Promisory Estoppel Flashcards

1
Q

What is Estoppel?

A

Mechanism for enforcing consistency - enforcing obligation to statements made for inducing another to believe/act upon it, even though there is no contractual obligation. Would be unjust or inequitable to do so!

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2
Q

Two leading cases of estoppel

A

Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) 2 App Cas 439

Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] 1 KB 130

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3
Q

Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Company (1877)

A

House of Lords held that MRC was entitled to be relieved against forfeiture of the lease, as H’s notice to repair property within six months was temporarily suspended for the duration of negotiations between parties.

Ruled based upon voluntary consent of each party to negotiate, and what was equitably inferred on part of MRC to suppose that the timeframe was suspended

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4
Q

Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947]

A

Denning held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover full rent from the period after the war had ended, and the property was fully let.

  1. Denning did not call this an estoppel case, and in fact differentiated it from the estoppel case Jorden v Money (1854), which held that estoppel must relate to statements of fact, and not statement of intention/promise.
  2. Denning drew on Hughes v Metropolitan Railway, classifying it as ‘promises intends to be legally binding’, and that in Jorden, the promisor did not intend to be legally bound
  3. Also came to be in direct conflict w FvB, where his holding recognises “a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum… notwithstanding the absence of consideration”. Denning said he supposed that FvB did not consider HvMRC.
    3a. This can be differentiated because FvB was concerned with legal rights that are permanently extinguished, Hughes concerned with temporary suspensions
    3b. Hughes is a situation where one party tells the other not to perform a contractual obligation owed, and so he cannot treat non-performance as a breach, having consented it.
    3c. Foakes is a situation where the party is able to change his mind regarding consenting to nonperformance and require performance of the obligation insofar as it is still possible.
  4. CLP had temporarily suspended rights for the full rent during the war-time period.
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5
Q

Ingredients of Promissory Estoppel

A

The promise that gives rise to the estoppel must be a
(i) Clear and Unequivocal Promise, being one intending to affect legal relations between parties, demonstrating the promisor is giving up strict legal rights against the promisee;

an equity will be raised in favour of the other party, subject to qualifications that

(ii) the promisee has altered his position;
(iii) it is inequitable for the promisor to go back on his promise
(iv) that estoppel is generally suspensory, and promisor can resile from his promise with reasonable notice for the promisee to resume his position
(v) the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume position
(vi) estoppel cannot be a sword, only a shield

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6
Q

Clear and Unequivocal promise and case

A

The promise giving rise to the estoppel, for the promisee to rely on, must be clear and unequivocal, with the intention to affect legal relations and clearly demonstrating that the promisor is giving some legal rights agains the promisee;
Established in Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741, 757, where the statement forming the basis of promissory estoppel can not be ambiguous - this is to protect promisors, where they will only lose their legal rights upon clearly having given them up

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7
Q

Promisee altered position (to his detriment) because of the promise

A

Promisee altered his position in reliance on the promise made (to his detriment).
E.g. Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co - tenants “lost time” for negotiations
High Trees - no obvious detriment but altered position such that it is inequitable to allow promisor to go back on his promise

Rule set out in The Post Chaser [1982] 1 All ER 19 “the representee must have conducted his affairs in such a way that it would be inequitable for the representor to enforce his rights, or to do so without reasonable notice”
- In this case, the defendant (promisee) could resume original position and there was no inequity in resiling from the promise, so the court allowed the promisor/plaintiff to enforce its original right.

Also in Collier v P&MJ Wright. Arden LJ found elements of reliance to support promissory estoppel, but diluted the requirements by finding that C partly paid debt in reliance, therefore inequitable for W to resile promise, but it wasn’t fully tried in court, and Longmore LJ said the courts should be slow to find a promise forgoing its rights; D&C Builders v Ree was a weak precedent that Arden LJ used.

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8
Q

Inequitable to go back on promise

A

Usually satisfied by the promisee’s change in position, but not always. Will consider the time element, circumstances and events during and subsequent to the promise being made.

  1. The Post Chaser - held that it was not inequitable for the plaintiff to go back on his promise since the defendant had not altered position, time frame was only 2 days.
  2. D&C Builders v Rees - No inequity in resiling because R had threatened D to extract a promise to accept less
  3. Williams v Stern (1879) - Creditor resiled promise to debtor to give him extra time to pay, but chose to exercise his right to seize his assets after hearing that the debtor’s landlord was going to do so. Courts held that it was not inequitable!
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9
Q

Suspensory, unless promisee cannot resume original position

A

Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761. Courts held that TMM were entitled to reinstate licensing fees as long as reasonable notice was given. These licensing fees were suspended during the war, and was intended for a new contract to be drafted when the war ended.

