PARTICIPATION Flashcards

You may prefer our related Brainscape-certified flashcards:
1
Q

TT Accessories and Abettors Act (Chap 10:02)

A
  • any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commissions of any indictable offence may be indicted, tried and punished as a principal offender
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Definition of the Principal

A
  • the person who conducts the most immediate actus reus of the offence and possesses the mens rea for the offence.
  • a person may also commit an offence through an innocent agent. The offence MUST be one that can be committed through an innocent agent.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Offence committed through an innocent agent

CASES

A

Walters v Lunt (cannot be committed through an innocent agent)

Ds charged with receiving stolen articles from a child (7yrs).

The court held that according to statute a child under 8 could not be guilty of larceny. Therefore, property taken by the child is not considered stolen (or obtained under circumstances which amount to felony), therefore D could not be guilty of receiving stolen property.

R v Cogan & Leak
D1 after a night of drinking procured and persuaded D2 to have sex with his wife to punish her for past misconduct. During the act the wife cried but did not struggle. D2, who was also intoxicated and encouraged by D1, mistook her sobs and distress for consent.

D2s conviction of rape was quashed on the grounds of the decision held in Morgan (D cannot be convicted of rape is he honestly and reasonably believed the woman consented)

D1 appealed that he cannot be guilty of aiding an abetting D2 to rape his wife if D2 was acquitted of that offence.
The court held: it is irrelevant that D2 did not intend to have sexual intercourse with his wife without consent. D1 was using him to procure a criminal purpose and so was liable.
The sex without consent was the actus reus and it was completed by D1 who had the appropriate mens rea.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Multiple Perpetrators

  1. more than one 1st degree principal + don’t know who did the fatal blow
A
  • Criminal Law permits the conviction of more than one person as a principal in the 1st degree.
    • each must have the relevant mens rea and does distinct acts together which constitute the sufficient act for the actus reus.
      or
    • if several persons act together in a common design (joint enterprise) and the actus reus is cause by 1 but it is not known by whom, all are principal offenders.

**joint enterprise: 2 or more people engage with the common purpose that an offence be committed.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Multiple Perps: don’t know who did the fatal blow

CASES

A

Queen v Salmon (joint enterprise, unsure who did the fatal blow)
3 Ds practicing firing with a rifle (deadly @ 1 mile), fired shots at a target 100yrds away and accidentally (inadvertently) killed a boy in a tree almost 400yrds way.

It was not proved who fired the fatal shot, the court held that they had not taken proper precautions to prevent injury to other and all 3 were guilty of manslaughter.

Regardless of who fired the fatal shot, the other 2 were joint actors with him. Death resulted from the action of the 3 so they were all liable.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Multiple Perpetrators

  1. in the absence of an agreement an agreement is implied
A
  • there can be a common purpose where, in absence of an agreement there is implied (tacit) agreement to commit the offence
    1. where 2 persons spontaneously work together, assist and encourage each other in an attack. This proves a joint venture.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Multiple Perps : absense of an agreement

CASES

A

Proof of spontaneous joint venture:

Mohan
D1+2 quarrel with V, chased, cornered and struck him with cutlasses inflicting multiple wounds. V died but there was no certainty who struck the fatal blow. They were convicted or murder (sentence to death) but appealed because this uncertainty of who struck the fatal blow was necessary to prove that they acted according to a pre-arranged plan.

The court held: since they attacked V at the same time, with similar weapons and a common intention to suffer grievous bodily harm; proof of a prearranged plan was unnecessary.

Each aided and abetted the other an thus were principal offenders.

R v Raymond; R v Charles
V was raped by 4 Ds included R&C. V died from a stab wound inflicted by 1 of the men.

The court held that where 2+ persons commit a felony rape having agreed to use whatever force necessary to overcome the resistance of V and V died due to this force then ALL are guilty of murder.

HOWEVER there must be evidence of Joint Enterprise for without this evidence the accused must be acquitted:

Williams
3 Ds pick up a hitchhiker. The driver, D1, asked for money and V pulled out his wallet. D3 attempted to rob V. He became afraid and jumped out of the moving vehicle and died from injuries sustained from the jump. D2 was acquitted of charges.

