Philosophical Positions on Mind and Body Flashcards

Question

Name two arguments for Functionalism

Answer 1

“The optimistic Argument” The possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) seems to require the truth of something like functionalism. “The pessimistic Argument” If two creatures function in the same ways, achieve the same results, have isomorphic internal states, etc., then what could justify the claim that one has mental states and the other does not? The identity-theory says that the justification has to do with what kinds of stuff the creatures are made of: only the one with the right kind of brain counts as having mental states. But, the functionalist says, this flies in the face of our ordinary practices of understanding, attributing, and explaining mental states, which don’t rely on which brains state someone is in.

Answer 2

Strange Realizations Imagine that AI has advanced to the point where an android with a “brain” consisting of a computer running a program can behave much as normal humans do, maybe by mimicking the operation of a human brain at a neuron-by-neuron level. Note that if functionalism is indeed true, this should be possible! The Disney Principle: “[i]n Walt Disney movies, teacups think and talk, but in the real world, anything that can do those things needs more structure than a teacup. . . . laws of nature impose constraints on ways of making something that satisfies a certain description” (Block)

Answer 3

The Chinese Nation Argument Suppose that instead of the program being run on an external computer made of silicon chips, the entire population of China is enlisted to run the simulation. They are equipped with walkie-talkies and communicate with each other in a way that implements the functional profile of the computer, ak´a our brain (Block, 1978).

Answer 4

Philosophical zombies are creatures that do not have inverted qualia, but no qualia at all, although they also behave exactly like us and in fact implement our functional profile. From a functionalist perspective, there is no difference between them and us, yet the states in them are not accompanied by any feel at all. In them “it’s all dark,” there’s no consciousness at all. Isn’t it essential for at least some of our mental states to be accompanied by certain feelings and qualitative states? And if creatures with absent and inverted qualia are possible, then how can we assume that functionalism captures the mental?

Answer 5

Jackson’s Version of the Knowledge Argument (against Physicalism) P1 If physicalism is true, then anyone who knows all the physical facts about the world knows everything there is to know about it. P2 It is not true that anyone who knows all the physical facts about the world knows everything there is to know about it. C Physicalism is not true. Mary, a scientist who exists in a black-and-white world where she has extensive access to physical descriptions of color, but no actual perceptual experience of color. Mary has learned everything there is to learn about color, but she has never actually experienced it for herself. The central question of the thought experiment is whether Mary will gain new knowledge when she goes outside of the colorless world and experiences seeing in color.

Answer 6

Does Mary actually learn something upon her release? According to Dennett, we are lurked into thinking that Mary does learn something new because we fail to appreciate what exactly it would mean to actually be omniscient, i.e., to not only know a whole lot, but literally everything. Does her learning consist in acquiring new knowledge, or only in acquiring new abilities? Knowledge-that is factual or propositional knowledge, i.e.,knowledge that something is the case. Knowledge-how, in contrast, is practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge how you do something.

Answer 7

The Ability Hypothesis Knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize. It isn’t knowing that certain possibilities aren’t actualized. It isn’t knowing-that. It is knowing-how. Therefore it should be no surprise that lessons won’t teach you what an experience is like. Lessons impart information; ability is something else. (Lewis)

Answer 8

“old fact new guise reply” Mary indeed learns something, and her new knowledge is factual knowledge-that, but all she does is acquiring new knowledge-that of some physical fact already previously known to her

Answer 9

Mental states according to identity theory, are one expression of of a property peing percieved through the mental path way, thus being interpreted as a mental thing. The same property is also being percieved through the physical path way, and in turn interpreted as physical thing.

Answer 10

Semantic Physicalism is about how we semantically define properties. It states that, if we define mental properties in physical terms, this shows that mental expressions are really just physical. Identity theory assumes that both physical and mental experiences are different expressions of the same underlying physical thing. While Semantic Physicalism can account for something mere mental and attemts to define it in physical terms, Identity theory searches for a correlating physical experience.

Answer 11

For functionalism, mental states are functional and defined by their causal role. They are something between cause and effect. Cause and effect are both physical/behavioural events.

Answer 12

According to semantic physicalism mental states are really physical states we don't have a physical way of expressing and or relating to, yet.

Answer 13

According to analytic behaviourism, mental states are behavioural predispositions we posess.