Philosophy of Mind

Question 1

What is meant by a mind?

Answer 1

The element in an individual which gives the ability to think and feel, it’s the faculty of consciousness and thought

Question 2

What is meant by phenomenal properties ?

Answer 2

is the quality within a mental state that refers to what it actually feels like to experience something

Question 3

What is the definition of qualia?

Answer 3

is an intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal property that is introspectively accessible

Question 4

What is meant by an intentional property?

Answer 4

mental representations about contents outside of the mind. Intentionality points to a relationship the mental state has to something beyond the mind. For example, when we have the mental state of desire, we are desiring something in the material world – the world outside of our minds

Question 5

What is the definition of Substance dualism?

Answer 5

The belief that minds exists and cannot be reduced down to our bodies

Question 6

What are the two substances present in substance dualism?

Answer 6

The physical – the material part of us. It has location, it is tangible, extendable, etc.

The mental – relating to the mind. It isn’t material; it is thought.

Question 7

What is the indivisibility argument for substance dualism?

Answer 7

P1: all physical objects are divisible as I can imagine them being divided up further, no matter how small the object gets. For example, cutting an apple into segments.

P2: Minds / mental states are not divisible because I cannot imagine them being divided. For example, dividing the mental state of hope.

P3: two things cannot be identical if they do not share all the same properties – Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identical law.

C1: Therefore, the mind and body cannot be the same thing, as they do not share the property of divisibility.

Question 8

What is the criticism to the indivisibility argument, stating the mental is in fact divisible?

Answer 8

Some philosophers believe the mind is best understood as a bundle of mental events (like perception, memories, emotions) and we can divide these qualities into categories. Therefore, the mind has been divided in some sense. Secondly, some parts of our mind are not available to us in the same sense other parts are (Like subconscious thought) therefore we can imagine it being divided through this line of reason also.

Question 9

What is the response to this criticism?

How is this countered?

Answer 9

we mustn’t mistake properties of the mind as its ability to be divided. The mind does not have location in the same sense physical objects do. So, although we may be able to loosely place certain mental states into categories, we cannot imagine breaking off one of these categories from the concept of the mind itself. For example, breaking off perception from the rest of the mind. It appears they are all so tightly connected and interlinked, that we still cannot truly conceive of the mind being divided, even when we do imagine these different categories, as these categories cross into other categories and they are reliant on one another to build the concept of the mind itself.

yet if we have been able to identify different properties, it is a leap to assume that this process could not go any further and be able to conceive more clearly of the mind being divided in the future. In actual fact, the only reason why we cannot conceive of the mind being divided as clearly as we’d like, is most of us are uncertain of what we are even meant to be thinking of when we think of “a mind”. If we had more clarity on what a mind was, it may be easier to conceive of its divisibility clearer.

Question 10

What is the criticism to the indivisibility argument, stating not everything physical is divisible?

Answer 10

Physical objects on face value seem easy to divide, yet once we imagine them in motion/in activity, we cannot conceive of its divisibility. For example, someone throwing a punch. The punch is entirely physical in its nature. Yet it is not clear how to divide a punch into parts/segments. Therefore, it seems there are in fact ways of talking about the physical world where it is not clear that division is possible.

Question 11

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 11

There are ways we can conceive of a physical object in action being divided. For example, the speed and force of the punch. It also remains true that we can still imagine the physical object in action being divided regardless of whether in activity or not.

Question 12

What is the conceivability argument for substance dualism?

Answer 12

P1: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my extended body

P2: anything that is conceivable is metaphysically possible

^Therefore it is metaphysically possible for my mind to exist without my body

P3: if it is metaphysically possible for two things to exist without one another, then those two things cannot be identical – due to Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identical law

C1: Therefore, my mind is not identical to my extended body

C2: Therefore, there are two types of substances

Question 13

What is the criticism to the conceivability argument, stating a mind without a body isn’t truly conceivable?

Answer 13

When we imagine a mind without a body, it still appears to be doing physical things, that would still require a body. Even a disembodied mind appears to have location and take a certain perspective and be able to take in physical information (like sound waves, light waves, etc). All of which seems to require a physical body. Thus, we’re actually just imagining a body with different restrictions and limitations than our current body – yet a body, nevertheless.

Question 14

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 14

Just because the thing we’re imagining leaving the body has some body-like properties (like location) doesn’t mean that it is a body itself. It also has non-body like properties, like not being subject to gravity. The mind in reality is a very complex concept, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise that it may share some qualities with different multiple concepts.

Question 15

What is the criticism to the conceivability argument, stating what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible ?

Answer 15

Conceivability (especially in areas we are not cot absolutely clear in our thinking) is not a sure guide to metaphysical possibility. For example, if you’re not fully comfortable with the theory of Pythagoras theorem, then it seems possible to conceive of mathematical truths that go against this theorem. Yet the underlying truth behind Pythagoras theorem remains, despite how we may conceive it. Thus, if we don’t know something for certain, we may conceive of stuff differently – showing how conceivability is not a good guide to possibility.

Question 16

What is this criticism response?

