Poverty and Inequality P2: Targeting and Policies Flashcards

1
Q

Anti-Poverty Policy:

Objectives:

A

Objective: (1) maximize coverage and (2) minimize leakage

What is it?

Designed policy specifically aimed at reducing poverty among beneficiaries

Trade-Offs Consider:

  1. Equity vs. Efficiency
  2. Administrative costs versus Asymmetric information
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Anti-Poverty Policy:

Issues: (Name)

A
  1. Assymetic Information Problem
  2. Costs
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Anti-Poverty Policy Issues

Issues with Assymetric Information:

A

I. Adverse selection (attract non-poor)

II. Moral hazard (transfer may alter behavior → incentive to not work possibly

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Anti-Poverty Policy Issues

Problem and Types of Cost:

A

I. Administrative Costs:
- - Universal income may be easist (from this pov)
- Costs for government and the poor (forms, travel, stigma)

Options: (a) Hire data people for surveys and have a good tax system (expensive) or (b) have people self-declare → Assymetric informaton issue

II. Incentive Costs

  • Can incentivize overestimating poverty line: say more poor to get money
  • Not want incentives where non-poor act poor for money (efficiency concerns)

III. Political Economy Costs

  • Tax payers would have to pay policy
  • Citizens want to minimize own tax

Equity vs. Efficiency issues
Minimize: locate benefit offices closest to those who need them

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Anti-Poverty Policy:

Mechanisms: (3)

A
  1. Indicators:Based on characterisitics (income, age, gender, disabilitied, thatched roof)
    • means testing
    • But strong incentive effects
  2. Self-Targeting:Self-Identifying (workfare, placement of benefits office, food subsidies)
  3. Participatory wealth ranking:(Community-based)Rank selves, who deserved transfer
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Targeting

Types of Targeting:

A
  1. Perfect Targeting
  2. Universal Program
  3. Mixed Program
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Types of Targeting

Perfect Targeting:

A

Identify every y below z and put on z (the poverty gap)

Financing: Non-poor see reduction post-transfer income

Then, if a lot of poor and few taxpayers → hard to do

Note: (costly)

  1. Administratively costly
  2. Incentive effects (in they stop working → total transfer goes up)
  3. Need good tax system
  4. Political costs
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Types of Targeting

Universal Program

A

Give everybody the poverty line redarless of z

This will eliminate poverty (not inequality)

Notes:

  1. Fewer disincentives effects (none)
  2. Admin costs low
  3. No need good tax system
  4. (Bad) Total costs very high
  5. (Bad) How to finance this??
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Types of Targeting

Mixed Program

A

- Reduce indincentive effects
- Help those close (not below poverty line)

| Q those below the poverty line → give z - Z(y) - function of income

## Footnote

Notes:

1. Admin costs lower (relative)
2. Possible incentives low
3. Need good tax system
4. Total costs: between perfect and universal

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Types of Targeting

Where to get the money?

A

Where to get the money? (Biggest issue)

  • Loans (internationally) → not sustainable
  • Foreign aid

🧙🏼 Huge natural resource deposits → revenue expropriate to funding (note: corruption issue)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Cash Transfers

Why cash transfers?

And debates:

A

Why cash transfers? Income support most needy

Debates:

  1. Universal vs Targeted
  2. Conditional vs. Unconditional
  3. Administrative vs Incentive costs
    - Large debate in econ < larger debate in politics

🧙 Evidence (especially from Global South) of positive effects of CTs on well-being

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Cash transfers

Mechanisms:

A

CTs efficient if help solve market failure

Two forms:

  • Externalities → underinvest in children’s health and schooling
  • Intra-household decision-making → decisions nnot reflect women’s and children’s interests

Then, cash transfers:

  • Externalities → Make conditonal on education and health
  • Intra-Household decisions → Empower women by targeting them with transfer
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Conditional Cash Transfers (Study)

PROGRESA:

A
  • “Protype” → PROGRESAMexico(subsequently: OPORTUNIDADES)Conditions: (1) children attend school and (2) regular health checksTypically givenn motherExpectations:
    1. Improve schooling
    2. Improve health
    3. Increase women’s empowerment

Based on Sustainable Development Goals:
- Give money to mother: Development Goal #5

  • Conditional attending school and health checks: Development Goals #4 and #2
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Conditonal Cash Transfers

Pros and Cons

A

Pros:

  • Deals disincentive effects
  • Direct linked outcomes donors care about

Cons:

  • Seen parternalistic
  • More administratively costly (collection info and infrustructure costs)
  • Sub-optimal for households compared to unconditional
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Conditional Cash Transfers

Evidence

A
  1. Improves schooling and health
  2. Delayed fertility for adolesent girls
  3. (New) Reduce adult and child mortality (especially for children and women)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Conditional Cash transfers

Non-Targeted Consequences

A
  • Effects women’s empowerment?
  • Effects marital outcomes?Increase discourse violence, disillusionment or money leave toxic relationship?
  • Effects fertility parents?
  • Effects maternal oucome?Decrease num childrenWhy? (1) empowerment and (2) increased access to health services relating to fertility choices
  • General Equilibrium effects?Some evidence for inflation
17
Q

Universal Cash transfers

What are they?

Problems need to solve?

A
  1. Large enough cover basic living expenses alone
  2. Slow/no-phase out
  3. Untargeted, available large population

Problems need to solve:

  1. Robotization (increased inequality and labour income stagnation)
  2. Welfare traps in existing programs
  3. Existing programs not reach all needy groups (characterization hard)

Note: Not even (almost) viable for developing countries because of the lack of physical capacity

“Basic Income” ⇒ Meet basic needs and could be poverty line

“Universal” ⇒ Everyone gets it (no targeting) and unconditional (0-1 participation in labor force)

18
Q

Universal Cash Transfers

Biggest issues need to solve?

And debate

A

Biggest Issue: FINANCING

Debate:

  • Theory vs evidence
  • Rigerous evidence lacking
  • General equilibrium effects?
19
Q

Unconditional Cash Transfers

What are they?

A
  • CCTs critized parternalistic
  • Families know best
  • Administratively less costly
20
Q

Unconditional Cash Transfers (Study)

Haushoferand and Shapiro (2016)

A
  • NGO pairing: give directly
  • Randomized control trail in western Kenya (2011-2013)
    1. T1: Randomize wife/husband
    2. T2: Lum sum/ 9 monthly payments
    3. T3: Size payment

Targetting based on living under thatched roof

Results:

  • Invest more (home improvements, change roof)
  • Consume more (food and education)
  • Less hungry
  • No effect alcohol and tobacco consumption
  • Increased psychological wellbeing
  • Reduced poverty
21
Q

Unconditional Cash Transfers (study)

Malawi

A
  • Malawi

Q: What effect of cash and conditional on outcome (school)?

Q: What effect delaying marriage and child rearing?

Expect: (1) increased labor market participation, (2) better health, (3) better material outcomes, (4) more empowerment household, (5) greater economic growth

---

  • Unconditional only small dropout rate decrease → conditional better
    • Conditional: better scores
    However, marriage and pregency less in unconditional (less incentive for financial reasons)