The court held that there was no evidence of joint enterprise to rob V.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Definition of Secondary Parties

A
  • Persons who assist the Principal in committing the offence
  • aka accessory or accomplice
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Four ways to become a Secondary Party/ Accomplice

A
  1. Aid (prior to or at the time of the offence)
    - helps, supports or assists the perpetrator to commit the Principal offence.
    - does not need to be known by the Principal
  2. Abet (must know the Principal)
    - incites, instigates or encourages the perp to commit the offence
  3. Counsel (must know the Principal)
    - provides advise, encouragement before the commission of a crime
  4. Procure
    - sets out to see that the offence is committed and takes the appropriate steps to produce its commission
    - where a person performs an act which results in another unwittingly committing (the absolute) offence
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Secondary Party

CASES

A

Romero & Macrado v R
A bag of cannabis was found on board a ship of which D1 was captain. Crew member, D2 attempted to assist with concealing the substance, Both were charged for possession of a controlled substance

Principal:
where a crime is committed by a principal offender and either before or during the commission of the crime a secondary party renders assistance (aids, abets, procures or counsels) he is also guilty of that crime with knowledge contemplation and foresight.

R v Wright
FACTS: ***

Principle:
If the a person is rendering aid, assistance or encouragement to the Principal during the criminal offence he will be labelled an accomplice.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

What are the Bases of Liability?

A
  • A person who assists in the commission of an offence bears the same criminal responsibility as the principal
  • the consequences of committing and assisting an offence is the same
  • A person who takes part in or encourages a criminal offence will not share the same criminal responsibility as the one who strikes the blow.
    *They will be guilty of different degrees of the crime
    Eg. he who intended S.B.H will be guilty of murder, he who intended that V be unlawfully hit would be guilty of manslaughter.
    Persons actually engaged in a robbery may have more sever sentences than those who assist in its commission (like promising to store the stolen goods)
  • Mere presence at the scene of the crime or knowledge that D intends to commit a crime is not enough. One must also act with intent to assist or encourage.
  • Mens rea MUST be proven: intention to assist and knowledge of the relevant circumstances
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

BASES OF LIABILITY

CASES: Mere Presence is not enough

A
R v Clarkson and Carroll
2 soldiers (after a night of drinking) heard a woman being raped by fellow soldiers, entered the room and watched it take place. They were charged with aiding and abetting the rape.

Principle:
It is not enough that the presence of D gave encouragement, it must also be proved that D INTENDED to give encouragement.
While D’s presence might encourage the P, his presence might not be to encourage P. So while there is encouragement it won’t be WILLFUL ENCOURAGEMENT.

Coney
The Ds watch an illegal prize fight which took place in front a large crowd They did not say or do anything or take active part in the management of the fight. They were convicted of assault as being Ps of the 2nd degree.

Principle:
The conviction was quashed: mere voluntary presence does not necessarily render persons guilty of aiding and abetting.

*The actus reus is generally some act of assistance/help but in the context of
assistance it has been generously construed:

**Coney: while the court quashed the conviction because mere presence does not quate aiding and abetting but their presence is encouraging, aiding and abetting the fight and is consequently guilty of assault. This is because the spectators make the fight and their encouragement is, therefore, the actus reus. Thus, WHERE PRESENCE IS NOT ACCIDENTAL IT IS EVIDENCE OF AIDING AND ABETTING BUT NO MORE THAN EVIDENCE.

Wilcox v Jeffery
D was aware that statute prohibited a certain musician from being employed while in the UK but attended an arranged concert where the musician performed and wrote about it in his magazine. He was charged with aiding and abetting the musician in contravening that statute.

Principle: Application of Coney principle; where D’s presence is not accidental it can be inferred that his presence is an encouragement to the commission of the offence.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

BASES OF LIABILITY

CASES: Mens rea must be proven: Intention to assist and knowledge of the circumstances

A

Lomas
Upon request D returned a jemmy (an instrument used for breaking into houses) to his friend who is a known criminal, who used it to commit burglary. D was guilty of accessory before the fact since he had certain knowledge the jemmy would be used for an illegal purpose -though he did not know which house.

Principle: mere knowledge that P intends to commit a crime does not constitute an accessory before the fact. D must know of the particular crime. Knowledge + Assistance is enough to constitute accessory before the fact.

Bullock
D was charged with housebreaking and larceny as 2 cars he owned were used for 2 robberies. He claimed he did not lend the cars and their use for robbery was unknown to him.

Principle: Where D loans property which has full control of, a distinction between ‘general unlawful purpose’ and ‘particular unlawful purpose’ is not required.

Therefore: In the case of Lomas who returned the jemmy to it’s rightful owner (who was not in a position to withhold use to the P) particular unlawful purpose is required as D MUST know the particular crime. However, were D had control of the car the position is different.