What is its counter-response?

Answer 16

this counter example shows a case of ignorance tainting conceivability. conceivability remains a good guide to metaphysical possibility when we use the tool correctly. Modern philosopher David Chalmers draws the distinction between “prima facie” conceivability which is conceivability without much rational reflection and “ideal” conceivability – conceivability with ideal rational reflection. If we were to rationally reflect on what we we’re conceiving, then we’d realize we don’t know enough about Pythagoras theorem to trust such conception. If this is a case of ideal conceivability, then issues that arise in cases of prima facie conceivability are not relevant to it.

yet sometimes we feel like we have clarity, or we feel justified in our rational reflection, yet it still turns out we were wrong. In this case we are not ignorant as we have done all the rational reflection we can, we’re just simply wrong regarding what we we’re conceiving. Thus, it is hard to weigh up or measure ignorance in order to justify using conceivability as a tool t metaphysical possibility, therefore we cannot rely on this distinction made by Chalmers.

Question 17

What is the criticism to the conceivability argument, stating what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?

Answer 17

Something maybe metaphysically possible in this world and yet not tell us anything more about reality. for example, it is metaphysically possible that I could be American, yet this tells us nothing about reality, as I’m actually British.

Descartes argument relies on the conceivability argument – stating what is conceivable is metaphysically possible. Yet we can conceive of lots of truths that would contradict substance dualism. For example, “the mind and the body are identical” is conceivable. So, under Descartes own premise of conceivability, we can use it to equally justify alternative theories, like physicalism. If both dualism and physicalism pass the test of conceivability, we are no closer to knowing which one is the true theory. Thus, his argument only supports the possibility of dualism, nothing else.

Question 18

What is this criticisms response?

Answer 18

David Chalmers draws the distinction between negative and positive conceivability. Something is negatively conceivable if it does not entail a contradiction, yet positively conceivable if it involves picturing a scenario using “modal imagination”. He states negative conceivability is more binding on metaphysical truths. In this sense, we may argue that given Descartes previous indivisibility argument and conceivability argument, he has given enough proof to show how his methods are not mere modal imaginations, as it remains true that the mind and the body do seem to have different properties, so we cannot rule off substance dualism under this criticism alone.

Question 19

What is property dualism?

Answer 19

There are at least some mental properties that are not reducible nor reliant on physical matter.

Question 20

How is property dualism different to substance dualism?

Answer 20

substance dualism states there are non-physical substances out in the world. Whereas property dualism states there aren’t any non-physical substances, instead there are non-physical properties of physical things.

Question 21

What is a philosophical zombie?

Answer 21

a being that is physically identical to a conscious being yet is not conscious themselves. They can emote and behave in the same way humans can. If they were to be ‘hurt’ they would respond in the same way a conscious being would, yet they don’t actually feel pain.

Question 22

What is the philosophical zombie argument?

Answer 22

The philosophical zombie argument is an argument against physicalism and in favour for property dualism: the view that although there is only one substance (the physical), mental properties are not identical to physical properties.

If mental states were identical to physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something with these physical properties to not have the mental states as well. The philosophical zombie shows how mental states cannot be deduced to physical properties.

P1: if phenomenal properties were identical to physical properties (physicalisms claim), then it would be metaphysically impossible for a being to have one without the other. The physical properties could not exist without the mental properties also existing.

P2: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible

P2: A philosophical zombie is conceivable, and thus possible

C1: phenomenal properties are therefore distinct from physical properties

C2: Property dualism must be true, as the two are distinct concepts

Question 23

What is the criticism to the philosophical zombie argument, stating a philosophical zombie is not actually conceivable?

Answer 23

Consciousness / qualia appears to be a necessary condition for us to conceive of a being who can emote, respond, etc.

Thus when we are conceiving of this philosophical zombie, we are actually just ignoring all of the mental properties and mental states that must be present for this human.

Therefore, the philosophical zombie argument assumes that we can conceive of such reality in the first place. in reality, this appears impossible once we really dissect what it is were meant to be thinking of right now.

Question 24

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 24

However, now we are stuck in an awkward situation where some are claiming that they can conceive of such zombie, and some are claiming that they cant.

In order to sway the argument, we may look at the supporting evidence for either side.

There appears to be modern examples which we can use to better support the philosophical zombie argument as being conceivable.

For example: if modern AI were to be taken one step further. If an AI algorithm in a replica body were to exert all the same behaviours and characteristics as a human, then this would be an example of a lack of consciousness / qualia, and yet still identical physical behaviours / traits.

Therefore, it appears that such scenario is conceivable, as it is starting to happen in modern day science.

Question 25

What is the criticism to the philosophical zombie argument, stating what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?

Answer 25

Conceivability (especially in areas we are not cot absolutely clear in our thinking) is not a sure guide to metaphysical possibility. For example, the masked man fallacy. Let’s imagine that a man who was wearing a mask robbed a bank. I conceived that it is not my father under the mask. Yet if it was actually my father, then it’s impossible for it to not had been my father. Yet this is contradictory to what I conceived – showing how we can conceive of the impossible. There is too big of a grey area between possibility and conceivability. Thus, if we don’t know something for certain, we may conceive of stuff differently – showing how conceivability is not a good guide to possibility.

