Property: Future interest: Rules enhancing marketability Flashcards
Precatory Language:
O transfers Blackacre “to A on the hope that A will operate a circus on the land.”
A has a
FSA
O has
Nothing
Precatory Language:
O transfers Blackacre “to A for the purpose of operating (or for the use of) a farm.”
A has a
FSA
O has
Nothing
Precatory Language:
O transfers Blackacre “to A on the condition that Blackacre is used as a farm.”
A has a
FSA (it is not a FSSCS because there is no re-entry or termination language)
O has
Nothing (except possibly a claim against A for money damages for breach of covenant)
Restraints on Alienation
O transfers Blackacre “to A for so long as A never attempts to sell Blackacre.”
A has a
FSA
O has
Nothing
Why?
Temporary (five years or more) and permanent (as here) absolute restraints on the alienation of fee simples (any type) are considered “unreasonable” and thus are void
Restraints on Alienation:
O borrows money from First National Bank (FNB) giving FNB a mortgage on Blackacre (which O owns in fee simple). The mortgage provides that if O sells Blackacre, the payments will be accelerated and due immediately. Is this restriction valid?
But not all restraints on alienation are considered unreasonable and void:
Yes. Due-on-sale clauses are considered “reasonable restraints” and thus are valid under state and federal law
Restraints on Alienation
O transfers Blackacre “to A for life, but if A attempts to sell her interest in Blackacre, the property shall revert to O.”
A has a
Life Estate Subject to a Condition Subsequent (because restraints on life estates are generally valid)
O has two future interests
- A Reversion (in the event A never attempts to sell)
- A Right of Entry (in the event A attempts to sell)
Restraints on Alienation
O transfers Blackacre “to A for 20 years; A may not assign or sublease her interest in Blackacre without O’s written consent.”
A has a
Leasehold (Tenancy for Years)
The restraint on alienation is
Valid (but will be strictly construed against the landlord)
Restraints on Alienation
O transfers Blackacre “to A, but if A should ever decide to sell Blackacre, she must first offer to sell it to O at the then fair market value.”
A has a
FSA
O has a
Valid Right of First Refusal
Rule: A right of first refusal is considered a “reasonable” restraint on alienation if the party holding the right must pay the then (i.e., time of future sale) fair market value or is required to match legitimate third party offers.
Doctrine of Desirability of Contingent Remainders:
O transfers Blackacre “to A for life, remainder to B if B survives to the age of 21.”
Thereafter, A dies when B is only 19.
At common law,
O has a FSA. B’s contingent remainder was “destroyed” because it did not vest prior to the termination of A’s estate.
Under modern law,
Blackacre reverts back to O in FSSEL and B has a Springing Executory Interest
If B reaches age 21, B has a
FSA
If B dies before age 21, O has a
FSA
Rules in Shelley’s Case:
O transfers Blackacre “to A for life, remainder to A’s heirs (or next-of-kin).”
At common law,
A has a FSA based on two steps:
- To enhance the marketability of Blackacre, the Rule in Shelley’s case automatically converts the Contingent Remainder in A’s heirs into a Vested Remainder in A
- The Doctrine of Merger merges A’s Life Estate and Vested Remainder into a FSA
Under modern law,
A has a Life Estate, A’s heirs have a Contingent Remainder in Fee Simple (because a live person has no heirs), and O has a Reversion
Rules in Shelley’s Case:
O transfers Blackacre “to A for life, then to B for life, remainder to A’s heirs.”
At common law,
A has a Life Estate and a Vested Remainder in Fee Simple (because of the Rule in Shelley’s Case), but there will be no merger because of B’s Remainder in a Life Estate
Under modern law,
A has a Life Estate, B has a Remainder in a Life Estate, A’s Heirs have a Contingent Remainder in Fee Simple, and O has a Reversion
Doctrine of Worthier Title:
O transfers Blackacre inter vivos “to A for life, remainder to O’s heirs.”
At common law,
A has a Life Estate and O has a Reversion (to enhance the marketability of Blackacre, the Doctrine of Worthier Title—as a rule of law—converts the Contingent Remainder in O’s heirs into a Reversion in O)
Under modern law,
Same as common law, except that the Doctrine of Worthier Title is a rule of construction (which creates a rebuttable presumption of a Reversion in O)
Doctrine of Worthier Title:
O transfers Blackacre by will “to A for life, remainder to O’s heirs.”
At common law,
A has a Life Estate and O’s heirs have an Indefeasibly Vested Remainder in Fee Simple (because the Doctrine of Worthier Title does not apply to testamentary transfers)
Under modern law,
Same as common law
Doctrine of Worthier Title:
O makes an inter vivos transfer of Blackacre “to A for life, remainder to O’s heirs. It is my (O’s) intent for my heirs to have a remainder in Blackacre.”
At common law,
A has a Life Estate and O has a Reversion (because the Doctrine of Worthier Title—as a rule of law—converts the Contingent Remainder in O’s heirs into a Reversion in O)
Under modern law,
A has a Life Estate, O’s heirs have a Contingent Remainder in Fee Simple (because the second sentence of the conveyance is sufficient to override the rebuttable presumption of a Reversion in O), and O has a Reversion.
Rule in Wild’s Case (a rule of construction):
O transfers Blackacre “to A and her children.” At the time of the conveyance, A has no children.
A has a
Life Estate
A’s children have a
Contingent Remainder in Fee Simple
O has a
Reversion