Bainbridge
Equipment used by thieves for breaking into a bank was bought 6weeks earlier by D. D was charged with being an accessory before the fact as he bought the equipment for the thieves with full knowledge that it was to be used for breaking and entering premises.

Principle:
where D has knowledge of that the type of crime committed was INTENDED, specific knowledge of date or particular premises need not be proven.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Principle when Assisting Offenders

A

accessories before the fact

accessories after the fact:
- can take the form of helping the P escape arrest, trial or punishment

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Crim Law Arrestable Offences Act 1992 (TT)

A

where a person has commited an arrestable offence any other person who knowingly acts with intent to prevent his arrest or punishment is guilty of offence.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Joint Enterprise:

1. The Paradigm Case

A

where 2+ persons plan a crime and participate in its execution, each is liable for the act of others

17
Q

Joint Enterprise:
2. Minor Variation

+ CASE

A

If D executes his role in the criminal act but varies in time, place or manner of execution, A will be equally liable for D’s act

R v Swindle & Osborne
if 2 persons are encouraging and inciting each other to drive recklessly on the public road and one accidentally (inadvertently) hits and kills a man both are guilty of manslaughter- 1 as P of 1st degree and the other as accomplice.

18
Q

Joint Enterprise:
3. Liability for unusual/undesired consequences.

+ CASE

A

where complications arise in JE where 1 party is guilty of a crime that was not the purpose of the JE:
- the other is not liable for the consequence of the unauthorized act

R v Anderson & Morris
D2 had a fight with V and when D1 learnt what happened they both (d1 and d2) went together to find V. A fight occurs between D1 and V while D2 stood aside not taking part.D1 stabbed V to death. D2 denied knowing that D1 had a knife.

Principle: where 2 persons embark on a JE, each is liable for acts done in pursuance of the JE. If one goes beyond what was agreed as part of the JE, the other is not liable for the consequence of the unauthorized act.

Therefore: D2 conviction of manslaughter was quashed.

19
Q

Joint Enterprise:
4. Overwhelming Supervening Act

+ CASE

A

If the act of P is one the accessory count not have anticipated or is of different character, that act is not part of the JE and the accessory will bear no criminal responsibility for it.

Jogee
Facts: ***

Principle: Where there is a spontaneous outbreak of violence, if the act could not be anticipated by the accessory and is fundamentally out of character to turn the accessory’s own acts to history, then he will bear no responsibility for it.

20
Q

Joint Enterprise:
5. Similar Act, Different Crime

+ CASE

A

If in the commission of a JE one participant (on his own) develops an intention to kill or do S.B.H – the second participant will be guilty of manslaughter if the act causing death is within the scope of the JE

Smith
Barman stabbed to death during an altercation between 3 assailants and D acted in concert with them to attack the bar and if necessary the barman who would try to stop them.

Principle: anything within the scope of the JE is the responsibility of each participant who chooses to enter into the criminal purpose.

Therefore:
The use of the knife, which D knew was in his friend’s posession, was within the scope of the JE, thus he was liable convicted of manslaughter.

R v Steward and Schofield??
A variation in the intent of one participant at the time the relevant act was committed
does not terminate a joint enterprise. In such an instance the scope of the JE must be
ascertained along with, in crimes of specific intent, the state of mind of D. Where D is
proved only to have the mens rea of a lesser offence, only the lesser crime would be
proved against D even if the act in question may have resulted in a more serious crime
by another where his specific intent was proved

21
Q

Joint Enterprise:
6.Felony Murder Rule

DOES NOT APPLY EVERYWHERE
APPLIES IN T&T + GUYANA

CASES

A

If JE is proved, ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE LIABLE for the acts done is pursuance of the enterprise, including the unusual consequences that arise (apart) from what was agreed upon.

  • It would not matter who did the killing, all will be guilty of murder

R v Gransaul and Ferreira

Dole Chadee

The State v Dhannie Ramsingh

22
Q

Joint Enterprise:
7. Withdrawal

+ CASE

A
  • A person who conspires to commit a crime is a secondary party of that crime when it is committed UNLESS he effectively withdraws befire the commission of the crime.
  • He must withdraw from the conspiracy or countermand or nullify the incitement.
  • He MUST communicate this withdrawal and leave no doubt on his withdrawal.

R v Becerra and Cooper
Facts:

Principle:
If one member decides to withdraw from a joint enterprise, mere mental change of intention and physical change of place is not enough. There must be a timely notice that leaves all with no doubt of D’s withdrawal.

Therefore: the court held that D shoiting “let’s go” and running away is does not constitute withdrawal as it was not done timely nor clearly expressed D’s withdrawal.