Question 26

What is the response to this criticism?

What is its counter response?

Answer 26

the masked man fallacy only shows how we can conceive of the impossible when under complete ignorance. Descartes would argue there is no room for ignorance when conceiving of our own mind, if we understand it clearly and distinctly. Clear and distinct ideas are reliable and therefore we can draw conclusions from conceivability, as we’re just using these reliable previous thoughts.

Descartes assumes here however, how the mind appears to the mind, is an accurate representation of the mind itself. Yet neuroscientific discoveries show how we are very ignorant of the state of our own mind – for example subconscious mental states, etc. Thus, when we conceive of our mind separate from our body, we maybe conceiving of the impossible, under ignorance, as we would no longer usually claim that we are fully aware of all of the contents of our minds, especially the drivers behind our choices, actions and feelings.

Question 27

What is the criticism to the philosophical zombie argument, stating What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?

Answer 27

Even if Descartes shows how the mind being separate is conceivable and possible, we do not have to accept that this must be the case.

Something maybe metaphysically possible in this world, and yet still not tell us anything more about reality. For example, it is metaphysically possible that I could be American, yet this tells us nothing more about reality, as I’m actually British.

Equally, there are lots of possibilities in this world, that aren’t actually the case. Therefore, although a philosophical zombie maybe possible, it doesn’t tell us anything informative about THIS world.

It is possible minds are identical to the physical, and it is possible that they’re not - he has only shown metaphysical possibility; not certainty, or even likelihood.

Question 28

What is the Mary’s room argument, in support for property dualism?

Answer 28

Marys room looks to prove how there is other properties that are not physical ones in the world. It is an argument against physicalism – as if physicalism argues all properties are physical and thus we can only have knowledge on physical things. The argument is used to show how Mary does not have all the knowledge about colour, despite having all the physical knowledge.

P1: Mary is a top neuroscientist, and knows all the physical facts there are to know about colour

P2: Mary has however never seen colour herself

P3: When viewing colour for the first time, Mary doesn’t gain any new physical knowledge about colour, instead she gains phenomenal knowledge about colour

P4: phenomenal facts are not identical to physical facts

C1: physicalism is false, and property dualism is true

Physicalism is taken to be false due to the existence of non-physical facts. These non-physical facts are about non-physical properties – qualia. If such non-physical properties exist, then property dualism is true.

Question 29

What is the criticism to the Mary’s room argument, stating that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge, instead she gains ability knowledge?

Answer 29

Ability knowledge is the knowledge of how to do something - I know how to ride a bike. When Mary views color for the first time, she doesn’t gain any new propositional knowledge as she already knows it all, however she does gain ability knowledge – like the ability to imagine now the color red. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences, and so on.

Question 30

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 30

However, Mary is still a human being – she has a functioning brain, functioning senses, nervous system, eyes, etc. She has always had the ability to see color, she just simply hasn’t used that ability yet. She therefore doesn’t gain a new ability, as she has always been able to do this, just has never been given the opportunity. Thus, this does not explain the new knowledge she has gained.

Question 31

What is the criticism to the Mary’s room argument, stating that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge, instead she gains acquaintance knowledge ?

Answer 31

Acquaintance knowledge is the knowledge of something - I know of Fred. Mary knows all the propositional facts there are about red – without being acquainted with the knowledge of redness. Mary is not acquainted with the knowledge of redness because her brain has never seen red before. But when she sees red, the property of redness becomes acquainted to all her other propositional knowledge of red. For example, you can know all the physical facts there are about your celebrity crush. You can know where they live, what they do, what they like, etc. Yet you cannot say that you know them, until you have met them. The same way of thinking applies here.

Question 32

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 32

it appears she gains both types of knowledge – not just acquaintance. In seeing red, she can now form new propositional statements that she knows to be true – for example knowing “the property of redness feels like this”. Whilst these new positional facts are only known subjectively (due to the nature of qualia) they are still in addition to the physical facts.

Question 33

What is the criticism to the Mary’s room argument, stating that Mary gains new positional knowledge, but this is new knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way – the new knowledge, old fact argument?

Answer 33

There is more than one way to know the same fact. Yet it is possible to know one way of knowing this fact, and not the other ways. For example: “I know there is water in this glass” and “I know there is H20 in this glass” are the same fact. Yet I can know there is water in the glass, without knowing its elements are H20. I gain nothing new when I find out water’s elements are H20, instead I just gain a new way of knowing this same old fact. The same logic can be applied for Mary’s case. Before she saw the color, Mary knew all the physical facts about color there is to know. She doesn’t gain any new facts when she sees color, she just gains a different way of knowing these facts.

Thus the fact pile remains unchanged - nothing new has been added to it. but there’s now new routes to understand the same fact you already knew.

Question 34

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 34

Yet if this new route is a phenomenal route, and this phenomenal route is a new addition to how we previously knew how we could arrive at a propositional fact - then surely this new route in itself is an example of phenomenal knowledge.

