PLAIR Cases Flashcards
R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003]
INQUIRIES
• A family sought to challenge the decision of the Home Secretary not to hold an inquiry in public on the death of their relative who was murdered while in legal custody. They were successful. the Court relied on Article 2 ECHR on the right to life to find that there was an obligation to investigate the death of the petitioner’s relative as it was ‘in the public interest for a public inquiry to be held into the death of a person who at the time of the death was being held in legal custody’.
• This case should be viewed as fact specific
• Not all governmental refusals to hold an inquiry can be successfully challenged through JR
Keyu and others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2015]
INQUIRIES
• The petitioners’ claim under Article 2 ECHR was unsuccessful but they also relied on common law grounds to challenge the respondents’ failure to hold an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 s1.
• Petitioners argued that the decision was irrational and disproportionate
• “The respondents clearly considered the request for an inquiry seriously and rejected it for reasons which are individually defensible and relevant, and which cumulatively render it impossible to characterise their conclusion as unreasonable, let alone irrational”. [129] per Lord Neuberger
• Lady Hale dissenting: The decision was unreasonable. The Respondents did not consider the public interest in properly inquiring into an event of this magnitude, the private interests of the relatives and survivors in knowing the truth and the importance of setting the record straight. In this case, the value of establishing the truth was overwhelming.
R (Anderson) v SS for Home Department (2003)
HRA 1998
• HRA 1998 s. 2: A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any Judgment, decision, declaration of the European Court of Human Rights
• What does “take into account” mean?
• Court will not, without good reason, depart from principles laid down in judgement in grant chamber
Kay v Lambeth LBC (2006)
HRA 1998
• Question arose as to whether lower domestic courts have to follow prior HoL decisions where they conflict with ECHR
• Held that lower courts are still bound by High Court decisions
• Duty to take ECHR law into account, but not necessarily to follow it
• -> not relieved of duty to follow prior house of lords rulings, even where they conflict with the Strasbourg Court
R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator (2004)
HRA 1998
• Duty of courts is to keep pace of Strasbourg courts
• No more, no less (per Lord Bingham): Mirror principlE
R (Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2004)
HRA 1998
• “We must interpret the Convention Rights in a way which keeps pace with rather than leaps ahead of the Strasbourg jurisprudence” (per Lady Hale)
R v A (2001)
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• Strong interpretative obligation
• Applies even if there’s no ambiguity in the language
• Even if parliament’s intention is clear, and it goes against HR, courts will try and find it compatible with HR
• s. 3 places a duty on court to strive to find a possible interpretation compatible with convention rights
Re S (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) (2002)
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• s. 3 (1) not available where the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or is by implication necessarily contradicted by the statute
• Judge’s task is to interpret, not to legislate
Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004]
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• The Rent Act 1977 allowed the surviving spouse of a protected tenant of a dwelling house to succeed to the statutory tenancy on the tenant’s death, if living there. A person living with the original tenant as “his or her wife or husband” was treated as a spouse for these purposes. The petitioner in this case complained that this breached his Article 8 ECHR rights since he was prevented from succeeding to the statutory tenancy of his late partner, with whom he had lived in a stable homosexual relationship for almost 20 years.
• Found law was discriminatory and a violation of ECHR
• Relied on s. 3 to “read down” the provisions so as to allow the same sex partner of the deceased tenant to succeed to the statutory tenancy
• s. 3 might require court to depart from the legislative intention of provision in issue
• If purpose of HRA is to give effect to longstanding ECHR rights, and court is being asked to do what s. 3 says it must do, why is court being asked to do that?
