PERSONAL JURISDICTION Flashcards
A student attending college in her hometown in State A was in a car accident with a driver in State B. The driver initiated a negligence action against the student in State A federal court. Because the student was on vacation in State C at the time the case was initiated, the driver had the student served with process personally in State C.
Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the student in State A federal court be constitutional in this case?
Yes, because the student is a domiciliary (citizen) of State A.
Correct. The student’s status as a State A domiciliary (she is in her “hometown”) makes personal jurisdiction constitutional there. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). The fact that the student was served outside of State A is immaterial to the constitutionality of jurisdiction in State A based on the student’s state citizenship.
A truck owned by ABC, Inc. (a State A corporation with its principal place of business in State B), and driven by one of its employees traveled through State C on its way to State D to deliver some merchandise there. While in State C, the truck collided with a car driven by a rancher, who was injured in the accident. The rancher filed suit against ABC in State C, alleging negligence by the ABC truck driver. Service of process was achieved by delivering service to ABC’s CEO while she was traveling in State C.
Assuming the ABC truck driver was acting within the scope of employment when the accident occurred, would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over ABC in State C courts be constitutional in this case?
Yes, because ABC, through its employee, purposefully operated a truck within State C and the lawsuit arose out of that activity.
Correct. When a defendant (here through its employee) purposefully avails itself of a state’s roads, an accident arising from that conduct will subject the defendant to jurisdiction in that state in a case based on that accident, which is what happened in this case. This is specific jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
In State A there lives a former employee of a corporation who once lived and worked for the company at its State B headquarters (the corporation is also incorporated in State B). The former employee initiated an action against the corporation in State A federal court, asserting a claim for wrongful termination. To achieve service of process, the former employee served the driver of one of the corporation’s delivery trucks while it was stopped at a gas station in State A.
Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation in State A courts be constitutional in thi
No, because the corporation does not have any contacts with State A that are related to this action.
Correct. There are no facts in this question indicating that the corporation has contacts with State A. The fact that a former employee lives in State A does not make this a contact of the corporation, since she is not a current employee and is not there under the company’s direction. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The presence of the driver is unrelated to the lawsuit and so that cannot support personal jurisdiction over the company. Without any relevant forum state contacts, no personal jurisdiction is possible. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
A customer from State A purchased a ladder from a local hardware store based in State A. Afterwards, the customer moved to State B. The following month, the customer returned to State A for a visit, told the owner of the hardware store about the move to State B, and bought a chainsaw. Back in State B, the customer was injured while standing on the ladder attempting to trim a tree with the chainsaw. The ladder collapsed and the chainsaw cut him badly.
The customer initiated an action against the owner of the hardware store in State B federal court alleging that both the stepladder and the chainsaw were defective.
May the State B federal court constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the hardware store owner in this case?
No, because the hardware store owner did not market or deliver the products in question in State B and cannot be subject to jurisdiction based on the customer’s contacts with State B.
Correct. The hardware store owner has no connection with State B, given that the store is located in State A and the facts do not indicate that the owner marketed or distributed the products in State B. The fact that the customer is now a State B citizen does not give the owner a connection with that state; the customer’s contacts with State B cannot be ascribed to the hardware store owner. Defendants are only responsible for their purposeful contacts with the forum state, not those of others. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Retread, Inc., a State A corporation, manufactures rubber soles that are used to produce running shoes manufactured by XYZ, Inc., a State B corporation, which sells them throughout the United States. Retread has no control over where XYZ chooses to sell its shoes and receives no information about where such sales occur.
In State C, a runner wearing an XYZ shoe was injured when the sole separated from the rest of the shoe. The runner initiated a products liability action against Retread in State C federal court. Assume that State C courts exercise jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. Last year XYZ sold 2% of its shoes containing Retread soles in State C, but that number has fluctuated up and down over the years.
Retread has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Which of the following would be an appropriate ruling of the court on this motion?
Grant the motion, because Retread did not intend for its product to be sold in State C nor is there evidence that there was a regular flow of its rubber soles into State C of which Retread was aware.
Correct. The facts do not indicate that Retread specifically directed its shoe soles into State C or had a regular flow of its products into State C. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (Kennedy & Breyer opinions); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (O’Connor opinion). At a minimum, the defendant must have an expectation that the product will be marketed in the forum state, which Retread arguably lacked here. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). No facts show that Retread had knowledge (or awareness to use Justice Brennan’s language from Asahi) of the level of XYZ’s sales in particular states, and even so, it is unclear whether a court would treat knowledge of 2% of product sales in State C as being sufficient to give Retread an expectation that its products would be marketed in the forum state.
