Perception as a source of knowledge Flashcards

1
Q

what is direct realism?

A

the immediate objects of perception are mind independent objects and their properties.

  • the external world exists independently of the mind
  • and we perceive the external world directly
  • whatever you look at, you are also perceiving its properties
  • objects retain these properties even when you are not looking at it, they continue to exist e.g. if you leave an apple in a draw it will rot
    -often thought of as common sense theory of perception
  • no third mediator between us and objects
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1
Q

how is the argument from illusion an issue for direct realism?

A
  • when we experience illusions, our perceptions distort the true nature of physical reality, so that what we perceive is not the same as what is actually out there
  • reality is DIFFERENT to our perception of it
    -e.g. when looking at a half-immersed straw in a glass of water it may appear bent/crooked when it is NOT actually crooked
  • if direct realism was true, the external world would be exactly how we perceive it
  • BUT in illusions there is an obvious difference between reality and our perceptions
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2
Q

how can direct realist respond to the argument from illusion?

A
  • we are directly aware of the straw BUT it APPEARS bent because of the circumstances
  • it has the relational property of looking crooked
  • this appearing is not another thing mediating between us and the straw
  • direct realists don’t have to suppose that objects have to appear exactly as they are
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3
Q

explain the issue of perceptual variation for direct realism

A
  • the appearance of physical objects can vary depending on the conditions which they are perceived in
    -e.g. Russels table example: when I stand on one side of the room, a shiny wooden table may have a white spot on it because of reflection of light, but to someone standing on the other side there may be no white spot
  • we can’t privilege one colour over the other, so the table cannot be said to have a particular colour
  • the spot is either there or it isn’t - so one of us is not perceiving the table DIRECTLY AS IT IS
    -russel also says the shape of the table may change: when I look from a birds eye view it is rectangular, but when I look from a few metres away it is kite shaped: it can’t be both shapes!
    -the apparent properties of the objects are not the same of their real properties, there are differences in our perception and of the table and the table itself; DR says there should be no such difference
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4
Q

explain a response to the argument from perceptual variation

A
  • objects may appear differently to perceivers but they are still directly perceived
  • things have RELATIONAL PROPERTIES: one that varies in relation to something else
  • e.g. lukewarm water can appear cold to the perceiver because the temperature of our hands is RELATIVE to the temperature of the water
  • similarly a table can appear white or brown from different angles; the table has the (mind-independent) relational property of appearing brown to some people while appearing white to others
  • the table has both of these mind-independent properties but which one you perceive varies depending on where you are
  • we can explain scientifically why the water feels different, or why the table appears different: agreed methods of determining
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5
Q

explain the argument from hallucination against direct realism

A
  • during hallucinations (being ill or taking drugs) we perceive things that aren’t actually there
    e.g. I may see a goblin on my sofa but there is no goblin on my sofa in reality
    -often a person cannot distinguish their hallucinations from a veridical perception
  • if a hallucination and veridical perception are indistinguishable, then the person must be aware of the same thing in both cases
    -if what a person is aware of in a hallucination is in the mind, then what we are aware of in veridical perception is also in the mind; it is all SENSE DATA
  • we perceive the world indirectly and direct realism is false
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6
Q

explain a response to the argument from hallucination

A
  • hallucinations are not perceptions they are imaginations
  • in cases on hallucinations we confuse imagination for perception
  • they are not the same phenomenon
  • hallucinations have a very different causal history; produced by malfunction in the brain
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7
Q

explain the time lag argument as an issue for direct realism

A
  • it takes 8 minutes for light from the sun to reach the earth
  • when you look at the sun you are not seeing the sun as it is now, you are seeing it as it was 8 mins ago; there is a difference between the sun itself and your perception of it
  • we are NOT directly perceiving it
  • if the sun ceased to exist in the last 8 mins, we would not know about it yet
  • if what we are seeing may no longer exist, then we cannot really be seeing it; what we are seeing must be sense data
  • this is also true of objects close to us; the time lag is just shorter
  • so we can generalise ad say that immediate objects of perception are sense data and all our perception of physical objects is indirect
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8
Q

explain a response to the time lag argument

A
  • there is nothing in the direct realist view that says that what we perceive must be simultaneous with the object perceived
  • it confuses WHAT we perceive with HOW we perceive it
  • what we are perceiving is still a mind-independent object –> it’s just we are perceiving the object as it was a few moments ago rather than now
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9
Q

what is indirect realism

A

-The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
- the external world exists independently of the mind (realism)
- but we perceive the external world INDIRECTLY, via sense data
- there are 3 elements in perception; the perceiver, the real objects they perceive and the appearance of these objects to the perceiver
- the immediate objects of perception are sense-data –> which is caused by and represents the mind-independent external world
- sense-data are representations of reality + exists only in your mind
- because perception involves an inference, it is indirect

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10
Q

what is John lock’s primary/secondary quality distinction?

