Philosophy And Religion

Question 1

Omnipotence (supporting argument for the concept of God)

Answer 1

Power is the ability to do things. As perfect, God will have perfect power, or the most power possible.

Counter:
But does anything include the logically impossible? Could God make 2+2=5? Could God create a married bachelor? Some philosophers say there is no limit to God’s power. However, there is simply no way we can meaningfully say this
Reply: aquinas

Question 2

Aquinas, summa theologica (supporting argument for the concept of God)

Answer 2

Aquinas argues that the correct understanding of God’s omnipotence is that God can do anything possible. What is impossible is a contradiction in terms - the words that you use to describe the impossible literally contradict each other. So any description of a logically impossible state of affairs or power is not a meaningful description, because it contains a contradiction. What is logically impossible is not anything at all

Question 3

Supreme goodness (supporting argument for the concept of God)

Answer 3

If goodness just is perfection, then saying God is perfectly good is just to say that God is perfectly perfect - or the most perfect possible being. There is more than one way to be perfect, and God is perfect in all ways. This is a metaphysical sense of ‘goodness’

The other sense of ‘goodness’, which is the sense in which I will understand it in our discussion, is the moral sense. In this sense, ‘God is perfectly good’ means God’s will is always in accordance with moral values

Plato and Augustine connect the two understandings of perfect goodness. What is perfect includes what is morally good; evil is a rule of ‘lack’, a ‘falling short’ of goodness. If evil is a ‘lack’ or ‘failure’, what is morally good is more (metaphysically) perfect than what is not.

Question 4

Eternal and everlasting (supporting argument for the concept of God)

Answer 4

Being perfect, God is self-sufficient, dependent on nothing else for existence. If something brought God into existence, God would be dependent on that thing to exist. If there were something that could end God’s existence, then God is equally dependent on that thing to continue to exist. If God depends on nothing else, then nothing can bring God into existence or end God’s existence. And so (if God exists) God’s existence has no beginning or end.

There are two ways in which this can be expressed. If God exists in time, then God’s existence is everlasting - God exists throughout all time. If God exists outside time, then God’s existence is eternal - God is timeless. In this case, God has no beginning or end because the ideas of beginning and end only make sense in time - something can onto start or stop existing in time. God is not in time, so God cannot start or stop existing

Question 5

Paradox of the stone (counter for omnipotence + reply)

Answer 5

Can God create a stone that he can’t lift? If the answer is ‘no’, then God cannot create a stone. If the answer is ‘yes’, then God cannot lift the stone. So either way, it seems, there is something God cannot do. If there is something God can’t do, then God isn’t omnipotence.

Reply: George mavrodes argues that this famous paradox makes an assumption, it presupposes the possibility of something logically impossible. The claim that someone, x, can make something that is too heavy for x to lift, is not normally self contradictory. However, it becomes self contradictory - logically impossible - when x is an omnipotent being. ‘A stone an omnipotent being cant lift’ is not a possible thing; a self stone an omnipotent being cant lift’ is not a possible power. If God lacks it, God still doesn’t lack any possible power.

Question 6

Can God be omnipotent and perfectly, or supremely, good? (Counter for supreme goodness and reply)

Answer 6

1) to commit evil is to fail to be supremely good
2) if God is supremely good, then God cannot commit evil
3) therefore, if God is supremely good, there is something that God cannot do.
4) Therefore, God cannot be both supremely good and omnipotent

Reply:

1) God has the power to commit evil, and he can will it, so he is omnipotent. However, he always chooses not to, so he is supremely good.
2) there is no distinct ‘power to commit evil’, because ‘evil’ doesn’t name a distinct act. To commit evil, God would have to do something, e.g. Hurt someone justifiably. God has all the powers to bring this about - there is no power he lacks to do whatever the evil act would be - but chooses not to act in that way
3) aquinas argues that there is no distinct ‘power to commit evil’, because evil is not a ‘something’, but an absence of good. Asking whether God can commit evil is like asking whether God can fail. Being ‘able’ to fail is not power; failing demonstrates a lack of power to succeed. There is no ‘power to commit evil’ as committing evil is the result of the lack of power to do good. As God does not lack the power to good, God cannot commit evil.

Question 7

The Euthyphro dilemma + tautology (counter for supreme goodness & reply)

Answer 7

1) is God good because what he wills is good
or
2) does God follow a moral code.

If 1 is true then God could say that killing children is good and it would have to be seen as good.