• Cases dealt w/ in domestic courts instead of in Strasbourg
• By reading statute in such a way, brings it in line w/ convention rights
o Obligation is to read and give effect to legislation in a way which is compatible with convention rights so far as is possible
• Court is to try as hard as possible to find a compatible meaning, which may mean going beyond express words parliament has used
• Avoiding the need for a declaration of incompatibility per s.4
o Lord Millett (dissenting): “In my view, s3 does not entitle the court to supply words which are inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislative scheme; nor to repeal, delete or contradict the language of the offending statute”
o Lord Rodger: If the interpretive obligation is exercised in a manner which does not contradict the principle and scope of the legislation, then the court is not crossing the border from interpretation to amendment
o Lord Nicholls: “It is an unusual and far-reaching obligation that may require the Court to depart from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear”
o Lady Hale: have to consider ordinary meaning of leg; acknowledge that things change over time (ie social norms are different now than they were when leg. was enacted, should read leg. in view of this)
Smith v Scott 2007
HRA 1998: DECLARATION OF INCOMPATIBILITY S. 4
• The appellant argued that the law which does not allow prisoners to vote violated the Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR. The CoS could not rely on HRA s3 as it would depart too significantly from a fundamental feature of the legislation, so the legislation was found to be incompatible with the ECHR.
• Court said there are a bunch of ways to draw the line with regards to prisoner voting rights, but that’s NOT an interpretative exercise
o Would be legislating on it’s own account
• Not for court ot say who should vote and who shouldn’t
• That’s for parliament
• So made declaration of incompatibility
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote v. Wallbank [2004]
HRA 1998 S. 6 PUBLIC AUTHORITY
• Core Public Authority: A body whose nature is governmental in a broad sense of that expression. Hence, under the Human Rights Act a body of this nature is required to act compatibly with Convention rights in everything it does”.
• Hybrid Public Authority: A body “exercising both public functions and non-public functions […] A hybrid public authority is not a public authority in respect of an act of a private nature. (Per Lord Nicholls)
Whaley v Watson (2000)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Scottish parliament has been created by UK parliament, thus must act within scope of powers like any other public bodies
• If it doesn’t court can intervene and require it to do so
• “[The Scottish Parliament is a] body which – however important its role – has been created by statute and derives its powers from statute. As such, it is a body which, like any other statutory body, must work within the scope of those powers. If it does not do so, then in an appropriate case the court may be asked to intervene and will require to do so, in a manner permitted by the legislation. In principle, therefore, the Parliament like any other body set up by law is subject to the law and to the courts which exist to uphold that law.” [per Lord Rodger].
AXA Case (2011)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Common law grounds of JR don’t apply to Scottish parliament (can only bring action under s. 29 SA 1998)
• SO is not just any public body, so if you want to challenge an act of Scottish parliament it must be under s. 29
• But: would be open to the courts to strike down an Act of the Scottish parliament if such an act was contrary to fundamental rights of the rule of law
• “It cannot however be assumed that the grounds upon which the lawfulness of an Act of the Scottish Parliament may be reviewed include all, or any, of the grounds upon which the Court of Session may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in other contexts” (Per Lord Reed)
Cameron v Procurator Fiscal (2012)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Statute imposed additional bail conditions, court found that these breached art. 5
o Struck down
Salvesen v Riddell (2012)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Issue was complicated land law
• Statute at stake held to be a violation of article 1, protocol 1
• Used s. 102 -> suspended effect of statute for 12 months to give them a chance to fix it
Christian Institute & Ors v Lord Advocate (Scotland) (2016)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• SC struck down “named person” scheme under art. 8
Somerville v Scottish Ministers (2008)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Time limits -> one year time bar in HRA (s. 7 (5) (a))
• But not in SA 1998 for “devolution issues”
• HoL: one year time limit does not apply to the proceedings as drafted because the petitioner’s case was that the acts of the Scottish ministers were outside the limits of their devolved competence
• Scottish government didn’t like this…
• Passed Convention Rights Proceedings Amendment (Scotland) Act 2009
o One year time limit to bring action on devolution issue challenges
Guzzardi v Italy
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• Applicant arrested on suspicion of being involved with the mafia
• Put in prison, awaiting trial
• Law in Italy at that time said people could be held in prison for up to two years while awaiting trial, after that time they must be set free
• After 2 years, police took him out of prison, put him on a remote island near Sicily where they forced him to be a resident
o Didn’t have enough to take him to trial, but also weren’t allowed to keep him in prison, so…
• Italy tried to argue that he wasn’t deprived because he was “free” and not in prison
• ECHR didn’t agree with Italy’s argument”