A reporter from State A wrote an article profiling the president of a major company in State B. The company president is a State B citizen and the article was published in the main newspaper covering State B, which has over 1 million print subscribers in State B. The profile discussed numerous State B activities of the president and the company.
The president believed the article was full of harmful lies that would hurt the president’s reputation. Thus, the company president initiated a defamation action in State B federal court against the reporter, seeking $100,000 in damages. Process was served on the reporter at home in State A.
Would personal jurisdiction over the reporter be constitutional in State B?
Yes, because the reporter’s intentional wrong was aimed at and caused its principal harm in State B.
Correct. By committing defamation within a newspaper published in State B, both the publication and harm of the defamation were aimed at and occurred in State B, rendering the reporter subject to jurisdiction there. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288 (2014) (stating, with reference to Calder v. Jones, “[B]ecause publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel, the defendants’ intentional tort actually occurred in California”) (emphasis in original); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
A bank in State A lent money to a borrower domiciled in State A. When the loan became due, the borrower failed to pay. After that time, the borrower inherited property in State B. The bank initiated an action against the borrower on the debt in a court of State B. To obtain jurisdiction over the borrower in State B, the bank attached the borrower’s State B property as is permitted under State B law.
May State B constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the borrower in this case?
No, because the attached property has no relationship to the lawsuit.
Correct. The borrower’s contacts with State B consist solely of the ownership of the inherited property, which is unrelated to the debt claim being asserted by the bank. Under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), this would be insufficient because it does not comport with the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which requires that forum state contacts be related to the claim being asserted to support specific jurisdiction. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
A client from State A hired a lawyer from State B to handle the client’s purchase of real property located in State B. The lawyer did so, but the client failed to pay the lawyer’s fees. The lawyer initiated an action in State B federal court, asserting a claim for the unpaid fees involving the property purchase and attaching the State B property in question (as is permitted under State B law) to get jurisdiction.
Is personal jurisdiction in the State B federal court over the client constitutional in this case?
C Yes, because the suit arises out of the client’s engagement of the lawyer to purchase the State B property.
Correct. The State B property is at the heart of the fee dispute between the client and the lawyer, given that acquiring the property is the work for which the lawyer was retained. The client purposefully availed itself of State B by entering an agreement with a State B lawyer and purchasing property there and the dispute arose out of that State B activity; thus, sufficient minimum contacts exist. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). No facts here suggest that personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
A carpenter who lives in State A purchased some building supplies from Green, Inc., a mail order company having its principal place of business in State B. After receiving the supplies in State A, the carpenter failed to pay for them. Consequently, the company initiated an action against the carpenter in State B federal court seeking to collect the amount due. The company served process on the carpenter by delivering the summons and complaint to the carpenter personally at the carpenter’s winter cabin located in State B.
Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the carpenter in State B be constitutional in this case?
Yes, because the carpenter was served with process personally in State B.
Correct. In Burnham, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of in-state service of process as a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over an individual real person. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Here, personal jurisdiction would be constitutional in State B because the carpenter was personally served with process there.
A pedestrian was struck by a truck being driven by a driver who was delivering goods for XYZ, Inc. The accident occurred in State A, which is the pedestrian’s home state. The truck driver is a citizen of State B; XYZ, Inc. is incorporated in State B and has its principal place of business there.
The pedestrian initiated an action against the truck driver in State A federal court, seeking $150,000 in damages. The truck driver in turn impleaded XYZ into the action, seeking indemnification under the employment agreement for any damages the driver might have to pay the pedestrian. The driver served XYZ with the third-party summons and complaint in State B at its headquarters (by delivering it to the CEO), only 90 miles away from the State A federal courthouse where the action was pending. The long-arm statute in State A reads, “Nonresidents are subject to jurisdiction in the courts of this state when they cause injury to someone within this state.”
XYZ responded by filing an answer denying liability and seeking dismissal of the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. How should the court rule on XYZ’s personal jurisdiction defense?
Deny it, because XYZ was served 90 miles from the State A federal courthouse.
Correct. Unnder the so-called “bulge” rule, when a third-party defendant is served within 100 miles of the courthouse where the action is pending, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction. In this case, XYZ has been joined as a third-party defendant and was served 90 miles from the courthouse so the bulge rule is satisfied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
An actor from State A entered into a contract to do commercials for a shampoo company in exchange for a fixed $500,000 fee. After doing the commercial, which was filmed in State A, the company failed to pay the actor. The company is incorporated and has its principal place of business in State B.
The actor initiated an action against the company in State A federal court, seeking damages for breach of contract. The contract provides: “Any civil action arising out of this contract must be filed in any state or federal court in State B. The terms of the contract shall be governed by the law of State A.” The actor served the registered agent of the company who was authorized to receive service in State A.
The company responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. State A has a long-arm statute that permits jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. How should the court rule on the motion?
