Philosophy 27 MT1

Question 1

Euthanasia’s definition

• often used definition
• Foot’s Definition

Answer 1

Often used: quiet and easy death, or the means of procuring it, or the action of inducing it

Foot: Inducing or otherwise opting for death for the sake of the one who is to die

Question 2

Nagel’s considering and rejecting of the three reasons for denying death is intrinsically bad

Answer 2

Death vs. Pain
N: death is not like pain, Death is extrinsically or relationally bad, bad because of what it deprives us of, namely all the goods of life

1. Nothing can be bad for someone without being unpleasant to her
   N. False: devotion of ones life trying to communicate with asparagus plants, this is bad even though its not unpleasant
2. If something is bad, its badness must be experienced by a particular person at a particular time. But after death, there is no person to whom a bad experience could be ascribed.
   N. False, what constitutes badness of death is that one’s life is over and there will never be anymore of it
3. Death is non-existence so there is no relevant difference between death and pre-natal non-existance. Prenatal nonexistance is not bad, so death is also not bad
   N. prenatal non existance does not deprive you of something good you otherwise would have had if you had been morn earlier. But death does.

Question 3

Foot’s take on why life is usually good

Answer 3

1. life is bad if when there is more evil than good in it
   F: many people have more evil than good in their lives; we do not however, conclude that we would do these people no service by rescuing them from death
2. Life is bad when the overall balance of good and evil together with the good of experience tilts towards evil
   F: Imagine that the entirety of your experience is of experience is of excruciating pain. why suppose that experience of this kind is any good at all?
3. another suggestion is that life is good as long as one has a desire to live, and that is bad when they lose this desire
   F: it was better for the Gulag prisoners to die, even if they club to life

Question 4

Foot and her minimum of basic human goods

Answer 4

good life is one that comes up to some standard of normalcy, defined by a minimum of basic human goods. A good life is one that lies at or above the minimum; a bad life is one that lies below the minimum

the basic human goods:
1. Not driven to work far beyond one’s ability
2. support of family or community
3. ability to satisfy hunger and thirst,
4. having hopes for the future
5. ability to rest
6 not being overwhelmed by pain, nausea, or depression

if able to satisfy these basic rights, life is good
6 is most important, and it destroys ability to enjoy anything else, 2 and 4 leads to depression, and 1, 3, 5 and nausea leads to pain
must be not alleviateable

Question 5

Lafollette’s argument on licensing parents

Answer 5

P1. If meet these three criteria, should be licensed
-the activity is potential harmful to others, not the person being licensed,
-Safe performance of the activity requires a certain competence
-We have moderately reliable procedures for assessing that competence
P2. Parenting meets all three
C. Parenting should be licensed

P1 support:
-we normally license certain activity such as driving, medicine, pharmacy etc
-we license these activities because they meet the criteria set forth
-thus we ought to license all activity that meets these criteria
P2 support:
-parenting is potentially harmful to children
-it requires certain competencies to be done well
-we have or can develop moderately reliable procedures for assessing that competence
Conclusion:
-we should license parenting even though it can severely inconvenience or even harm people, and even though it may not be perfectly accurate

Question 6

objections to licensing parents

- people have a right to children
- licensing parents is a form of prior restraint
- there are no objective, adequate, and discemible criteria of "good parenting"
- there are no reliable predictors for who will abuse their children
- the test would be sucepctible to unitentional errors/misuse
- insurmountable practical difficulties exist

Answer 6

.