If 2 is true then this would mean that God is not omnipotent and thus not perfect as if suggests that there is a constraint on God.

If 1 is true then it is a tautology to say: ‘God is good’ as this is the same as saying ‘God wills what God wills’

Counter: God is good ‘ means ‘God is good to us’, I.e God loves us and wants the best for us, which is independent of what God wills

Reply: but then, there is some standard of what good is, namely what is best for us, which is independent of what God wills

Another counter:
‘God is good’ should be understood metaphysically, not morally: ‘God is good’ just means that God has all perfections.

Reply: but then what is the connection between the metaphysical sense of ‘good’ and the moral sense of ‘good’? Does God being perfect entail that God is morally good? If so then it’s still a tautology

Question 8

Free will argument (counter for omniscience)

Answer 8

How can humans have free will if God knows what we will decide to do? If I am free, I must be able to decide whether to do something or not. If God knows what I will do or what I would’ve done, then I then have no free will. If i am free then God is not omniscient.

Reply:
Because of free will, it is impossible for anyone including God to know the future
Reply: kenny
Just because God knows what I am going to do, does not mean I cannot choose freely

Question 9

Kretzmann - omniscience and immutability (counter for omniscience and reply)

Answer 9

Kretzmann argues that God cannot be omniscient and immutable.

1) a perfect being is not subject to change
2) a perfect being knows everything
3) a being that knows everything always knows what time it is
4) a being that always knows what time it is is subject to change
5) therefore, a perfect being is subject to change
6) therefore, a perfect being is not a perfect being
7) therefore, there is no perfect being.

Question 10

Omniscience (supporting argument for the concept of God)

Answer 10

Perfect knowledge is usually taken to mean omniscience. Knowing everything.

However, it can be argued that God is the most perfect possible being, and perhaps it is impossible to know everything. For example, if human beings have free will, then perhaps it is not possible to know what they will do in the future. So let us say for now that omniscience means ‘knowing all the truths that it is possible to know’

Omniscience is not just a matter of what God knows, but also how God knows. Aquinas argues that God knows everything that he knows ‘directly’, rather than through inference or through understanding a system of representation (such as language or thinking in terms of proposition). Other philosophers disagree, and argue that if God doesn’t know all true propositions, then there is something God doesn’t know; so God has propositional knowledge as well as direct knowledge.

Question 11

Ontological argument

Answer 11

Claim that we can deduce the existence of God from the concept of God.

(A priori)

Question 12

Anselm, proslogium (supporting argument for ontological + Gaunilo’s counter + reply)

Answer 12

1) by definition, God is a being greater than which cannot be conceived
2) (we cannot coherently conceive of such a being, I.e. The concept is coherent)
3) it is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind
4) therefore, God must exist

Anselm uses the supporting argument of:
Think of y and x.
X we cannot conceive not to exist but y we cannot, therefore y is greater than x.

Counter:
1) it seems coherent to say that ‘God does not exist’
2) Gaunilo ‘in the behalf of the fool’ - we can conceive how great this being would be if it existed but that doesn’t prove that it exists.
He then uses the perfect island example:
I can conceive an island that is greater than any other island. And so such an island must exist, because it would be less great if it didn’t. This is ridiculous, so the ontological argument must be flawed.

Reply:

1) You do not understand the concept of God if you say this
2) the ontological argument only works for God, and so this is not a counter example. He argues that thinking that God doesn’t exist is incoherent but there is nothing incoherent in thinking that the greatest island doesn’t exist. What could make that island the greatest? God on the other hand must be the greatest conceivable being - he wouldn’t be God otherwise.

Question 13

Descartes (supporting argument for ontological and hume’s counter + reply)

Answer 13

1) I have the idea of God
2) the idea of God is the idea of a supremely perfect being
3) a supremely perfect being does not lack any perfection
4) existence is perfection
5) therefore, God exists

Descartes supporting argument: God’s non existence is a self contradiction just as triangles that angles don’t add up to 180 degrees. Once we have a clear and distinct idea of God we see he must be real. Descartes says that the only concept that can do this is God because it included the concept of existence as perfection.

Hume counter argument:

1) nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction
2) whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non existent
3) therefore, there is no being whose non existence implies a contradiction.

Reply:
1) Descartes argued that premise 2 is false because our minds are finite, we normally think of the divine attributes separately and so we don’t notice that they entail one another. But if we reflect carefully, we shall discover that we cannot conceive of any one of the other attributes while excluding necessary existence.