A
  • PRIMARY QUALITIES: sense data of certain properties of objects that resemble their real properties, they are OBJECTIVE
    e.g. size, shape, motion, position
  • SECONDARY QUALITIES: ‘powers’ to produce a sensation in humans, they are SUBJECTIVE
    e.g. colour, taste, sound, smell
  • when I look at a tree, my sense data of its size and shape correlate accurately with its true size and shape, but my sense data of it’s colour and smell do not
  • whatever is causing me to see the leaves as green is not green itself
  • an object can be imagined without its secondary qualities but not without its primary qualities
  • this distinction explains the difference between reality (primary qualities) and our perception of it (secondary qualities)
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11
Q

what is the issue for indirect realism that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects?

A
  • it leads to scepticism about the external world, how can we be sure that there is a physical world at all?
  • if we only perceive sense data, how can we be sure it is an accurate representation of the external world? or that there is an external world?
  • our senses can deceive us
  • our sense data may not represent any material reality; we may be a brain in a vat, or an evil demon is deceiving us
  • since we cannot directly observe reality we cannot be sure it exists
  • we cannot get beyond the ‘veil of perception’ to access the external world behind it
    –> our sense-data constitutes a veil between us and reality which we cannot penetrate to discover the material world
  • how can indirect realism claim there is an external world if we can never actually perceive the external world?
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12
Q

explain the response of the involuntary nature of our experience to the problem of scepticism (Locke)

A
  • we cannot control what we see or hear
  • e.g. if someone is speaking to you you can’t choose not to listen to them, you have to
  • locke points out that we are unable to avoid certain sense-data
  • by contrast, memory and imagination allow us to choose what we experience
  • the fact that we cannot control our sensations/experiences suggests they must be made by some exterior cause
  • sensations are not subject to our will
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13
Q

explain the response of the coherence of various kinds of experiences to scepticism (Locke)

A
  • our senses cohere with each other and back each other up
    e.g. if you knock on a table touch backs up the sound
  • like two witnesses giving the same description of someone, if it matches up it is deemed as reliable
  • the senses independently offer support for each other’s testimony, suggesting there is one external cause
  • would be extremely coincidental if the different senses of sound and touch agreed about the geometric properties if those objects did not exist
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14
Q

explain the response that the external world is the best hypothesis to scepticism (Russell)

A
  • Russell accepts that there is no deductive proof of the external world, so we must treat it as a hypothesis
  • we have an instinctive belief of a physical, external world that corresponds with our sense data and we should only reject these beliefs when they are shown to be incoherant
  • imagine you see a cat sitting on the sofa, you go and make a cup of tea and when you come back the cat is sitting on the floor
  • there are two possibly hypothesis
    a) the cat exists independently of my mind and while I was making a cup of tea it walked from the sofa to the floor
    b) the cat does not exist independently of my mind and stopped existing while I was making a cup of tea and sprung back into existence in a different location when I returned
  • russel says that hypothesis a is the better explanation because it connects the two perceptions whereas hypothesis b isn’t an explanation at all
  • hypothesis a also explains why the cat gets hungry even when I’m not perceiving it
  • even though we can’t prove the existence of mind-independent objects, Russell argues that we should believe in them since they are the best hypothesis
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15
Q

explain the response to indirect realism (Berkley) that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects

A
  • indirect realism says what we perceive is sense data that resembles the mind-independent external world
  • but how is it possible for mind-dependent sense data to resemble mind-independent objects?
  • e.g. sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not
  • for example, one moment my sense data of a table is square shaped, the next it is diamond shaped –> the sense data changes but the mind-independent object does not - so how can the two things resemble each other?
16
Q

What is idealism? And Berkley’s idealism?

A
  • the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects
  • all that exists are minds and ideas
  • there is no external world independent of minds
  • we perceive ideas directly
  • all that exists are minds and their ideas!
  • unless something is being perceived, it doesn’t exist
  • the universe is sustained in existence through being perceived by the infinate mind of god
  • the perceptions god gives us are sufficiently similar and cohere with each other so that there is the appearance of us perceiving the same objects
17
Q

What is Berkley’s argument: the attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction for idealism?