Question 7

active euthanasia

Answer 7

killing someone for her/his own sake

Question 8

passive euthanasia

Answer 8

letting someone die for his/her own sake

doing nothing to prevent death or removing obstacle in way of death

Question 9

voluntary euthanasia

Answer 9

when the person who is to die chooses to die

Question 10

involuntary euthanasia

Answer 10

when person who is to die chooses not to die

Question 11

nonvoluntary euthanasia

Answer 11

when the person who is to die neither chooses to die nor chooses to not die

eg. in coma

Question 12

Consequentialism definition

Answer 12

the moral value of conduct is completely determined by the overall value of its consequences

Question 13

non consequentialism

Answer 13

the moral value of conduct is not completely determined by the overall value of its consequences

Question 14

Doctrine of doing and allowing

Answer 14

doing harm is worse than merely allowing it to occur

Question 15

Doctrine of double effect

Answer 15

intending harm is worse than merely foreseeing its occurrence

Question 16

Utilitarianism

Answer 16

a kind of consequentialism
-value of consequences= expected utility
- Utility= the overall well-being
Eu, expected utility
Eu= sum of probability of a certain consequence occurring x the value of the consequence

Question 17

Act-Utilitarianism

Answer 17

an act is right if its expected utility is at least as great as the expected utility of any available alternative

Question 18

What kind of rule is optimal?

Answer 18

a rule is optimal when the expected utility of its general internalization is at least as great as the expected utility of any alternative rule

Question 19

when is a rule generally internalized

Answer 19

a rule R is generally internalized when everyone believes that R is justified and is disposed to act in accordance with R

Question 20

Rule-Utilitarianism

Answer 20

an act is morally permissible if it is allowable under any optimal rule

Question 21

the problems of act-utilitarianism

Answer 21

• Act U requires us to perform actions we judge to be morally impermissible
  
  • Killing one to save five
• Act U seems excessively demanding: it requires us maximize EU, to be moral saints

Question 22

problems of Rule-Utilitarianism, (with IE)

Answer 22

if IE was widely practiced
-avoidance of doctors
-loss of horror at the idea of killing others
-serious mistakes
-loss of control/autonomy
-those who suffer irremediable pain would suffer longer than they otherwise would
-resources that might be devoted to curing disease would be spent on keeping people with incurable diseases alive
Hooker believes that IE should not be practiced, and is forbidden by optimal rule

Question 23

Rule-U and VE/NE

Answer 23

• the optimal rule R here would be carefully crafted to allow both VE and NE
  
  • benefits: less pain and greater autonomy
• “carefully crafted” : must guard against
  
  • risk of misdiagnosis
  • opting for death when people might be saved by cures in medical pipeline
  • intentional abuse and coercion
  • “slippery slope” to general acceptance of IE

Question 24

CEJA’s view on Rule U and VE and NE

Answer 24

sees problems with any rule that would permit AVE or ANE

- loss of public trust in medical professionals
- patients might not be able to resists physician's suggestions that E may be appropriate
- poorer quality of patient care
- slippery slope: pain
- slippery slope: criteria for permissible E

Question 25

Standard objections to rule- utilitarianism

Answer 25

•Rule-u: act is permissible if the optimal rule would allow it. The optimality of a rule is measured by the goodness of its consequences o Rule u condemns many acts that act-u takes to be permissible o The problem: the main reason to accept rule-u is also a reason to accept act-u. So rule-u threatens to collapse into act-u. But resisting collapses=rule-fetishism

Question 26

list the different doctrines

Answer 26

•DKLD: killing is worse than letting die •DDA: doing harm is worse than merely allowing it to occur o DDA is more general principle. Both principles are non-consequentialist •CD: active euthanasia=bad; Passive euthanasia= not always bad

Question 27

DDA and Euthanasia

Answer 27

* If DDA is true, and so DKLD is true, then, generally speaking, it is more difficult to justify AE than it is to justify PE * James Rachels and Michael Tooley think that AE and PE are morally equivalent, so they reject DKLD and DDA

Question 28

Rachels on AE and PE

Answer 28

•1. CD is false: whenever PE is permissible, AE is also permissible o AE is often more humane than PE • eg. Cancer patient in terrible irremediable pain  Option A. treat patient and watch him die in agony  Option B. withhold treatment to hasten death  Option C. kill patient painlessly •2. CD leads to decisions concerning life and death made on irrelevant grounds o eg. CD says that letting S babies with blocked intestinal tracts die is permissible, but killing DS babies with blocked intestinal tracts is impermissible. But the life or death of a DS baby should not depend on whether it has a blocked intestinal tract • 3. DKLD is false o smith-jones pairs of case: smiths drowns child, jones let child die o same motives, money, same intentions, to kill, same reactions, delight, same consequences, child dies o difference in mode of death: killing vs. letting die

Question 29

Tooley on DKLD

Answer 29

* K and LD is morally equivalent | * Same page as Rachels

Question 30

Foot: how to determine if something is morally permissible?

