Property Dualism Flashcards
What are the key aspects of Property Dualism? What is the key argument against it and what philosophers argue for it?
- Physical substance
- Mental properties
- Physical properties
- David Chalmers
- Frank Jackson ‘knowledge (Mary argument)
- Qualia- The subjective qualities of experience. Also referred to as phenomenal knowledge.
- The problem of consciousness
- Easy + Hard - The Zombie argument
-Interactionist vs Epiphenomenalist
Explain indefinitely heterogeneous dispositions
Dispositions that can be manifested in many, many different ways. Ryle argued that mental states are indefinitely heterogeneous behavioural dispositions, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour.
Explain introspection
Direct, first-personal awareness of one’s own mental states. (Objection to behaviourism)
Explain super-Spartans
People (or creatures) in Putnam’s thought experiment who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour has been suppressed, and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour. (Objection to behaviourism)
Explain physicalism
A modern form of materialism, which claims that everything that exists is physical, or depends upon something physical.
Explain physicalism, reductive
A form of physicalism that claims that mental properties are physical properties
Explain supervenience
A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.
Explain Inverted qualia
The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways; e.g. they both call the same object ‘red’. (Objection to functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness)
Explain multiple realisability
The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour.
Explain the Location problem
An objection to MBTI theory. If physical states and brain states are identical then they should share all of the same properties. Physical states have the property of existing spatially. Mental states don’t. It seems ridiculous to say that they do.
Explain a philosophical zombie
An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness
Explain Metaphysical possibility
Something is metaphysically possible if there is at least one possible world in which it is true
Explain physical possibility
Something is physically possible if it could be true given the laws of nature in the actual world
Explain the problem facing interactionist property dualism and David Chalmers response
Problem: How to explain how mental properties cause physical events and empirical objections to whether it occurs
Chalmers Response: For any fundamental causal relationship, we do not have an account of how it works. There is no special problem here. Furthermore, we have no empirical evidence that mental properties do not affect physical properties.
Explain the objection to Epiphenomenalist dualism and the response.
Problem: The claim that phenomenal properties (or at least mental properties) have no causal role is met with the objection that this is counter-intuitive and doesn’t reflect our experience of our mental lives,
Response: Epiphenomenalism can respond that such properties appear to have a causal role because what causes them (a brain state) also causes what looks like their effects (bodily movements, other mental states)
Explain the objection to epiphenomenalist property dualism from the evolutionary theory and Jackson’s response
Problem: Epiphenomenalism is incompatible with evolutionary theory, because evolution only selects properties that make a difference to the survival and reproductive success to the animal.
Response: Jackson responds that properties that are selected for can have by-products. And consciousness is a by-product of advantageous brain processes
Explain the problem of introspection against Epiphenomenalism dualism and the reply
Problem: We can object that epiphenomenalism entails that we cannot gain knowledge of our mind.
Response: Our beliefs about our mental states are caused by the same brain processes that cause those mental states. As this is a reliable process, we can have knowledge of our mental states. Alternatively epiphenomenalist can argue that our experiences partially constitute our beliefs about them.
Explain the problem of other minds against property dualism and the response
Problem: If phenomenal properties are logically independent of bodies, then no amount of evidence from someone’s bodily behaviour could prove that they are conscious.
Response: Property dualists would argue that other people experience phenomenal properties is the best hypothesis
Explain Ryle’s argument of the category mistake
Problem: To think of consciousness in terms of phenomenal properties is to misunderstand how we talk and think about the mind
What is the knowledge Mary Argument summarised?
- Mary knows all the physical facts about colour
- Mary does not know what it feels like to see colour
- Therefore, what it feels like to see colour is not a physical fact
- Physicalism says that all facts are physical facts
- Therefore, physicalism is false
What is the ability knowledge response to ‘the knowledge’ argument?
- We can accept that Mary learns something new but we can reject Jackson’s claim that it is non-physical.
- Instead we might argue that she gains ability knowledge.
-Matt sees red for the first time all she does is gain new abilities. She gains the ability to imagine red, for example. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences.
What is the argument that Mary gains new acquaintance knowledge?
- It’s new kind of physical knowledge; knowledge by acquaintance.
- Mary can know all the physical facts about red- What it is, when people see it, how they react to it, etc.- is without being acquainted to redness itself.
-Mary is not acquainted with redness because her own brain has never had this property itself. But when she sees red for the first time the property occurs in her brain and she becomes acquainted with redness. Mary gains new knowledge from being acquainted with redness in this way.
What is the response based on new knowledge, old fact to frank Jackson’s argument?
- There is more than one way to know some fact.
- For example, ‘I know there is water in that glass’ expresses knowledge of the same underlying physical fact that ‘I know there is h20 in that glass does’.
- But it’s possible to know the former and not the latter. The same fact can be understood bia two different concepts.
- We can apply this to Mary.
- Brfore she left the black and white room Mary only knew redness in theoretical terms. But when she leaves and sees red she gains a new concept: the phenomenal concept. And it’s impossible to know what it’s like to see red without this concept.
- We can argue that this phenomenal concept just provides a different way of understanding the same underlying fact.
- So, Mary doesn’t learn any new, non-physical fact. She just learns a different way of understanding the same fact.
Outline and explain David Chalmers philosophical zombies argument.
- Such zombies seem conceivable. We can imagine a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia. In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience.
- We can use this intuition to form an argument for property dualism similar to Descartes’ conceivability argument:
- Philosophical zombies are conceivable
- If philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible
- If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are non-physical
- If phenomenal properties are non-physical then property dualism is true
- Therefore, property dualism is true
