Politics of Populism (readings) Flashcards
Halikiopoulou (2018) - A Right-Wing Populist momentum?
4 points
1) Right-wing populism is not a uniform phenomenon (differ fundamentally in rhetoric & agendas)
2) Rise of ‘right-wing populist’ is not a NEW phenomenon (should be interpreted as a broader trend that commenced mid-1980s & has fluctuated since)
3) Poses new ‘supply-side’ (rather than demand-side) dynamics. Those parties that have distanced themselves from fascism and stress ‘liberal values’ to justify exclusionary practices do better.
4) Results from Eastern Europe are more mixed and don’t fit the ‘momentum’
Aylott and Bolin (2019) - A party system in flux
Focus on the Swedish parliamentary election, September 2018. Rise of the populist Sweden Democrats - received 17.5% of the vote / 3rd largest party.
Left parliament ‘fragmented and finely balanced’
Peter Mair (2000) - Partyless Democracy
Appealing to the ‘largely undifferentiated mass electorate’.
- Relations with the institutions of government are no longer mediated to any significant extent by traditional political parties.
(erosion of a party’s representative function facilitates populism)
Kriesi (2014) - The Populist Challenge to democracy
3 points
1) Increased importance of EU & Global level politics (denationalisation of politics and policymaking) - not directly accountable, operating ‘backstage’
2) Increased MEDIATION of politics - an adaption of party leaders and politicians to ‘media logic’. Creates a closer interaction between the public and party leader (eg social media)
(links to Mair’s idea of party erosion as a representative function as they communicating outside the established channels of political communication)
3) A new STRUCTURAL conflict that opposes ‘losers’ of globalisation to ‘winners’ (those ‘left behind’ who lack the affluence to capitalise on the international mobility and career opportunities of globalisation)
Rosanvallon (2006) - Populism as the ‘perfect anti-politics.’
1) The stigmatisation of governing authorities (seen as a harmful source of power)
2) Total rejection of politics
3) Criminalising or ridiculing the essence of power
(eg Brexit Party’s non-manifesto = a contract with the British people)
mobilising those who are distinctly ‘unpolitical’ and sceptical towards representative politics
BEPPE GRILLO (Italy’s 5-star movement)
Beppe Grillo (Italian comedian and personality) started the 5-star movement around honesty and direct democracy (mobilised against rampant corruption in Italian Politics)
- Achieved 25.5% of the vote in 2013 and then refused to cooperate with the mainstream parties
- Wanted Italy to leave the Eurozone and see the creation of the ‘united states of Italy’
An explicit example of anti-politics
(not a party but a MOVEMENT/ cannot be included in traditional Left/Right paradigm)
Populism = contemporary political mainstream?
Changing political landscape (eg globalisation, mediation of pol, denationalisation etc) that form a more compelling argument = POPULISM IS NOT A SOLITARY PHENOMENON/ IDEOLOGY
Examples of populism not being mainstream
PORTUGAL (no populist party)
- Favourable perception of their electoral system
- Confident in the EU (77% would vote to stay)
- Strong welfare state (socialists reversed many austerity cuts)
- Immigration is LOW (only 5% from Portuguese speaking countries such as Brazil) = no anti-immigrant sentiment for populists to mobilise/ capitalise on
FRANCE
Macron beating far-right populist Marine Le Pen (National Front) (explicit anti muslim rhetoric) by a considerable margin (66% vs 33%)
GREECE
‘The sun sets on Greece’s Golden Dawn’ - Guardian article
Greece’s centre-right ‘New Democracy’ party partly accounts for the neofascists’ decline
Greece have abandoned populism and ‘the fiery rhetoric of SYRIZA’
(= effect of a populist party actually being elected into gov?)
