Peaceagreements

Question 1

Analytically it is useful to distinguish between two processes in Jarstad’s (2008) view.

Answer 1

1. Peace-building: From violent conflict to peace. Regards the post-settlement period and includes the implementation of the peaceagreement.
2. Democratization: From authoritarian rule to democracy. Refers to the process of opening up political space, including improvements regarding contestation, participation, and human rights.

Question 2

What is the democratic peace theory?

Answer 2

Normally we tend to think that ‘pece’ and ‘democracy’ are mutually beneficial and reinforcing (= a postive sum game):

• In democracies conflicts are mostly non-violent.
• Democracies don’t fight each other.

Question 3

Does the democratic peace theory hold outside an established democracy context? What is the paradox?

Answer 3

Does not seem the theory holds for non-established democracies. Instead it might lead to a ‘zero sum’ or a ‘negative sum’ game.

Paradox: while democracy as a political system is associated with peaceful conflict management both within and between states, the road to democracy is often conflict ridden. The core element of democracy, such as popular participation, mobilization of interest groups, and open competition between political parties, increase the risk of violent conflict in societies entering a democratisation process.

Question 4

What is the 4 types of trade-off situations where the choice is between reforms to promote democracy versus efforts to secure peace, according to Jarstad (2008)

Answer 4

1) Horisontal dilemma: the (dis)advantage of inclusion vs. exclusion of rival elites/rebel groups/political parties.
2) Vertical dilemma: the trade-off between democratic legitimacy vs. efficacy (relationship between elite and mass politics).
3) Systematic dilemma: there may be a trade-off between the need for international intervention (to end violence) and ‘local ownership’ and engagement in the peace process (= international vs. local ownership).
4) Temporal dilemma: trade-offs between short-term and long-term effects.

Question 5

What are the aspects of peacebuilding that may give rise to dilemmas between efforts to promote peace and support to democratisation that Jarstad identifies (2008)?

Answer 5

1) When peacebuilding includes multiple tasks with competing objectives.
2) When the coordination between a multitude of actors falter.
3) When project-oriented and short-termed missions fail to mitigate negative long-term effects.
4) When international engagement makes the host society dependent on external support.

Question 6

2 aspects of democratisation that can activate dilemmas in war-torn societies.

Answer 6

1) The essence of the stipulated goal of democratization: Democracy per definition implies opposition and mobilization alon distinctive lines and a certain degree of polarization. This means that democracy provide both the opportunities and incentives for conflict.
2) The shifts involved in democratic transition: Democracy does not automatically result in other desirable goals such as economic development and equality. When reforms do no work the risk of violence increases.

Question 7

What is Fortna’s (2008) argument about the relation between peacekeeping and democratisation?

Answer 7

Positive and negative effects of democratisation and peacekeeping appear to cancel each other out, reflecting inherent dilemmas in the attempts to foster both stable peace and democracy in the aftermath of civil war.

Question 8

Fortna (2008) breaks peacekeeping into 4 categories.

Answer 8

1) Observation missions: Small unarmed deployments of military and sometimes civilian observers to monitor a ceasefire, the with-drawal or cantonment of troops, or other terms of an agreement (e.g. peacekeeping mission in Angola in 1991 UNAVEM II)
2) Interpositional missions (traditional peacekeeping): Deployments of lightly armed troops. Like observer mission, they monitor and report on compliance with an agreement, but they also often serve to separate forces or to help demobilize and disarm military factions (e.g. the UN mission in Angola in 1994 UNAVEM III)
3) Multidimensional missions: Include both military and civilian components helping to implement a comprehensive peace settlement. In addition to the roles played by observer and interpositional missions, they perform tasks such as organising elections, human rights training and monitoring, police reform, institution building, economic development etc. (e.g. mission in Namibia UNTAG)
4) Peace enforcement missions: Mandated to use force for purposes other than self-defence and involve substantial military contingents to provide security and ensure compliance with cease-fire (e.g. UN mission in Sierra Leone in 1999 UNAMSIL)

Question 9

When does peacekeeping have a positive effect on democratisation according to Fortna (2008)?