The elements of H20 are new facts, they are physical, and they do not alter the original fact of knowing there is a glass of water, but they are new information and new facts. Likewise, the phenomenal experience is a new fact. It was not present before the original experience, and could not have been present, since it consists in (is intrinsic to) the phenomenal experience. To reduce the phenomenal to mere perspective is to lose the content of the phenomenal in this experience

Question 35

What are the two wider problems with substance dualism?

Answer 35

1) the problem of other minds
2) Dualism makes a category mistake

Question 36

What is the wider problem with substance dualism, stating the problem of other minds?

Answer 36

Substance dualism states the mind and the body exists and they cannot be reduced down to one another - they are their own concept. They believe the mind is non-physical while the body is physical. Yet there is nothing readily accessible or observable about a non-physical concept other than introspection. I know my own mind exists because I can introspect. Yet this same method cannot be used to conclude other people’s minds exist. The only thing we can go off to conclude other people’s minds exist is their behaviours - yet this a physical concept, and thus cannot be used to conclude a non-physical concept exists. Therefore substance dualism creates the problem of skepticism about other people’s minds.

Question 37

What is the first response to the problem of other minds, stating the argument from analogy?

Answer 37

This response states as I know my own mind, and as other people so closely mimic the human behaviours of my own, then it is likely they also have minds.

P1: I have mental states of certain kinds

P2: For me, I know they are caused by certain inputs (any sort of event) and met with certain outputs (like behaviours)

P3: Other bodies have similar kinds of inputs and have similar kinds of outputs to my own

P4: Similar effects usually have similar causes

C1: It is therefore likely that other bodies have minds too

Question 38

What is the response to the counter response to this?

Answer 38

This argument relies on the fact we trust that similar effects have similar causes. Maybe this response has confused the correlation of human behaviors to its causation. The effects caused by mental properties also seem to vary so much from person to person, that it’s hard to claim this principle can be applied to states of the mind. For example, the effects of someone crying may have two completely different types of causes – either through happiness or sadness.

Question 39

What is the second response to the problem of other minds, stating the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis?

Answer 39

The best hypothesis looks for the best explanation in a complex area of thought.
Given other peoples complex behaviours, creativity and complex deep discussion, it is the best hypothesis that this all comes from a mind - as this is what holds the strongest explanation for the origin of other peoples complex existence, that mimics my own. This explains how we’re able to grow relationships with one another. This explanation holds the most metaphysical groundwork.

Question 40

What is the criticism of this response?

What is the counter to this?

Answer 40

This commits the fallacy of Occams razor.
Just because it’s the simplest response, doesn’t make it the most accurate response. There maybe another explanation with the same explanatory power as the best hypothesis.

how do we know that everyone else also having minds is the simplest explanation? It may only seem that way because solipsism is so farfetched from how we interact in the world. Yet just because solipsism isn’t the simplest explanation, this doesn’t mean its metaphysically impossible, or unlikely. What if instead there was an evil demon who was making us feel like other’s behaviors is a trustworthy source of someone’s mind – when in reality there is no other mind? The best hypothesis fails to eradicate skepticism.

However, if there is an evil demon making us feel like other people have minds is a trustworthy inference, this still requires for the evil demon itself to have its own mind. And if we can conceive of the evil demon having a mind and myself also having a mind, it doesn’t feel farfetched to conclude others may also have minds – seeing as I know I am not the only one with one.

Question 41

What is the argument against substance dualism, stating it makes a category mistake?

Answer 41

Ryle argues the language we use to talk about the mind confuses us about the logical category the mind belongs to.

Category mistake – is a logical mistake where we apply a property/description to something that, due to the category of that thing, makes no sense to apply such property to it. For example, taking the category of a table, and applying concepts to it that don’t make any sense – like a table’s voting rights. The concept of voting rights does not align to the concept of a table. Youa re therefore applying a property to something that does not belong in the concept of that thing.

Instead, the mind is a collection of behaviors. Substance dualism makes a mistake when it applies the concept of the mind to the category of “stuff”. We assume the mind is a “thing” and when we figure out it is not a physical thing we’re led to conclude it is a non-physical thing – yet this is a category mistake.

Question 42

What is an example of a category mistake?

Answer 42

Imagine you are being shown around a university – you are shown the lecture halls, the exam rooms, the classes, etc. At the end of the tour, you say okay I have seen all those things; can I now see the university? Yet the answer would be that you’ve already seen the university – to assume it is anything more than this bundle of things is a category mistake.

Question 43

What is the response to this criticism?

Answer 43

Though a category mistake here is possible, the concept in question must be proven false before we explain how it is a category mistake - Ryles has jumped a key premise here:

He assumes that substance dualism is false and then goes on to explain what this error is and how it’s occurred. Yet if we can give a successful argument to defend substance dualism; then it hasn’t made a category mistake.

Question 44

what is meant by interactionist dualism?

Answer 44

interactionist dualism states the mind and body interact with one another. The mind can influence the body (like emotional response) and the body can influence the mind (like heat)

Question 45

what is the criticism from the conceptual interaction problem?

