Con Law > Overview > Flashcards
Overview Flashcards
must be real, live controversy at all stages; if issue has been resolved,
court will not hear
Mootness
harm must actually be threatened
Ripeness
plaintiff must have a concrete stake in the outcome at all stages of litigation
Standing
If action already going on in state court on unsettled question of state law, federal court
will abstain so state can settle issue
abstention
The supreme court may rule on issues involving political question. True or False?
False. Court will not decide issue that is not suitable for judicial branch.
Which power allows Congress to regulate:
Channels of interstate commerce—roads, rails, waterways, phones, etc
Instrumentalities of interstate commerce—trucks, trains, planes, etc.
Activities having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
Commerce Power
Which power allows Congress to spend money for any public purpose and regulate beyond enumerated
powers by attaching strings to a grant as long as the strings are: (i) clearly stated, (ii)
related to the purpose of the grant, and (iii) not unduly coercive?
Spending Power
Appointment and removal of officers and Supreme Court Justices, Pardon federal crimes, veto power, issue executive orders.
Domestic presidential powers
Unable to declare war without congress but may commit troops, signs treaties with approval of 2/3 senate, issue executive agreements.
Presidential Powers over External Affairs
Reasons for impeachment
Treason, bribery,
high crimes, and misdemeanors by majority vote of the House; are tried by Senate; and
conviction requires two-thirds vote of Senate
Who can states sue?
- The United States may sue states without their consent
- States cannot sue the United States without its consent
- State can sue state in federal court; Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
Who can states tax/regulate?
- State cannot directly tax federal government
- State cannot directly regulate federal government
- State may tax federal employee and contractor salaries (indirect tax)
Due Process Clauses
5th and 14th Amendment
Immunities Clause
14th Amendment, Prohibits states from denying their own citizens rights of national citizenship (corporations are not citizens)
In federal court, standing requires __________.
A concrete stake in the outcome is required for standing in federal court. A person has standing if she can demonstrate a concrete stake in the outcome of the controversy shown by an injury in fact-caused by the government-that can be remedied by a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor (i.e., causation and redressability).
At least $75,000 in controversy is not a standing requirement. It is a requirement to establish diversity jurisdiction.
An economic injury is not required for standing in federal court. The injury to the plaintiff does not have to be economic. An impact on a person’s well-being or enjoyment of the environment has been found by the Supreme Court to be sufficient harm for standing.
Allegations of a Taxing and Spending Clause violation are not required for standing in federal court. Standing can be based on any injury in fact. Moreover, in most suits by taxpayers involving allegations of violations of the Taxing and Spending Clause, standing will not be found because the taxpayer’s interest is too remote.
One of the requirements for standing in federal court is that a decision in the plaintiff’s favor will eliminate the harm to the plaintiff.
This concept is known as ____________.
Redressibility is the part of standing that provides that a decision in the plaintiff’s favor must be able to remedy the harm.
Justiciability refers to the concept that a case may be tried in court. In federal courts it is a broad term that encompasses a number of more specific topics, such as ripeness, mootness, and standing.
Remediability means something that can be remedied. While it is closely related in meaning to the concept of redressability, it is not the term that the Supreme Court uses to describe the concept that a decision in the plaintiff’s favor will eliminate the harm to the plaintiff.
For a plaintiff to have standing in federal court, she must demonstrate that she has a concrete stake in the outcome of the case.
What must the plaintiff show to demonstrate a concrete stake in the outcome?
A person has standing if she can demonstrate a concrete stake in the outcome of the controversy shown by an injury in fact-caused by the government-that can be remedied by a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor (i.e., causation and redressability).
An economic injury is not required for standing in federal court. The injury to the plaintiff does not have to be economic. An impact on a person’s well-being or enjoyment of the environment has been found by the Supreme Court to be sufficient harm for standing.
Some specific injury must be alleged, and it must be more than a merely theoretical injury that all persons suffer by seeing their government engage in unconstitutional actions.
As part of a deal to raise the federal debt limit, Congress passed a statute by a greater than two-thirds vote in both houses giving the President authority to cancel particular spending provisions that are contained within legislation that he signs into law. The statute provided that Congress could override the President’s decisions only by a three-fourths vote. As soon as the statute went into effect, a Senator who had voted against the statute filed suit in federal district court, challenging its constitutionality.
Is the Senator likely to succeed in her lawsuit?