Answer 9

One year after fighting has ended all types of peace-keeping have a positive effect on democratisation, except multidimensional peace-keeping. This is ironic since these missions are supposed to have the largest impact on democratisation.

Question 10

What is Fortna’s (2008) conclusion about peace-building and democratisation?

Answer 10

Peace-keeping has no clear strong or positive effect on democratisation, relative to cases where belligerents are left to their own devices. This stand in stark contrast to its effects on the stability of peace. Peace-keepers help keep the peace very effectively, but they do not necessarily foster democratisation (= peacekeeping makes peace much more likely to last).

Question 11

How can we critize Fortna’s (2008) conclusions on peace-keeping and democratisation?

Answer 11

Fortna does not address explicitely the issue of legitimacy or ownership; in the short term peace-keeping is likely to be seen as positive since the civilians would be dependent on them for aid and support, so it is natural that their short term effect on creating peace is positive. However, the longer peacekeepers stay, the likelier they are to be seen as being unhelpful and potentially as occupiers as their attempt to assist in building infrastructure (as in the case of multidimensional peace-keeping) is seen as an imposition of Western political models and economic models.

Question 12

What is Wallensteen’s (2012) definition of conflict resolution?

Answer 12

Conflict resolution is a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept other’s continues existence as parties and cease all violent actions against each other.

Question 13

What is the different components of Wallensteen’s (2012) definition of conflict resolution, and what do they entail?

Answer 13

• The AGREEMENT is normally a formal understanding, though they may also be informal, implicit or even secret understandings.
• Accepting EACH OTHER’S CONTINUED EXISTENCE AS PARTIES distinguishes an agreement from a capitualtion/withdrawal.
• The word ACCEPT in the definition does not implythat the parties agree to everything or that they like each other. It only means that they accept the other as much as they need for the agreement to be implemented by the opposing side.
• The parties must CEASE ALL VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST EACH OTHER: There is a variation in whether ceasefires precede, be simultaneous with or come after the signing of a political agreement.

Question 14

What have been the trend in the practice of peace-keeping and the research on peace-keeping?

Answer 14

• Negotiated ends to civil wars were quite rare during the Cold War; the number of conflicts terminated by victories was double the number ended by peace agreements.
• The focus of scholarship during the 1970-1980s was mainly on how to get the warring parties to sign agreements - how to facilitate negotiations, pre-negotiationg, etc. What happens after an agreement is reached was neglected.

Question 15

What risks do leaders face when signing up to a peace agreement?

Answer 15

1) Other leaders who try to take advantage of the compromises included.
2) Followers who see it as a capitulation and betrayal of the ethnic groups interest.
3) Any excluded parties who seek to destroy the peace process.

Question 16

What is Hampson’s (1996) answer as to why peace agreements succeed or fail?

Answer 16

4 possible answers:

1. The extent of international support.
2. The ‘ripeness’ of the conflict for resolution (meaning the intrinsic desire of the parties to make peace.
3. Regional power balances that favour peace.
4. The ‘quality’ of the peace agreement itself, especially whether it contains real power-sharing.

Question 17

What is the problem with Hampson’s (1996) answer for why peace agreements succeed or fail?

Answer 17

He tends to give most weight to the international rather than the domestic factors, but he does not explain why some cases tend to get more international attention than others, or what specifically international actors should do.

Question 18

How does Walter (2009) explain the variation in the duration of civil wars?

Answer 18

1. Problem with information: Even though conflict can rend information about the fighting groups the information rate varies. The speed of which a settlement is reached depends on how much information the war is able to uncover about different characteristics of the combatants over time.
2. Commitment problems: The big problem for warring parties in civil wars is that they cannot by themselves credibly commit to ending hostility and disarming.
   - The key role for international actors is to allow domestic actors the escape their commitment problems by agreeing to enforce agreements.

Question 19

What is Walter’s (2009) conclusion on the duration of civil wars?

