Ocean Impacts, Resources & Management Flashcards
What are some basic facts about ocean resources?
Accounts for more than 90% of the living space on Earth
Responsible for 50% of Oxygen production
Absorbs 1/3 of CO2 emissions
Blue economy makes up approx 5%of global GDP.
List some of the ocean ecosystem services.
Supporting biodiversity
Carbon sequestration
Goods: fish, precious minerals.
Services: tourism, recreation, erosion control, transportation
What are the local negative impacts on oceans?
Fishing Habitat modification Transport (strikes, noise) Pollution: Nitrogen (dead zones) Poisons (and bioconcentration) Ocean plastics Deep sea mining (habitat destruction, pollution…)
What are the global negative impacts on oceans?
- Acidification (corals, etc.)
- Water temperature effects (range, growth/maturation rates, timing mismatches, competition…)
- Dissolved oxygen
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO 2014): 75% are operating at full capacity or are in crisis.
What is the global ocean health index and what does it conclude?
An index to assess the health and benefits of the global ocean.
The overall score sends a message that the ocean isn’t ‘dying’ as many people may think. However, the score remains far from 100, indicating that marine life would fare better and we would gain more benefits if we used the ocean in more sustainable ways.
What are the economic losses from mismanagement of fisheries?
Economic analysis reveals that overfishing of global fisheries loses more than $80 billion a year.
Allowing fish stocks to recover to healthier levels would cut losses and create revenue for long-term growth, while helping fisheries adapt to climate change and meet global demand for seafood.
There are multiple ways to arrive at a more sustainable and profitable level of fishing.
What is tragedy of the commons?
Hardin’s example: cattle grazing on common pasture
‘Open access’ – no constraint on use.
Incentive for each herder to overgraze, to accrue a small benefit, while ‘costs’ (of less grass) are shared amongst the whole population.
Benefits outweigh the costs…but if everyone does this, no more grass, pasture collapses, bad for everyone.
Short term individual incentives are not aligned with the common good.
Why does tragedy of the commons take place?
Free access actually harms the common good – it is free access is problematic and leads to overexploitation.
Assumes that:
1) Stakeholders are rational: herders have a clear vision of the benefits they gain from grazing – it is easy to understand how individual rational interests are formed
2) Costs and benefits derived from overgrazing are deferred: costs/damage to pasture not immediately seen, or take into account; raises the question of uncertainty
3) A lack of coordination - herders each pursue their own interests without discussion and without agreement, ultimately, without coordinating how the common resource is shared
How can we overcome T.o.C?
We need coercive devices that limit the problem of collective action, otherwise overexploitation naturally arises through (rational) individualistic behaviour.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Ownership rights, and therefore a shared responsibility, ‘given’ to users.
‘common property’ typically belongs to well-defined groups - institutions and social norms usually emerge that regulate individual behaviour.
‘EFFORT CONTROL’
a rotation scheme.
Ostrom - Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires that coordinating institutions are established. Self-governing / self-reinforcing solutions.
How did the ‘cod wars’ come about?
NW Atlantic cod collapse. Due to:
- Overfishing (improved technology, too many boats)
- Political complexity - vested interests (social & economic), heavy use of subsidies to support dwindling returns,
- Uncertainty in fish biomass assessments
- International competition and weak/slow institutional responses
Name some examples of US fisheries management.
The Magnusson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act (MSA) regulates fisheries within the US exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects species that are in danger of extinction or likely to become endangered species.
The Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act (FWCA) authorizes collection of fisheries data and coordination with other agencies for environmental decisions affecting living marine resources.
Stakeholder engagement in both the scientific assessment and management process. Congressional testimony by scientists, fishers, and lobbyists.
How is a stock assessment carried out?
Scientific study of a fish stock
current status of a stock relative to established targets (e.g. is fishery over-exploited, are mammals depleted?)
How much catch is sustainable?
If stock is depleted, what steps are required for rebuilding?
Gather data: local, state, federal, fishery, academic, NGO, etc.
Data evaluation
Run models, evaluate outputs
Present final agreed results to council
What reference points are involved in management benchmarks?
Limit reference point (LRP) – state of a fishery that is not desirable; if a LRP is reached, immediate management action should drastically reduce or stop fishing until the stock is rebuilt.
Target reference point (TRP) – state of a fishery that is considered desirable and should be maintained.
Threshold reference point – early warning state of a fishery approaching the TRP or LRP, where management action should be taken.
How do individual transferable quotas work?
ITQ – Property rights based management tool (see article by Libecap, 2009)
Tradable harvest rights
Use stock assessment to set annual total allowable catch (TAC)
Distribution of limited, tradable shares of the TAC to fishers and other stakeholders
A tradeable right to remove a certain amount of fish
Value of the fish (therefore the ITQ) depends on the condition and value of the stock -> fishers are motivated towards conservation
Avoids ‘race to fish’ associated with open access; consolidation and economic efficiency through quota trading
What are the dangers of imposed property rights?
Ostrom:
Formal property rights solutions might do more harm than good. Introducing formal property rights and other external laws in such regimes might crowd out existing informal arrangements.
In all known self-organized governance regimes that have survived for multiple generations, participants invest resources in monitoring and sanctioning the actions of each other so as to reduce the probability of free-riding