Planning Law

Question 1

LINGLE v. Chevron (2005)

Issue: COMMERICAL RENT CONTROL

Facts of case: Hawaii put rent cap on what oil companies could charge owner-operated gas stations. It was an effort to control fuel prices. Chevron said “UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING” of its property.

Was it a taking?
Amendments at issue?
Case cited?
Legal doctrine?

Answer 1

Was a taking.

5th and 14th

Court cited Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980)

Legal Doctrine:
From Agins: government regulation of private property is “a taking if it does not SUBSTAINTIALLY ADVANCE LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS.”

Issue: Is the “SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCES” formula a valid precedent to determine 5th Amendment REGULATORY TAKING?

Court: NO. Must rely on: Lucas (1992) “JUST COMPENSATION”, Penn Central (1978) “ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION ON CLAIMANT.”

Question 2

CITY OF BOERNE v. Flores (1997)

Issue: CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 (RFRA)

Facts of case: Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating RFRA by denying him a permit to expand his church. Zoning authorities argued that church was in historic district which forbade new construction, overriding RFRA.

Did the historic district trump RFRA?
What 2 amendment(s) at issue?

Answer 2

Yes. Congress exceeded 14th Amendment enforcement powers by subjecting local ordinances to federal regulations. No evidence the historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

1st, 14th

Question 3

City of Monterey v. DEL MONTE DUNES at Monterey

Issue: DEVELOPER EXACTIONS

Facts of case: Del Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned in Monterey. Many proposals over years, with demands for smaller and smaller development. Del Monte Dunes sued Monterey. Jury instructed to determine whether EVERY VIABLE ECONOMIC USE was rejected, if rejection ADVANCED LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Was this a TAKING?
What (2) amendments at issue?
Do plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial if they allege constitutional violations in REGULATORY TAKING cases?

Answer 3

Yes.

7th, 14th

Yes.

Question 4

DOLAN v. City of Tigard (1993)

Issue: DEVELOPER EXACTIONS

Facts of case: Approval for Dolan’s application to expand store and pave lot conditional on her (1) dedicating land for public greenway to minimize flooding because exacerbated by expansion of paving on lot and (2) dedicating land for pedestrian/bicycle pathway to relieve traffic congestion. Dolan appealed to Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). said requirements not related to her proposal, UNCOMPENSATED TAKING. LUBA said reasonable relationship, Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. Appealed to Supreme Court.

Which amendment at issue?
Legal Doctrines (2)?

Answer 4

5th

Is required ESSENTIAL NEXUS present? Must be connection between the nature of the exactions and impact of proposed development.

ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY TEST. Must be rough proportionality between the degree of the exactions and impact of proposed development.

General principle: When government enacts land regulations, must be close fit between land use regulation and objective of government. TAKINGS CLAUSE prevents individuals from bearing burdens public as a whole should bear.

Question 5

NOLLAN v. California Coastal Commission (1987)

Issue: DEVELOPER EXACTIONS

Facts of case: California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to demolish a small bungalow and replace it with a house that conformed with the neighborhood to maintain public pathway between two beaches on property. The Nollans argued it couldn’t be required unless evidence their house would have direct adverse impact on public access to beach, said it was a TAKING.

Was it a taking?
Which (2) amendments at issue?
Which legal doctrine?

Answer 5

Yes.

5th and 14th

No ESSENTIAL NEXUS (connection between the nature of the exactions and impact of proposed development) between house blocking visual access to the beach and requiring access to the beach via a public pathway. The TAKINGS CLAUSE of the 5th Amendment is violated unless there is an “ESSENTIAL NEXUS” between the required concessions and the public impact of the proposed development.

Question 6

FIRST ENGLISH Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California (1987)

Issue: DEVELOPMENT MORATORIUM

Facts of case: In 1979, LA County passed ordinance (DEVELOPMENT MORATORIUM), prohibiting construction on land hit by flood. First English owned campground in this area, was not allowed to rebuild their buildings. First English asked for damages. Case didn’t go to court until 1985, church unable to use property for this period.