Question 14

Malcolm (supporting argument for ontological argument + kant’s counter + reply)

Answer 14

Malcolm argues that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible

1) either God exists or God does not exist
2) God cannot come into existence or go out of existence
3) if God exists, God cannot cease to exist
4) therefore, if God exist, God cannot come into existence
5) if God does not exist, God’s existence is impossible
6) therefore, if God does not exist, God’s existence is impossible
7) therefore, God’s existence is either necessary or impossible
8) God’s existence is impossible only if the concept of God is self contradictory
9) the concept of God is not self contradictory
10) therefore, God’s existence is not impossible
11) therefore, God exists necessarily

Counter Kant:

1) if ‘God does not exist’ is a contradiction. Then ‘God exists’ is an analytic truth
2) if ‘God exists’ in analytic truth, then ‘existence’ is part of the concept of God
3) existence is not a predicate, something that can be added on to another concept
4) therefore, ‘God exists’ is an analytic truth
5) therefore, ‘God does not exist is not s contradiction.
6) therefore, we cannot deduce the existence of God from the concept of God
7) therefore, ontological arguments cannot prove that God exists.

Malcolm’s reply:
Malcolm agrees with Kant that contingent existence is not a property, but argues that Kant does not show that necessary existence is not a property. Kant discusses ‘God exists’ but does not distinguish this claim ‘God exists necessarily’

Question 15

Plantinga possible worlds argument (supporting argument for ontological)

Answer 15

A ‘possible world’ is a way of talking about how things could have been.

A proposition that is true describes the actual world, the way things are, a true state of affairs. A proposition that is false describes the way things are not, a false state of affairs.

1) a being with maximal excellence omnipotence etc is only maximally excellent in that one possible world
2) therefore a maximally excelling being would only be maximally excellent if it was omnipotent etc across all possible worlds
3) a maximally great being is possible in a possible world
4) therefore a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds including the actual world

Reply: no proof of premise 3. In fact we gave some logical problems with God self contradictions

Question 16

Paley’s watch argument (supporting argument for design & hume’s counter + reply)

Answer 16

William paley compares our responses to finding a stone lying in a field and finding a watch lying in a field. I’d i wondered where the stone came to be there, I might rightly think that, for all I knew, it had always been there. But if I found a watch, I wouldn’t feel that the same answer is satisfactory. This is because, paley says, the watch has PARTS ORGANISED FOR A PURPOSE. He says this is the mark of design and that it must have a designer.

Suppose the watch produces another watch. Does this explain the design of the second watch? No says paley, it still has a designer.
Additionally, he argues that ‘the works of nature’ have the same property as the watch, namely parts organised for a purpose. Just because we create new living things, does not mean that we are the creator.

Paley calls the designer God. He draws the conclusion that the designer must be a person and that the designer is distinct from the universe.

Hume’s counter:

1) the arrangement of parts for a purpose, does not, on its own, show that the cause is a designer. We can only know this in cases in which we have experience of a designer bringing such order. We have this experience with the products of human design, but we don’t have any such experience in the case of nature. So we can’t know the cause of order in nature.

Reply:

1) paley said all we need to know is the organisation of parts for purpose. This is sufficient to infer that something is designed, and hence a designer exists.

Question 17

The argument from analogy (supporting argument for design + Hume’s counter + reply)

Answer 17

1) in the organisation of parts for a purpose, nature resembles the products of human design
2) similar effects have similar causes
3) the cause of the products of human design is an intelligent mind that intended the design
4) therefore, the cause of nature is an intelligent mind that intended the design.

Hume’s Counter: the analogy is not very strong. The products of human design, such as a house or a watch, are not much like nature of the universe as a whole. The ‘grey disproportion’ between a party of the universe and the whole universe also undermines the inference that something similar to human intelligence caused the universe. We cannot, therefore, reasonable infer that the cause of nature is anything like a human mind

Paley’s Reply:
Strictly speaking, paley doesn’t offer an argument from analogy. He does not argue that natural things are like watched, so their causes are like the causes of watched. He is arguing that watched have a property - the organisation of parts for a purpose - which supports the inference of a designer. Everything that has this property has this cause.

Question 18

Swinburne laws of nature argument (supporting argument for design + counter + reply)

Answer 18

Swinburne distinguishes between two types of order or regularity in nature.