Answer 45

P1: There are necessary conditions for causation - for example: location, energy transfer, etc

P2: what is conceivable is metaphysically possible

P3: I cannot conceive of an interaction between the physical and non-physical because it doesn’t meet the necessary conditions

C1: interaction between the two is impossible

Question 46

what is the response and counter response to this?

Answer 46

Response: Descartes tried to respond to this criticism suggesting that interaction between the mind and body may take place in the pineal gland. This gland meets the necessary conditions for interaction - it has location, etc. He believed imagination and perception took place in this gland and viewed it as the gland that connected the mind, soul and body.

Counter-response: There is no evidence in modern day science to support this claim. Infact, Descartes at the time believed that humans were the only ones to have this pineal gland and took this as evidence we are different. This response also doesn’t capture the original argument – Descartes states where the interaction would take place, not how.

Question 47

what is the empirical problem for an interactionist dualist?

Answer 47

Science has a long history of being able to explain once mysteries in physical terms. For example, gravity used to be a mystery until modern science came about.

Interactionist dualism and modern science are incompatible.

P1: The universe is a closed causal system, in which the total amount of energy remains constant

P2: Any non-physical to physical would have to involve an addition of energy to the physical world

C1: Interaction between the physical and non-physical is scientifically impossible

Question 48

what is the response to this?

Answer 48

P1 is a scientific assumption that works well, but science is not complete and we do not have a complete scientific description of everything in the universe, so saying that the universe is definitely a closed causal system is a stronger claim than current scientific evidence permits – it is a working assumption, not a proven conclusion.

Question 49

what does Epiphenomenalist dualism mean?

Answer 49

Epiphenomenalist dualism states the body influences the mind, yet the mind doesn’t influence the body. Phenomena in the mind comes from physical events. These mental events are casually impotent – they do not have any other effect.

Question 50

what is the challenge from introspective knowledge for Epiphenomenalist dualism?

Answer 50

Introspection is the act of observing your own mind. We feel like we can gain knowledge of the operations of our minds through this introspection. Introspective knowledge is acquired through direct awareness – it does not require for me to figure it out through other means. Yet epiphenomenalism claims that mental states are casually inert. This goes against our experience of our mind and how it relates to the external world. For example, if I hit my own foot, I notice I am in pain through introspection. The mental state of pain has caused my belief that I am in pain and should therefore use an ice pack.

Question 51

what is the response to this?

Answer 51

it appears we have mistaken correlation with causation here. it is just a coincidence that mental states usually align with the physical. The physical events are causing the mental events AND causing the physical events that follow. We are therefore confused and believe that it is the mental events causing further physical events, when really it is still the result of the original physical event.

Question 52

what is the challenge imposed from our mental life for Epiphenomenalist dualism?

Answer 52

phenomenology means the study of the mind and how we experience it. There seems to be causal connection from the mind. Our inner experience of our mind and its casual powers is direct awareness of the casual power, and therefore is strong evidence that mental events are not inert.

^mental states cause other mental states. I have first-hand experience of one mental event (like sadness) causing another mental event (like anger). The operations inside our minds create further operations.

^mental states cause other physical behaviours. I am aware first hand of my mental events causing physical events. For example: i have the desire to get an A in philosophy, so I revise (the physical)> it is unlikely id revise as much, if this mental state wasn’t present. Therefore, actions seem reliant on mental states, as otherwise it is unclear what would motivate them, if the mental events themselves were causally inert.

Question 53

what is the response to this?

Answer 53

Although it remains true that usually a physical event follows a mental event, we never actually experience this “casual connection”. This again is the problem of causation vs correlation.

Question 54

why does natural selection / evolution pose an issue for Epiphenomenalist dualism?

Answer 54

Natural selection is the theory that organisms which better adapt to their surroundings, have an advantage of survival, and therefore their genes are more likely to be passed on. Those without such trait, are more likely to die. This suggests only traits with survival advantages evolve, and are passed on. However, if the mind is casually inert, then by definition it cannot provide any advantage to survival. This means consciousness cannot be naturally selected and therefore could not have evolved. However, this isn’t true, as we are conscious, and the mind has in fact evolved. Therefore, as there is more evidence for evolution than there is for epiphenomenalism, and as the two conflict, we’d have to claim that epiphenomenalism is therefore false.

Question 55

what is the response to this?

Answer 55

mental states may be a by-product of the process of evolution. Not everything in the process of evolution serves a specific purpose. for example, why does the human body still have a tail bone?

Question 56

what is meant by Physicalism?

Answer 56

everything is physical or supervenes to the physical – including substances, properties, events, etc. It denies the existence of anything non-physical, and therefore tends to be devoted to scientific methods of gaining knowledge.

Question 57

what is meant by hard behaviourism?

Answer 57

Hard behaviourism - is a strand of physicalism that states all there is to the mind is behaviours. They believe both an ontological and semantic reduction can occur without loss of meaning.
While investigating the mind we must investigate something accessible and observable – behaviours are both accessible and observable.

