POR Practice Questions Flashcards
Which design argument is stronger — teleological or cosmological?
Teleological: the purpose and order of this world could not have come by chance (focus on the end results)
William Paley used the watchmaker analogy to conclude that observation can logically conclude that the world was created due to its complexity — Swinburne argues due to evident order and purpose. Aquinas, in the Fifth Way, claimed that nature appears ordered and with purpose — a river flows just as an arrow flies: with guidance and cause
As a sceptic, Hume deplored these arguments. Characteristics of design are far more evident in a watch and order could be a mere coincidence; without ‘order’ the world would be chaos. He criticised Aquinas in that we can infer the cause (God) through the effect (the world) as the world is imperfect, thus not aligning with traditional Christian omnibenevolent/omnipotent God
Cosmological: the universe itself accounts for its own existence (focus on the start)
Aquinas’ Five Ways establish God as the unmoved mover (Aristotle), the uncaused causer, and the necessary being. As everything in the world is contingent (dependent), nothing could exist without a cause — infinite regress is impossible. Gottfried Leibniz questioned why there is something instead of nothing, arguing that there must be a reason
Hume criticised the leap in the cosmological argument. One cannot logically go from everything in the world has a reason to the world itself has a purpose. Russell agreed; everyone has a mother, but the human race itself does not by requirement have a mother
A posteriori arguments are based on observation and thus criticised not for logical fallacies but for improbabilities — science condemns both arguments. F R Tennant’s ‘anthropoid principle’ refers to the way the universe has been structured so life was inevitable, thus proving God’s fine-tuning, but Darwin’s evolution undermines this
Does the ontological argument justify belief in God?
Anselm’s ontological arguments justifies belief as it is analytic and a priori:
Analytic propositions are true by definition and Anselm argued that ‘God exists’ is analytic a priori as the concept of God includes the concept of existence and vice versa; Psalm 53:1 : ’The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God’’. In his first form he argued that God is ‘that which nothing greater can be thought’ and a real, necessary God would be surpass an imaginary one. In his second form he argued that it was impossible for God not to exist as he has a necessary existence, which can be known through logic rather than observation, and only contingent beings fail to exist
The nature of Anselm’s argument as analytic and a priori warrants criticism:
Guanilo compared God with a ‘most grand’ island to argue that we cannot claim existence of something because it is a superlative. Anselm, impressed by this, argued that an island, contingent, and God, necessary, are not comparable as God is wholly unique (yet this the nature of analogy). Aquinas maintained that God’s existence was not analytic as atheists have no belief in God; ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is deplorable as Aquinas viewed God as unknowable to the human mind, whilst Anselm seems to argue we all understand God
Descartes’ ontological argument claims that as traditional Christian God is perfect, God must exist:
He disagreed with Aquinas in that we cannot know God, as human have inherent shared concepts such as that of equality, cause and God’s existence
Kant’s criticised this, as ‘existence is not a predicate’ (characteristic); adding ‘exists’ does not reform our understanding of God. This depicts a category error. Russell criticised predicates as insufficient in demonstrating existence
Yet Norman Malcolm maintained that necessary existence is distinct from contingent existence, thus could be used as a predicate as it transcends what Kant identifies as ‘exists’
How satisfactory are religious experiences as proof for the existence of God?
What makes an experience distinctly religious?