1) there are some temporal regularities (related to human actions)
2) there are other temporal regularities (related to the laws on nature)
3) we can, by analogy, explain the regularities relating to the laws of nature in terms of persons
4) there is no scientific explanation of the laws of nature.
5) as far as we know there are only two types of explanation - scientific and personal
6) therefore, there is no better explanation of the regularities relating to the laws of nature than the explanation in terms of persons
7) Therefore, the regularities relating to the laws of nature are produced by a person (a designer)
8) therefore, a designer exists.

Counter: -see Hume of the point that designer is not best explanation

• Swinburne’s argument is an analogy - how similar are the laws of nature to someone writing a book? How can we tell?
• why choose human like reason and not random chance?

Reply to last point:
Swinburne’s reply - science is always introducing new entities to explain things - sub atomic particles - why can’t we do the same with God

Question 19

Is the designer God? (Counter argument for design)

Answer 19

Even if you prove there is a designer, it doesn’t have to be God.

Hume argues:

1) the universe appears not be infinitive as theists agree therefore it’s designer can be either
2) designers don’t have to be creators w.g car designers
3) designed by a group
4) all designers we thought have a body
5) all designers we know for

Question 20

Aquinas’ argument for motion (supporting argument for cosmological argument & counter)

Answer 20

1) some things in the world are in motion
2) whatever is in motion is put into motion by something else. Nothing can move itself
3) if a is out into motion by b, and b is also in motion, then b must have been put into motion by something else again.
4) if this goes on to infinity, then there is no first mover
5) if there is no first mover, then there is no other moved, and so nothing is in motion.
6) therefore, there must be a first mover
7) the first mover is God

Counter:
We can raise questions about 2 and 5 and the move from 6 to 7

Question 21

Aquinas’ argument from causation (supporting arguing for cosmological argument + counter)

Answer 21

1) we find, in the world, causes and effects
2) nothing can be the cause of itself
3) causes follow in order: the first causes the second which causes the third
4) if you remove a cause, you remove its effect
5) therefore, if there is no first cause, there will be no later causes
6) therefore, given that there are causes, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes
7) therefore, there must be a first cause, which is not itself caused
8) God is the first cause

Counter:
There is a problem with premise 6. The idea of an infinite regress of causes is difficult to understand. The important point is this: infinity is not a very large number. If there is literally an infinite chain in causes, that chain on causes never has a starting point. We never reach an account, therefore, of how the process gets started - it never gets started, it has always been

Question 22

The Kalam argument (supporting argument for cosmological argument and counter)

Answer 22

1) of anything that begins to exist, something causes it to exist
2) the universe began to exist
3) therefore, there is a cause of the existence of the universe

Counter:
Premise 1 assumes that something can’t come out of nothing.
Premise 2 is based on the claim that the universe cannot have always existed.

Question 23

Descartes cosmological argument (supporting argument)

Answer 23

1) I do not cause myself otherwise I would be perfect
2) I have an idea of God in my mind (innate concepts
3) there must be as much reality in the cause as in the effect
4) therefore, there is a God who caused me to be a thinking thing

Question 24

Swinburne’s inductive argument (supporting argument for cosmology & counter)

Answer 24

While the arguments given do not prove God caused the universe, they are at least highly likely to be correct and are the best explanation we have for the time being. Swinburne says something much the same about the design argument.

Counter:
Is this the best explanation? A simpler one is that the universe have no cause - occums razor (don’t multiple entities upon necessaries)

Question 25

Descartes’ second argument - continues existence through time (supporting argument for cosmological & counter)

Answer 25

1) some cause is needed to keep me in existence
2) there cannot be an infinite chain of causes because what cause me also keeps causing me
3) my parents, etc, do not keep me in existence
4) therefore, God is my cause

Reply: Descartes argument rests on ‘us’ being mind only. Science seems to suggest that there are arguments against this

Question 26

Copleston’s argument from contingency (supporting argument for cosmological argument & counter & reply)

Answer 26

1) things in the universe exist contingently
2) something that exists contingently has an explanation of why it exists; after all, it’s existence is not inevitable
3) this explanation may be provided by the existence of some other contingent being. But then we must explain these other contingent beings
4) to repeat this ad infinitum is no explanation of why anything exists at all
5) therefore, what explains why contingent beings exist at all can only be a non contingent being
6) a non continent being is one that exists necessarily, and doesn’t need some further explanation for why it exists
7) this necessary being is God

Counter:
Russell accepts that of any particular thing in the universe, we need an explanation of why it exists, which science can give us. But it is a mistake to think that we can apply this idea to the universe itself 5. Just because everything in the universe is contingent, it doesn’t follow that the universe is also contingent or needs an explanation. The universe is ‘just there, and that’s all’

Reply: we can reply that inferring from parts to whole does not always commit the fallacy of composition.

