Property Dualism Flashcards
The hard problem of consciousness
- The phenomenal concept of the mind, where minds or mental states are characterised by the subjective quality of experience
The zombie argument- formally
P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies.
P2. If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
C1. Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
P3. If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of
consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor
supervene on physical properties.
C3. Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.
Zombie argument responses
P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies.
P2. If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is
metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
C1. Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there
are zombies.
P3. If it is metaphysically possible that there are
zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C3. Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.
A philosophical zombie is not conceivable
P1- it is conceivable that there are zombies
P2- if it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
C1- therefore it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
P3- if it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
Zombies can’t describe qualia
Zombies they can’t be lying since they have no mental state to lie about, equally they can’t be telling the truth since they have no qualia.
- Therefore there are just words coming out of their mouth. How could these words describe qualia in a way that is indistinguishable from normal people if they haven’t that experience or in fact any experience.
Consciences is like health
- It is not conceivable for two people to be in exactly the same physical state but for one to be healthy and the one ther unhealthy.
- similarly it is not conceivable for two people to be the exact same physical state but for one to be conscious and the unconscious.
Zombies are meaningless
- by definition zombies behave exactly as real humans do, so it would be impossible to tell the difference
- if there are in no way to verify a position the. It should be considered meaningless- verficationism.
What is conceivable may be metaphysically possible
- this argument relies on a position called essentialism about natural kinds
- according to essentialism natural kinds are groupings of entities that share a common essence