Schleiermacher claimed that the essence of religion was based on personal experience — everyone is intuitively aware of divinity (Jesus was the one with completely in obscured ‘God-consciousness’). William James identified 4 main features of RE: ineffability, noetic, transient, passivity — he said that they did not prove anything but it is reasonable to infer a God interested in our world and worth of RE determined by changes in subject (pragmatist). Rudolf Otto believed true REs were ‘numinous’ and inexpressible and so religious language is a ‘scema’ (attempt to find words to express the inexpressible)
Therefore, REs have meaning but our inability to truly comprehend or express divinity means existence of God cannot be proven. Critics of Schleiermacher argue he reduces religion to emotion, thus even hallucinations are valid to an extent — must be a possibility of testing experience against Bible and Church
There are naturalistic explanations for RE:
Ludwig Feuerbach saw REs as originating in the mind rather than God — people idealise a God to meet their needs (Freud’s ‘wish-fulfilment’). Winnicott thought RE was better understood as illusion and declaring them ‘real’ leads to madness
By contrast, others view them as union with the divine. Swinburne believed REs were evidence of a God according to the principle of credulity and testimony. Accordingly, we should trust our own experiences and those of others
Mystical and conversion experiences are not evidence of a God despite appearing supernatural and life-changing:
F C Happold saw mysticism as underlying religion and faith — the mystic understands the material world is just an aspect of divine reality — the ‘Divine Ground’ and humanity’s purpose is to unite with this. Conversion experiences could still be attributed to psychological factors emphasised by James and Freud
Assess the view that monotheism cannot be successfully defended by the problem of evil
The inconsistent triad can be explained by our finite understanding:
As an a priori argument, it is logical to argue that a perfectly good God cannot also be all-powerful and exist with suffering in the world. However, Aquinas emphasised the finite understanding of humans and how language we use of God is analogical. Further, Hick’s suggests that God chose to allow human free-will so that we can be free to worship him and it is not coerced. Yet JSM claimed that evidence points to a sadistic, malevolent creator, contrasting Paley, who argued we only need look at the world to know there is a caring God
Additionally, Swinburne disagreed with the premise that omnipotence includes the logically impossible — he instead argued that it means God can only do the possible
Theodicies of Augustine and Irenaeus defend monotheism:
Augustine, as a Christian, believed it impossible for any of God’s creations to be less than perfect — evil is not a quality but a privatio boni (absence of good). Irenaeus argued that the imago dei of humans included free-will due to God’s benevolence, also that there is evil for us to grow and appreciate good. Hick furthered this with ‘vale of soul-making’
Yet does this adequately support monotheism? Privatio boni evident within the Fall, for example, would be a miscalculation by God, challenging his omniscience. Moreover, how can one grow from terminal cancer, for example? Evil seems to be more than just a tool to put us on the right path
Which understanding of the relationship between God and time is the most useful — that of Boethius, Anselm or Swinburne?
Boethius concludes that God is timeless and thus doesn’t have a past, present and future:
‘His knowledge, too, transcends all temporal change and abides in the immediacy of his presence’ — God does not now what we will do in the future as there is no future for God, thus we d have genuinely free-will and can be punished/rewarded for our actions. However, does a timeless, immutable God undermine traditional teaching of a caring, benevolent God?
Anselm’s ‘four-dimensionalist’ approach:
Contrasting human presentism, God is timeless and limits of the imagination are not evidence against the eternity of God. Difference between Boethius and Anselm is subtle: whilst Boethius spoke of God viewing our actions ‘as though’ from a lofty peak, Anselm rejects the ‘as though’, taking this mage literally. Accordingly, we have free will as God watches us from above, free from the constraints of space and time.
But in this interpretation does God have true free will? If there is no future for God then there is no ‘after’ for which he can make choices, thus his choices are predetermined (Aquinas’ analogy)
Swinburne viewed God as everlasting, acting within time:
A timeless God, in his view, is incapable of benevolence as a caring being must respond and change, which is impossible for a God who has no future. A God independent of space and time contradicts the Bible, which has evidence of God interacting with prophets and other individuals. Swinburne rejects Platonic notion that the unchanging is more perfect than the changing
However, if God exists within time and is omniscience then surely our actions are predetermined if God is omniscience and has a future — he must know it and thus we cannot act freely as God’s knowledge in infallible
How do the apopahtic way and the cataphatic ways compare as approaches to religious language?
