Proximate Cause Flashcards

1
Q

a. Francis Bacon on proximate cause

A

i. There can be a number of causes, but only the actor or the person closest to the actual cause should be responsible.
ii. The example is appealing, but ineffective.

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2
Q

b. Thomas Street

A

i. We all would like ProxCause to be a simple inquiry, and bacon gave us one, but as soon as you look at the real cases, they never work.
ii. The theories have not been as influential or helpful as they should have.

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3
Q

Ryan v. New York Central RR

A

i. Facts
1) P house was 130 feet away when it was destroyed by fire caused by the D’s NEG management or insufficient condition of a train. Fire first consumed his woodshed and then moved on to other houses, including the P’s.
ii. Issue:
1) Is the D’s NEG the cause of the P’s loss? If but for the fire would the house have burned down.
iii. Holding
1) NO, the D is liable for destruction of the property adjacent to his house but not the P’s house
a) Not “ordinary and natural” result to fire to woodshed
b) Degree of heat, state of atmosphere and material in adjoining structures, was it really foreseeable?
2) To hold otherwise would subject the D to liability against which no prudence could guard and no private fortune would be adequate
a) Destruction of civilized society
b) Punishment beyond offense committed
iv. Notes
1) The D’s NEG is without doubt the butforcause of the P’s house burning down.
2) From the D’s perspective,
a) Is it the direct consequence?
i) Direct is the immediate cause of the injury
ii) The more we separate the loss from the cause, the easier it is to say it is not the direct cause
b) Is the P’s loss foreseeable?
i) from the D’s perspective Is foreseeable different from proximate cause?
3) Too show causation one must show both cause in fact ( the but for test) and proximate cause (that the act is within close proximity to the injury)
a) Cause in fact
i) But for the event occurring, the injury would not have happened
b) Cause in Law
i) Direct causation (minority)
1. It does not matter how foreseeable the result as long as what the negligent party’s physical action can be tied to what actually happened.
a. There are no Intervening causes between the act and the injury
ii) Foreseeability (Majority)
1. if the harm resulting from an action could reasonably have been predicted.

			4) Exam question T/F it would be better for the P in the squib case if the two people in the intervening market acted in an instinctual manner. 
								1. 
			5) Hypo
				a) Townhome, 
					i) You set fire to a row of townhomes, by just setting the first home one fire. Is the fire a proximate or immediate cause of 2nd or 3rd homes demise?
						A. You can't expose the D to too extensive of a liability
				b) Vehicles
					i) You slam on your breaks on the freeway and cause a 30 car pile up. Are you 
				c) Good case to show proximate cause is completely different from causation? 
			6) You should be responsible to buy your own damn insurance. I can't buy insurance for your house, so you should be responsible to some degree.
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4
Q

d. City of Lincoln

A

i. Facts
1) D vessel smashed into the P’s vessel rendering it non-navigable
ii. Holding
1) Only inquiry is whether damage complained of is “natural and reasonable” result of the D’s act
2) D is liable because consequence flowed from his act
3) Reasonable human conduct is not considered intervening act that bars P from recovery.
iii. Notes
1) Driver is driving too fast and starts to loose control, the P leaps out and breaks his finger, but the D recovers control of the car.
a) Does the P recover?
i) What was the cause of his injury?
A. Was it cause in fact?

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5
Q

i. Mauney v. Gulf Refining

A

i. Facts
1) P tripped over a stool in husbands café after reacting to a warning that the D’s tanker is going to explode
ii. Holding
1) No recovery because the D could not have foreseen the P’s injury due to a stool in front of her feet when the D could not have seen the same stool through the walls.
iii. Notes
1) Foresight has nothing to do with actual vision,
a) Foresight is whether you as the D will forsee a women will jump up in a building to run out to her car will trip and hurt herself because of your actions…
i) Nope not foreseeable.

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6
Q

j. Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough

A

i. Facts
1) P motorman for trolley company operating a car in the D’s neighborhood. A large chestnut tree fell on top of the trolley car during a wind storm. The P was injured but the P was operating the trolley car at excessive speeds in violation of an ordinance
ii. Issues
1) Did the P’s violation of ordinance by driving too fast cause his own injury?
iii. Holding
1) No, the fact that speed brought the P to place of accident at the moment the tree fell was “mere chance” which no foresight could have predicted. COINCIDENCE
iv. Notes
1) Do we decide the case on a basis of cause in law or cause in fact?
a) Cause in fact!
b) P’s NEG did not CAUSE the P’s injury.
2) Was the P’s NEG of speeding within the harm of being hit by a tree?
a) NOOOOO harm within the risk.
b) Proximate cause would be applicable, if the tree had fallen on the tracks and he couldn’t stop in time.

