property dualism

Question 1

property dualism

Answer 1

• according to property dualism, there is only one kind of substance, physical substance
• but, at least some mental properties are a new kind of property that is not fixed by physical properties
• there are natural laws that correlate mental properties with physical ones, but it is possible that these laws could be different

Question 2

Chalmers on consciousness

Answer 2

• consciousness is not the same thing as the mind, because there can be unconscious mental states
• consciousness is characterised by a subjective quality of experience, something it is like to be that subject
• cognitive science has a great deal to say on how conscious abilities work, but not about subjective quality of experience (qualia)

Question 3

two concepts of mind

Answer 3

• phenomenal concept: subjective quality of experience (first person)
• psychological concept: what the mind does, how we explain behaviour (third person)
• the phenomenal concept can’t be reduced to or explained in terms of the psychological concept
• mental states can often be described in both ways
• e.g. pain: phenomenal - how it feels; psychological - caused by damage, leads to aversion behaviour

Question 4

the easy and hard problems

Answer 4

two ‘mind-body problems’

• easy: how could a physical system have psychological properties? this is technical, but not ultimately mysterious, and no threat to physicalism
• hard: how could a physical system have phenomenal properties? a physical explanation can only explain physical structure (constitution) and function (how it works), but this doesn’t explain phenomenal consciousness

property dualism is supported by the hard problem

Question 5

metaphysical possibility and possible worlds

Answer 5

• metaphysical possibility: what is possible given the real nature or identity of things
• a possible world: a complete description of a metaphysically possible reality
• possible worlds can contain things that are physically impossible because they could have different laws of nature
• there is no possible world where water exists, but not H20 , that is because they are the same thing

Question 6

physicalism

Answer 6

• physicalism: everything that exists is either physical or depends on what is physical
• if physicalism is correct, then any world that is physically identical to our world will be identical in all respects
• if physicalism is correct, it is metaphysically impossible for there to be a world with the same physical properties as our world but different mental properties

Question 7

philosophical zombies

Answer 7

• they are exact physical duplicates of people, but with no phenomenal consciousness
• they are not physically possible, they could be metaphysically possible

Question 8

Chalmer’s zombie argument

Answer 8

1. it is conceivable that there are zombies (the idea of a zombie isn’t a logical contradiction)
2. if it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
3. therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
4. if it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties
5. therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties
6. therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true

Question 9

objection to the zombie argument: a zombie world is not conceivable

Answer 9

• attacks the premise
• we think that zombies are conceivable because when we think of the physical properties of a person that doesn’t determine also thinking of consciousness
• but physicalists object to this: we are not thinking clearly when we conceive of zombies
• the reason why we think that we can conceive of zombies is because we do not fully understand consciousness
• if we had a full physical understanding of consciousness, then we would not be able to clearly think of the physical properties without thinking of consciousness
• physicalists may claim that Chalmers is assuming that physicalism is false because if physicalism is true, then zombies are not conceivable

Question 10

response to: a zombie world is not conceivable

Answer 10

• we do not have a full physical account of consciousness so we cannot assume that one is possible
• some claim it is reasonable to suppose that we can have a full physical explanation without being able to explain consciousness
• if that is correct, then we can conceive of physical duplicates where one is conscious and the other is not

Question 11

objection to the zombie argument: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 11

• is conceivability a good guide to metaphysical possibility
• e.g. H20 is water: this is not an analytic truth, it is conceivable that water is not H20
• from this we could conclude that it is metaphysically possible that water is not H20, but that is not right
• when we conceive of water not being H20 what that shows is possible is that a different chemical structure could play the same role as water (e.g. falling from the sky and flowing through rivers), but that chemical is not water
• likewise, it may be that when we conceive of zombies what the shows is possible is that other physical structures could play the same role as the actual one, but not that our physical make up could exist with consciousness

Question 12

response to: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 12

• there is a disanalogy between water and phenomenal properties
• the concept water is a concept of something with a particular structure and causal role; likewise H20: hence they could be (and are identical, H20 is the essences of water
• this is not the case with phenomenal properties and physical properties
• concepts of neurological properties: these are concepts of structure and function, its essence is given by its physical structure and casual powers
• the concept of pain: this is a concept of how some feels, not what it does; its essence is the way it feels
• therefore, the concept of pain cannot be identical with a neurological concept
• this means that any correlation between physical properties and consciousness is contingent
• so, zombies are metaphysically possible

Question 13

objection to the zombie argument: what is metaphysically possible tells nothing about the actual world

Answer 13

• even if it is possible that philosophical zombies could exist, maybe it is not true that there could be one in the actual world
• this is saying that physicalism is true in the actual, but property dualism is true in some possible worlds

Question 14

response: what is metaphysically possible tells nothing about the actual world

Answer 14

• this objection is not popular, and most philosophers view it as a mistake
• Saul Kripke has argued that all identity claims are necessary
• physicalism is the view that mental properties are physical properties (or supervene on physical properties)
• this means that physicalism is either necessarily true or necessarily false
• so, what is possible does tell us something about what is actual

