Personal Jurisdiction Cases Flashcards
Pennoyer
Facts: Neff (plaintiff) hired J.H Mitchell for legal work. Neff failed to pay Mitchell, and Mitchell sued in Oregon state court. Neff was not a resident of the state or personally served with process. Instead, Mitchell published notice of the summons in newspaper (constructive notice). Neff failed to appear, default judgment was entered against him. Shortly thereafter, Neff took title to a tract of land in Oregon. Mitchell had the sheriff seize the land to be sold to satisfy the judgment. Land was sold to Pennoyer in an auction. Neff sued Pennoyer (defendant) to recover the property
Holding: Neff did not voluntarily appear or receive service in the state. The Oregon court lacked in personam jurisdiction because a non resident defendant in personam actions is entitled to personal service in the state not constructive notice unless the actions is an in rem matter.
Carnival Cruise
Facts: plaintiffs purchased tickets through a travel agent in Washington state for a cruise operated by defendant, Carnival Cruise. plaintiffs receive paper tickets containing a form contract with a forum selection clause requiring all disputes to be brought in Florida. Plaintiffs were aware of forum selection clause. Plaintiff was injured on cruise ship and sued defendant in Washington. Defendant motion for lack of PJ citing forum selection clause.
Holding: Forum selection clauses contained in passage contracts are enforceable as long as they pass judicial scrutiny and fundamental fairness.
Mullane
Facts: defendant established a common trust fund pooling multiple trust in one large fund. Central Hanover petitioned the court for settlement of its first account as trustee. Beneficiaries of the trust were given notice by publication in a local newspaper. plaintiff was special guardian of beneficiaries of the trust who had not appeared in response to the notice. objected that the notice was inadequate to provide due process.
Holding: Fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to inform the interested parties of the action and afford them the opportunity to be heard.
constructive notice is ok for parties locations or identities not know. constructive notice not okay for parties identities and locations known (mail of service needed)
International Shoe
(Specific)
Facts: Plaintiff collector of contributions to Washington unemployment fund asserted that defendant, Int’l Shoe failed to pay into fund for several years. Int’l Shoe was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri. Plaintiff served notice to salesmen of Int’l Shoe working in Washington. Int’l Shoe said it was not a corporation doing business in Washington, had no registered agent within the state, and was not an employer and did not furnish employment within the state as defined under state law.
Holding: salesmen occasionally rented at International Shoe’s expense rooms in hotels or business buildings within the state. It is clear that these activities establish sufficient contacts with Washington, to make it reasonable, under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce PJ
McGee
(Specific)
Facts: Franklin resident of California purchased a life insurance policy from International, a Texas company with no offices or agents located in California. Franklin paid premiums until he died which defendant refused to pay because Franklin had committed suicide. Plaintiff, the beneficiary of life insurance policy, brought suit in California against defendant
Holding: The California court has jurisdiction over defendant because of their connection with California. The life insurance contract was delivered to a California resident, premiums were mailed from California, insured died in California. All of these established substantial contacts of defendant with forum.
Hanson
(Specific)
Facts: Dora Donner, a Pennsylvania resident, established a trust in Delaware with a Delaware bank as trustee.Donner moved to Florida, where she died and where her will was then probated. Hanson, defendant, was the primary recipient of the Delaware trust. Denckla, plaintiff, split the majority of the estate when the will was probated in Florida. Plaintiff wished the Florida court to exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware trust and trustee, in which case defendant would have no share of the estate. Defendant filed separate suit in Delaware. Delaware court said Florida court lacked lacked jurisdiction over the trust and had no personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
Holding: Unilateral activities of the plaintiff not sufficient to satisfy this minimal-contacts requirement. The Florida court lacks jurisdiction over the Delaware trust.
Florida court could not exercise PJ over the Delaware trustee. The trustee did nothing to purposefully avail itself of the benefits or protections of Florida’s laws.
