‘peaceful Coexistence Failed By The End Of 1961 Bc Both Superpowers Proved In Their Involvements In Espionage And Intervention That They Were Not Fully Committed To It’

Question 1

Success criteria

Answer 1

-containing of cw tension and fundamentals
- did not prevent the spike in tensions
-Created more tensions and did not fully resolve nuclear anxieties
-spirit of cooperation
-platform for dialogue

Question 2

1. Summit diplomacy

Answer 2

Geneva con- open skies in theory would calm nuclear anxieties and step closer to disarmament . Science and cultural exchanges lead to ‘spirit of Geneva’ and marked a beginning of dialogue and foundation of PC were in place. Camp David- first su president in the USA - would not have happened when Stalin was in charge, marked a new beginning of friendship and diplomacy.

Ca-rejected by Khrushchev, reveals the culture of distrust bc he is not being honest with the west, secretly building up arsenal. The fact that he is still building up military shows how he is anxious about the security of the SU and strengthening the defence capacity of the east to protect it from west- containing of cw tensions.
PC was not about the ussr stepping back from competition with the USA [arms and space race] which substantially increased tensions in this period w/the hysteria in the USA over Sputnik and u2 incident in Paris- hark back to cow status quo- militarisation mistrust and sus.

Question 3

2. Austrian state treaty

Answer 3

1955 ‘europes Korea’
Eliminated the potential FP of Korea and source of conflict. Not liable to joint the su, paved the way for summit diplomacy, only sig agreement made.
Ca- only achieved bc it fits the ussr’s strategic interests, this narrowed the latitude for cooperation bc it showed that there was a limit for just how much the su can tolerate before it condemns the terms and treaty made. Khrushchev’s rhetoric and actions were very aggressive at times in Paris and towards Kennedy in Vienna - did not prevent the spike in tension.

Question 4

Poland and Hungary

Answer 4

The lack of intervention from the west- accepted the aggressive nature of the su and accepted the live and let live rhetoric
Destalinisation secret speech condemns Stalin’s crimes . Khr was not Stalin and ended the Stalinist legacy of terror and paranoia. Redefined the relationship between the su and eastern blocs - the su was changing and breaking away from Stalinism.
Allowed Poland a degree of independence so tensions surrounding Poland [a persistent source of conflict ] between the east and west was relaxed whereas before the Lublin govt, and operation unthinkable intensified tension between the west and the east to liberate Poland from soviet occupation.
Ca- destalinisation was an empty rhetoric when the WP was threatened , Hungary
Polish and Hungary had shown how difficult it was for the soviet gov to encourage satellite states to reform without changing the basic structure of communism that Stalin had implemented- khr was just as paranoid about soviet security exemplified by hun.
Hungary - vulnerability of the satellite states influence and demonstrated the limits of independence of eastern bloc countries.