Question 27

What is the general problem of evil

Answer 27

1) if God is supremely good, then he has the desire to eliminate evil
2) if God is omnipotent, then he is able to eliminate evil
3) if God is omniscient, then he knows that evil exists and knows how to eliminate it
4) therefore, if God exists, and is supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient, then evil does not exist
5) evil exists
6) therefore, a supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient God does not exist

Question 28

What is the logical problem of evil

Answer 28

Claims that the mere existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. In other words, the following claims cannot all be true:
God is supremely good 
God is omnipotent 
God is omniscient 
Evil exists 

If any of the three claims are true then the belief is that the fourth must be false: on this version, the argument is deductive

Mackie says 1-4 are inconsistent. He argues that we need to add two additional claims before we get inconsistency
5) good is opposed to evil, such that a good thing eliminates evil as far as it can
6) there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do
Also you can deny 4, arguing that evil doesn’t exist or

Question 29

What is the evidential problem of evil (brief)

Answer 29

It claims that the amount and distribution of evil that exists is good evidence that God does not exist. Inductive.

Question 30

Two types of evil

Answer 30

Natural evil - suffering caused by natural events and processes such as earthquakes, diseases, the predation of animals on each other etc

Moral evil - actions and motives of human beings

Question 31

Good can’t exist without evil (counter for logical problem of evil)

Answer 31

It claims that there can be no good without some evil. It denies either 5 or 6 (from logical problem) or both. Being omnipotent, God can presumably do anything that is logically possible. But if it is logically impossible for good to exist without evil, then God can’t create a world in which good can exist without evil. And evil does not oppose good, but in some sense is necessary for it.
In what sense? By analogy, someone might argue that one colour requires the existence of other colours e.g to generate contrast.

Counter: Mackie says there is no reason why everything couldnt be red. Of course, if everything was red, then we probably wouldn’t Notice this and we wouldn’t have a word for red.
Reply:
But this is a claim about we think and talk. It doesn’t show that things would be red. Likewise, if evil didn’t exist, we wouldn’t know that things were good; but that doesn’t show that God can’t create a world in which there is good but no evil. What God can do isn’t restricted by human language or thought.

Question 32

Evil is just the absence of good (counter argument for the problem of evil and reply)

Answer 32

Evil does not really exist - p4 is simply the absence of food. E.g red and not red

Reply:
This doesn’t show why God couldn’t logically make world all red

Question 33

The world is better with some evil in it than it could be if there was no evil/first second order good arg (counter for problem of evil + reply)

Answer 33

While it may or may not be true that and good requires evil, there are some goods that clearly require some evil. The logical problem of evil assumes that God has the desire to eliminate all evil. But this isn’t true if some evil is necessary for a greater good. In particular, there are virtues, such as sympathy, benevolence and courage, that require suffering to exist. A universe without suffering would be a universe without these virtues.

Mackie puts it like this:
Call suffering a first order evil and pleasure a first order good. Second order goods, such as virtues, Aim at maximising first order goods (pleasure) and minimising first order evils (suffering). But second order goods are impossible without first order evils. We can now argue that these second order goods are more important or more valuable that first order goods, so the universe that contains them is significantly better than a universe with only first order goods, so much that the existence of first order evils does not outweigh second order goods. So God brings about a universe with second order goods and first order evils.

Reply:
Mackie objects however, that we have left second order evils, such as malevolence, cruelty and cowardice, out of consideration. We hVe only explained how a universe with first order evils could be better than one without first order evils.

Reply:
But we haven’t explained how universe, such as ours, that has both first and second order evils to better than one without both. We haven’t shown how the existence of God is compatible with the existence of second order evils

Question 34

Evil is due to human free will argument (counter argument for the problem of evil and reply)

Answer 34

Second order evils are the result of free will. Being morally imperfect, we do not always use our free will for good, but sometimes being about evil. However, this is compatible with the existence of God because being free is such a significant good that it outweighs the evil that we bring about. The universe is better with free will and second order evils than it would be without either.