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7
Q

Central of Georgia RR v. Price

A

i. Facts
1) D NEG missed the P’s stop and put her in a hotel that same night a kerosene lamp exploded in the hotel room causing her serious injuries. The P sues the RR.
ii. Issue
1) Is D’s failure to drop the P off at an appropriate stop proximate cause of her burn?
iii. Holding
1) No, once again just a weird timing coincidence. The Hotel is more NEG for maintaining a defective lamp. The P’s injuries are not a natural cause or proximate cause of the D’s NEG; rather unusual and could not been foreseen or provided against by he highest practical care
iv. Notes
1) The RR was NEG in not getting her off the train in time, but that NEG in no way increased the danger that she would be injured by the exploding lantern.
a) Is it an issue with foreseeability or direct consequences.
i) d

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8
Q

l. Hines v. Garrett

A

i. Facts
1) 19 Year old female P was dropped off about a mile from her actual stop when the train overshot it. They dropped her off in an area known to be infested with brigands and hobos. The P was raped twice on her way back to the stop.
ii. Issues
1) Is the D’d NEG in dropping off the P in shady part of town a proximate cause of the P’s injuries even though it was 2 third parties that acted tortuously?
iii. Holding
1) D’s NEG exposed the P to the very act that caused her injuries, therefore they are NEG
iv. Notes
1) The railroad should have foreseen the issues with her walking through a seedy part of town. And their NEG in letting her off at a bad stop.

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9
Q

n. Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton

A

i. Facts
1) D discarded a dynamite camp on unenclosed premises. Little Charlie Copple found the cap and played with it. He later traded the cap to Jack Horton for some writing paper. Little jack thought the cap was an empty .22 shell and decided to clean it out with a match. It exploded in his hand injuring jack.
ii. Issues
1) Is the D’s NEG in storing its blasting caps the proximate cause of the P’s injuries?
iii. Holding
1) No, Copple’s mother’s action broke the causal chain. Once she saw it and continued to let him play with it, the NEG was then hers instead of the Companies.
iv. Notes
1) Active force v. Intervening actor, What is the difference?
a) An active force is one that is at the present
b) An intervening actor is one that is inserted into the tortious action, breaking the chain of causation. I.E. throwing the dynamite in the market (squib) Scott v. Shepherd
2) Beal
a) Active force comes to rest in a dangerous position (middle of the road) , this creates a new or increasing risk of loss, thereby making the active force a proximate cause if a tortious act occurs due to the dangerous position they have been put in.
b) However if the active force comes to rest in a safe position, and an intervening actor moves the force to create a new harm, the result it is too remote to constitute proximate cause.

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10
Q

o. Brower v. New York Central RR

A

i. Facts
1) The P is in horse-drawn wagon carrying cider, barrels, and other goods. While crossing the track it is struck by the D’s train. The P’s goods scattered near the collision and stolen by thieves
ii. Issues
1) Is the D’s NEG in causing the collision also the proximate cause of thieves stealing the P’s goods?
iii. Holding
1) Yes, the D’s NEG in causing the collision resulted immediately in rendering the P unable to protect his property, the disappearance of goods is natural and a probable result of them being scattered in a large city.
a) The act of an intervening third party will not excuse the original party’s NEG if the D’s NEG could have been foreseen
2) Dissenting, the Proximate cause imports “unbroken continuity” between cause and effect
a) A murder on a train is a bad example because it is not very foreseeable that a bandit would get on a derailed train to steel something and then murder a train passenger.
b) Not analogous to the instant case.
c) because theft is much more foreseeable than murder then left.
iv. Notes
1) The active force has come to rest when the collision is over. Are the intervening actors perpetuated by the collision coming to rest in a safe position or a dangerous one?
a) A dangerous one (city)
2) Was the crime foreseeable? Like Hines v. Garrett, where the girl was dropped off in a bad neighborhood, theft is foreseeable in a large city.
3) Hierarchy of intervening actors
a) Criminals actors
b) Negligence actors
c) Benevolent actors
4) Two schools of thought concerning Causation
a) Direct consequences
b) Foreseeability

