Proprietary Estoppel Flashcards
PE - Remember Equitable maxims!
C must have clean hands!
Dalby can also defeat a claim that the landowner acted unconscionably, REGARDLESS of level of reliance and detriment
Lord Walker (Gillet v Holt) on unconscionability
“The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round” –> looking at assurance, reliance and detriment
Sidney Bolson v Karmios
Denning: representee must REASONABLY be of impression that representor intends them to rely
Proprietary estoppel vs. promissory estoppel
Proprietary estoppel can be used as a sword i. e. actually bring a claim for a right in the land
Remedies: no award
Equity has already been satisfied (Sledmore v Dalby)
Problem with the “expectation-based” approach to remedies arising from PE
Tends to presume expectation of claimants and might be disproportionate to any detriment suffered
1) Promise/assurance/representation
2) Reliance
3) Detriment
Then
4) Unconscionability?
Holistic approach, but still apply each of the 3 key components before drawing a conclusion based on overall unconscionability
Williams v Staite
Lack of clean hands may defeat claim for PE and defeat arguments of 4 categories: Cs knew all along that they had no permission at all to built on the land
“Reliance”
If C can argue “change of position” due to reliance on assurance, they might be able to prove the second of the Taylor Fashions components
Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees
Oliver J’s more flexible test: promise made by landowner, relied on by C, to a detriment and unconscionable to allow landowner to go back on promise
Historical development of PE
Fraud-based by landowner (Willmott v Barber) –> unconscionability-based (Taylor Fashions)
Thorner v Major (now leading case)
Lord Walker:
Other than looking holistically at element of unconscionability, stating point is to look at representation/assurance before going on to look at reliance and detriment, contradicting himself in Gillett v Holt
PE: s. 116 LRA 2002
Once key elements explained needed for PE and also the role of the courts in making an award –> VITAL to demonstrate how such a right might be protected against 3rd parties
Greasley v Cooke
MIXED MOTIVES OK - Denning: her unpaid care-work was evidence that she clearly relied on assurance that she could remain in property. It didn’t matter that she entered into a relationship with one of the family members
Pascoe v Turner
MIXED MOTIVES OK - Although Mrs Turner’s actions could also have been based on her feelings for her former partner Mr Pascoe, reliance on his promise that the house would be hers was ONE of the reasons she moved in and renovated –> title to property
Remedies: full transfer
Where equitable to award full title (Pascoe, Re Basham)
RELIANCE: turning down of substantive employment opportunities
Thorner, Dugdale, Ottey v Grundy
Ownership: PE v. constructive trust
PE: range from nothing to full title
CT: quantification based on “holistic contributions” (Hale in Stack v Dowden)
Campbell v Griffin
MIXED MOTIVE OK - C. stated categorically he would have cared anyway for elderly couple who promised him their property but died intestate –> assurance was ONE of the reasons for him staying and caring for them
PE vs. constructive trusts
Dixon, Lord Walker: overlap between the two
Lady Hale’s holistic approach in Stack v Dowden: concept constructive trust now more all-embracing - seems that almost any contribution by C towards well-being of registered proprietor could now be seen as giving rise to constructive trust
Both based on reliance, detriment and unconscionability
Inwards v Baker
Denning: the minimum necessary to achieve justice
Similar situation to Dillwyn, awarded life interest to son who had built on land promised by father - son never expected full title!
