Philosophical Perspectives

Question 1

What is the most basic division of views about the mind-body problem?

Answer 1

Dualism vs monism

Question 2

What is dualism?

Answer 2

The world/universe consists of 2 types of phenomena: physical and non-physical things)

Question 3

What is monism?

Answer 3

The world/universe consists of only one type of phenomenon. Most monists are materialists: whatever exists is either matter, or depends on matter for its existence

Question 4

What are main perspectives on the relationship between the mind and the body?

Answer 4

Cartesian dualism, behaviourism, the mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, and eliminative materialism

Question 5

What is cartesian/substance dualism?

Answer 5

Two kinds of substance (mental and physical). Mind is a non-physical entity. Souls are immortal. We have free will, which implies our actions are not subject to physical laws. Brain is part of material world while consciousness is property of the mind. Minds are not literally contained within the body (non-physical substances do not have spatial properties)

Question 6

What is a problem with cartesian dualism?

Answer 6

The question of how the mind and body can interact

Question 7

What is a similar but different perspective of dualism?

Answer 7

Property/attribute dualism

Question 8

What is behaviourism?

Answer 8

Materialist theory. Emphasis on study of observable events/behaviours. Mental is not suitable subject matter for science, behaviour does not really have mental causes, and depends on learning of associations instead (SR). Psychologists should aim to discover general principles of learning (eg reinforcement). No mind-body interaction and no mind-body problem as there is no such thing as minds

Question 9

What are problems with behaviourism?

Answer 9

Fundamental aspect of being human is understanding ourselves and others as mental beings (how we interact etc). If the mental has no place in science, we either accept that this aspect of human existence is false, or we have to translate mental terms into physical/behavioural terms. An attempt at this was logical/analytical behaviourism

Question 10

What is logical behaviourism?

Answer 10

A thesis about the meaning of mental terms. A way to keep the mental fundamental aspect. Someone is in a certain mental state if (and only if) they behave in a certain way associated with that state

Question 11

What is a problem with logical behaviourisms?

Answer 11

Doesn’t take into account cultural differences or social situations. People can act or regulate behaviour. Also does not discuss dispositions (powers/tendencies) that are only revealed when triggered (eg fragility of a wine glass)

Question 12

How could mental states be seen as dispositions?

Answer 12

Saying someone is in a particular mental state is the same as saying they are disposed to behave in a articular way. A replacement of mental terms with non-mental terms, with terms that refer to stimuli and responses. Offers a materialist account of mental causation - the realisation of a behavioural disposition

Question 13

What is are problems with logical behaviourisms, in terms of the explanations with dispositions?

Answer 13

Difficulty explaining special access we have to our own mental states. Mental states as inner causes of behaviour. A mental state isn’t uniquely associated with a specific set of behavioural consequences. Cannot provide analyses of cases where one mental state causes another mental state

Question 14

What is the mind0brain identity theory?

Answer 14

The mind is the brain. Mental state types are to be identified with physical state types. To have a belief is for one’s brain to be in a certain state/ Mental state types supervene on physical state types. ‘Type-type’ identity theory doesn’t allow for multiple realisability

Question 15

What does ‘supervene’ mean?

Answer 15

Can’t have a change in mental state without an underlying change in physical state, not vice versa

Question 16

What is multiple realisability?

Answer 16

Some input/output but different ways of getting there

Question 17

Why is identity theory seen as being too chauvinistic?

Answer 17

A being or other system can be a legitimate member of the mental realm, only if it has a neurophysiology like ours

Question 18

What is a functionalist theory that is relevant to the philosophy of consciousness?

Answer 18

Functional state identity theory, which is similar to logical behaviourism but extents and elaborates it. Includes a focus on functional roles and realisers of those roles, where mental states are to be identified by their functional roles

Question 19

What does functional state identity theory say about mental states?

Answer 19

Emphasises that mental states are internal states, dispositional states, can cause and be caused by other mental states or external input, cause behavioural output, are physically realisable (possibly multiply realisable) and those states that causally mediate between an organisms sensory input and motor output

Question 20

How are mental state types to be identified within functional state identity theory?

Answer 20

To be identified with a certain internal state of a system that is causally related to certain inputs, outputs and other internal states of the system

Question 21

How does functionalism avoid the charge of chauvinism?

Answer 21

Mental states are not limited to humans with brains

Question 22

What is a problem, however, for funcitonalism?

Answer 22

Appears to be too liberal in its ascription of mental states

Question 23

What are mind-brain identity theory and functionalism both forms of?

Answer 23

Reductionism

Question 24

What is reductionism?

Answer 24

The position that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to simpler or more fundamental things. Reductive materialism. Every mental or psychological property is equivalent or identical to one or more physical properties

Question 25

What are reductionist theories of consciousness?

Answer 25

Theories according to which consciousness can be explained by the standard methods of neuroscience and psychology

Question 26

How are identity theorists seen as reductionist?

Answer 26

Reductionist about consciousness as mental states are a subset of all mental states, but there’s the need to explain conscious vs unconscious in terms of brain states and processes

Question 27

How are functionalists seen as reductionist?

Answer 27

Reductionist about consciousness since mental states are a subset of all mental states, but there’s the need to explain conscious vs unconscious in terms of some functional states of the brain/nervous system. eg the synchronous oscillation of neurons in visual cortex, which solves the binding problem, and might be the neural correlate of visual awareness

Question 28

How is eliminative materialism similar to the mind-brain identity theory?

Answer 28

Claims it is an empirical fact that mental states are identical with brain states, and that this is justified only by scientific evidence

Question 29

How is eliminative materialism unlike mind-brain identity theory?

Answer 29

Argues there is no reason to assume there will be any neat mapping between mental states captured in the everyday language of folk psychology and the brain states and processes revealed by some modern science, eg alchemy