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11
Q

p. Atherton v. Devine

A

i. Facts
1) P injured in a car accident, on the way to the hospital they were in another car accident and injured again while the ambulance iis n route to the hospital. Is the D who caused the first accident the proximate cause of his injuries?
ii. Holding
1) First collision was a substantial factor in causing the subsequent injury.
iii. Notes
1) Why would you not just charge the other tortfeasors?
a) Difficulty in determining the other causes
b) Was the ambulance driver NEG in their driving?
i) Ambulance Driver was driving excessive speeds (they are bleeding out)
A. No there is no NEG
ii) Ambulance driver was drunk?
A. Yes there is NEG
c) Common law holds that any tortfeasor that is considered an intervening actor, you as a P can sue any of them in a chain as long as its just for the injuries resulting after their intervention

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12
Q

SS 2-448

A

i. Intentionally Tortious or Criminal Acts Done Under Opportunity Afforded by Actor’s Negligence
1) Third party’s intentional tort or crime is SUPERSEDING cause of harm to another UNLESS negligent actor REALIZED or SHOULD HAVE REALIZED likelihood that a third party might have availed self of opportunity to commit tort or crime.
ii. Test Question
1) The P would prefer a doctrine of comparative NEG over Superseding cause
a) True, under a superseding cause doctrine the P does not recover.
b) A superseding cause is an unforeseeable cause that breaks the chain of causation.
c) A foreseeable intervening cause that does not break the chain of causation.

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13
Q

t. Bigbee v. Pacific telephone and telegraph Co.

A

i. Facts
1) P trapped in the D’s phone booth when it is struck by a drunk driver. They could not get out in time and were injured
ii. Holding
1) D is NEG in management and placement of the booth and not relieved of its proximate cause argument
2) D NEG precisely because it is likely a person trapped in the phone booth could be struck by a drunk driver on a busy street
iii. Notes
1) Does the intervening actor break the chain of causation?
a) Was it foreseeable?
b) Why was the D NEG in maintaining the phone booth? Because the mechanism wouldn’t work that opened the door. Does the harm of the door not working within the risk of the driver hitting it?
c) Was the Booth Negligently placed? Very possibly
d) How about the door opening? Custom, is what dictated how the door opened. You cannot hold a companies safety standards against them.

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14
Q

u. Britton v. Wooten

A

i. Facts
1) D’s Lessee NEG stacked excessive amounts of flammable trash inside a grocery store; arsonist set fire the stack.
ii. Holding
1) Followed the restatement and rejected the claim that criminal acts of third parties relieve original NEG party from liability
iii. Notes
1) Does the intervening actor break the chain of causation?
a) Was it foreseeable?
2) Safety statute, the NEG of the D was due to the safety issues involved with stacking the trash. Was the harm within the risk? I actually don’t think so, why was the statute created? More likely than not to prevent fire, but how would stacking it cause fire?

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15
Q

v. Bell v. Board of Education

A

i. Facts
1) School left P behind at a 6th grade drug awareness fair near the school. While walking back the P was accosted by three boys who raped her and sodomized her.
ii. Holding
1) After jruy found for P, the appeals court was unable to say that intervening act of rape was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
iii. Notes.
1) Does the intervening act of the boys attacking her break the chain of causation from the teacher?
a) Was it foreseeable?
i) The students were at a drug awareness fair.

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16
Q

w. SS 3-34 Brown Transport Company Example

A

i. Facts
1) Brown transport company NEG seals a container truck loaded with flammable liquid. The leaking truck presented a risk of fire or explosion. Passerby strikes a match to light her cigar, and blows up the truck
ii. Notes
1) If the person lit it maliciously after getting fired by an employer, does the intervening actor break the chain of causation?
a) Not really foreseeable, but it should be sent to the jury
2) If the person lit it negligently and was just smoking?
a) This is more foreseeable and could be found by a trier of facts.

17
Q

Wagner v. International RR

A

i. Facts
1) P and cousin on board the D’s train when the train traveled around a corner the cousin fell out of the train by a bridge. The conductor stopped the train and started a search for him. This all happened at night. Some rescuers went down the trestle and found the cousins body, shortly the P fell and landed on the ground near the cousin.
ii. Issues
1) Does the D’s NEG in operating a train with doors open extend from cousin to P who became injured while looking for him?
iii. Holding
1) Yes, it invites a jury question. Danger invites rescue, the D is liable for wrong that imperiled the cousin and P. the D may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer but is accountable as if he had. Continuity not broken by exercise of volition.
iv. Notes
1) THIS IS A RESCUER CASE
a) Does the NEG of the D applicable to the rescuer case, or does the rescuers own NEG constitute a sufficient intervening act to break the chain of causation?
b) Could the P exceed privilege and break the chain of causation? Yes if really rash.