Answer 19

The greatest problem opponents encounter in trying to resolve a civil war is not that of reaching an agreement, but that of writing an enforceable contract under conditions of extreme risk. Combatants decide to pursue peace settlements in part because a third part is willing to verify or enforce demobilisation, and because their role in the first postwar government can be safeguarded. These guarantees are necessary for the combatants to credibly commit to treaties that create enormous opportunities for post-treaty exploitation.

Question 20

How do Walter (2009) relate to other theories?

Answer 20

Walter argues against theories that only looks at structural factors such as economy, politics, etc. This is for example Fearon and Laitin (1996).

Question 21

What is the problem with Walter’s (2009) theory on bargaining problems?

Answer 21

• Walter does not have empirical evidence for her basic assumptions. Even though she uses empirical examples as evidence for her theoretical statements, her basic assumption that bargaining problems is the key determinant factor when explaining the occurence and continuation of civil war is not empirically based.
• This relates to the problem that Walter takes a lot of structural explanations of civil war for granted.
• Her theoretical perspective is a realist ‘cost-benefit’ perspective, which rules out questions of identity, humiliation, and ideology, but especially the social construction of structures. Because Walter’s explanation refers to structural problems of information and commitment she misses some cruscial points in not acknowledging the social and collective constructions of these structures.

Question 22

What is Stedman’s (2002) critique of Walter?

Answer 22

Some combatants may take instrumental use of the ‘security dilemma’: It seems that Walter’s analysis asked implementers to take on faith that warring parties were solely motivated by insecurity and fears of furture vulnerabilities. Such a depiction seriously underrepresents a basic recurrent problem in civil war negotiations; strategic deception by parties who sought to use an agreement and its implementation as a source of advantage to winning the war.

Question 23

When can ‘the spoiler problem’ arise according to Stedman (2002)

Answer 23

Spoilers are defined to exist only when there is a peace process to undermine - when at least two warring parties have signed a peace agreement or committed themselves to such a pact.

Question 24

What are the different dimensions of spoiler activity (Stedman, 2002)?

Answer 24

1) The position of the spoiler (inside vs. outside)
2) The number of spoilers
3) The type of spoiler (limited, greedy or total)
4) The locus of the spoiler problem (located amon leaders, followers or both)

Question 25

How do we differentiate between indside and outside spoilers (Stedman, 2002)?

Answer 25

Inside spoiler: Signs a peaceagreement, signals a willingness to implement it, yet fails to live up to its obligations.

• Use stealth strategies; they sign up to agreements for tactical reasions.
• They tend to limit their violence to keep their threat hidden.

Outside spoilers: Use violence in their attempt to undermine peace (e.g. assassinate moderates, blow up symbolic and strategic targets).

Question 26

How do we differentiate between the types of spoilers (Stedman 2002)?

Answer 26

The limited, greedy and total spoiler differs primarily on the basis of goals and commitments.

• At the friendlier end of the spectrum is the limited spoiler: They have limited goals, like a share of power, redress of grievances, basic security of followers. This, however, does not mean that limited goals imply limited commitments - the limited goals might be non-negotiable and result in heavy sacrifice.
• At the most violent end is the total spoiler: Pursues total power and holds immutable preferences - that is their goals are not subjected to change.

Question 27

How do we manage spoilers according to Stedman (2002)?

Answer 27

3 main strategies:
1. Inducement - or giving the spoiler what it want
2. Socialisation - changing the behaviour of the spoiler so that it conforms to better norms, via carrot and sticks as well as persuation.
Coercion - punishes the spoiler and reducing its capacity to wreck the peace process (3 types of coercive strategies, coercive diplomacy, ‘the departing train’ strategy, and ‘withdrawal)

Question 28

What are the thre main types of coercive strategies to manage the spoiler problem (Stedman 2002)?

Answer 28

1) Coercive diplomacy: Has not been frequently used against spoilers, with the exception of the use of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.
2) The ‘departing train’ strategi: Combines a judgement that the spoilers demands are illegitimate and a willingness to take the peace process forward of whether the spoiler joins (e.g. Blair and Northern Ireland)
3) Withdrawal: This is a blunt instrument that can only work if all parties to an argument are equally culbable and all spoilers are limited spoilers who want a settlement to succeed.