The apophatic way pays homage to God’s transcendence, but so does the cataphatic way:
Pseudo-Dionysius argued that the via negativa is the only way to speak of God as he is beyond all human understanding (‘a cloud of unknowing’). Moses Maimonides used analogy of a ship to argue that via negativa allows us to better understand God without limiting him in our thoughts
By contrast, the cataphatic way can be condemned as anthropomorphising God by limiting him to our positive descriptions. However, Aquinas’ solution to this was analogy, viewing positive claims as valid as long as they are analogical — equivocal language used to emphasise different meanings of words which is unhelpful, whilst univocal language undermined God’s transcendence
Perhaps the apophatic way is too restrictive and impractical:
To Evangelical Christians, the apophatic way undermined Biblical concepts of God as a ‘Father’ and ‘King’, thus impeding our understanding God. Whereas Aquinas’ analogy supports the Bible and does not restrict descriptions of God to what he isn’t — the analogy of proportion (where words are made relative to the subject) and analogy of attribution (where words are relative to their definition)
Ramsey’s models and qualifiers allow us to relate God to human understanding whilst understanding he is infinitely different
Symbols and analogies are often used independent of religion, a testament to the use of the cataphatic way:
Paul Tillich viewed all via positive religious language as symbolic; symbols ‘open up levels of a reality which were otherwise closed to us’. Distinct from signs, symbols ‘participate’ in what they represent
To use literal language of God is groundless — he even condemned traditional omnipotence and omnibenevolence, as it still puts God within the list of existing things (despite being at the top)
Nevertheless, the space for interpretation in symbols can lead to conflict (eg transubstantiation vs consubstantiation), whilst the via negativa allows literal speaking, carrying no deeper meaning, thus avoiding extremist interpretation
Does the verification principle successfully demonstrate that religious language is meaningless?
Verification successfully presents religious language as meaningless as it is not analytic or synthetically verifiable — it is non-cognitive:
Ayer’s verification principle argues that if a statement is not analytic or synthetic, it says nothing about reality, this is logical positivism. He followed Hume, who declared that abstract reasoning or empirical testing is the only way for a statement to have meaning. However, this rules out far more than logical positivists intended, which Ayer accepted and amended with the ‘Weak Verification Principle’, allowing for sensible standards of evidence
Hick, however, argued that religious language is ‘eschatologically verifiable’, however, critics argue that this is wish-fulfilling and, even if it is true, it is not empirical without use of the five senses
Does Flew’s ‘falsification’ do it more successfully?
Flew noted that, to a religious believer, nothing could prove that God does not exist; fideism is the notion that reason and faith are not correlated. R M Hare disagreed, using the word ‘bliks’ to note that religious language contains conviction that cannot be disproven, yet it is meaningful to the person
Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ allow religious language more meaning:
Religious language is non-cognitive and can only make sense when used in context of the game. It cannot be ‘false’ because it does not make factual claims, instead it is an expression of lifestyle (D Z Phillips) — only makes sense in context by others in the ‘game’
Did any of the participants in the falsification symposium present a convincing approach to understanding religious language?
Flew’s cognitive approach contrasts Hare’s non-cognitive approach:
Flew’s falsification argues that an assertion which does not rule out anything is not meaningful, it must deny the opposite or ‘die a death of a thousand qualifications’. Hare’s response is non-cognitive as he argues that the ‘unfalsifiable bliks’ of RL are meaningful in a different way to empirically verifiable truth-claims — parable of the ‘lunatic’ — express beliefs and attitudes
Despite coinciding Tillich’s symbol and Aquinas’ via negativa, Hare’s approach is less convincing as it reduces all RL to mere attitudes; surely ‘Jesus rose from the dead’ must rule out that Jesus remained dead to carry meaning, as Flew exemplified: ‘I simply do not believe that they are not both intended and interpreted to be… assertions’
Mitchell’s participation presents a convincing approach to theists:
The parable of the partisan, he maintains that RL does have a factual quality which will eventually be available — Hick’s eschatological verification. Nevertheless, Anselm’s second ontological argument would distinguish partisan’s belief in the stranger’s intentions (contingent) vs theist’s belief in God (necessary) — yet this is the nature of analogy, as Aquinas noted
Compare this to Hare (no factual quality) and Flew (no meaning)
Persuasiveness of Flew’s falsification is undermined by inherent contradiction in his argument:
Much like Ayer’s verification principle cannot be empirically verified, Flew’s position is unfalsifiable, as reverence of empirical evidence does not by definition rule out anything that cannot be experimentally proven false, thus his argument has no meaning. Yet he might respond arguing that this misses the point of his thesis: by avoiding qualifying his own argument he is exposing the unfalsifiable nature of RL
Must be noted that there is a lack of contradiction in Hare and Mitchell, which undermine’s Flew’s coherence