The Senator will not succeed because she lacks standing to challenge the statute. The Supreme Court has held that members of Congress lack standing to challenge a law authorizing the President to exercise a line item veto (such as the statute here), reasoning that the injury is not concrete and personal, but rather is institutional in that it is shared by all members of Congress. [Raines v. Byrd (1997)] (A) is incorrect even though it is a true statement. The Supreme Court has ruled that the President has no power to exercise a line item veto of just part of a bill because it violates the Presentation Clause of the United States Constitution; the President must either approve or reject a bill in toto. However, (A) is not the best choice here because the Senator is not a proper person to bring the challenge. (B) is incorrect. The statute itself is invalid regardless of the requirements for overriding the President’s line item veto. However, as stated above, the Senator does not have standing to challenge the statute. (D) is incorrect because the success of the lawsuit challenging the statute does not depend on the strength of the vote passing the statute.
A woman whose child attended a charter school learned that the children of the woman’s neighbor who attended a parochial school received a hot lunch paid for, in part, through federal expenditures enacted under Congress’s spending power. The charter school received no funding from the federal government. The woman challenged this federal expenditure as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
For her to bring the suit, at the very least what must the woman allege?
The woman must allege that she pays federal income taxes and that the use of federal funds in this manner is improper under Congress’s taxing and spending power. In general, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of federal funds. The major exception to this rule is where the taxpayer alleges that the expenditure was enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power, and exceeds some specific limitation on that power, in particular the Establishment Clause. Here, by providing federal tax money to parochial schools, there may be excessive entanglement with religion and thus a violation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the woman would have standing to contest this federal expenditure. The woman would not have to have children to make this challenge. However, she would have to be a taxpayer. Thus, (A), (C), and (D) are wrong.
In compliance with a federal statute that permits government agencies to sell or give away surplus government property, the Secretary of State directed that one of the State Department’s surplus airplanes be given to a church. The Secretary knew that the church planned to use the plane to fly medical supplies to its missions in Third World countries. These missions provide medical assistance, but they also attempt to evangelize residents of the countries in question, and the Secretary was aware that, in addition to medical supplies, the plane might transport Bibles and religious tracts translated into local languages. Had the Secretary not ordered the plane to be given to the church, it would have been sold at a very reasonable cost to a nonprofit organization that helps teach young people the fundamentals of piloting and maintaining aircraft.
Which of the following parties would be most likely to have standing to sue to prevent the Secretary of State from making the gift to the church?
A member of the nonprofit flying association is most likely to have standing to challenge the gift. To have standing to challenge government action on constitutional grounds, a person must show that he has a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation. This is to ensure adequate presentation of the issues. To have such a stake, the potential litigant must show that he has an injury in fact caused by the government that is more than the theoretical injury that all persons suffer when the government engages in unconstitutional acts, and that a decision in his favor will eliminate his harm. A member of the flying association can show both components here: If the gift is unconstitutional, the association has suffered more than a theoretical injury-it has lost the opportunity to purchase the airplane from the federal government at a good price, and a decision in the club’s favor will eliminate the injury because it will then be able to purchase the plane. Thus, the member of the nonprofit flying organization has standing. (B) is incorrect because the only injury that a citizen would suffer here is the theoretical injury that we all suffer from the government’s unconstitutional acts. People have no standing merely as “citizens” to claim that government action violates federal law or the Constitution. (A) is incorrect because a person’s injury as a taxpayer is generally held to be insufficient to establish standing. There is an exception where the federal government acts under the taxing and spending power and that action allegedly violates the Establishment Clause, but the government action here falls under the Property Clause and not the Spending Clause; thus, the exception does not apply. (D) is incorrect because the state attorney general has no stake in the outcome of the litigation, and it is not sufficient even if he is deemed to represent the interests of all the citizens in the state.
Can states regulate interstate commerce?
It is true that although it is a federal power, states may regulate interstate commerce subject to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. The negative implications (also called Dormant Commerce Clause) generally prohibit states from discriminating against out-of-state business or unduly burdening interstate commerce.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is NOT exclusively federal; states DO have power to regulate aspects of interstate commerce, as long as they do not discriminate against out-of-state business or unduly burden interstate commerce and Congress has not preempted the field of regulations.
It is not true that the regulation of commerce is an exclusive state power that has been reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. As discussed above, it is a power delegated in the Constitution by the Tenth Amendment.
It is not true that as long as there is no conflict with existing federal legislation, states are free to regulate interstate commerce. As discussed above, states may not regulate a field preempted by federal law or unduly burden interstate commerce.
A state’s regulation of interstate commerce in an area where Congress has not already acted is valid if the regulation:
If Congress has not acted, state regulation of interstate commerce is valid if the regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and does not unduly burden interstate commerce. If the regulation does discriminate against interstate commerce, it is valid if it is necessary to an important, noneconomic government interest.
“Narrowly tailored to serve an important state interest” is an intermediate scrutiny standard used in some equal protection cases. It does not reflect either standard used to judge state regulations of commerce, as set out above.
“Rationally related to a legitimate state objective” reflects the rational basis test used in some due process and equal protection cases and does not reflect either standard used to judge state regulations of commerce, as set out above.