18
Q

McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp

A

i. Holding
1) Rescue doctrine
a) Informs the tortfeasor it is foreseeable a rescuer will come to the adi of a person imperiled by the tort feasor’s actions.
b) Tortfeasors owes the rescuer a similar duty as to the imperiled
c) Rescue doctrine negates the presumption that the rescuer assumes the risk of injury
2) Rescuer statues
a) D NEG to person rescued; and
b) NEG caused peril to person rescued
c) Peril appeared to be imminent
ii. Notes

19
Q

aa. In Re Polemis & Furness withy & co.

A

i. Facts
1) P employed the D to charter a vessel and cargo to morocco; cargo included Flammable chemicals. A heavy plank fell into the hold of the vessel, causing an explosion which set to vessel and completely destroyed her; vessel owners claimed NEG, D claimed exemption due to fire clause and that damages claimed were too remote; arbitrators found that 1) the plank fell due to the P’s NEG and 2) a spark caused by a falling plan could not have been easily anticipated
ii. Issues
1) Can the P recover as damages the cost of the ship due to the D’s NEG even though an arbitrator established the D could not have foreseen such a result?
iii. Holding
1) Yes
a) Bankes,
i) Foreseeability is helpful in determining if the D is NEG or not, but Not material to determining liability
A. Destruction of vessel direct result of the D NEG, therefore the D is liable for damages (not to remote)
b) Warrington
i) D are liable for actual damages that occurred even if there is a difference between the actual damages and the foreseeable damages
A. The Arabs could have foreseen Denting, so they are NEG however, was the explosion the direct consequence of the dent?
c) Scrutton,
i) Natural and Probable are unhelpful adjectives
A. If an ant would or might probably cause damage, The D may be found NEG
a. EVEN IF DAMAGE THAT IN FACT OCCURS COULD NOT BE FORSEEN.
iv. Notes
1) In the Polemis case Arabs (drop plank into hold of ship explosion ensues,)
a) the first view would be more favorable to the D’s, true or false?
i) False
2) First view
a) The damage that was foreseeable is material in regards to NEG”
i) Foreseeability is helpful in determining if the D is NEG, but not Material in determining liability.
A. NEG for the denting and the denting caused the explosion so they are liable.
a. Direct consequences, proximate cause theory
3) Second view
a) The damage that
i) The foreseeability is the test to see if the damages were too remote.
A. Was the weird damage foreseeable? No, not foreseeable, too remote.
a. NEG for the actual damage but not the damage that is proximately caused.
b. Foreseeability test
4) Jr. Council
a) Could not have foreseen the extent of the damage, but they could foreseen the type of damage, therefore regardless of how much it cost, you were still liable for the type of damage.
5) Polemis adopts the direct consequences, proximate cause theory, not the foreseeability test
6) Bon Mot, Seavey “prima facie at least, the reasons for creating liability should limit it.”
a) Was some damage foreseeable
i) In order to say the defendant was liable, we have to say she was engaged in a NEG act, to see if she was involved in a NEG act we have to as if it was foreseeable?
b) Seavey, would decide the case in the reverse under the foreseeability test

20
Q

b. Overseas Tankship v. Morts dock (Wagon Mound #1)

A

i. Facts
1) P ship NEG discharged oil into the water; the tide and wind carried the oil near the P’s wharf; after consulting with the supervisor, authorizes employees to resume welding; two days later, oil caught fire and destroyed the P’s wharf
ii. Issues
1) Is the D’s NEG discharge of the oil the proximate cause of the destruction of the wharf
iii. Holding
1) No
a) A man must be considered responsible for the probable consequences of his act; the foresight of a reasonable man alone can determine responsibility = Foreseeability
b) To replace foreseeability with “direct” leads to never ending and insoluble problems of causation
i) Impossible test to apply
ii) Polemis overruled? YES!
iv. Notes
1) Foreseeability makes you culpable for the direct consequences, but not the further damages
a) Foreseeability is adopted as the single test for proximate cause.
2) Why was the D’s conduct NEG with respect to the wharf owner?
The Oil mucked up the wharf.

21
Q

c. Wagon Mound #2

A

i. Facts
1) P ship NEG discharged oil into the water; the tide and wind carried the oil near the P’s wharf; after consulting with the supervisor, authorizes employees to resume welding; two days later, oil caught fire and destroyed the P’s wharf
i. Facts
1) Same as above except owner of another docked ship is suing overseas Tankship
ii. Holding
1) D’s engineer should have known that he was duty bound to stop the discharge immediately
a) Even if this particular event could have only happened in rare circumstances “reasonable man could not dismiss such a risk from his mind and do nothing when it was so easy to prevent it = BPL analysis
iii. Notes
1) In the first case, the