• “In order to determine whether someone has been ‘deprived of his liberty’, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effect and manner of implementation of the measure in question”
R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2006)/ Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• UK domestic case on this issue
• Became Gillan v Quinton…
• Gillan was PhD student on his way to protest arms fair; Quinton was a journalist who was also going to this arms fair but was there to cover the protests for work
• Both stopped by police, searched
• PhD student had some papers confiscated
• Police ignored journalist’s press credentials, wouldn’t let her take photos of being stopped and searched
• Police had carried out the stop and searches under s. 44 Terrorism Act (2000)
• Gave them the power to stop and search individuals without reasonable suspicion
• G and Q challenged under art 5
• HoL did not accept this challenge
o “I would accept that when a person is stopped and searched, the procedure has the features on which the appellants rely. ON the other hand, the procedure will ordinarily be relatively brief. The person stopped will not be arrested, handcuffed, confined or removed to any different place. I do not think, in the absence of special circumstances, such a person should be regarded as being detained in the sense of confined or kept in custody, but more properly of being detained in the sense of kept from proceeding or kept waiting. There is no deprivation of liberty” (Lord Bingham)
• Applicants took case to ECHR -> case became Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010)
• “The court observes that although the length of time during which each applicant was stopped and searched did not in either case exceed 30 minutes, during this period the applicants were entirely deprived of any freedom of movement. They were obliged to remain where they were and submit to the search and if they had refused they would have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 s. 1”
o Eventually, ECHR found UK in violation of Art. 8
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1990)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• Case from which the Reasonable Grounds test was derived
• Test:
• 1. If the suspicion is honestly held (subjective test), it is for the accused to prove that the suspicion was unreasonable
o Police officer themselves must have an honest belief that the individual has done something warranting a stop and search or arrest
• 2. This suspicion must be based on objectively reasonable grounds (objective test)
o Looking at specific circumstances of the case, a fair minded observer would also have reached the same conclusion as the police officer (that individual and done something worth of stop and search or arrest)
• Both parts of test ^^ must be met
o If both are met, reasonable grounds valid even if the belief was mistaken
- Applicants were former members of the IRA
- Had been convicted in the past for crimes relating to the IRA, but had served their time and were out free
- Every time police were concerned about IRA activity, they would keep arresting the applicants
- Police would say they had a reasonable suspicion because they had been convicted in the past for IRA activity
- Held: failed to meet requirements of objective observer
- “Reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as “reasonable” will, however, depend upon all the circumstances”
- Terrorism concerns cannot lead to suspension of “reasonableness” requirement
Salduz v Turkey (2009)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Young man (minor) arrested on charges that he had participated in an unlawful protest
• Arrested and taken to station, interrogated, without being given access to a solicitor
• ECHR found this violated his rights under art. 6, because he hadn’t been provided access to a lawyer
• “In order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently ‘practicable and effective’, Article 6 ECHR requires that, as a rule access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right”
Cadder v HM Advocate (2010)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Scotland
• Young man (minor) detained on suspicion of having attacked a father and son
• Arrested
• At time, in Scotland, under s. 14 Criminal Procedure (S) Act 1995 a person detained had no right to consult a solicitor, only to have the fact of their detention intimated to a solicitor
o No access to a solicitor before your interrogation
• High Court: declined to follow Salduz
• Said Salduz applied specifically to the situation in Turkey, interrogation procedures in Scotland are different and are overall rights compliant
o TF decided against petition of applicant
• UKSC: it is a breach of art. 6 for the prosecution to rely on evidence obtained during an interview where the suspect had not been afforded an opportunity to consult a solicitor
• HC should have followed Salduz
Chalmers v HM Advocate (1954)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Purpose of questioning not to extract a confession
• Interrogations should have the sole purpose of fact finding
o Clarifying the facts of what happened
• Can’t place individual under such an amount of stress that they feel compelled to confess
• Questioning which amounts to cross-examination will probably be excluded
Cudona v HM Advocate (1996)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Young girl arrested on suspicion of murder
• Questioned for uninterrupted period of 3 and a half hours
• Broke down and confessed
• Interrogation found to be in violation of art. 6, therefore her confession could not be used
• Suspect statements must be spontaneous and voluntary
• Cross-examination or interrogation problematic
• Leading or repetitive questioning likely to lead to exclusion of evidence
Peggie v Clark (1868)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (SCOTLAND) ACT 2016
Arrest w/out a warrant?