Was it a REGULATORY TAKING?
Do they have a right to damages?
What amendment at issue? Which clause?

Answer 6

Yes.

The temporary inability to use their property was a TAKING. They should receive “JUST COMPENSATION” (damages) retroactively for what was determined by an appellate court 6 years later to be a REGULATORY TAKING.

5th, JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE

Question 7

TAHOE-SIERRA Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002)

Issue: DEVELOPMENT MORATORIUM

Facts of case: Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed 2 DEVELOPMENT MORATORIA lasting 32 months in total, while writing a plan for sustainable development and studying the impact of current development on the Lake Tahoe Basin. Affected real estate owners filed suits, claiming TAKING without JUST COMPENSATION.

Is a DEVELOPMENT MORATORIUM while developing a comprehensive plan a “TAKING” requiring “JUST COMPENSATION”?
Amendment at issue? Clause?

Answer 7

No. Whether it was a “TAKING” depends on landowner’s expectations, actual impact, public interest, reasons for moratoria. The Court felt that calling any temporary deprivation of ALL ECONOMIC USE a TAKING would mean a government would have to pay a landowner for normal delays in land use applications.

5th, TAKINGS CLAUSE

Question 8

BABBITT v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon (1995)

Issue: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

Facts of case: Bruce Babbitt was the Secretary of the Interior. The suit was brought by Sweet Home against him and the US Fish and Wildlife Service, etc. Sweet Home claims that the red-cockaded woodpecker (endangered species), and the northern spotted owl (threatened species) economically injured them because they could not log, etc. on the land. Sweet Home challenged the ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) definition of “HARM” saying it should only extend to direct harm, like injuring or killing, not harm to their habitat.

Does the ESA protect the habitats of endangered species?

Answer 8

Yes. The Supreme Court said that in the ESA, the word “HARM” includes habitat modification, not just direct injury or death to endangered animals.

Question 9

Village of Willowbrook v. OLECH (2000)

Issue: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT/SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

Facts of case: Grace Olech asked Village to connect her property to municipal water supply. Village made this conditional on allowing them to have a 33 ft easement on her property. Olech refused, saying they only needed 15 ft as they had asked other property owners for. District Court dismissed, Appellate Court reversed.

Question for Supreme Court: does EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE protect "CLASS OF ONE" (no specific membership in any class or group).
Which amendment at issue? Clause?

Answer 9

Yes. If a plaintiff alleges they are intentionally treated differently from others in a similar situation without a rational basis, they can be a “CLASS OF ONE”.

14th, (EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)

Question 10

City of CLEBURNE, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985)

Issue: GROUP HOMES

Facts of case: Cleburne Living Center applied to operate home for mentally [impaired]. City Council denied special use permit.

Question for Appeals Court: Does requiring only group homes of mentally [impaired] to apply for special use permits violate the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the 14th Amendment?

Answer 10

Yes. Classifications for EQUAL PROTECTION must be RATIONALLY RELATED to a LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST. Federal government has outlawed discrimination against mentally [impaired] people in federally funded programs. The reasons for requiring the permit were based on fears of residents prejudices, which is not a RATIONAL basis, and there was no threat to the city’s LEGITIMATE INTERESTS.

Question 11

CITY OF EDMONDS v. Oxford House, Inc. (1995)

Issue: GROUP HOMES, OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS

Facts of case: City zoning code says single-family dwellings must house a family, i.e.: “persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons.” Oxford House, a group home for recovering addicts was issued a citation. Oxford House said that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination against those with disabilities - including those with addiction issues, city failed to make REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS by allowing group home. City said FHA didn’t apply to city’s zoning code.

Is the zoning code requirement that families can have more occupants in a dwelling than non-families exempt from the FHA?

Answer 11

No. A simple limit of occupants would be exempt from FHA, say if the total occupants allowed in a district were fewer than the group home. But because the code treated families and non-families differently, with five maximum for unrelated persons, and no cap for families, the provision was not exempt from FHA.

