Occupiers liability visitors Flashcards
Occupiers’ liability is governed by the
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (lawful visitors) and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (trespassers).
C may bring an action against D under the
OLA 1957.
Under Section 1(2) C must be a
lawful visitor on D’s premises. They must have either express permission through being an invitee, or have contractual permission such as having a ticket for an event. C may have implied permission through being a licencee who has entered premises for a long time without complaint (Lowery v Walker), or a delivery maker such as the postman. Or C may have a legal right of entry such as a police officer with a warrant, or gas meter reader.
D must be the
occupier, with control of the premises, as in Wheat v E. Lacon and Co.
‘Premises’
must fall within the very wide definition under Section 1(3)(a):’any fixed or moveable structure, including any vessel, vehicle and aircraft’, and could even include ladder (Wheeler v Copas).
IF C IS AN ADULT:
Under Section 2(1) D owes C a ‘common duty of care’.
Under section 2(2), D must “take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited”, (Laverton v Kiapasha).
D must take reasonable precautions to keep C reasonably (not completely) safe, and will be compared to the reasonable occupier (Vaughan v Menlove, Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks) or reasonably competent professional occupier (Bolam v Friern Barnet HMC).
IF C IS AN ADULT ‘SKILLED’ VISITOR:
Under Section 2(3)(b) D can expect that a skilled visitor when carrying out work will “appreciate and guard against any special risks ordinarily incidental to it” , as in Roles v Nathan. This does not apply to rescuers such as firemen, as in Ogwo v Taylor.
IF C IS A CHILD:
Under Section 2(1) D owes C a ‘common duty of care’.
Under Section 2(2), D must “take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited” , (Laverton v Kiapasha).
D must take reasonable precautions to keep C reasonably (not completely) safe, and their standard of care will be compared to the reasonable occupier (Vaughan v Menlove, Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks) or reasonably competent professional occupier (Bolam v Friern Barnet HMC).
However, C is a child, and under Section 2(3)(a) D must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults” , (Perry v Butlins Holiday World).
A child is more at risk than an adult, so D’s standard of care will be judged subjectively and will be higher, (Moloney v Lambeth BC).
D must guard against the risk of an allurement, as in Glasgow Corporation v Taylor. If there is an allurement, there will only be liability if the injury was reasonably foreseeable, (Jolley v Sutton), without previous warnings, and the mere existence of an allurement is not enough for liability, (Liddle v Yorkshire CC).
Very young children must be supervised by their parents, (Phillips v Rochester).
IF LIABILITY MAY BE PASSED TO AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR:
Under Section 2(4)(b), D may be able to pass liability on to Z as an independent contractor because the state of the premises was due to Z, as in Ferguson v Welsh.
D must show that they (a) took reasonable steps to check that Z was competent (Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club), that it was (b) reasonable to have given the work to Z, and that they (c) checked that any ‘non-technical work’ had been properly done (Woodward v Mayor of Hastings, Haseldine v Daw) There is no duty to check ‘technical work’.
To conclude
D will