The trustee had no office in Florida, it transacted no business there, it held no trust assets there, and it solicited no business there. As the trustee did not have substantial contacts with Florida.
Shaffer
(Specific)
Facts: plaintiff brought a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware against the Greyhound Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, represented by Shaffer, alleging acts that took place in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a motion for an order of sequestration of shares of Greyhound stock owned by the individual defendants moved to vacate the sequestration order on the grounds that the ex parte sequestration violated their due process rights and that the property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware. Court rejected motion because this was a quasi in rem case, which is traditionally based on seizure of property in the jurisdiction rather than the defendant’s contacts.
Holding: the Delaware sequestration statute deprived defendants of their property without due process. Here, the property seized was statutorily located in Delaware, but it did not have any relation to the subject matter of the litigation.
The defendants had nothing to do with the state of Delaware; their only connection to it was that they had accepted directorial positions in a company incorporated in Delaware, but accepting these positions does not mean they can be taken to a Delaware court. Delaware had no PJ.
World-Wide
(Specific)
Facts: Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a car from World-Wide in New York while they were still residents of that state. The next year the family left New York to move to Arizona. On the way they were struck by a car in Oklahoma. Robinsons were burned in car crash. Robinsons brought a products-liability suit against World-Wide, claiming that the fire was a result of the defective design of the car. World-Wide appeared in court claiming that Oklahoma’s exercise of jurisdiction over them violated the company’s due process rights.World-Wide, a New York corporation, conducted no business in the State of Oklahoma. district court ruled against World-Wide. World-Wide (plaintiff) then sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to stop the court’s exercise of PJ over them.
Holding: That the plaintiffs could foresee the automobile’s use in Oklahoma is not sufficient to authorize the state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Because the plaintiffs conducted no activities in Oklahoma, it is unreasonable to say that they should have anticipated being haled into an Oklahoma state court.
McIntyre
(Specific)
Facts: plaintiff, a New Jersey resident became seriously injured while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre, defendant. Injury occurred in New Jersey, the machine was manufactured in England where defendant was incorporated. New Jersey Supreme Court found that, even though defendant never marketed its goods in the state nor shipped them there, New Jersey courts had jurisdiction over the company because the manufacturer knew or should have reasonably known that its products were distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead their products being sold in any of the 50 states even in New Jersey. Defendant appealed.
Holding: Based on precedent, Asahi, Justice O’Connor stated “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”
McIntyre did not engage in any conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey. Consequently, it cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of a New Jersey court.
Abdouch
(Specific)
Facts: Plaintiff was a secretary for the presidential campaign for John F. Kennedy in 1960. Richard Yates gave plaintiff a copy of a book with an inscription in the book with her name in. Later the book was stolen. Defendant, who sells books through his company purchased the book in 2009. In the same year defendant sold the book to a buyer in Nebraska. Defendant sells books on website. Defendant advertised the plaintiff’s book on the website as sold with a picture of the inscription. Only 2 out of 1,000 of defendant’s mailing list live in Nebraska. Defendant was not registered to do business in Nebraska and did not own or lease any real estate in Nebraska. Defendant did not advertise in any Nebraska publications and had sold less than $615 in books to Nebraska residents. Defendant’s total revenue was 3.9 million. Plaintiff discovered the picture of the book on the website and sued defendant in Nebraska for invasion of privacy. Trial court dismissed for lack of PJ over defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
Holding: Based on Zippo Test and Calder Effects Test if the website simply posts information, the website cannot be the basis for personal jurisdiction. And if defendant’s acts were intentional, uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state, and caused harm in the forum state, personal jurisdiction is proper.
Website was interactive and allowed customers to browse and purchase books. However, the level of interaction with Nebraska was minimal, and no evidence was presented that showed that the website was directed toward Nebraska. And no evidence showed that the defendant’s advertisements were directed at Nebraska.