“Necessary to protect local businesses” does not reflect a standard used in any case; if a state regulation seeks to protect local business it generally is invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued a lengthy set of regulations regarding personal radar detectors. The regulations deal with the safety of such detectors and the frequencies on which they may operate, so as not to interfere with FCC-licensed radio and television stations or with radar used by commercial airliners and private aircraft.
May a state constitutionally ban the use of radar detectors on its roads?
The state may ban the radar detectors. States may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce as long as the local regulation does not conflict with, or is not preempted by, federal regulation and the regulation meets the following tests: (i) the regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition in order to benefit local economic interests, and (ii) the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the local benefits of the regulation. In this case, the federal regulations do not conflict with the state ban and are not so comprehensive as to preempt nonconflicting state regulation. With regard to the two-part test, the first standard is met because the regulation is not discriminatory against out-of-state products (because it bans all radar detectors regardless of origin). The second part is a balancing test, in which the court will consider whether the regulation promotes legitimate state interests and whether less restrictive alternatives are available. Here, the ban clearly promotes the state’s legitimate interest in highway safety by making it harder for speeding motorists to evade detection. Anything less than a ban would not be effective in preventing the use of the detectors, and their use makes radar, the state’s best means of preventing speeding, much less effective. On balance, the ban’s local safety benefits outweigh its burden on interstate commerce and transportation. (A) is incorrect because a field will be held to be preempted only where the federal statute is so comprehensive that it appears that Congress intended to occupy the whole field, and here the federal regulations concern only safety of the devices and use of frequencies. (B) is incorrect because it is too broad-not every law that burdens interstate commerce is unconstitutional. Rather, a balancing test will be applied. (C) is not as good an answer as (D). The fact that a state ban affecting interstate commerce operates only within the state does clear one hurdle to validity, because a state does not have the power to regulate interstate commerce. However, the mere fact that the ban would not operate outside the state does not go as far as (D) in addressing other Dormant Commerce Clause issues (e.g., is the law preempted, are its benefits to the state outweighed by its burden on interstate commerce).
The state legislature of state A enacted legislation prohibiting the use of tractor-trailer rigs weighing more than 100,000 pounds gross, on the basis that superheavy trucks rapidly degrade the state’s roadways and pose a greater safety danger than smaller trucks. A trucking firm that frequently uses state A’s highways for trips between state B and state C purchased several tractor-trailer rigs weighing over 100,000 pounds when loaded. The trucking firm brings an action for declaratory relief in federal court in state B, seeking to have the state A legislation declared unconstitutional. It presents expert testimony that the heavier trucks are no less safe than smaller models. State A produces no evidence, but asserts that the legislation is justified as an exercise of its police power.
How should the trial court rule?
The legislation violates the Commerce Clause. As a general matter, a state may regulate in ways that impact on interstate commerce as long as the regulation does so only indirectly and the benefits outweigh the burdens imposed by compliance with the regulation. [Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (1981)] When, as here, only a bare assertion that the regulation would increase safety is involved, a court will generally find that the regulation is invalid. This does not mean that a state could not prevail if it proved that the benefits of the regulation do in fact outweigh the burdens. Indeed, the Court intimated that such would be the case in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959). But state A has not made a sufficient showing here, and the trucking firm has presented colorable “expert” evidence to the contrary. (A) is incorrect because economic and social regulations are tested at the rational basis level for due process purposes, and even the minimal showing here would suffice for the state. (C) states a correct premise (i.e., that the state is regulating for highway safety), but an incorrect result, and is wrong. (D) is wrong because the state has in fact made no such showing before the court. Thus, while there is a normal presumption of constitutionality, the state here has not met its burden in defending the measure in the face of contrary, expert evidence.
Large semi-trailer trucks use one of two basic designs of tires. There are some differences in the two designs of the tires, but both are deemed to be equally safe by independent testing labs. A state has enacted a statute banning the use of one of the tire types. The other tire design is legal and available for sale in all states. A trade association of interstate trucking firms has brought suit to have the statute declared unconstitutional. The state argues that no burden exists because the other tire design can be used in all states.
How should the Court rule on the constitutionality of the statute?