Answer 30

``` • 1. Is A contrary to justice? o If yes: impermissible o If no: go on to next question • 2. Is A contrary to Charity? o If yes: impermissible o If no: permissible • A is morally permissible if it is not contrary to either justice or charity. Otherwise A, the action, is impermissible. ```

Question 31

Foot: Justice

Answer 31

• Justice concerns what we owe in terms of noninterference or service • What we owe someone is determined by their rights • Two kinds of rights o Liberties • I have liberty to X: no one can demand that I not do X o Claims • Noninterference: a duty of noninterference with me having or securing X • Service: duty to provide me with X

Question 32

Foot: Charity

Answer 32

• Charity is the virtue that attaches us to the good of others. Does NOT concern rights • There are duties of charity, things that the virtue of charity requires us to do. So not all acts of charity are optional o Eg. Drowning child has no right to be saved, but you have a duty of charity to save that child

Question 33

Justice, Charity, and DKLD

Answer 33

• Sometimes, justice speaks against Killing but not against letting die, while charity speaks against neither o Eg. Wounded soldier: impermissible to kill him, permissible to let him die • The moral relevant difference between Killing and Letting die is Salient when a person for whom death would be welcome invokes the right not to be killed

Question 34

Justice, charity, and Smith-Jones

Answer 34

* That the moral difference between killing and letting die is salient in some situations does not mean that it must be salient in all situations * Smith’s Killing is contrary to Justice, Jones’s Letting die is contrary to Charity. This is a morally relevant difference * It’s just that the difference is not reflected in different judgment about permissibility

Question 35

Rachels' argument for K and LD

Answer 35

o Rachels argument: •1. If the difference between K and LD were morally important, then Jones’s behavior would be less reprehensible than Smith’s/ •2. Jones is no different from Smith •3. Therefore difference between K and LD is not morally relevant

Question 36

Schmo’s Argument: Smoking vs. Exercising

Answer 36

* Thesis: Smoking is medically worse than exercising * Schmo’s argument: Smith and Jones, with the same medical profile, both have a serious heart condition. Smith smokes and dies. Jones exercises and dies. So there is no medically relevant difference between smoking and exercising * Schmo supposes that the medically relevant difference between smoking and exercise must be reflected in different medical outcomes in all cases. But this is false * Rachels supposes that the morally relevant difference between killing and letting die must be reflected in different moral judgments in all cases. But this is false

Question 37

DDA and involuntary Euthanasia

Answer 37

• The right thing to do depends on whether euthanasia is active or passive o AIE: Contrary to Justice so impermissible o PIE: not contrary to justice and often not contrary to Charity so may be permissible

Question 38

DDA and voluntary Euthanasia

Answer 38

• Not contrary to Justice (Consent=waiver of right not to be killed) • Typically, not contrary to charity—so, • Typically, AVE and PVE are permissible • Complications that speak against permissibility—requests for death may stem from o Treatable depression o Misinformation o Desire not to be a burden on others/society

Question 39

DDA and nonvoluntary euthanasia

Answer 39

* ANE contrary to Justice, so impermissible * PNE not contrary to Justice, and often, like PIE, not contrary to Charity, so may be permissible * The moral evaluation of Nonvoluntary euthanasia should resemble the moral evaluations of involuntary euthanasia

Question 40

DDA and Euthanasia summary

Answer 40

* AIE: NO * ANE: NO * AVE: often * PIE: often * PNE: often * PVE: often