Goodyear
(General)
Facts: 13-year-old boys from North Carolina were killed in a bus accident outside Paris, France. Parents, plaintiff, filed a wrongful-death suit in North Carolina state court against The Goodyear, the defendant. Defendant was an Ohio corporation, and three of its subsidiaries (also defendants) organized and operating exclusively in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. Plaintiff’s alleged that a defective tire manufactured in Goodyear’s Turkey plant was the cause of the accident. Although Goodyear USA regularly conducted business in North Carolina and agreed to submit to the court’s jurisdiction, its subsidiaries did not. subsidiaries argued that the state court lacked jurisdiction over them and filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the claims.
Holding: It is clear that North Carolina is not a forum in which the subsidiaries are at home. The subsidiaries’ sale of some tires in North Carolina through intermediaries is not a continuous, systematic business contact with the state sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over them.
Daimler
(General)
Facts: plaintiffs, residents of Argentina, brought suit against Daimler, defendant, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MBA), a Daimler subsidiary, collaborated with Argentinian forces to kidnap, torture, and kill MBA workers during an Argentinian war. These workers were the plaintiffs or persons closely related to the plaintiffs. plaintiffs based their claim of the district court’s jurisdiction on Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), which was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributed Daimler cars to all 50 states and had various facilities and offices in California. Daimler filed a motion to dismiss the claims based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
Holding: aimler’s affiliations with California are not so substantial that they justify this suit being heard there. Daimler and MBUSA are incorporated and have their principal places of business outside of California. Although MBUSA distributes cars to and maintains offices in California, MBUSA distributes cars to every state.
The affiliations of MBUSA and Daimler with California are not so continuous and systematic as to render the companies at home in California.
Bristol
(General)
Facts: plaintiffs, residents of California and 33 other states, brought suit against Bristol, defendant, in California Superior Court. The plaintiffs asserted a number of claims, alleging that Plavix, a drug BMS manufactured, injured them. BMS was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in New York. Plavix was not designed, developed, or manufactured in California. Further, the plaintiffs residing outside of California did not buy or take Plavix in California. Bristol moved to quash service of summons on those plaintiffs who were not California residents. Superior court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal held that California courts had specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims. The California Supreme Court affirmed, finding specific jurisdiction because the claims and injuries of the resident plaintiffs were identical to those of the nonresident plaintiffs.
Holding: For a state court to assert specific jurisdiction, there must be an affiliation between the forum state and the specific claim at issue.
Although the defendant’s has many contacts with California, none of those contacts are affiliated with the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. Bristol did not design, develop, or manufacture Plavix in California, and the nonresident plaintiffs did not buy or take Plavix in California. Thus, both the Bristol conduct giving rise to the claims and the nonresident plaintiffs’ injuries occurred outside of California.
Burnham
(General)
Facts: Plaintiff and wife decided the separate. At that time, they were living in New Jersey with their two children. They agreed to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and the wife would move to California, where she would have custody of both children. Wife moved to California, plaintiff filed for divorce in the state of New Jersey on the grounds of desertion, but never attempted to serve her. Plaintiff while in California for business and to visit his children, was served with a California court summons and wife’s divorce petition. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash on the basis that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for California to assert jurisdiction over him, because he lacked the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction.
Holding: Because the plaintiff was physically present in California when he was served with process, the state properly asserted personal jurisdiction over him.
Gibbons
(Long Arm Statute/General)
Facts: defendant, a Texas resident, and the Browns, Florida residents, were driving in Montreal, Canada. Defendant was giving Mr. Brown directions, but she gave Brown wrong directions and Brown collided head-on with an oncoming vehicle on a one way street. defendant sued Mr. Brown in Florida for injuries she sustained. Ms. Brown, plaintiff, later sued defendant in Florida for injuries she alleged were caused by defendants’ faulty directions.
Holding: In order to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant under a long-arm statute, the plaintiff must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts within the coverage of the long-arm statute and must show sufficient minimum contacts with the state to satisfy due process.