The statute banning the use of one of the tire designs is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce even though an equally safe alternative is available in all 50 states. If Congress has not enacted laws regarding a subject, a state may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if the regulation: (i) does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests; and (ii) is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits). The facts do not suggest that Congress has regulated the subject of truck tires on state roads. The facts also do not indicate whether either tire design is manufactured in the state, so discrimination in favor of local economic interests is absent. The final test is a balancing test to determine whether the regulation is unduly burdensome, and here the regulation probably will fail. In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines (1959), the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute requiring trucks to use contour mudguards rather than flat mudguards. One aspect of the burden on commerce in that case was that another state required flat mudguards rather than contour mudguards, precluding trucking companies from using one type of mudguard in all 50 states and indicating that the safety benefits that Illinois was claiming for contour mudguards had not been conclusively established. In this case, because the other tire design is legal in all 50 states, the burden on interstate commerce is not as great. Nevertheless, it is still significant. By not permitting equally safe alternative types of tires, which might be cheaper or more readily available, the state is imposing an undue burden on all trucking companies in other states whose trailers might at some time pass through the state. On the other side of the equation, the Illinois mudguard regulation in Bibb arguably was a safety measure, which is an area of legitimate local concern. Here, there is no evidence of any safety benefit; both types of tires have been deemed equally safe by independent testing labs. On balance, therefore, the statute is unconstitutional because its incidental burden on interstate commerce outweighs any legitimate local benefits. (A) is incorrect because the equivalence in safety makes the state’s argument weaker. Had the permitted tire design been shown to be substantially safer than the design that was banned, the state would be able to argue that a legitimate local benefit outweighs the burden on interstate commerce. (B) is incorrect because the state power to regulate highway safety is not absolute, but must be balanced against the federal commerce power. If a safety regulation imposes a significant burden on interstate commerce, particularly where the objective of the regulation could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives, the Court will probably find it unconstitutional. (D) is incorrect for two reasons: First, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV applies only to citizens of a state, and neither the trade association nor the corporations it is composed of are considered citizens of a state. More importantly, the Clause only prohibits discrimination by a state in favor of its own citizens concerning fundamental rights. Even an individual truck driver who is a citizen of another state could not use the Clause to challenge the statute because it also bars state residents from using the tires.
The state of Blue enacted a statute to protect its faltering lobster industry. The statute provides that no lobster shall be taken from lobster beds lying within three miles of the state shoreline unless the lobster is at least one pound in weight. The statute’s one-pound limitation is intended to enable young lobsters to reproduce before being caught. At the same time, Congress enacted a lobster conservation act that provides $5 million for research funds to develop and improve breeding grounds for lobsters. The federal act imposes a special excise tax of $1,000 on each lobster caught in violation of state law if later shipped in interstate commerce. A lobsterman who lives in the state of Green, which is just south of the state of Blue, crossed over into waters lying within three miles of the Blue coastline. He was arrested by state Blue law enforcement officers for taking lobsters that weighed less than one pound. The man defended the charge by challenging the constitutionality of the state Blue statute.
Which of the following results is most likely?
The statute will be upheld because it does not discriminate against out-of-state economic interests and it is not unduly burdensome. A state or local government may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if such regulation: (i) does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests; and (ii) is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits produced by the regulation). The state of Blue statute does not discriminate against out-of-state elements of the lobster fishing industry. The statute is designed to maintain the lobster population by allowing lobsters to reproduce. By maintaining the lobster population, the state is attempting to further the legitimate interest of reviving its faltering lobster fishing industry, rather than trying to protect a local business against interstate competition. In addition, the statute is applied evenhandedly (i.e., it does not merely regulate the activities of out-of-state lobster fishers while exempting in-state fishers from those same regulations). Therefore, the statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The statute may impose some incidental burden on interstate commerce by requiring out-of-state lobster fishers to refrain from taking lobsters weighing less than one pound from lobster beds within three miles of the state shoreline. However, this burden should not result in any great difficulty for out-of-state lobster fishers who wish to catch lobsters in state Blue waters. There is nothing especially burdensome or restrictive about the statute’s provisions, and certainly the incidental burden that does exist does not outweigh the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining its lobster population and the vitality of its lobster fishing industry. Consequently, the statute is not unduly burdensome. Because the statute is not unduly burdensome and is nondiscriminatory against out-of-state competition, it does not violate the Commerce Clause. (B) is incorrect because it is overbroad. The Commerce Clause does apply even when a state seeks to protect natural resources. (C) is incorrect because the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents when such discrimination concerns fundamental rights, such as those involving important commercial activities or civil liberties. The Blue statute does not discriminate in favor of its own citizens, because no one is permitted to take a lobster from a lobster bed lying within three miles of the state shoreline unless the lobster weighs at least one pound, regardless of whether that person is a resident of the state of Blue. Therefore, the statute confers no advantage on state residents and there is no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. (D) is incorrect because the statute is not preempted by the federal act. Under the Supremacy Clause, a state law that directly conflicts with a federal law will be held invalid. Even if a state law does not directly conflict with a federal law, it may still be held invalid if the law prevents achievement of federal objectives or it appears that Congress intended to preempt the entire field of regulation. Here, the state statute seems to be in harmony with the federal act, since both seek to preserve lobster fishing. Moreover, no implied preemption will be found since the act recognizes and reinforces state laws on the subject by providing a penalty for shipping lobsters taken in violation of state law. Thus, (D) is incorrect.
