Philosophical Perspectives Flashcards
What is the most basic division of views about the mind-body problem?
Dualism vs monism
What is dualism?
The world/universe consists of 2 types of phenomena: physical and non-physical things)
What is monism?
The world/universe consists of only one type of phenomenon. Most monists are materialists: whatever exists is either matter, or depends on matter for its existence
What are main perspectives on the relationship between the mind and the body?
Cartesian dualism, behaviourism, the mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, and eliminative materialism
What is cartesian/substance dualism?
Two kinds of substance (mental and physical). Mind is a non-physical entity. Souls are immortal. We have free will, which implies our actions are not subject to physical laws. Brain is part of material world while consciousness is property of the mind. Minds are not literally contained within the body (non-physical substances do not have spatial properties)
What is a problem with cartesian dualism?
The question of how the mind and body can interact
What is a similar but different perspective of dualism?
Property/attribute dualism
What is behaviourism?
Materialist theory. Emphasis on study of observable events/behaviours. Mental is not suitable subject matter for science, behaviour does not really have mental causes, and depends on learning of associations instead (SR). Psychologists should aim to discover general principles of learning (eg reinforcement). No mind-body interaction and no mind-body problem as there is no such thing as minds
What are problems with behaviourism?
Fundamental aspect of being human is understanding ourselves and others as mental beings (how we interact etc). If the mental has no place in science, we either accept that this aspect of human existence is false, or we have to translate mental terms into physical/behavioural terms. An attempt at this was logical/analytical behaviourism
What is logical behaviourism?
A thesis about the meaning of mental terms. A way to keep the mental fundamental aspect. Someone is in a certain mental state if (and only if) they behave in a certain way associated with that state
What is a problem with logical behaviourisms?
Doesn’t take into account cultural differences or social situations. People can act or regulate behaviour. Also does not discuss dispositions (powers/tendencies) that are only revealed when triggered (eg fragility of a wine glass)
How could mental states be seen as dispositions?
Saying someone is in a particular mental state is the same as saying they are disposed to behave in a articular way. A replacement of mental terms with non-mental terms, with terms that refer to stimuli and responses. Offers a materialist account of mental causation - the realisation of a behavioural disposition
What is are problems with logical behaviourisms, in terms of the explanations with dispositions?
Difficulty explaining special access we have to our own mental states. Mental states as inner causes of behaviour. A mental state isn’t uniquely associated with a specific set of behavioural consequences. Cannot provide analyses of cases where one mental state causes another mental state
What is the mind0brain identity theory?
The mind is the brain. Mental state types are to be identified with physical state types. To have a belief is for one’s brain to be in a certain state/ Mental state types supervene on physical state types. ‘Type-type’ identity theory doesn’t allow for multiple realisability
What does ‘supervene’ mean?
Can’t have a change in mental state without an underlying change in physical state, not vice versa
What is multiple realisability?
Some input/output but different ways of getting there
Why is identity theory seen as being too chauvinistic?
A being or other system can be a legitimate member of the mental realm, only if it has a neurophysiology like ours
What is a functionalist theory that is relevant to the philosophy of consciousness?
Functional state identity theory, which is similar to logical behaviourism but extents and elaborates it. Includes a focus on functional roles and realisers of those roles, where mental states are to be identified by their functional roles
What does functional state identity theory say about mental states?
Emphasises that mental states are internal states, dispositional states, can cause and be caused by other mental states or external input, cause behavioural output, are physically realisable (possibly multiply realisable) and those states that causally mediate between an organisms sensory input and motor output
How are mental state types to be identified within functional state identity theory?
To be identified with a certain internal state of a system that is causally related to certain inputs, outputs and other internal states of the system
How does functionalism avoid the charge of chauvinism?
Mental states are not limited to humans with brains
What is a problem, however, for funcitonalism?
Appears to be too liberal in its ascription of mental states
What are mind-brain identity theory and functionalism both forms of?
Reductionism
What is reductionism?
The position that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to simpler or more fundamental things. Reductive materialism. Every mental or psychological property is equivalent or identical to one or more physical properties
What are reductionist theories of consciousness?
Theories according to which consciousness can be explained by the standard methods of neuroscience and psychology
How are identity theorists seen as reductionist?
Reductionist about consciousness as mental states are a subset of all mental states, but there’s the need to explain conscious vs unconscious in terms of brain states and processes
How are functionalists seen as reductionist?
Reductionist about consciousness since mental states are a subset of all mental states, but there’s the need to explain conscious vs unconscious in terms of some functional states of the brain/nervous system. eg the synchronous oscillation of neurons in visual cortex, which solves the binding problem, and might be the neural correlate of visual awareness
How is eliminative materialism similar to the mind-brain identity theory?
Claims it is an empirical fact that mental states are identical with brain states, and that this is justified only by scientific evidence
How is eliminative materialism unlike mind-brain identity theory?
Argues there is no reason to assume there will be any neat mapping between mental states captured in the everyday language of folk psychology and the brain states and processes revealed by some modern science, eg alchemy