A semantic reduction can therefore occur as all mental language can be translated into physical descriptions / behavioural talk. For example, the mental state of being happy, can be described through endorphins, dopamine, high pitch voice, etc.

Question 58

what is soft behaviourism?

Answer 58

Soft behaviourism – is a strand of physicalism that states ontologically all there is the mental is behaviours, yet a semantic reduction cannot occur due to how society uses mental language.

You cannot do a comprehensive translation of mind talk into behavioural talk, even though this mind talk is ultimately not referring to anything outside of behaviours. There are so many different ways a behaviour could reflect a feeling – for example, feeling sad or happy could both result in the behaviour of crying. This complexity behind behaviours is why we use “mind talk” as it is a simpler description. Thus there would be a loss of meaning if a semantic reduction occurred.

Question 59

what is the similarities and differences between hard and soft behaviourism?

Answer 59

Both accept an ontological reduction – they both believer underlying there is only physical matter. However, they disagree on whether a semantic reduction can occur.

Question 60

what is the criticism from the distinctiveness between mental states and behaviours (super-Spartans and perfect actors) - against hard behaviourism?

Answer 60

If all talk about the mind can be reduced to talk about physical behaviours, then there is an issue if we have a perfect actor. Imagine a perfect actor called the “super-spartan”. These are people who refuse to show any visible sign that they are in pain. Therefore, even when they are going through conditions that we’d imagine to be extremely painful (like burning), as they do not show any behaviour of being in pain, we’d have to claim they are not in pain.

If hard behaviourism is true, then ‘X’ is in pain must be identical to X’s bodily movements.

However, although no behaviour entailing pain is shown, it would seem contradictory under the conditions to claim that someone being burnt is not feeling pain. We would want to state that they are in fact feeling pain, they are just not expressing it through their behaviours. In their head they maybe thinking “this pain is intolerable” yet this internal thought is not observable, and therefore hard behaviourism has no way to explain how mind talk can be fully reduced to behaviours, if behaviours are not present.

Question 61

what is the response and counter response?

Answer 61

response – A soft behaviourist can respond to this by stating the person feeling this heat still has the disposition to pain behaviours, yet for some reason it just hasn’t resulted in a behaviour.so even if there is no pain behaviour, there is still a behavioural disposition which we can analyse the term “pain” into.

counter-response – yet if a race existed where there is a culture of never displaying pain, then they wouldn’t even have the disposition of pain behaviour, as they have never seen it. However, they would still be in pain nevertheless. Thus, there would be a mental term that could not be analysed in terms of a behaviour, making soft behaviourism false.

Question 62

what is the criticism from the issues defining mental states due to a) circularity and b) the multiple ways we can realise a mental state through behaviours?

Answer 62

A) Bridging mental states to dispositions causes an issue of circularity. For example, we may bridge the mental belief that it’s raining to the behaviour of picking up an umbrella. Yet this assumes various other mental states, like the desire to not get wet. This process of linking a mental state to a disposition creates an infinite chain of explanations and so cannot be analysed properly.

Thus, the mental state we try to analyse will always involve the analyse of something that involves another mental state, making it too circular.

B) Multiple realisability is where we may come to realise a certain mental state through multiple, different behaviours –that all point to one mental state. When someone has the mental state of feeling anxious, this can be shown through behaviours of going quiet, or excessively talking. These two behaviours are entirely different in nature, and yet still point to the same mental state. This poses an issue for a reductionist theory. If “anxious” can be reduced by definition to excessively talking, it then can’t also be reduced to something entirely different.

Question 63

what is the response to this?

Answer 63

However, this seems to only pose an issue for the hard behaviourist. Soft behaviourism believes that mental terms can also be analysed in terms of their behavioural dispositions. Yet dispositions are not tied to a single behaviour – they require observation of multiple behaviours in multiple contexts to determine. Thus, because soft behaviourism doesn’t reduce mental terms into specific behaviours, it doesn’t face the issue of multiple realisability.

Question 64

what is the criticism form the asymmetry between self-knowledge and the knowledge of other people’s mental states?

Answer 64

Both Hard and Soft behaviourists claim that we gain knowledge about the mind by observing behaviours. Since everyone’s behaviours are public, including my own, I must know as much about my own mind as I know about anyone else’s mind. However, this seems false, as I can acquire knowledge on my own mind through self-introspection, which is not observable by others, only myself. Due to this factor, claims on self-knowledge seems better supported than claims on other people’s minds. No one else can correct me on what my own mind is thinking as only I have direct access to this. Yet if I made an observation based off observation alone on someone else, they are in the position to correct me and state that’s not what they were thinking / feeling.

Question 65

what is the response and counter response to this?

Answer 65

Response – yet we can imagine times where claims on self-knowledge is in fact corrected / proven wrong by others who have observed us. For example, a therapist who talks with their patients through their emotions. The patient may state that they feel angry, yet as the therapist observes them more they release they are not angry, they are sad. All the therapists would’ve had access to in order to draw such conclusion is our behaviours.

