Past Paper true and false questions Flashcards
In Kruger v Coetzee the Appellate Division set out a test that since then has become known as the ‘classic’ test for negligence in the South African law of delict. It is implied by this test that, for a person who caused harm to another to have done so negligently, it is not only necessary, but also sufficient, that a reasonable person in his/her position would have foreseen the reasonable possibility that his/her conduct would result in that harm.
False (this answer only mentions the first leg which is not sufficient)
In Kruger v Coetzee the Appellate Division found that the defendant had not acted negligently, because the condition set about immediately above had not been satisfied (more specifically because ‘a diligens paterfamilias in the defendant’s position would not have foreseen the possibility of his horses straying through the open gate on to the main road and causing damage to motor cars which might collide with them’.)
False ( he did forsee the damages would occur but he did take necessary steps by informing the local authority)
In Sea Harvest Corporation v Duncan Dock Cold Storage Scott JA, for the majority, found that the negligence required in order to hold the defendants liable had not been established because ‘as a general possibility a fire in the cold store at Duncan Dock was not reasonably foreseeable’.
False ( only an internal source of a fire would have been foreseeable)
In Mkhatswa v Minister of Defence the Supreme Court of Appeal held that, in order for the so-called ‘foreseeability leg’ of the negligence test to be satisfied, it was not necessary that a reasonable person would have foreseen ‘a reasonable possibility’ of harm, but was sufficient that a reasonable person would have foreseen ‘a mere possibility’ of harm.
False ( must be a reasonable possibility of harm)
In Mkhatswa v Minister of Defence the Supreme Court of Appeal held that, to the question whether ‘those in command at Apex base’ had been negligent in the required sense, it was irrelevant whether reasonable persons in their position would have foreseen that certain omissions on their part might result in harm being suffered by someone like the plaintiff – i.e., an ‘innocent’ inhabitant of the township in question, as opposed to someone who had been involved in the earlier clash with soldiers from the base. In so holding, the Supreme Court of Appeal in effect endorsed an ‘abstract’ approach to negligence, in so far as the harm-sufferer is concerned.
False, they endorsed a relative approach
In Ngubane v SATS the Appellate Division discussed four considerations that are relevant to the determination of whether a reasonable person, having foreseen a reasonable possibility of harm resulting from certain conduct, would have taken steps to guard against that harm: (a) the degree or extent of the risk created by the conduct; (b) the gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of harm materialises; (c) the utility of the conduct; and (d) the burden of eliminating the risk of harm.
true, this case sets out the VdW elements of Px H < B (U)
In Ngubane v SATS the Appellate Division found, as regards considerations (a) and (b) set out immediately above, that the risk was high (‘near certainty’) and the gravity was great (‘serious, if not fatal, injury’).
True
In Pretoria City Council v De Jager the Appellate Division, having set out the same four considerations discussed in Ngubane v SATS, and having stated that in general the inquiry whether the reasonable person would have taken measures to prevent foreseeable harm involves a balancing of considerations (a) and (b) with (c) and (d), went on to find that the defendant (the Council) had not failed to take reasonable precautions in the circumstances and thus had not been negligent.
True
- this case shows that even if there is harm you will not always be liable
- application of the Ngubane factors
- burden of taking precautions was too high for the municipality
In Mukheiber v Raath the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated the view, which the Appellate Division had previously expressed in Van Wyk v Lewis, that, in the case of a surgeon, negligence is to be determined by considering the general level of skill and diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the branch of the profession to which the practitioner belongs.
True, doctors are held to a higher standard
Having applied the higher standard referred to immediately above, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mukheiber v Raath found that the defendant (Dr Mukheiber) had been negligent.
True
In Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape the majority of the Constitutional Court, having applied the ‘reasonable doctor standard’, held that certain medical personnel in the defendant’s employ had been negligent in causing the plaintiff’s harm. The minority judgment by contrast held that, since the medical personnel in question were two final-year medical students, a lower standard than the ‘reasonable doctor standard’ had to be applied and, having applied that lower standard, found that no medical personnel in the defendant’s employ had been negligent.
False
In Cowan v Ballam Greenberg JA (in his dissent) insisted that, for the defendant to have acted with the negligence required for him to be held liable for the death of the deceased, it was sufficient that a reasonable driver in his position would have foreseen the possibility of harm to the horse (which the deceased was in charge of at the time but did not own) and would, as a result, have slowed down sufficiently to have avoided the collision which killed the deceased. In other words, Greenberg JA accepted that negligence is to be determined by taking a ‘relative’ rather than an ‘abstract’ approach to the harm-sufferer.
False, Greenberg JA took a relative approach but the description is an abstract approach If it was sufficient to see harm to the horse this is an abstract approach.
In Road Accident Fund v Sauls the Supreme Court of Appeal expressly stated that, for the driver of the insured vehicle (the truck) to have been negligent in the sense required for liability to arise in respect of the emotional shock suffered by the plaintiff, it was necessary that he (the driver) ‘should have foreseen as a reasonable possibility that she [the plaintiff] would be harmed’. And the Court expressly found that the driver ‘was negligent vis-à-vis herself [the plaintiff]’. This suggests that, whether or not the Court applied it, it certainly endorsed a ‘relative’ approach to negligence, in so far as the harm-sufferer is concerned.
True, the court takes a relative approach
Fagan criticises this approach because they do not apply the test properly
A in the situation described below is less likely to be held liable to B for the loss resulting from his harm X if the law takes, in respect of the harm suffered, a ‘relative’ approach, than if it takes an ‘abstract’ approach:
A caused harm X, and resultant loss, to B by performing certain conduct. A’s conduct was not negligent in relation to B’s harm X, as it is not the case that a reasonable person in the position of A would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of the conduct causing harm X to B and for that reason would not have performed it. However, A’s conduct caused harm X to B by causing harm Y to B. And A’s conduct was negligent in relation to B’s harm Y as it is the case that a reasonable person in the position of A would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of the conduct causing harm Y to B and for that reason would not have performed it.
True , this is a further harm scenario. If we take a relative approach he would not be liable but if we took an abstract approach he would be.
NB to remember that we don’t take the relative approach to this in SA law this is just Fagan’s hypothetical.
In Road Accident Fund v Russell the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the defendant could not be held liable for the deceased’s suicide, because the insured driver, who had negligently caused the collision in which the deceased had been injured, had not also been negligent in respect of the suicide – the Court therefore took an abstract approach to negligence, in so far as the harm suffered was concerned.
False, even though they did take an abstract approach he was held liable.
According to the but-for test for causation, which was endorsed by both Corbett JA and Viljoen AJA in Minister of Police v Skosana, event X was a cause of event Y if and only if, had event Y not occurred, event X would not have occurred either.
False
Although B’s injury in the situation described below was caused by A’s conduct (his driving), and although A did act negligently (by driving faster than 60 km/h), B’s injury was not caused by A’s negligent driving (his driving faster than 60 km/h):
A drives down a city road at 100 km/h. Without warning, B runs into the road and is injured by the impact of A’s car. It was negligent for A to have driven faster than 60 km/h. It would not have been negligent for A to have driven at 60 km/h or slower. Had A not driven down the road, B would not have been injured at all. However, even if A had driven at only 60 km/h, B would still have been injured by the impact of the car.
True, he would have been killed or injured anyway because he ran into the road. The negligent driving did not cause the harm