Question 12

Golden v. The Planning Board of the Town of RAMAPO (1972)

Issue: GROWTH MANAGEMENT

Facts of case: 1969 Zoning ordinance amendments intended to phase growth. Some areas would have up to an 18 year delay for development, depending on the availability of municipal facilities (water, sewage, transportation, schools, parks, etc.) Golden sued when preliminary subdivision denied by Board.

Does New York State enabling legislation authorize phased development controls?
Are Ramapo’s growth control zoning amendments a “TAKING”?

Answer 12

Yes. But the town must adhere to it’s scheduled phasing.

No. The regulations are not unreasonable and the value of property is not diminished to the point of being a confiscation.

Question 13

City of Los Angeles v. ALAMEDA BOOKS, Inc. (2002)

Issue: SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES

Facts of case: City of LA did a study in 1977 showing higher crime rates near adult businesses and enacted a code prohibiting them within 1,000 ft of each other, later amended to one per building. Alameda Books and Highland Books, who each operated combined video arcade and bookstores, which were banned under the amendment, sued.

Which amendment at issue?
Can a city use a study to demonstrate whether an ordinance serves SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST?

Answer 13

1st.

Yes. The 1977 study showed that the limitations on adult businesses in the ordinance served the city’s INTEREST in reducing crime.

Question 14

CITY OF ERIE v. Pap’s A.M. (2002)

Issue: SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES

Facts of case: Pap’s A.M. operated a strip club called “Kandyland”. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to intentionally appear nude in public. Pap’s sued seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance’s enforcement.

Does Erie, PA’s public indecency ordinance, prohibiting nude dancing, violate the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of free expression?
Which amendments were at issue?

Answer 14

No. Justice O’Connor’s wrote in the majority opinion: “The requirment is a minimal restriction IN FURTHERANCE OF THE ASSERTED GOVERNMENT INTERESTS, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer’s erotic message.”

1st and 14th

Question 15

Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. TAXPAYERS FOR VINCENT (1984)

Issue: SIGNS AND BILLBOARDS

Facts of case: An LA law prohibited signs on public property. The Appellee, supporters of a local candidate, posted signs on public property.

Does prohibiting signs on public property abridge the Appellee’s FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1st amendment)?

Answer 15

No. It is within the city’s power to limit the visual assault created by an accumulation of signs on public property. This problem is a SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE EVIL within the city’s power to prohibit. An INCIDENTAL RESTRICTION on expression is justified as a reasonable regulation of the TIME, PLACE, OR MANNER OF EXPRESSION if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

Question 16

METROMEDIA, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981)

Issue: SIGNS AND BILLBOARDS

Facts of case: The City of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs to improve the city’s appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to drivers. Only “onsite” billboards with messaging relating to the property would be permitted. A coalition of business owners who owned advertising signs petitioned the court.

Does a city ban on “offsite” outdoor advertising signs violate 1st and 14th amendment provisions for FREE SPEECH?

Answer 16

Yes. The exception for onsite advertising (commercial signage) discriminated against non-commercial speech, since all off-site signs, commercial or non-commercial were banned.

Question 17

PENN CENTRAL Transportation Company v. New York City

Issue: TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION

Facts of case: The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 allowed the City to designate structures and neighborhoods as “LANDMARKS” or “LANDMARK SITES.” But the City offset the burden of landmarking with a TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHT (TDR) that could be sold to neighboring property. Penn Central wanted to build a 50-story building atop the Terminal, but this was not allowed by its LANDMARK status.

Was landmarking Grand Central Terminal, which restricted building on that parcel, but compensating Penn Central with TDR, a “TAKING”?
Which amendments at issue?

Answer 17

No. TDR allowed Penn Central to transfer some of building’s development rights to neighbors. Penn Central was not singled-out; 400 structures were designated LANDMARKS.

The Supreme Court looked at (1) ECONOMIC IMPACT on Penn Central, (2) character of government action. A TAKING is more readily found when a government physically invades a property than from a public program that weighs ECONOMIC BENEFIT with PUBLIC GOOD.