eg referendum 2015 - 60% voted to REJECT 3rd EU bailout and harshest measures of Austerity yet it still went ahead = punishment of SYRIZA
6 causes of populism
1) Polarisation - (sharply contrasting) can be a cause or effect
2) Disaffection with democracy - (eg Italy 5 - star movement = anti-corruption)
3) A consequence of mainstream failures - (eg failure of the centre-right tends to lead to a formation of the far right)
(Angela Merkel ‘gutting out’ of her party led to the opening of space on the right fringe sending ‘unhappy conservatives into the arms of right-wing populists’ (Kuzmany 2019)
4) Value change - shift back to self-determined economics
5) Left behind - left move to centre// populists picking up far-left voters (links to Kriesi 2014, ‘losers’ of globalisation being mobilised by populists promising defence of the welfare state against the ‘wealthy elite’ eg SYRIZA elected on an anti-austerity platform in Greece - 26.9% of the vote)
6) New Cleavages - Reaction to the globalisation of democracy
STRUCTURAL CONFLICT (Globalisation) (Kriesi 2014)
- Opposes ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation.
- ‘losers’ have been isolated by globalisation as they don’t have the AFFLUENCE or INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY to progress with the career opportunities of globalisation
- Populist challengers then compete for the mobilisation of the ‘losers’
THE POPULIST CHALLENGE (globalisation) (left and right) (Kriesi 2014)
RIGHT - mobilise against the denationalisation of politics (due to globalisation) in the defence of national identity. (Taggart’s idea of the ‘heartland) appeals to an imagined version of the past before the EU (take BACK control)
LEFT - Defence of the welfare state and economic privileges of the DOMESTIC sectors in the economy (not focus on other countries)
(Greece/ SYRIZA mobilised the left through anti-austerity platform against the Troika - 26.9% of the vote)
SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRY EXAMPLES
- UNITED KINGDOM
Brexit Party - 31.6% of vote in EU elections 2019
- vote LEAVE - take BACK control, appealing to the ‘heartland’ imagined and glorified past of UK sovereignty
The ‘people’ against the undemocratic EU elite in Brussels
Antagonistic US vs THEM
- Rise of issue voting - BREXIT dominating 2019 election over traditional class-based voting (working-class dealignment)
48% of working-class voted Tory vs 33% of working-class voted Labour (YouGov)
SWEDEN (Aylott and Bolin, 2019 reading)
- Originally stable formation of coalitions in each of the parliamentary ‘blocs’ (centre right alliance or red-green alliance of the centre-left parties)
- SWEDEN DEMOCRATS formed by Neo-Nazis in 1988`
(extreme anti-immigration views (associated rising levels of crime with migration) and social conservatism)
= 17.5 % of the vote and 3rd LARGEST PARTY - 2 main parties received less than half of the vote BETWEEN THEM
Parl = ‘fragmented and finely balanced’ (a & b) - polarised pluralism - Annie Loof had to approve Lofven as PM despite having described her party as the ‘polar opposite’
GERMANYYYYY (2017 ELECTION)
- Chancellor Angela Merkel had traditionally held the majority in Ger since 2005
- AfD emerged (cooee) - very ‘anti-islam’ ‘reclaiming German’s national pride’ ‘German family’ warning against multiculturalism
BUT appeals to civic nationalism sees them as not sharing ‘our’ liberal values on democracy - NOT ethnic nationalism (excluding on basis of ideology rather than race)
= 12.6% of the vote 3RD LARGEST PARTY IN PARL, GAIN 94 SEATS
- CDU (Merkel) and SDP (opposition) formed ‘grand coalition’ gov to prevent populist influence
Merkel ‘gutting out’ of conservatives in her party prior to the election opened up a space on the right fringe and sent these ‘unhappy conservatives into the arms of right wing populists’ (Kuzmany 2019)
GREEEEEECE (2012 elections acc)
- Collapse of stable 2 party system (always had about 80% of the vote between them)
MAY and JUNE elections 2012 - 2 main parties received less than a 1/3 of the vote
- Gains for populist parties on both ends of the spectrum
SYRIZA (left) = 26.9% of the vote
GOLDEN DAWN (right) = 6-7% of the vote
REFERENDUM 2015 - 60% of Greeks voted to REJECT 3rd EU bailout yet it still went ahead paired with the harshest levels of austerity
(effect of the populist party having to act as a mainstream party)