22
Q

Doughty v. Turner

A

i. Facts
1) D knocked asbestos cover into a vat of extremely hot sodium cyanide, no splash resulted, however later exploded and molten liquid flew from the vat and landed on the P
ii. Holding
1) Court of appeals barred recovery because injury occurred as a consequence of a risk about which the D was not NEG
iii. Notes

23
Q

e. Hughes v. Lord Advocate

A

i. Facts
1) D servants working on pipe to which they had access via a manhole; a tent covered the Manhole and lanterns were placed to alert person to cover. The p and uncle began playing in the tent and hole when the lantern fell down a hole and caused an explosion.
ii. Holding
1) D is liable since foreseeability of injury by burning not distinguishable from foreseeability of injury by explosion.
iii. Notes

24
Q

f. Smith v. Brain Leech

A

i. Facts
1) P decedent burned on the lip by splashing molten metal; prior medical history such that susceptible to cancer, develops cancer and dies.
ii. Holding
1) D liable since foreseeability of injury by burning is not distinguishable from foreseeability of injury by explosion.
iii. Notes

25
Q

g. Steinhauser v. hertz corp.

A

i. Facts
1) P is a 14yo passenger in his parents car when it was struck by the D’s driver; no injuries at the scene but the P later institutionalized for Schizophrenia; P suffered mild concussion two years prior
ii. Holding
1) Friendly
a) Reversing trial court decision and jury charge requiring P’s parents to prove she was normal,
b) P parents do not have to prove that the P was perfect
iii. Notes

26
Q

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.

A

i. Facts
1) P standing on platform of the D’s RR. Two men ran to catch a moving train, one was carrying a package of fireworks. When he jumped aboard to the car he appeared to fall so the guard pushed him from behind helping him on to the train. The package was dislodged in the process and fell onto the tracks where it was run over and exploded and caused a set of scales to fall and hit the P.
ii. Issues
1) If the RR is NEG for helping the man board the train, are they then liable for the injuries sustained by the P?
iii. Holding
1) Cardozo
a) NEG involves invasion of a legally protected interest the violation of a right
b) D was not NEG to the P therefore they did not violate any of her rights (no duty to the P)
c) No tort against the P because the D committed wrong to someone else (no vicarious beneficiary)
d) Cardozo appears to be interested in the relationship between the parties and the breach of duty; not concerned about proximate cause or causation
2) Andrews
a) More interested in Wrongfulness of act and cause and effect than relationship of parties to the NEG act
b) Distinguishes Salmond as too narrowly defined
c) If unreasonable act affects a right, NEG occurs whether the damage does or does not result
d) Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger
e) NEG involves a relationship between NEG actor and those whom he IN FACT injures
f) Damage and the four Un’s (Unusual, unexpected, unforeseen, unforeseeable)
g) Proximate = the law’s arbitrary tracing a series of events only up to a certain point
iv. Notes
1) Criteria for tort
a) DUTY, BREACH, PROXIMATE CAUSE, DAMAGES
b) Cardozo solves the issue at a stage prior to proximate cause, by saying there is no duty to the P, because the issue was not foreseeable.
c) Benny says that when we are engaged in dangerous activity proximate cause liability extends further than if we were engaged in normal behavior.
d) Benny says that the P is trying to take advantage of the vicarious breached duty of another.
i) The duty was breached in response to the individual being pushed onto the train, but that vicarious breach does not
e) Is proximate cause a question for the court or a question for the jury?
i) If reasonable minds cannot differ, than it is a question for the court. If they can, it’s a question for the jury.
f) Benny says
i) Perhaps he would accept the argument that a D who foreseeably endangers the p is liable for property damage, but not personal injury.
ii) Polemis, we are liable for denting, but not for fire.
g) The orbit of danger
i) If the P is within the orbit of danger, than the D has a duty to that P
A. If the passanger, has a red package that says explosives, the D would have a higher duty of care.
h) Andrews comes up with the phrase “substantial factor”
i) Each case needs to be decided on its facts, every case is different.
ii) Is the case forseeable?
A. Maybe, it should have got to the jury.
i) Foreseeable injury by unforeseeable means
i) Courts differ on the outcomes

27
Q

SS 3-29

A

i. An actors liability to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.

28
Q

Mitchell v. Gonzales

A

i. Facts
1) P decedent drowned while vacationing with the D’s son; D asleep on the beach when the boy drowned
ii. Holding
1) Adopted a substantial factor test
a) A proximate cause of injury is a cause which in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred
i) Test is prejudicial against the P’s
iii. Notes
1) The jurors screwed up a but for instruction, which means proximate cause is completely useless in instructing the jury