Question 15

objection to the zombie argument: the Churchlands on thought experiments

Answer 15

• thought experiments about what is conceivable or ‘metaphysically possible’ are unhelpful
• we are imagining that a being with a brain just like ours could have no consciousness - but this reflects our own epistemic limitations
• ‘deadbies’: 200 years ago, someone says ‘I just can’t imagine how living things could really be composed of dead molecules - how can life arise out of the interactions of things that are not alive?’ - this tells us nothing about the nature of life
• conceivability isn’t a good guide to actuality (let alone possibility) - our concepts change as we discover more about the world
• what things are is what they are in the actual world, not what ‘metaphysic essence’ they have - science tells us what things are, and we can’t predict or second guess this
• metaphysics a=must give way to experimental science

Question 16

property dualism and Frank Jackson

Answer 16

• property dualism: there is only physical substance, but there are both physical and mental properties
• Frank Jackson argued that even if we had perfect knowledge of all the physical facts, there would still be things that we did not know
• so, there must be other facts about the world
• these other facts are knowledge of qualia - the qualities of things; what something is like

Question 17

epiphenomenalism

Answer 17

• epiphenomenalism: mental events are caused by physical events, but mental events do not have any causal powers; mental events are a by product of the physical world
• Frank Jackson was an epiphenomenalist (he has now rejected property dualism and defends physicalism)
• he defended property dualism using the knowledge argument (sometimes known as the Mary argument)

Question 18

the knowledge argument overview

Answer 18

• argument for property dualism
• Mary lives in a completely black and white environment
• she has a full understanding of physical facts about the world, including scientific knowledge about how light works and how our brains process information
• when she leaves her room and sees a red object for the first time, does she gain new knowledge?
• if so, then there must be facts about the world that are not physical facts

Question 19

the knowledge argument in full

Answer 19

1. Mary knows everything about physical processes involved in colour vision
2. but she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself
3. therefore, there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a complete physical account of it
4. so, physicalism is fake (because it claims that only the physical exists)

Question 20

objection to the knowledge argument: ability knowledge response

Answer 20

• objects to the premise
• Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge
• this objection claims that the argument involves equivocation (relying on two meanings of a single term)
• the knowledge argument will only disprove physicalism if Mary gains propositional knowledge from her experiences
• perhaps Mary gains ability knowledge from her experience, not propositional knowledge: knowledge how to recognise red things, knowledge how to imagine red things, etc

Question 21

response to: ability knowledge response

Answer 21

• Jackson responds to this objection by saying that Mary does gain ability knowledge, but she also gains propositional knowledge
• he says she gains knowledge of what others’ experiences are like
• she knows what it is like for other people to see red

Question 22

objection to the knowledge argument: acquaintance knowledge response

Answer 22

• objects to the premise
• Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge, but does gain acquaintance knowledge
• this is similar to the ability knowledge response, but instead claims that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge
• e.g. imagine someone (Razina) who is obsessed with a celebrity (Taylor Swift) and knows everything about them, if they meet the celebrity (Taylor Swift) in person, they may say that they know them in a new way, but this needn’t include any propositional knowledge

Question 23

response to: acquaintance knowledge response

Answer 23

• a response is to argue that all acquaintance knowledge involves propositional knowledge
• e.g. being acquainted with red involves knowing that seeing red is like this

Question 24

objection to the knowledge argument: new knowledge/old fact response

Answer 24

• Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way
• some physicalists accept that there is a sense in which Mary does gain new knowledge, but deny that this shows there are any new facts
• e.g. suppose someone knows that there is water in the glass, if they learn that water is H20 then they now also know that there is H20 in the glass; this is new knowledge, but not a new fact because water is H20
• according to this view, Mary gains a new way of thinking about the physical facts she already has knowledge of but not any new knowledge
• (knowledge of physical facts already known, just in a different way)

Question 25

response to: new knowledge/old fact response

Answer 25

• a response is to argue that if you gain new knowledge, you must become aware of new facts
• e.g. if you learn that water is H20, then you also learn the fact that the liquid in your glass has a certain chemical structure
• likewise, Mary gain knowledge of the fact that red looks like that
• (gaining new propositional knowledge (which the objection accepts) = learning new facts)

Question 26

dualism’s category mistake

Answer 26

• Ryle argues that to think mental states are distinct from their associated behaviours (as dualism claims) is to make a category mistake – it confuses one type of concept with another
• Ryle gives the following example to illustrate why dualism makes a similar such category mistake: suppose someone were to visit Oxford to see the university, the visitor is shown the library, the lecture theatres, the teachers, etc; after the tour is complete, he says ‘but where is the university?’
• the visitor has made a category mistake in thinking that the university is something other than the things he’s been shown already
• the visitor thinks the university is in the category of objects you can isolate and point to, but instead it’s more of an abstraction
• Ryle argues that dualists make the same sort of category mistake when talking about mental states
• suppose an alien were to ask what the mental state of pain is. You show the alien people stubbing their toes, being tortured, wincing, saying ‘ouch!’, and so on, after showing the alien these examples of pain it asks: ‘but what is pain?’
• in just the same way Oxford University is nothing more than the buildings, teachers, and so on, Ryle is arguing that the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions associated with pain
• there is nothing you can show the alien over and above these behavioural dispositions