• Circumstances must be exceptional
• There must be reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been committed
• Prompt arrest must be justified by the seriousness of the crime
Saunders v UK (1996)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (SCOTLAND) ACT 2016
• Held by ECHR: an obligation to testify imposed by the law under the threat of a sanction violates convention
o Can’t be forced to testify to incriminate oneself
• The right not to incriminate oneself lies at the heart of a fair procedure and applies to all types of criminal proceedings. it is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent
• The right to incriminate oneself… does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the subject such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing
R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (2014)
ECHR ART 2
• In 2005, man suffered severe stroke which left him paralyzed from the neck down
o Wanted to end his life but couldn’t commit suicide without assistance
o Applied to the High Court for a declaration that either:
• It would be legal for a doctor to assist in his suicide; or
• The present legal regime concerning assisted suicide is incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Right to respect for private and family life)
• Held by ECHR: the question of assisted suicide falls within a state’s margin of appreciation
Pretty v UK (2002)
ECHR ART 2
• Woman dying of motor neuron disease, end stage would be distressing and undignified
o Wanted to determine when and how she would die
• But wasn’t in a position to commit suicide
• Wanted husband to help her
• But: assisting in a suicide is a crime in the UK
• Asked for assurance from Director of Public Prosecutors that he wouldn’t be charged…
o Request refused
• (ECHR Strasbourg) Court held: no violation of art. 2
o Right to life in article 2 could not be interpreted as conferring right to die
• State obliged to protect life, not the opposite
• So: no right to die, whether at hands of third person or by a public body
• Thus no right to assisted suicide either
McCann and Others v UK (1995)
ECHR ART 2
• UK authorities received intel that IRA terrorists planning attack
• 3 suspects, planning to detonate a car bomb
o One was a known explosives expert, the other two had been convicted of offences relating to explosives and terrorism
• Suspects seen crossing border, seen examining a parked car
o Soldiers inspected car, saw something that they suspected was a remote-controlled car bomb
• No attempt taken at that time to diffuse
• Decided that suspects should be arrested, officers instructed to use lethal force if necessary because of the device attached to the car
o In trying to arrest, suspects make moves as though reaching for something, soldiers think they’re reaching for remote or weapons and shoot them
• But, suspects didn’t have any weapons or detonating devices, and there was no bomb in that particular car, though there was a bomb found in Spain in a car registered to suspect
• Families of victims brought case against the UK for violation of article 2 paragraph 2
• Was this a proportionate response to the perceived threat? Was it absolutely necessary under the terms of Article 2 ECHR?
• Court said:
o “Absolutely necessary” is a stricter test than elsewhere in the convention (i.e. where their actions necessary for the protection of a democratic society?) -> actions of state subject to much stricter test than elsewhere
o # of factors considered by court
• Suspects were known by IRA, previously convicted for terrorism related offences, also had duty to protect people of Gibralter, as well as to soldiers
o Found that:
• Soldiers who shot suspects did not violate article two
• Use of force was justified as it was based on an honest belief which is perceived for good reason to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the state and its law enforcement personnel. There was no violation of Article 2 ECHR in this regard.