A
  • Locke’s distinction of primary/secondary qualities states that secondary qualities are mind-dependent, they are subjective, whilst primary qualities resemble the real, mind-independent properties of that object
  • Berkley agrees with Locke to an extent
  • Berkley says that secondary qualities are mind-dependent
  • However, he also argues that primary qualities are mind-dependent
  • He offers arguments from perceptual variation to support this claim:
    ‘Something that looks small to me may seem large to an ant’
    ‘A smooth surface may look jagged under a microscope’
    –> we can’t say these objects have a singular size, shape, independent to how it is perceived
    –> so it relies on the perceiver and is subjective; just like secondary qualities
  • He also aims to show this by asking us to imagine something with only the primary qualities of shape, size and motion –> you can’t imagine it without colour
    –> therefore primary and secondary qualities are not distinguishable and so are both mind-dependent
  • everything we perceive is mind-independent
18
Q

What is Berkley’s master argument for idealism?

A
  • Try to imagine of a tree that is being perceived by no one
  • It is impossible! By thinking of the tree you are perceiving it, you can think of a tree, but NOT of a tree that exists independently from the mind
  • we can’t conceive of a mind-independent object because as soon as we conceive of the object it becomes mind-dependent
  • therefore mind-independent objects are incomprehensible
19
Q

Explain a response to Berkley’s master argument

A
  • the conclusion does not follow
  • just because it’s impossible to have an IDEA of a mind-independent object it doesn’t mean that they don’t exist
  • he confuses mind-independent objects with their representation in our mind
  • confuses the things we imagine with being mind-independent
20
Q

Explain the argument from hallucination and illusion as an issue for idealism

A
  • how does an idealist distinguish imagined objects from real-objects if it is all mind-dependent?
  • for realists, the distinction between illusions/hallucinations is obvious; it is when our mind-dependent senses trick us about reality
  • however, everything is mind-dependent to an idealist, so how are hallucinations/illusions different to our veridical perceptions if there is no mind-independent reality?
  • e.g. a pencil in water appears crooked when it is not. But if we perceive the pencil as crooked, then an idealist would have to say the pencil IS crooked, but this is false.
    -e.g. according to Berkley hallucinations are as real as ordinary perceptions
  • if I perceive a goblin because I took drugs, is it really fair to say that the goblin is as real as a table or chair?
  • and why would god cause such perceptions and deceit if he is a perfect being?
21
Q

explain the argument that idealism leads to solipsism

A
  • solipsism is the view that I can only know of the contents of my own mind, so nothing outside of my mind exists
  • Berkley’s master argument says that the idea of a mind-independent object is self-contradictory and impossible
  • this suggests that there is no reason to believe anything exists beyond ones experience
  • according to Berkley the world first appeared when I was born, will disappear when I die, and comes into and out of existence every time I close my eyes (nothing exists unless I am perceiving it)
  • this is surely absurd!
  • this objection also completely ignores the role of god in Berkley’s theory
  • he claims god is a permanent perceiver of the universe outside of our minds
  • but he also claims that all we are aware of are our minds and ideas
  • so is god an idea?
22
Q

explain Berkley’s response to the argument from solipsism

A
  • Berkley says god’s mind does not have sensible qualities and so we cannot frame it in our mind
  • but we know God exists on the basis that perception is involuntary and systematic, so we can know God exists beyond our own minds
  • we have an intuition which makes us aware that there’s a ‘self’ which possesses our ideas
23
Q

explain the problems with the role played by God in Berkley’s idealism as an issue for idealism

A
  • according to Berkley, what we perceive are ideas that exist in God’s mind
  • but this appears to conflict with Berkley’s conception of God
  • Berkley says that God doesn’t feel pain - he’s perfect
  • But I often feel and perceive pain
  • So if my perception of pain is an idea in God’s mind, surely God must feel pain too?
  • But this contradicts Berkley’s description of God as a perfect being that doesn’t feel pain - omnipotent
24
Q

explain Berkley’s response to the problems with the role played by God

A
  • Berkley’s response is that ideas like pain exist in Gods understanding
  • Although he doesn’t feel pain himself, he understands what it is for us to feel pain
  • When we feel pain, it was whatgod has actively willed us to perceive
  • God doesn’t have a body, he is a pure spirit, and so doesn’t suffer from pain or other sensations against his will
25
Q

explain a response to Berkley’s response of the problems with the role played by God

A
  • my perceptions are fleeting, and constantly change from one moment to the next
  • Yet god is said to be unchanging
  • But if my perceptions are ideas in Gods mind and my perceptions are constantly changing, surely god must change too
  • if he changes he cannot be perfect and immutable