Ajayi v RT Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd (1964)
Lord Hodson said that estoppel has suspensory nature, but can be final and irrevocable, and therefore extinctive if original position cannot be resumed.

THEREFORE, when a promisor SUSPENDS his rights, he may in fact effect:

(i) a total extinction of original right - Hughes v MRC - MRC gives up right to timely repairs. Or in instances where the promisee cannot resume position
(ii) partial extinction of original right - High Trees - where lessors could revert to full rent, but lost the right to the full rent during the period of the war
(iii) nothing for the promise - The Post Chaser. Promise was resiled, and nothing was lost, promisee can resume normal position

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10
Q

Promissory Estoppel is a shield but not a sword. What does this mean?

A

Cannot create a cause of action, and often operates as a defence to a claim, such as in Hughes v MRC where Hughes used promissory estoppel to defend against MRC claims for eviction.

Also only applies where there is a pre-existing contractual or legal relationship between parties, and operates defensively to prevent the promisor from enforcing original rights he has relinquished. Cannot operate offensively to give the promisee more than his original rights, or a new cause of action w/o preexisting legal relationship

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11
Q

In order words, what can promissory estoppel enforce/cannot enforce? 3 categories

A
  1. Can enforce promises of “same for less”
  2. Cannot enforce promises of “more for the same”
  3. Cannot create new legal rights independent of the existing relationship.

Rationale being to avoid undermining consideration as the primary test of contractual liability.

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12
Q

Enforcing promises of “same for less”

A

Generally, when there are promises to accept less, they are enforceable by consideration with LEGAL benefit, not practical benefit.
E.g. FvB - B’s promise to accept part payment was not enforced. This would have changed if fresh consideration was provided by Foakes.

However, a promise to accept less may be enforceable via promissory estoppel AS A DEFENCE against promisor’s action to enforce original rights i.e. Hughes v MRC and High Trees.

TO DISTINGUISH HOW PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND CONSIDERATION(LEGAL BENEFIT):

  1. Consideration for the promise PERMANENTLY EXTINGUISHES promisor’s original rights
  2. Promissory estoppel extinguishes the original rights TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY to protect promisee’s reliance and when it would be inequitable for the promisor to resile his promise.

Also supported by Arden LJ in Collier v Wright

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13
Q

Promises to give more

A

Generally speaking, promises to give more cannot be enforced with promissory estoppel. However, they may be enforced by consideration of both practical/legal benefit.

Williams v Roffey Bros.

However, the judge in Williams welcomed an estoppel argument to suggest that it would be unjust for defendants to resile their promise; since the doctrine of practical benefit already covers that, there has been no need to develop promissory estoppel accordingly.

So there is no good argument for why promissory estoppel cannot enforce promises to give more, and there is no good justification to distinguish promises to give more, and promises to accept less. In fact, promissory estoppel is a more flexible doctrine that could enforce these promises (as opposed to practical benefit), allowing for contract modification, by looking at the reasonableness of modification and promisee-reliance.

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14
Q

Under what of scenario can Estoppel seem like it’s being used as a sword?

A

Party can use estoppel when they want to enforce a claim based upon a recognized cause of action to defeat the defence of the other party (e.g. D promised P sth that P relied on, D did something against P, resiling on promise. P sues D for cause of action, using estoppel to back it up to defeat any defence of D)

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15
Q

How is waiver or forbearance being subsumed into estoppel

A

Waiver is giving up some or all contractual rights. Without consideration, it is often referred to as forbearance. Since High Trees, it has been associated with estoppel insofar as they are promises of sorts not to insist on strict legal rights.

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16
Q

Estoppel by representation

A

Confined to statements of facts and not promises. If a party makes of representation of existing fact, inducing another to act to his detriment in reliance upon the representation, he is permanently prevented from asserting facts contrary to what he had represented

17
Q

Estoppel by convention - Amalgamated Investment and Property Co v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd (1982)

A

T’s subsidiary made loans to A’s subsidiary. The contract was on the assumption that A was guaranteeing the loan, but the guarantee was worded such that it only covered loans made by T itself, and not a subsidiary. A sought a declaration against T, but was estopped from denying that the guarantee was for the loan by T’s subsidiary.

