Proliferation & The Nuclear Taboo Flashcards
Use and Effectivity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1970)
- Success - Effectively proliferates, evidenced by only 9/180 NWS’s. States such as SA and Brazil have relinquished their programmes
Harald Muller - NPT is an overall success and proliferates effectively, but must be managed properly
- Failures/Limits - Number of NWS’s is on the rise (Iran/NK) and NPT does not stop non-state actors
Scott Kemp - “supply side” constrains not enough to enforce NPT, black market and A.Q Khan network exemplify this
Role of the Nuclear Taboo - Nina Tannenwald
Nina Tannenwald popularised the idea of the Nuclear Taboo, has 3 parts which she states make it more effective than the NPT.
- The norm of non-use is embedded deeply in socieities, regardless of the NPT
- Actors generally agree on non-use given the catastrophic effects of NW’s, and that they are viewed as abhorrent
- Strengthened by crisis such as the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, the hotline set up between US/USSR demonstrates the will and existence of the taboo
Proliferation Optimists (Waltz) vs. Pessimists (Sagan)
Kenneth Waltz - Proliferation Optimists 5 Factors:
- ‘More may be better’ thesis
- Gradual spread of NW’s = more/greater deterrence
- Nuclear terror threat is overstated
- NW’s prevent wider conflict, such as CW turning ‘hot’
- Actors are generally inclined to act rationally due to costs
Scott Sagan - Proliferation Pessmists 5 Factors:
- ‘More = greater isntabiltiy’ thesis
- More = higher risk of accidents and security dilemma
- Nuclear terror is the greatest threat to nuclear order
- Cannot assumed RAM for all actors (Ikle - Hitler)
- Nuclear war has been avoided through luck, not good judgement
The Issue of Nuclear Latency in NW Control
Nuclear Latency regards how easily an actor can build ca NW’s (do not mistake for breakout, which is NE to NW)
Andrew Futter Highlights a number of challenges this poses, and their limitations
Challenges of Latency to NPT/Non-Proliferation:
- A number of states already on the threshold, ex. Iran and Japan
- The apparent ‘ease’ of making a bomb and the lack of supply-side constrains, ex. A.Q Khan network and Taliban
- States will always strive for utmost security, which NW’s seem to provide
- Spread of nuclear technology and development is increasingly hard to track
Limits of Nuclear Latency:
- Difficult to develop a weapon in secrecy
- Tests come into legal conflict with the NPT
- Diplomatically very costly to develop NW’s, ex. Irann
- Requires large political will and resource intensive, must be a large-scale project that the state wants to undertake