Counter: why doesn’t God just make us choose what is good?

Reply: because this isn’t logically possible. To be free is for ones choices not to be determined. If God made us choose good, then out choices would be determined, so we wouldn’t be free.

Counter: Mackie objects, second order evils are not logically necessary for free will, in the way first order evils are necessary for second order goods :

1) is it possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion
2) if it is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion, then it is logically possible to freely choose what is good on every occasion
3) God can create any logically possible world
4) therefore, it is possible for God to create a world in which creature are free and freely choose only what is good
5) God would eliminate evil that is necessary for a greater good
6) second order evil is not necessary for a greater good
7) second order evil exists
8) therefore, God does not exist

Question 35

Plantinga’s free will defence (counter for the problem of evil & reply)

Answer 35

1) a world containing creatures that are significantly free is better than a world containing no free creatures
2) God can create significantly free creatures
3) to be significantly free is to be capable of both moral good and evil good
4) if significantly free creatures were caused to do only what is right, they would not be free
5) therefore, God cannot cause significantly free creatures to do only what is right
6) therefore, God can only eliminate the moral evil done by significantly free creatures by eliminating the greater good of significantly free creatures.

Mackie’s reply:

1) is it possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion
2) if it is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion, then it is logically possible to freely choose what is good on every occasion
3) God can create any logically possible world
4) therefore, it is possible for God to create a world in which creature are free and freely choose only what is good
5) God would eliminate evil that is necessary for a greater good
6) second order evil is not necessary for a greater good
7) second order evil exists
8) therefore, God does not exist

Question 36

What about natural evil (supporting argument for the problem of evil)

Answer 36

The free will defence only tackles moral evil. So how do we make the existence of natural evil consistent with the existence of God?

Reply from Plantinga based on Augustine. Augustine argues that natural evil is he result of the free cations of non human creatures, namely Satan and his fallen angels. The traditional story goes that the devil was an angel, created by God, endowed with free will. But he rebelled against Him, and since then has sought to bring evil into the world. (Natural evil)

Question 37

The evidential problem of evil (supporting argument for the problem of evil and counter + reply)

Answer 37

It claims the amount of evil, the kinds of evil and the distribution of evil are good evident for thinking that God does not exist. Put another way, we can grant that evil as we know it does not make it impossible that God exists. But the fact that it is possible doesn’t show that it is reasonable to believe that God exists. Planets made out of green cheese are logically possible; but it isn’t reasonable to think they exist. The evidential problem of evil tries to show that belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good God is unreasonable, given our experiences of evil.

Counter: plantinga’s free will defence

Reply: plantinga’s argument only considers the amount of evil but the evidential problem also appeals to the kinds and distribution of evil. These are more difficult to dismiss as not providing evidence that a better balance of good and evil is possible.

Question 38

Hick’s soul making argument (counter argument for the problem of evil and reply)

Answer 38

Hick argues that we shouldn’t think that God has finished creating human beings. We are unfinished. Development is impossible without evil to respond to and correct. For example, we can’t be courageous unless there is danger, we can’t be benevolent unless people have needs, we can’t learn forgiveness unless people treat us wrongly, and so on.

Counter:
Mackie points out that on this view, God is not benevolent, if that means seeking to reduce suffering. Instead, God seeks our development of virtues, and this requires suffering.

Reply: God is interested in our greatest good. Because God is good, he wants us to become good, and so he wants a world in which this is possible. It turns out that such a world must contain evil. And so it is compatible with the existence of God

Counter:
what about animal suffering? Animals don’t grow spirituality, so how is the natural evil that they suffer justified?

Reply: we should misrepresent the experience of animals. They live in the present without fear of death or of future pains or dangers.

Question 39

The principle of verification (supporting argument for religious language is meaningless & counter & reply)

Answer 39

A test developed by the logical positivist stop see if a statement is meaningful or not.
According to the V.P, a statement is true of it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. A statement is empirically verifiable if there is some evidence that could be gathered to support if the statement is true or not.
‘God exists’ Ayer argues is not analytically true despite the ontological argument so according to the V.P. For ‘God exists’ to be meaningful it must be empirically verifiable but how can we find evidence for this claim? There exists something outside of space and time, now can you find in space and time evidence for this?