Question 29

What is Jarstad & Nilsson’s (2008) ‘logic of costly signalling’?

Answer 29

Costly signalling can be used to avoid war by communicating information about the belligerents reolve and capabilities, e.g. by engaging in risky actions such as disarmament, the former enemies take on the costs of increased vulnerabilities –> Costly signals can function as a mechanism to build trust.

Question 30

What is Jarstad & Nilsson’s (2008) main argument?

Answer 30

For peace to hold, parties must engage in costly concessions by turning words into deeds through the implementation of the agreed provisions to share power. Since not all types of implementation are equally costly, only the implementation of pacts that carry high costs are expected to enhance the prospects of peace.

Question 31

What is the claim about variation in the ‘costs’ of signals (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008)?

Answer 31

The ‘cost’ of signals varies by type of power-sharing - the claim is that political pacts are intrinsically less costly that either military or territorial pacts and are therefore less powerful as commitment devices.

Question 32

What is the costs associated with political pacts?

Answer 32

Political pacts are likely to involve some costs:

• A rebel group may fear the loss of wartime legitimacy.
• Governments are concerned about being sen as to negotiate with ‘terrorists’.
• There might be electoral costs, and they might stimulate ‘out-bidding’ by within group hardliners who can opportunistically denounce the ‘sell-out’.

BUT political pacts might just be ‘cheap talk’. This suggests that implementation of a political pact is not costly enough to function as a costly signal.

Question 33

What is the costs associated with military pacts?

Answer 33

• Involve higher logistical, economic, and material costs than do political pacts.
• Military pacts means that former adversaries share military tactics and strategies.
• If a military pact is implemeted the parties lose strategic battle and combat positions leaving them vulnerable to attacks from the other side.

Question 34

What is the costs associated with territorial pacts?

Answer 34

• Might involve government loss of control over parts of its territory.
• Territorial pacts can also involve concessions for the rebel groups, who might lose part of the territory it de facto controlled during the conflict, or when less power is devolved than the group hoped to gain.

Question 35

Jarstad & Nilsson test their theory of costly signals on the dataset IMPACT containing 83 peace agreements. What are their results?

Answer 35

• Political pacts are implemented but their implementation does not reduce the chances of violence in a statistically significant manner.
• Military pacts are significant by themselves - but military implementation has a very small hazard ratio.
• Territorial pacts if implemented are indeed less likely to be followed by post-settlement violence.

Question 36

What are the mechanism that state has devised to make it easier to maintain peace, according to Fortna (2003)?

Answer 36

State’s set up demilitarized zones, accept international peace-keeping missions, establish dispute resolution procedures, sign formal agreements, and undertake other steps to try to enhance the prospects for peace.

Question 37

Which assumptions does Fortna (2003) build her argument about the effects of cooperation on?

Answer 37

1) States are rationally led.
2) War is costly and not desired for its won sake.
3) Each ex-belligerent has incentives to take adcantage of its opponents, or good reason to fear its opponentøs intentions.

Question 38

How does Fortna (2003) define a cease-fire in her data-set?

Answer 38

A cease-fire is an end to or a break in the fighting, whether or not it represents the end of the war. Hence, a single war can involve several cease-fires.

Question 39

What is Fortna’s (2003) conclusion?

Answer 39

Arms control, third-party mediation, and attempts to control irregular forces have not helped maintain peace, and may instead be associated with especially fragile peace. Confidence-building measures, formalising an agreement, and withdrawal of forces may help, but the evidence to support their role is unclear. The most effective tools for maintaining peace are demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, joint commissions for dispute resolution and making the cease-fire specific.

Question 40

What is Badran’s (2014) conclusions on the strength of peaceagreements?

Answer 40

• Strong, detailed and comprehensive peaceagreements works best.
• Young peace is fragile.
• The peace agreement is not an end game; it is the first contractual move in the conflict-transformation process.
• Peace maintenance efforts have to be sustained for many years after signing the agreement.
• Agreements are not self-enforcing contracts.