Counter-response: Yet this response ignores the issue of self-introspection as a whole. The objection is I gain self-knowledge through introspection, yet I cannot gain knowledge on others through introspection. Thus, this hasn’t explained the asymmetry of the ways of gaining knowledge depending on who I’m observing – myself or someone else.

Question 66

what is the criticism from dualists arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism?

(philosophical zombie)

Answer 66

For example, philosophical zombie argument shows how we can conceive of a human that is exerting all the same behaviours as a conscious being, yet lacks qualia.

However, if all there was to the mind was behaviours, then we wouldn’t be able to conceive of this different between the philosophical zombie and a conscious being.

Question 67

What is the mind-brain type identity theory?

Answer 67

A reductionist, physicalist theory of the mind, that states the mind / mental properties are ontologically reducible to the brain – they are the same thing. Mental states are really just chemical reactions in the brain that we can observe scientifically.

The theory however is not analytically reductive theory, however. Our language and how we use words are not designed to reference brain states, yet this is ultimately all that they’re referring to. Although there is only one type of substance present here (the brain – the physical) this doesn’t mean language can be reduced to only brain states. For example:

There is a person called Joe Eden. He is known by his students as Mr Eden, yet by his children as Dad. These relations ultimately refer to only one person: Joe Eden. Yet each name cannot be replaced by one another without a loss of meaning. For example: his students calling him Dad instead. However, the ultimate reference of all phrases are identical: Joe Eden.

As the theory is a type of identity theory, it holds that all mental states have a corresponding neural state. For example, the mental state of pain can be reduced to c-fibres in the brain.

Question 68

what is the criticism of MBTIT, stating there are multiple ways we can realise a mental state?

Answer 68

A mental state can be realised differently in different people’s brains. This leads to issues around the claim that an ontological reduction can take place – as it appears there isn’t a clear identity. When people are put through brain scans during a certain mental state (like Joy) there is not a consistent, identical brain pattern that applies to everyone – even if there is similarity present. There are individual differences, so it doesn’t seem possible to say a certain mental state can be reduced down to a certain brain state – if this mental state has multiple possible corresponding brain states. If there is multiple identities, then an ontological reduction cannot occur – due to Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identical law.

Question 69

what is the response to this criticiscm?

Answer 69

One response is Functionalism (so rather than identify mental states with brain states, they identify mental states with functional states realised, in our case, in a brain) OR to stay within main-brain identity theories, there is the mind-brain TOKEN identity theory, which holds that every mental state is identical to a physical state, but each token (individual instance) can be realised in a different physical state (so there can be ‘Grace-pain’ which is realised and is identical to a physical state in Grace’s brain and there is octopus-pain which is realised and is identical to a physical state in the octopus).

Question 70

what is the criticiscm of MBTIT from dualist arguments? (Marys room)

Answer 70

For example, Marys room. Marys room makes us imagine a women who has all the physical knowledge there is to know about colour. yet once she views colour for the first time, she gains something else - she gains a phenomenal fact.

This therefore cannot be reduced down to her brain state alone, as she already had all the physical knowledge stored in her physical brain. instead there seems to be a gain of something non-physical - the phenomenal.

Question 71

What is the theory of eliminative materialism?

Answer 71

A physicalist theory that doesn’t believe the mind exists at all – all there is, is the physical, and this is the brain. It is not a reductionist theory, as it completely eliminates mental states all together. Mental states do not exist, and our current understanding is greatly mistaken. Everything that is believed to be mental will someday be explained in terms of the physical. ontologically, all there is, is the brain.

Question 72

what is meant by folk psychology?

Answer 72

Folk psychology – the everyday language and understanding about the mind. This is every day, unscientific beliefs that help us get through, before science finds the real mechanism / explanation. For example, folk medicine – the idea drinking brandy gets rid of a sore throat. This folk psychology is ultimately succeeded (and replaced) by true scientific understanding later on. This will eventually also happen with our concept of “the mind” - science will progress, and ultimately show that the mind doesn’t exist, only the physical. This process has already started to happen – like depression being linked with certain chemicals in the brain. This aligns with the progress of science as a whole – for example, scientists used to believe that light was its own fundamental concept, yet as science progressed they found out light is actually on the electromagnetic spectrum.

Question 73

what is the criticism of eliminative materialism, stating that our certainty of our mental states takes priority over other considerations?

Answer 73

I have introspective and direct access to my own mind, which gives me a level of certainty about its existence which outweighs any consideration that eliminative materialism gives that the mind can and should be eliminated – it is not merely a folk ‘construct’ but is, instead, a reality which I experience immediately all of the time.

Question 74

what is the response to this?

Answer 74

Yet certainty itself is not a sure guide to actuality. Folk beliefs have existed in the past like witch hunting, where there was a high level of certainty involved – which we now know to be false. This “immediate certainty” could be a complete facade, and we may only feel this way because we are so embedded in our current folk psychology / belief system.

Question 75

what is the criticism of eliminative materialism, stating that folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory powers (best hypothesis)?

