Property Dualism

Question 1

What are the key aspects of Property Dualism? What is the key argument against it and what philosophers argue for it?

Answer 1

• Physical substance
• Mental properties
• Physical properties
• David Chalmers
• Frank Jackson ‘knowledge (Mary argument)
• Qualia- The subjective qualities of experience. Also referred to as phenomenal knowledge.
• The problem of consciousness
  - Easy + Hard
• The Zombie argument

-Interactionist vs Epiphenomenalist

Question 2

Explain indefinitely heterogeneous dispositions

Answer 2

Dispositions that can be manifested in many, many different ways. Ryle argued that mental states are indefinitely heterogeneous behavioural dispositions, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour.

Question 3

Explain introspection

Answer 3

Direct, first-personal awareness of one’s own mental states. (Objection to behaviourism)

Question 4

Explain super-Spartans

Answer 4

People (or creatures) in Putnam’s thought experiment who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour has been suppressed, and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour. (Objection to behaviourism)

Question 5

Explain physicalism

Answer 5

A modern form of materialism, which claims that everything that exists is physical, or depends upon something physical.

Question 6

Explain physicalism, reductive

Answer 6

A form of physicalism that claims that mental properties are physical properties

Question 7

Explain supervenience

Answer 7

A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.

Question 8

Explain Inverted qualia

Answer 8

The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways; e.g. they both call the same object ‘red’. (Objection to functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness)

Question 9

Explain multiple realisability

Answer 9

The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour.

Question 10

Explain the Location problem

Answer 10

An objection to MBTI theory. If physical states and brain states are identical then they should share all of the same properties. Physical states have the property of existing spatially. Mental states don’t. It seems ridiculous to say that they do.

Question 11

Explain a philosophical zombie

Answer 11

An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness

Question 12

Explain Metaphysical possibility

Answer 12

Something is metaphysically possible if there is at least one possible world in which it is true

Question 13

Explain physical possibility

Answer 13

Something is physically possible if it could be true given the laws of nature in the actual world

Question 14

Explain the problem facing interactionist property dualism and David Chalmers response

Answer 14

Problem: How to explain how mental properties cause physical events and empirical objections to whether it occurs

Chalmers Response: For any fundamental causal relationship, we do not have an account of how it works. There is no special problem here. Furthermore, we have no empirical evidence that mental properties do not affect physical properties.

Question 15

Explain the objection to Epiphenomenalist dualism and the response.

Answer 15

Problem: The claim that phenomenal properties (or at least mental properties) have no causal role is met with the objection that this is counter-intuitive and doesn’t reflect our experience of our mental lives,

Response: Epiphenomenalism can respond that such properties appear to have a causal role because what causes them (a brain state) also causes what looks like their effects (bodily movements, other mental states)

Question 16

Explain the objection to epiphenomenalist property dualism from the evolutionary theory and Jackson’s response

Answer 16

Problem: Epiphenomenalism is incompatible with evolutionary theory, because evolution only selects properties that make a difference to the survival and reproductive success to the animal.

Response: Jackson responds that properties that are selected for can have by-products. And consciousness is a by-product of advantageous brain processes

Question 17

Explain the problem of introspection against Epiphenomenalism dualism and the reply

Answer 17

Problem: We can object that epiphenomenalism entails that we cannot gain knowledge of our mind.

Response: Our beliefs about our mental states are caused by the same brain processes that cause those mental states. As this is a reliable process, we can have knowledge of our mental states. Alternatively epiphenomenalist can argue that our experiences partially constitute our beliefs about them.

Question 18

Explain the problem of other minds against property dualism and the response

Answer 18

Problem: If phenomenal properties are logically independent of bodies, then no amount of evidence from someone’s bodily behaviour could prove that they are conscious.

Response: Property dualists would argue that other people experience phenomenal properties is the best hypothesis

Question 19

Explain Ryle’s argument of the category mistake

Answer 19

Problem: To think of consciousness in terms of phenomenal properties is to misunderstand how we talk and think about the mind

Question 20

What is the knowledge Mary Argument summarised?

Answer 20

• Mary knows all the physical facts about colour
• Mary does not know what it feels like to see colour
• Therefore, what it feels like to see colour is not a physical fact
• Physicalism says that all facts are physical facts
• Therefore, physicalism is false

Question 21

What is the ability knowledge response to ‘the knowledge’ argument?

Answer 21

• We can accept that Mary learns something new but we can reject Jackson’s claim that it is non-physical.
• Instead we might argue that she gains ability knowledge.

-Matt sees red for the first time all she does is gain new abilities. She gains the ability to imagine red, for example. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences.

Question 22

What is the argument that Mary gains new acquaintance knowledge?

Answer 22

• It’s new kind of physical knowledge; knowledge by acquaintance.
• Mary can know all the physical facts about red- What it is, when people see it, how they react to it, etc.- is without being acquainted to redness itself.

-Mary is not acquainted with redness because her own brain has never had this property itself. But when she sees red for the first time the property occurs in her brain and she becomes acquainted with redness. Mary gains new knowledge from being acquainted with redness in this way.

Question 23

What is the response based on new knowledge, old fact to frank Jackson’s argument?

Answer 23

• There is more than one way to know some fact.
• For example, ‘I know there is water in that glass’ expresses knowledge of the same underlying physical fact that ‘I know there is h20 in that glass does’.
• But it’s possible to know the former and not the latter. The same fact can be understood bia two different concepts.
• We can apply this to Mary.
• Brfore she left the black and white room Mary only knew redness in theoretical terms. But when she leaves and sees red she gains a new concept: the phenomenal concept. And it’s impossible to know what it’s like to see red without this concept.
• We can argue that this phenomenal concept just provides a different way of understanding the same underlying fact.
• So, Mary doesn’t learn any new, non-physical fact. She just learns a different way of understanding the same fact.

Question 24

Outline and explain David Chalmers philosophical zombies argument.

Answer 24

• Such zombies seem conceivable. We can imagine a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia. In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience.
• We can use this intuition to form an argument for property dualism similar to Descartes’ conceivability argument:
• Philosophical zombies are conceivable
• If philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible
• If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are non-physical
• If phenomenal properties are non-physical then property dualism is true
• Therefore, property dualism is true