• They genuinely believed it was necessary to shoot to protect the life of innocents
o So use of force by agents of state can be justified when based on an honest belief that there were good reasons, which were valid at the time
• Found that the operation as a whole DID violate article 2
• Not enough was done to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to the use of lethal force. This violated the UK’s obligations under Article 2
Osman v UK (1997)
ECHR ART 2
• High school teacher developed “disturbing attachment” to a 14 year old student, Ahmed Osman
• Followed him home, took pictures of him, gave him money
• Policemen visited school, but nothing happened
• Teacher legally changed name so that it was very similar to that of Ahmed
o Headmaster alerts police
• Teacher examined on 3 separate occasions by psychiatrist
o Psychiatrist found that he was not technically mentally ill but he should be removed from the school immedietly
• Suspended, pending investigation
• After this, there were a number of attacks on Osman home, all reported to police
• Teacher investigated further befcause he drove his car into another student, because he was jealous of that student’s relationship with Ahmed
• Teacher asks to be interviewed by educational authority
o Hints at potentially carrying out a shooting
• Police go to home to arrest, but he’s gone
• Few months later, shoots and kills Ahmed’s father, wounds Ahmed,
• UK held to have infringed on right to life of Osman’s
• Article 2 implies duty to take positive action in certain cases to protect individuals
o Scope:
• Obligation to protect life has to be interpreted in such a way that it doesn’t impose unreasonable duty on authorities
o Test:
• “The authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk of life of an identified individual or individuals […] and they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.
Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle (2008)
ECHR ART 2
• Mr. Van Colle employes Mr. B at opticians practice
o After a few weeks, they got into a physical argument, Mr. B never comes back to work
o Later, B is arrested for stealing from another optician
• A lot of items found in his garage, including items he had stolen from Mr. Van Colle
o Mr. VC’s car set on fire under seemingly suspicious circumstances
• Police say not suspicious, insurance says suspicious
• Mr. VC doesn’t tell police what insurance says
o Mr VC gets threatening call from Mr B, urging him to drop charges
• VC calls and leaves message for police
o Before police can get to him, VC shot and killed by Mr. B
• Osmond test applied
o court should endeavour to place itself in the position of the police officer and “assess events as they unfolded through his eyes” per Lord Bingham at [32]
LCB v UK (1998)
ECHR ART 2
• British national diagnosed with Leukemia in 1970s
o in 1950s, her father was present during nuclear tests on Christmas Island
• Said because her dad was exposed to radiation, this led to her developing cancer
• UK failed to warn her parents of the possible risk to her health
• Held: no breach of article 2
o Radiation didn’t reach dangerous enough levels to warrant UK contracting soldiers
o Weren’t satisfied that there was a causal link
o Taking into account information available to UK at the time, UK had done all it was reasonably expected to do
Armani da Silva v UK (2016)
ECHR ART 2
• Applicant was a relative of Mr. Da Silva was mistakenly identified as a terrorist suspect and shot dead on 22 July 2005 (shortly after London underground bombings)
• Did investigation fulfill procedural requirement of art. 2?