Answer 75

There are good examples where ‘folk psychology’ has been helpful in predicting and explaining - like understanding people’s behaviours. For example, I can predict that someone who has a strong sense of pride, is going to react with anger when purposely embarrassed. This all involves understandings of beliefs and emotions (folk psychology concepts!). Moreover, many scientific investigations of brain and of human behaviour make use of minds – CBT, for example, definitely uses emotions and beliefs as core aspects of its theory (so much so, even the NHS funds it). In neuroscience too, many neuroscientists are looking to explain folk psychology concepts (e.g. what is happiness like in terms of brain processes, or what happens in the brain during sadness) rather than eradicating folk psychology concepts like emotions and thoughts.

Question 76

what is the response to this?

Answer 76

The neuroscientist could argue that these predictions and explanations are working despite their links with folk psychology – this is just a coincidence, and these folk psychology concepts so happen to be also present. They may also re-emphasise the number of areas where folk psychological concepts do not appear to be much help, such as in human learning, sleep, and quite a lot of neurodiversity’s and mental health conditions.

Question 77

what is the criticism of eliminative materialism, stating that eliminative materialism is self-refuting?

Answer 77

According to folk psychology we have mental states, including beliefs. The eliminative materialist states that folk psychology is false, including ‘beliefs’ which are a mental state with intentionality (a property that the eliminative materialists are keen to eliminate). To assert that folk psychology is false involves the expression of a belief: the belief that folk psychology is false. This is self-contradictory as it cannot be that the eliminative materialist both claim there are no beliefs (along with all other mental states with qualia and/or intentionality) and that they believe folk psychology is false (as they cannot hold beliefs at all). The is circular.

Question 78

what is the theory of functionalism?

Answer 78

Functionalism holds that all mental states can be characterised into their functional role, and these functional roles can be realised in multiple different ways.

For example, the relationship between a computer (the brain) and its software (the mind).

It is not ontologically reductive, but it is reductive in another sense: it reduces mental states to function states (which can be realised in a whole array of different material or non-material ways).

Functionalism therefore moves from debating what the mind is made out of, to asking what its function is instead. For exmaple: what makes a mouse trap, a mouse trap? It is made out of metal and wood, yet these things alone do not tell us it is a mouse trap. Instead, we understand the physical object by its function to catch a mouse, not by what it is made of.

A function is what something does. What something does can be understood as what output results from a certain input. The total description of someone’s function is a list of all its possible inputs and all its possible outputs – this total list is what the mind really is.

Question 79

what is the criticism to functionalism, stating the the issue of a possible functional duplicate with inverted qualia?

Answer 79

Inverted qualia – what I perceive as blue, you may perceive as red, yet although we experience these colours different, we still use the same words for them. So, although I see your version of blue when I view red, we both still say red. This is inverted qualia.

This poses an issue for functionalism, as the input of looking at red results in the same output. Therefore, their functions are identical, but their qualia (and thus type of mental state) is different. Therefore, we cannot state all the mind is, is its function, as in this scenario they are two different things.

Question 80

what is the response to this?

Answer 80

what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. Although we can conceive of an inverted qualia scenario, it is unclear how likely this actually is.

Arguably there would remain functional differences between the person who sees red and the person who sees blue. For exmaple, red is meant to be an energising colour, while blue is meant to be a calming colour – this is why different pills have different colours to contribute towards this placebo effect. Therefore, if we created a set of inputs that would show this functional difference – like showing them both the colour red and then measuring their hormones – we’d see how functionally they are not the same, and how maybe the whole concept of inverted qualia isn’t conceivable under functionalism.

Equally, its hard to conceive how such complex language could develop if inverted qualia was possible. Surely at some stage, the difference in our qualia would be made clear, due to how we would function differently.

Question 81

what is the criticism of functionalism, stating the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia (Ned Blocks China though experiment) ?

Answer 81

Functionalism holds that anything that performs the function of the mind, can be considered a mind – as this is all the mind is. Yet this brings into question: what make something conscious?

Ned uses China as an example as they have a close population to the number of neurons in the brain. Imagine each person in China has a walky-talky that could communicate with other Chinese people (like how neurons communicate with one another). In this sense, they simulate the actions and the functions of a brain. They would then send all their inputs into some artificial body. This is known as the “Chinese brain” - as everyone in China is mimicking the function of a brain. Would this body be conscious? It appears that it wouldn’t, as although it mimics the function of the brain, we don’t think the China brain is conscious. Instead, something else seems to be missing from this function that would create consciousness. Consciousness seems like a more personal, deeper concept that merely inputs and outputs.

Question 82

what is the response to this?

Answer 82

the functionalist may respond by stating the Chinese brain is a poor analogy of the human brain. The Chinese mind isn’t functionally identical to a human mind, as its function can be affected by factors like access to electricity, etc. Equally, functionalism isn’t committed to the view that anything could become a mind – only substances which are fully capable of performing the function of a mind. Thus, the functionalist could argue that people with radios do not mimic the structure of a neuron well enough to be considered a mind.

Question 83

what is the criticism to functionalism, from Marys room?

Answer 83

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Question 84

what is the response?

Answer 84

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