardless of the fact that the harm suffered was unforeseeable) is rejected:

oPolemis’ does not uphold justice or morality

oThe courts analysis of the case rejects the rule from Polemis due to the harshness towards D.

Question 15

PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO. (CASE ADDRESSES DUTY OWED TO THE UNFORESEEABLE P)

Answer 15

•Cardozo: Foreseeable Zone of Danger

oThere is no such thing as transferred negligence where one is liable to another for harms suffered that were an unreasonable probability of invasion Ps bodily security.  

Because it was a wrong, with reference to someone else, the wrong done to A does not carry over to another B. Before D can be liable to a particular P there must be a duty owed to that particular P.

Question 16

PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO.

Answer 16

•Justice Andrews:

oEveryone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.

oAll those injured may complain where they share a relationship.  The consequences are not limited to those that are foreseeable.

Question 17

PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO.

Answer 17

oAndrews provides that the court must ask whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between the cause and effect and not whether the act would reasonably be expected to injure another.

oThe greater the distance between time and space, (remoteness between time & space) the greater the likelihood that other causes intervene to affect the result.

Question 18

PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO.

Answer 18

oAndrews provides that the court must ask whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between the cause and effect and not whether the act would reasonably be expected to injure another.

oThe greater the distance between time and space, (remoteness between time & space) the greater the likelihood that other causes intervene to affect the result.

Question 19

PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO.

Answer 19

Know which tool a P wants to employ vs. which tool a D would rather employ when establishing P/C.

The principles announced by both Cardozo & Andrew’s represent the split reflected today regarding limitations on Ps recovery where they are an unforeseeable P and the duty thus owed can be construed one of 2 ways.

Question 20

DERDARIAN V. FELIX CONTRACTING CORP. (INTERVENING CAUSES)

Answer 20

Where the acts of a 3rd person intervene between Ds conduct and Ps injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by Ds negligence. If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from Ds conduct, it may well be a superseding act, which breaks the causal nexus.

Question 21

DERDARIAN V. FELIX CONTRACTING CORP.

Answer 21

•Intervening Act:

oA test for determining if an intervening force constitutes a superseding cause is oft couched in terms of foreseeability.

oConduct of a 3rd party or another force that occurs between a Ds conduct and a Ps injury that does not interrupt the causal chain when it’s a foreseeable consequence flowing from the negligent conduct.

Question 22

DERDARIAN V. FELIX CONTRACTING CORP.

Answer 22

•Superseding Cause:

oSupplants & cuts off the liability of D 

oExtraordinary & not foreseeable

oA legal conclusion that breaks the chain of causation.  

o3rd party conduct is still present but the effect is the chain of conduct is broken cutting of Ds liability.

oIf its extraordinary it will not break the chain

Question 23

WATSON V. KENTUCKY & INDIANA BRIDGE & R.R. CO.

Answer 23

if the intervening criminal or intentional act is foreseeable, then it will be considered merely intervening and not superseding.

Question 24

WATSON V. KENTUCKY & INDIANA BRIDGE & R.R. CO.

Answer 24

•The mere fact that the concurrent cause or intervening act was unforeseen will not relieve the D guilty of the primary negligence from liability, but if the intervening agency is something so unexpected or extraordinary as that he could not or ought to not to have anticipated it, he will not be liable and certainly he is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of others by which damage is inflicted and hence is not liable therefore.