Lord Denning (and arguably Brandon LJ) held that T could have sued on the guarantee to recover the sum (ie creating a cause of action). Anyway, since the guarantee did not literally cover the relevant loan, in substance, T’s right to the sum (whether claiming or keeping it) was founded on estoppel. Brandon LJ stated (at 131–2) that while no one can ‘found a cause of action on an estoppel, he may, as a result of being able to rely on an estoppel, succeed on a cause of action on which, without being able to rely on that estoppel, he would necessarily have failed’

18
Q

Proprietary estoppel

A

Landowner stands by, acquiesces, while another person improves the land, mistakenly believing he owns the land, OR if the promisee relies to his detriment upon landowner’s promise that he has/will be given interest in the land.
Crab v Arun DC (1976)
Cause of action can be adopted

19
Q

What are the main differences between the estoppels?

A
  1. Promissory - Clear and unequivocal promise required, for proprietary estoppel the understanding between parties are much more imprecise
  2. Estoppel by representation - only statement of facts, no representations/promises as to the future, but promissory applies to promises or statements relating to the future
  3. Estoppel by representation is permanent in effect, promissory is suspensory.
  4. Some estoppels require detrimental reliance, but in others, such as promissory, detrimental reliance is not required
  5. Proprietary estoppel can create cause of action, promissory cannot
20
Q

Should common law seek to unify the various estoppel? 4 objections.

A

While there have been attempts to provide overarching definitions of estoppels (Denning in Amalgamated Investment p122), it is mostly objected.

First, to unify the estoppels, some rules have to prevail over the others, and there is no agreement which should prevail and why.
Second, differences between the estoppels are established as a matter of authority, and cannot be easily set aside. E.g. promissory estoppel cannot create a cause of action. However, even if promissory estoppel prevails over the others, do you necessarily want to expand the rule that promissory estoppel cannot be a cause of action?
Thirdly, general principles will be highly abstracted and give rise to uncertainty.
Fourthly, there is good reason for the separation, because the differences help for different applications - yet we should also consider why there are some differences between estoppels that ought to exist.

21
Q

Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179, CA - facts

A

C and A came to an “agreement in principle”, granting C access to the road at point B, but never came to a formal agreement. C acted in belief that he would be formally granted a right, and sold a portion of his land to a 3rd party with his prior access at point A, believing to now have access to point B. However, A closed access at point B entirely, causing C to be landlocked.

Court held that C was entitled to a right of access at point B and was not liable to make any payment to A in return for the rights of access

22
Q

Why is Crabb notable? 3 points, the last being Atiyah v Millet.

A
  1. Denning said that there is a cause of action for proprietary estoppel, but Scarman LJ said it is not helpful to make the distinction. Crabb was also referred to as an instance of promissory estoppel in Walton Stores v Maher.
  2. The remedy awarded protected C’s expectation interest without having the need to pay for it, because the period of land lock wrongfully infringed C’s estoppel was sufficient compensation.
  3. Atiyah argued whether the Court could’ve used orthodox contractual reasoning rather than estoppel; Lord Millet (who was then C’s counsel) argued that there were good reasons to support that no enforceable contract had been concluded. Atiyah thinks the law should’ve just been clearer regarding when there is obligation when there is some sort of detrimental reliance, without having need to classify as consideration or estoppel.
23
Q

Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1987) 164 CLR 387, HC Australia

A

W had negotiated with M to lease M’s property, requiring that M demolish existing buildings and build one to W’s specifications. M begun demolishing works, and informed W that it was essential to conclude an agreement for the works to progress, to which W’s solicitors said there should not be problems. M sent W the lease which had been executed by M, and continued demolishing and building. W had second thoughts, and informed M that they did not intend to proceed.

Court held that although no formal contract had been concluded, W was estopped from denying they were bound by an agreement, and W were liable in damages to M.

24
Q

Waltons Stores v Maher - Notable, why?

A
  1. Australia allowed estoppel to confer a cause of action
  2. Judges said that not every act of reliance upon a gratuitous promise brings estoppel into play, but needs “something more” - although not specific. ALTHOUGH, this ‘something more’ must render it ‘unconscionable’ for the promisor to go back on his promise (Inequitable).
  3. Unsure how English Courts would adopt this; There is Baird Textile v Marks and Spencer, where the dicta suggests adopting a broader scope of when estoppel could be a cause of action, but there is lack of clarity….
  4. Issue of remedy. Should remedies from estoppel compensate for detrimental reliance, or for fulfilling the expectations of a contract?
  5. What is the justification for separating proprietary and promissory estoppel? No good justification.