• Found that investigation as a whole was within article 2
o Was an effective and thorough investigation into facts, involving all of the appropriate people
o ““The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had publicly accepted that he had been killed in error by special firearms officers. A representative of the MPS had flown to Brazil to apologise to his family face to face and to make an ex gratia payment to cover their financial needs. They were further advised to seek independent legal advice and assured that any legal costs would be met by the MPS. The individual responsibility of the police officers involved and the institutional responsibility of the police authority were considered in depth by the IPCC, the CPS, the criminal court, and the coroner and jury during the inquest. Later, when the family brought a civil claim for damages, the MPS agreed to a settlement with an undisclosed sum being paid in compensation. The decision to prosecute the police authority did not have the consequence, either in law or in practice, of excluding the prosecution of individual police officers as well. Neither was the decision not to prosecute any individual officer due to any failings in the investigation or the State’s tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts; rather, it was due to the fact that, following a thorough investigation, a prosecutor had considered all the facts of the case and concluded that there was insufficient evidence against any individual officer to meet the threshold evidential test”
NHS Trust A v M (2001)
ECHR ART 2
• Hospital wanted to withdraw artificial feeing/ hydrating of person in vegetative state
• Held: article 2 imposes positive obligation to give treatment, BUT not where it would be futile
o Discontinuing treatment would not be an intentional deprivation of life under Article 2, when withdrawing treatment was in line with a respected body of medical opinion
Charles Gard and Others v UK (2017)
ECHR ART 2
• Sick little boy, parents wanted him to receive very new, experimental treatment
o UK authorities said no
• Held: “Article 2 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as requiring access to unauthorised medicinal products for the terminally ill to be regulated in a particular way”
o Leaving it up to states
Al-Skeini and Others v UK (2011)
ECHR ART 2
• Applicants were relatives of Iraqi civilians killed in southern Iraq by British Armed Forces during occupation of Southern Iraq
• -> Was UK responsible under Art. 2 for their deaths?
o “A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial. Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory. Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases”
o UK is responsible for people within its territory, but in exceptional circumstances can apply extraterritorially:
• State agent authority and control (e.g. diplomatic staff working overseas)
• When there exists “effective control” over an area
• Where a contracting party to convention exercising some or all of the public powers ordinarily exercised by the government in that area
• Question of fact
• In this case, held that UK held this effective control over individuals killed during military operations
o TF convention applies
• Where contracting party detains a foreign national overseas and holds them in a facility controlled by them
Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence (2013)
ECHR ART 2
• Extraterritorial effect also applies to British soldiers
o “Servicemen and women relinquish almost total control over their lives to the state. It does not seem possible to separate them, in their capacity as state agents, from those whom they affect when they are exercising authority and control on the state’s behalf”
Tagayeva and Others v Russia
ECHR ART 2
• Terrorist attack on school in 2004
o 30 terrorists held over 1,000 people hostage
• Russian military launches counter-attack hundreds died
• Russia found in violation of article 2 for:
o Failing to take preventative steps or minimize terrorist attack
o Carrying out an ineffective investigation
o Being deficient in the planning of the rescue operation
o Not establishing clear framework for when lethal force could be used
Lingens v Austria (1986)
ECHR ART 10
• Mr. L edited magazine in Austria, published articles accusing chancellor of protecting former members of the SS, who themselves were active in politics
• Special Protection under Article 10 for the press. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance
Bladet, Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (1999)
ECHR ART 10
• Press fulfills an essential function in a democracy
• It is a “public watchdog” in imparting information of serious public concern
Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape (1976)
ECHR ART 10
o Richard Crossman was a member of government (Minister), kept diary during his time as cabinet minister
• Wanted to publish diary entries in a book
• Dies, but widow and friends want to continuing with publishing
o Publisher Jonathan Cape agrees
o Attorney General sought restraint on publication because believed it contained information about British government which should remain confidential (due to doctrine of collective responsibility)
• Also, Breach of Confidence, does this apply to ministers?
o Court held that it could be published, refused injunction
• In principle, there is a principle of Breach of Confidence which applies to Ministers, but
• ‘The Attorney-General must show:
o that such publication would be a breach of confidence;
o that the public interest requires that the publication be restrained, and
o that there are no other facts of the public interest contradictory of and more compelling than that relied upon.
• Moreover, the court, when asked to restrain such a publication, must closely examine the extent to which relief is necessary to ensure that restrictions are not imposed beyond the strict requirement of public need.’ Per Lord Widgery LCJ
• Issue of timing was very important
• 10 years had passed since diary entries were made
o Was unlikely that their publication would inhibit free discussion in the cabinet of the day