To consider whether a “TAKING” has occurred, the Court takes into account: (1) nature of interference with property interest; (2) extent of interference; (3) number of units affected; (4) ability of property owner to continue to use subjected property to its INTENDED USE; and (5) LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE’S INTEREST in restricting the property’s use.

5th and 14th

Question 18

CITY OF EASTLAKE v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. (1978)

Issue: ZONING REFERENDUM

Facts of case: Forest City Enterprises sought to have a parcel they owned rezoned from “light industrial” to permit construction of a high-rise multi-family apartment building. While the application for rezoning was being processed, voters amended the city charter to required land use changes to be ratified by 55% of voters. The City Council approved the rezoning to residential, but then submitted to a referendum, which fell short of 55% of voters.

Does the city charter provision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% of voters violate DUE PROCESS rights of a landowner who applies for a zoning change?
Which amendment is at issue?

Answer 18

No. The referendum is a power RESERVED by the people in the Ohio State Constitution. Because it is a power RESERVED and not DELEGATED, the power is not subject to the requirement of standards.

The precedent of EUCLID V. AMBLER held that a property owner can challenge a restriction if the measure is clearly ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, BEARING NO RELATION TO POLICE POWER.

In Forest City, the restriction is not being challenged as ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS and BEARING NO RELATION TO POLICE POWER. The referendum, a basic instrument of democratic government, does not in itself violate the DUE PROCESS Clause of the 14th Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordinance.

(14th)

Question 19

Construction Ind. Ass’n of Sonoma Cty. v. City of PETALUMA (1976)

Issue: GROWTH MANAGEMENT

Facts of case: The Petaluma Plan was adopted in 1971. It limited new housing units to 1/3 to 1/2 market demand for 1970-71 and created an “urban extension line” marking outer limits of 20 year expansion of municipal facilities and land annexation. City claims growth curbs imposed because City water and sewage facilities inadequate, but Court found this was untrue. The Construction Industry Associate of Sonoma Cty said the Petaluma Plan penalized the RIGHT TO TRAVEL without FURTHERING ANY COMPELLING STATE INTEREST.

Does the Petaluma Plan infringe upon the constitutional RIGHT TO TRAVEL?

Answer 19

Yes, The RIGHT TO TRAVEL was including the Articles of Confederation but omitted from the Constitution. The US Supreme Court has decided that the PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITY CLAUSES of both documents were intended to be the same, therefore, the RIGHT TO TRAVEL is a constitutional right. In Truax v. Raich, the US Supreme Court indirectly indicated that it is a constitutional right of US citizens to migrate and settle.

However, in Eucld v. Ambler Realty Co. the Supreme Court protected zoning ordinances by saying they had to be shown to be ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE, having NO SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS, OR GENERAL WELFARE.

In RAMAPO, it was found that their facilities were nearing their limit, but in PETALUMA there was no shortage of municipal facilities. Therefore RAMAPO had a RATIONAL BASIS for “phazed zoning” but PETALUMA dId not.

Question 20

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (aka MOUNT LAUREL I) (1975)

Issue: HOUSING

Facts of case: Mount Laurel’s zoning code only allowed single-family detached homes with a minimum square footage. The code also set aside 30% of land for industrial use, but very little was developed. The NAACP says the regulations exclude low and moderate-income families.

May a developing municipality, in it’s zoning ordinances, make it physically and economically impossible for low and moderate income families to live there?

Answer 20

No. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the land use regulations of a municipality must make available enough options for low and moderate income housing to meet their FAIR SHARE OF THE REGIONAL NEED unless the municipality can demonstrate that in their particular circumstances that it should not be required to.

Land use regulation is within a state’s POLICE POWER. All POLICE POWER enactments must conform to state constitutional requirements of substantive DUE PROCESS and EQUAL PROTECTION of the law. Regulations must promote the GENERAL WELFARE.

Providing adequate housing for all types of people is essential in promoting the GENERAL WELFARE. Land removed from residential use for industrial purposes must be REASONABLY RELATED to the present and future potential for such purposes.