s. 116
Equity by estoppel that would rank in priority from the time the equity arises - meaning BACK-DATED to the time one can establish the promise, reliance and detriment occurred
LRA 2002: Estoppel rights can clearly be said to be proprietary rights in the land
1) Register s. 116 interest as a notice with land registry prior to transfer, or
2) actual occupation (Sched. 3, para. 2) –> enforce overriding interest following s. 29 priority rules. MORE LIKELY (because C will have no idea they have such right)
Lord Scott, leading judgement in Yeoman’s Row
Went further than Lord Walker: Total clarity requirement (estoppel requires clarity as to the objet and the interest in the property)
PE should be applied sparingly! landowner should not be estopped from asserting an agreement is void for non compliance with statute (s. 2 LP(MP)A)
Lord Walker: total clarity requirement virtually extinguishes PE
Estoppel > constructive trust
If C successfully claims beneficiary status under constructive trust, doctrine of overreaching becomes distinct possibility. Estoppel rights cannot be overreached - this mechanism applies ONLY to beneficiaries under a trust
Pre-Stack: equitable quantification based on financial contributions, safer bet to follow CT route
Now: loosening of reins in Thorner –> estoppel might be preferable
CT: assurance must be “clear and unequivocal” (Arif v Anwar)
PE: “clear enough, identifying specifiable proprietary interest Thorner)
Schedule 3: estoppel rights
Under Schedule 3 LRA 2002, para. 2, anyone who has a PRE-EXISTING PROPRIETARY right and is in discoverable occupation can use actual occupation as overriding interest against new proprietors (s. 29 priority rules)
Gillet v Holt: detriment
Benefit does not extinguish detriment: detriment to be judged from the moment arrangement/relationship ends
Crabb v Arun District Council
Promise has to be clear and unequivocal
Henry v Henry
Contrasts Dalby: Henry had also lived rent free but had suffered greater detriment through battling to provide for his family and giving up opportunities elsewhere on the strength of the assurance made
Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe
Lord Walker: Mr Cobbe was running a commercial risk, with his eyes open (obtaining planning permission for Yeoman’s Row to buy a property for £12 million)and could not rely on assurance given
Commercial vs. non-commercial premises
Yeoman’s (commercial risk with eyes open) –> Thorner (loosening of almost total clarity requirement, albeit in domestic setting)
Jennings v Rice
Lord Walker on the problem of the “expectation-based” approach: courts do what’s necessary o avoid unconscionable result –> disproportionate remedy cannot be the right way to do that
ECHOED by his view in Holt - court’s objective is to do justice between parties
Remedies: partial transfer
To do the minimum necessary (Yaxley, Thorner)
Contra Lord Scott’s argument (Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe):
PE circumvents statute (s. 2 LP(MP)A 1989) and is “unprincipled and unpredictable”
Explain 3 key elements, then go on to and demonstrate what might be regarded as the judicial safeguard: court’s discretion as to remedies even if PE is established (can even mean the equity has already been satisfied)
Sledmore v Dalby
Detriment might not be measured fiscally (Holt) but here, any detriment was outweighed by the advantages Dalby had enjoyed, such as living rent free
Contrasts Henry v Henry
PE based on express ASSURANCE vs. estoppel by acquiescence
Sidney Bolson vs. Ramsden v Dyson
Yeoman’s Row vs. Thorner
Thorner resurrected PE by loosening Lord Scott’s restraints of total clarity - Lord Walker:
assurance needs to be only unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously –> assurance can be drawn from implications and inferences from direct statements/conduct
Lord Walker in Yaxley: PE vs. constructive trust
Much common ground between the two, went further in Jennings, stating they are almost “indistinguishable”
Wayling v Jones
MIXED MOTIVE OK - W. relied on assurance by partner Jones that he would leave him the business, evidenced in W. working for minimal wage
NOTE THE BUSINESS SETTING
Gillett v Holt
Lord Walker (same as in Thorner v Major): holistic approach, components are not “watertight”
Priority even over a signed and executed will!
RELIANCE: moving and working for 40 years for low salary
DETRIMENT: Gillet had become independently wealthy despite having worker for low salary for Holt –> detriment not measured fiscally (given up studying)
Remedies: £
Where a land transfer has already taken place (Campbell, Jennings - based on proportionality)
Ramsden v Dyson || Dann v Spurrier
Promise can be made by silent acquiescence, landowner standing by and allowing C to suffer detriment because of initial representation
Lord Wensleydale: dishonest to remain passive and then profit at a later stage
Willmott v Barber
Fry J’s 5 probanda for PE:
If the landowner had encouraged C to rely on an assurance knowing full well that C was mistaken in the belief that they would take the property
–> FRAUDULENT ELEMENT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE, so we move on to Taylor Fashions
Lloyd v Dugdale
PE give C a pre-dated right in the land itself
“Proprietary Estoppel”
Transfer of land is enforceable through its operation, even though no formalities have been followed.
NORMALLY: transaction should be in writing, not simply verbal. Deed (LPA 1925 s. 52(1)) or at least in written form and signed (LP(MP)A 1989, s. 2)
What is a deed?
LP(MP)A 1989, section 1: signed by the parties in presence of a witness and delivered by an authorised person
Dixon on estoppel rights
Estoppel rights are proprietary and can bind a 3rd party as an interest that overrides through actual occupation
Dillwyn v Llewelyn
The courts must simply satisfy the equity: transfer of a freehold from father to son was only suitable remedy, as the expectation of the son could only be satisfied this way