B Deny it, because the company entered a contract with a State A citizen, performance under the contract occurred in State A, and jurisdiction in State A would not be unreasonable.
Correct. The company entered a contract with a State A citizen concerning a commercial that was shot in State A. When a party enters a contract with a forum state resident and anticipates performance of the contract there, that state may exercise jurisdiction so long as it is not unreasonable. Here, there are no facts that would indicate jurisdiction in State A would be unduly burdensome for the company, the plaintiff is a citizen of State A, and State A has an interest in protecting its citizens from breaches of contracts solicited and performed there. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
An auto manufacturer incorporated and with its principal place of business in Euphoria (a foreign country) designs its cars in Euphoria and manufactures them in State A in the United States. After manufacturing the vehicles, the manufacturer ships them to dealers in every state in the United States, each of which are independent franchisees rather than subsidiaries of the manufacturer. The manufacturer has been doing business in this manner regularly for over 70 years.
A customer purchased a car made by the manufacturer at a dealer based in State B. Unfortunately, while the customer was driving the car it malfunctioned in a manner that resulted in a severe explosion. The customer initiated an action in State B federal court against the manufacturer and the dealer seeking damages based on strict products liability, negligent failure to warn, and negligent maintenance claims.
The manufacturer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. State B has a long-arm statute that permits jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. How should the court rule on the motion?
Deny it, because the manufacturer directly shipped the vehicle into State B for sale and that vehicle gave rise to the customer’s claim.
Correct. The manufacturer shipped the car to State B itself, and that car is the basis of the customer’s claim in State B (there are no facts indicating that jurisdiction would be unreasonable). Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
A pacemaker is a device used to control abnormal heart rhythms. A pacemaker manufacturer incorporated and with its principal place of business in State A sells its pacemaker throughout the United States. All of the pacemakers the manufacturer produces are manufactured at its plant in State B.
After suffering a heart attack, a patient received a pacemaker from a doctor at a hospital located in State C. Unfortunately, the pacemaker failed and the patient died (the patient was a citizen of State C and died there). The patient’s estate initiated a wrongful death action against the manufacturer in State B federal court, seeking damages. Assume State B courts exercise jurisdiction to the constitutional limit.
The manufacturer moved to dismiss the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. How should the court rule on the motion?
A Deny it, because the manufacturer produced the pacemaker in State B and it gave rise to the claim.
Correct. All of the manufacturer’s pacemakers were produced in State B, meaning that the pacemaker in question came from there. So the manufacturer has a purposeful contact with State B that gave rise to the claim, making jurisdiction constitutional (no facts suggest that jurisdiction would be unreasonable in State B). Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
ABC, Inc., which is incorporated in and has its principal place of business headquarters in State A, builds airplanes at its factories in State B and State C. Because State B is small and ABC’s operations are large, ABC is the largest manufacturer in the state.
ExecuJet is a corporation under the law of Euphoria (a foreign country) that uses ABC airplanes to carry out its executive jet service. During a recent flight, an ExecuJet airplane lost all power and crash-landed in Euphoria, severely injuring the four passengers and two crewmembers on board. The airplane involved in the accident was manufactured by ABC in State C.
The injured passengers sued ABC for damages in State B federal court. Assume that the State B long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. ABC responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. How should the court rule on the motion?
Grant it, because ABC’s State B contacts did not give rise to the passengers’ claims, and its operations in State B are insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction there.
Correct. The crash did not arise from an airplane manufactured in State B (thereby preventing specific jurisdiction) and its manufacturing operations in State B are not sufficient to subject ABC to general jurisdiction. The corporation’s contacts with the state must be such that it may fairly be considered at home there, such as being incorporated there or having its headquarters there. Here, ABC is incorporated and headquartered in State A, not State B, so general jurisdiction is not possible there. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (outlining the requirements for specific jurisdiction).
A surgeon mistakenly amputated the right arm of a patient whose left arm was supposed to be removed. The surgeon made the mistake because the imaging machine used to identify the proper arm malfunctioned. The hospital where this occurred is located in State A, although the surgeon is a citizen of State B. The manufacturer of the imaging device—which shipped the machine to the hospital—produced the device in State C and is incorporated there. The patient is a citizen of State D.
The patient wishes to initiate an action in federal court seeking damages for the loss of the patient’s right arm. Which state can constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over the surgeon, the owner/operator of the hospital, and the device manufacturer in this case?
State A, because that is where the surgeon conducted the wrongful amputation and where the imaging machine was shipped.
Correct. The surgeon and the device manufacturer both have purposeful minimum contacts with State A (conducting the surgery and delivering the device, respectively) and the hospital is located there; the patient’s claims arose out of those forum state contacts. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