Question 21

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (aka MOUNT LAUREL II) (1983)

Issue: HOUSING

Facts of case: The Supreme Court of New Jersey felt Mount Laurel zoning still exclusionary, not compliant with Mount Laurel I. The Court felt that the ruling needed teeth and clarification. Other cases involved other municipalities as well.

Meeting the Mt. Laurel obligation:

1. Municipalities must remove all municipally created _______ to the construction of their fair share of lower income housing.

Answer 21

(barriers)

2. Using affirmative measures
   - incentive zoning
   - mandatory set-asides
3. Zoning for mobile homes

Judicial Remedies

1. Builder’s Remedy
2. Revision of the Zoning Ordinance
   - appoint “special master” to ensure compliance
3. Remedies for non-compliance
4. Adopt resolutions and ordinances
5. Court-ordered construction projects
6. Zoning ordinance deemed void (part/whole)
7. Approve particular applications to construct housing

Question 22

Village of ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (1977)

Issue: HOUSING

Facts of case: the Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with Arlington to build racially integrated low and moderate income housing. When MHDC applied for a rezoning, Arlington’s planning commission denied it. MHDC challenged the denial as racially discriminatory.

Was Arlington’s denial of the rezoning, which was needed for mixed-racial low and moderate income housing racially discriminatory?
What amendment at issue? What clause?

Answer 22

It might have been, but intent could not be proven. The rezoning denial might have had RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT, but evidence didn’t show DELIBERATE INTENTION.

DISCRIMINITORY EFFECT ALONE DOES NOT RENDER A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THERE MUST BE A MOTIVATING DISCRIMINITORY PURPOSE.

14th, EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Question 23

PALAZZOLO v. Rhode Island (2001)

Issue: INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS

Facts of case: Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel that is mostly salt marsh and subject to tidal flooding. The Coastal Resources Mgmt Program designates salt marshes as protected “coastal wetlands,” on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals denied, Palazzolo said State wetland’s regulations had “TAKEN” his property by depriving him of “ALL ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL USE” of his property.

May a property owner who acquired title to the property after it was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a TAKINGS claim?
Which amendments at issue?

Answer 23

Yes. The Supreme Court said there should not be an expiration date on the TAKINGS CLAUSE, and that future generations should have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.

However, Palazzo failed to show that he was DEPRIVED OF ALL ECONOMIC VALUE, since the parcel was still able to have a residence built on it under the regulations, and was undisputed to have a $200,000 development value even with the wetlands protected.

5th, 14th

Question 24

VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. Boraas (1974)

Issue: OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS

Facts of case: Belle Terre ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. “Family” meant one or more related persons or at most two unrelated persons. The Boraases leased their home to unrelated people, violating the ordinance and Bonne Terre told them to remedy this. The Boraases sued saying it was a violation of the DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES by interfering with the RIGHT TO TRAVEL and by expressing impermissible social preferences.

Does an ordinance restricting land use to “one-family” dwellings violate the EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES?
Which amendment is at issue?

Answer 24

No. The US Supreme Court said the ordinance did not violate the 14th amendment’s EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE because it was not ARBITRARY, did not UNREASONABLY apply to some individuals and not others, and was REASONABLY RELATED TO A RATIONAL STATE OBJECTIVE. The objective in this case was to prevent college students from living in an area to promote family values and quiet seclusion.

The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the 14th amendment because it did not deny anyone a fundamental right such as the rights to TRAVEL, ASSOCIATION, and PRIVACY.

(14th)

Question 25

MOORE v. City of East Cleveland

Issue: OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS

Facts of case: East Cleveland’s housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The definition of family was so strict, it didn’t include Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and her two grandsons, who were cousins not brothers.

Did this housing ordinance violate the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the 14th amendment?

Answer 25

Yes. The US Supreme Court felt that the ordinance was “instrusive regulation of the family” without accruing some tangible STATE INTEREST. The Appellant has a fundamental right to live with her blood relatives. The state argued that the statute prevented overcrowding, and minimized traffic, parking congestions, and undue financial burdens on the school system. The Court did not find those goals to be served by this ordinance.