In a nutshell:
1) all meaningless claims are either a) analytic or b) empirically verifiable. 2) ‘God exists’ is not analytic. 3) ‘God exists’ is not empirically verifiable 4) Therefore, ‘God exists’ is not meaningful

Counter:
The claim ‘a statement only has meaning if it is analytic or can be verified empirically’ is not itself analytic nor can it be verified empirically. Therefore, it is meaningless.

Reply: the v.p. Is not a empirical hypothesis, it is just a definition of what Ayer thinks should count as meaning.
And isn’t all the terrible things religion has some empirical evidence that the v.p. Is the right criteria of meaning? Depends on your point of view

Question 40

Flew’s principle of falsification (supporting argument for religious language is meaningful & counter)

Answer 40

Some philosophers have replaced the v.p with the f.p ‘a claim is meaningful only if it rules out some possible experience. For example, ‘the fork is there’ would rule out reaching out and touching nothing but thin air. ‘God is there’ does not falsify anything and is therefore meaningless.

The story of the invisible gardener:
Two explorers come across a clearing in a jungle containing flowers and weeds (good and evil). They try to detect if a gardener is at work but never verify the gardener’s existence. The explorer with faith says the gardener must be invisible and intangible etc. the sceptic explorer asks what is the different between this invisible gardener and no gardener at all.

Counter:
A problem for f.p are claims based on probability and things that are hard to disprove such as, ‘there is a yeti’ also claims that are ____ the future. If we weaken the f.p. To just must have evidence that counts against the claim we rally have gone back to v.p

Question 41

The religious experience argument (counter argument for religious language is meaningless & reply)

Answer 41

Religious language is really an attempt to capture something of the nature of religious experience

Ayer’s reply:
Whatever r.e are they do not contain facts and facts are needed to make statements. Hence r.l. Is still meaningless

Question 42

Hick’s Eschatologial verification (counter argument for is religious language meaningless + reply)

Answer 42

‘God exists’ is meaningful because it will be verified in the after life

Ayer’s reply:
This is not what he means by verification. What sense organs are you using to test your experience? It also begs the question a little. Is personal experience after death logically possible? How can you experience God anyway? Doesn’t feeling God count as verification? (Like catfish)

Question 43

Cognitive account

Answer 43

Argues that religious claims aim to describe how the world is, and so can be true or false.

Non cognitive (is religious language meaningless) argue that religious claims do not try to describe the world and cannot be true or false, atleast in the sense of stating facts.

Question 44

Hare’s Bliks Argument (supporting argument for religious beliefs can not be shown to be true or false & counter & reply)

Answer 44

A person’s religious beliefs are not stamens of fact but part of that person’s view of the world = a blik.
You annoy disprove a blik but bliks are meaningful and make a different to how we live. God exists = a blik. God doesn’t exist = a blik

Flew’s Counter:
When religious people say ‘God exists’ they don’t think of it in terms of a blik.

Mitchell’s reply:
Just because there is no clear cut of point when to stop holding a blik does not make them irrational.
The same argument can be made in terms of faith in God. God cannot be rejected in the face of a set number of contrary evident commitment (feeling) is also involved - thus a claim can be meaningful without us being able to say what experience would lead to us rejecting it.

Question 45

Wittgenstein’s (non cognitivist) language game argument (supporting argument for religious beliefs can not be shown true or false)

Answer 45

Words can only be understood in terms of their context. Sentences can look similar (surface grammar) but because of their different contexts, can have very different meanings (depth grammar).
There are loads of different language games accord to Wittgenstein, each of which is the speaking part of a ‘form of life’. A form of life = a social cultural practice. So according to him? Religious language must be understand as a part of religious life.
Main point: religious language is a language game with its own set of rules and it is wrong to judge it by another set of rules which is what the logical positivists do.

Counter:
We cannot criticise or support religious beliefs by using evidence. Religious beliefs cannot be criticised on the grounds that they are not true or highly improbable, because this presupposes that religious language makes factual claims, and it does not.

Reply: as part of human life, religious belief still needs to make sense of our experiences.

Counter: does non cognitist religious language make sense
Witgensteins account looks more like a reinterpretation that an analysis of r.l.

Question 46

Blik

Answer 46

An attitude to or view of the world that is not held or withdrawn from empirical experience

Question 47

Cartesian circle

Answer 47

Refers to the circular reasoning Descartes seems to employ regarding clear and distinct ideas and God

Question 48

Pantheism

Answer 48

The view that God and the universe are the same thing

Question 49

Extended mind theory

Answer 49

The idea that mental states and processes extend outside the mind