Question 26

BERMAN v. Parker (1954)

Issue: EMINENT DOMAIN

Facts of case: In 1945, Congress passed the DC Redevelopment Act, creating the DC Redevelopment Land Agency, to identify blighted areas in DC. The agency could use eminent domain. Berman and others owned a department store in a blighted area targeted by the commission. They objected to their property being seized for beautification of the area.

Can the government:

1. Transfer property from one private party to another?
2. Condemn property that isn’t blighted as part of a plan to eliminate blight from an area?

What amendment at issue?

Answer 26

1. Yes. The US Supreme Court found the government can transfer property from one private party to another as part of a redevelopment plan that serves a PUBLIC PURPOSE (i.e., to promote general physical, aesthetic, sanitary, or economic quality of an area) under the 5th Amendment and the constitution only requires JUST COMPENSATION to a property owner.
2. Yes. Congress’s purpose was to “redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the conditions that cause slums”. The Court felt that “if owner after owner were permitted to resist redevelopment programs…integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.” The Court decided that “[o]nce the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the [redevelopment] project….rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”

5th

Question 27

Hawaii Housing Authority v. MIDKIFF (1984)

Issue: PUBLIC USE AND EMINENT DOMAIN

Facts of case: the Hawaii legislature discovered that the state and federal governments owned nearly 49% of the land in Hawaii, and that another 47% was owned by just 72 private owners. They enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967, which used a method of redistribution where titles could be transferred from lessors to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the act.

Did the Land Reform Act of 1967 violate the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Answer 27

No. The US Supreme Court said Hawaii could take titles of property with JUST COMPENSATION for the purpose of reducing the concentration of ownership. The Court said that the statute was RATIONALLY RELATED TO A CONCEIVABLE PUBLIC PURPOSE, and that “debates over the wisdom of takings” were best carried out be legislatures, not federal courts. The Court held that the fact the the titles were transferred to private beneficiaries did not mean it was not for a PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Question 28

KELO v. New London (2005)

Issue: PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN

Facts of case: New London, CT used eminent domain to seize the private property of Susette Kelo and others. New London’s intent was to sell their land to private developers, which
they said would create jobs and increase tax revenues. The property owners argued it was a 5th Amendment “TAKING” because it was not for a public use.

Does a city violate the 5th Amendment TAKINGS CLAUSE if the city takes private property and sells it to a private developer for economic development?

Answer 28

No. The city was following an economic development plan, which qualified as a “public use”, even though the land was not going to be used by the general public. The 5th Amendment did not require a “literal” public use, but a “broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘PUBLIC PURPOSE.’”

Question 29

HADACHECK v. Sebastian (1915)

Issue: PRE-ZONING REGULATIONS

Facts of case: Operating a brick kiln within a certain district of Los Angeles was a misdemeanor. When Hadacheck purchased his parcel, it was outside city limits, but then it was annexed. The land was on a valuable bed of high-quality clay which far exceeded the land value for residential use. The owner had built a lot of machinery on the property for manufacturing brick. He claimed the ordinance was singling him out because other operations in the area were not regulated.

Would enforcement of the ordinance deprive Hadacheck of the use of his property?

Answer 29

No. The ordinance only prohibited the manufacture of bricks, not the removal of the clay itself, so it was not a deprivation of property rights. Under POLICE POWER, the prohibition of manufacture could be justified relating to the health and comfort of the community. Not enough evidence was available to prove that the prohibition enacted was for the purpose of unjustly discriminating against the petitioner.

Question 30

WELCH v. Swasey (1909)

Issue: PRE-ZONING REGULATIONS

Facts of case: Francis Welch owned property in a residential section of Boston where building height was limited to 100 ft. After he was denied a permit to construct a 124 ft building on his property, Welch sued, saying: “the purposes of the acts are not such as to justify the exercise of what is termed the POLICE POWER, because, in fact, their real purpose was of an aesthetic nature…”

Are building height limitations a legitimate use of POLICE POWER?

Answer 30

The US Supreme Court did not answer the question because it felt this case did not raise a federal question. The Court did not decide whether a building height restriction generally was a legitimate use of police power because whether they were or not would be based on “local conditions”.

The Court did say that “where there is justification for the enactment of a police statute limiting the height of buildings in a particular district, an owner of property in that district is not entitled to JUST COMPENSATION for the reasonable interference with his property by statute”, and does not violate the EQUAL PROTECTION or DUE PROCESS CLAUSES of the 14th Amendment.

Question 31

KEYSTONE Bituminous COAL Association v. DeBenedictis (1987)

Issue: RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

Facts of case: The Pennsylvania State Legislature passed the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. The Dept of Environmental Resources (DER) prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines under buildings. Using Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Keystone alleged the Act violated the CONTRACT CLAUSE and TAKINGS CLAUSE of 5th and 14th Amendment.

Does a state violate the TAKINGS CLAUSE by forcing coal mining companies to keep certain amounts of coal in underground mines to support structures on the surface?
Does this restriction violate the CONTRACT CLAUSE by cancelling agreements miners have made to secure their rights to underground coal?

Answer 31

No.

No.

US Supreme Court found Act had a VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE, found it would not make it impossible for miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon did not apply.

The Court said it was not a TAKING “because petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates…”

The Court dismissed the CONTRACT CLAUSE violations because the state didn’t acquire property, only used its POLICE POWER to implement regulation which served valid PUBLIC INTERESTS.

Question 32

LUCAS v. South Carolina Coast Council (1992)

Issue: RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

Facts of case: In 1986, Lucas bought 2 residential lots on Isle of Palms in South Carolina. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structure on his land. The law was made to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands.

Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of ALL ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USE of his property amount to a "TAKING" calling for "JUST COMPENSATION"?
Which amendments (2) at issue?

Answer 32

Yes. The US Supreme Court said Lucas’s lots had ben rendered valueless by state law. “When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice ALL ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL USES in the name of the common good…he has suffered a TAKING.”

5th and 14th

Question 33

STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection

Facts of case: In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (“BSPA”). In 2003, the Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (DEP) filed for a Joint Coastal Permit to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (“SBR”), an association of homeowners, challenged the permit and constitutionality of BSPA.

By reversing longstanding holdings that littoral (i.e., on or near the shore) rights are constitutionally protected, did the Florida Supreme Court cause a “JUDICIAL TAKING” under the 5th and 14th Amendments?

Answer 33

No.

Justice Antonin Scalia said there could be no TAKING unless property owners could show they had rights to future exposed land and to contact with water that superseded Florida’s right to fill in its submerged land.

Under Florida law: (1) the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property has the right to fill in that land, and (2) the exposure of land previously submerged belongs to the state even if it interrupts the beachfront property owners’ contact with the water.

Question 34

YOUNG v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (1976)

Issue: SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES

Facts of case: American Mini Theaters opened 2 adult movie theaters in Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited opening adult theaters within 1,000 ft of buildings with “regulated uses” or within 500 ft of any residential district. American Mini sued the City on 2 grounds: (1) ordinances imposed undue burden on 1st Amendment rights, and (2) violated 14th Amendment’s EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Did Detroit’s 1972 ordinances violate the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the 14th Amendment?
Did the ordinances qualify as a restriction on FREE SPEECH in violation of the 1st Amendment?

Answer 34

No.

No.

Although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of the material.

Question 35

CITY OF RENTON v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1985)

Facts of case: The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within 1,000 ft of “any residential zone, single- or multiple- family dwelling, church, park, or school.” Playtime Theatres, Inc. challenged the enforcement and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.

Did Renton ordinance violate either the 1st or 14th Amendments?

Answer 35

No.

The US Supreme Court held that the ordinance was a form of TIME, PLACE, and MANNER regulation, not a complete ban on adult theaters. The law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at the theaters, “but the secondary effects of such theaters on the surround community.” The ordinance served a SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST in preserving quality of life and allowed for “reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”