Nichomanean Ethics Aristotle Flashcards

1
Q

Aristotle:

A

Aristotle was Platos most genuine student
Aristotle was born in Stageira
Platos school in Athens was the Academy
Aristotle left the Acadmey after Platos death
Aristotles starts his own school - the students in this school were called the peripatetics - people who walked around - reference to followers of Aristotle
Aristotle was charged with impiety

We have a lot of Aristotles work, but we don’t have all of it
There are some of aristotles dialogues that we don’t have

Aristotles works can be separated into different groups:
Organon ‘tool’ or ‘instrument’ - logic and method, maybe epistemology or philosophy of science
Physical works - works on nature and natural science, biology, chemistry, astronomy, maybe psychology
Metaphysics - questions about what is real, what are causes, Aristotle calls it first pholsopohy or theology
Ethics
Politics
Rhetoric
Poetics - literary theory

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2
Q

Nicomachean Ethics - what is happiness and how is it achieved

A

Happiness and eudaimonia
fulfillment , flourishing, well-being
Eudaimonia is not a subjective feeling - not a fleeting state, not intentional
No one is eudaimon about anything - like an object
No one is eudaimon one day and not the next - Aristotle thinks you can’t even be called eudaimon until long after your death
only gods and adult humans can achieve this, not kids or animals

Aristotle thinks that happiness is activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue
We could ask what the point of this inquiry is

Although eudaimonia is not a feeling, it must involve pleasure
Someone who finds everything they do a struggle is not living happily

Not all activities of the rational soul are alike
Theoretical studies focuses on one type of area of study - finding out what is true about the world
productive inquiries - like medicine, music, anything that involves making or doing things
Practical inquiries - action, knowing what to do, point of these inquiries is to learn how to do things

The point of knowing how to get happiness is practical
The end goal of this inquiry is action, not knowledge
We undertake it not for the sake of theory, but for the sake of experience and how to become virtuous and good

Aristotles aims are somewhat ambitious, he is not trying to convert the moral skeptic
He doesnt think you can argue someone into wanting to be good - Unlike Plato

Aristotle thinks that ethical philosophy can not and should not answer the kinds of questions that Plato’s answers within the Republic

Aristotle thinks that young people are not goof audiences, because they are inexperienced in actions that occur in life, while philosophical discussion is about these

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3
Q

That vs why

A

In any inquiry, one initially proceeds from what is better known to us to what is better known by nature
When we have scientific/epistemic knowledge, it’s explanatory, explaining why things are the case - this inquiry begins with knowing That
In order to know why it is the case, we must know that that is the case

The things that constitute the data for ethical inquiries, like living a virtous or happy life, the thats are going to be reputable opinions or common opinions (endoxa), and so the thats are going to be the idea that most people or wise people think

One thing Aristotle does surveys the existing beliefs about things, and then develops various puzzles and tries to figure out what seems true and what seems problematic
Good theories should salvage as much as Endoxa as they can

But…
Won’t people disagree about the “thats” when it comes to right and wrong

Aristotle thinks that in practical science like ethics it doesn’t matter if it is exact - it’s ok just to have an idea

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4
Q

There is such thing as the human good

A

Every sort of expert knowledge, or skill and every inquiry and in every action and undertaking, they all seem to aim at some good - because of this, it makes sense to say that the good is something that all things seek
All actions aim to some good - the good is to what every action aims
The good is the end goal of an activity
Human good is the highest end

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5
Q

Every action seeks some good - is that true?

A
  • Not just any old action. Aristotle is talking about Actions
  • Aristotle is not talking about involuntary actions, nor is he talking about reactions
  • Actions (with a capital A) are things that are prompted by reason
  • Arent there lots of different ends
  • He makes the assumption that there is only one good
  • There could be a whole bunch of ends
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6
Q

Subordinate ends

A

In all activities the ends of the controlling ones are more desirable than the ends under them, because it is for the sake of the former…

When we have heriarchally arranged ends, the subordinate ones are less choice worthy and less desirable

Eg. i teach class, to get paid, to buy a scooter, so that i can ride the scooter
Riding the scooter is the superordinate end, while the other ones are subordinate
You want to ride the scooter more than wanting to get paid and wanting to get paid more then wanting to teach
Wanting to ride the scooter is wanted for its own sake, while the other ones are wanted for the sake of something else

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7
Q

Ends cannot go on ad infinitum

A

Whenever we have a hierarchy arranged ends, it must have one end
If there was no single pious end, it would make all other ends or desires empty
Rules out that two things can’t be desired for the sake of the other

Why is desire empty and futile if there is no final, highest end that is chosen or desired for its own sake

Happiness is the highest end and is chosen for its own sake

Happy lives - the human good = the highest end = happiness eudaimonia)
There is indisupte about what happiness is - some say it is a life of pleasure, a life of honour, etc

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8
Q

How is this settled? - laying out the endoxa

A

A life of pleasure
Life of gratification and satisfying desires/bodily desires
Aristotle says no - this is a life fit for grazing animals - suitable for beasts
A life pursuing honour
Engage in politics and give then honourific titles
Aristotle points out that the aim is honour, but that is too superficial - too dependant on what other people do - other people honouring us - our happiness should be something we can control and up to us - seems to be located in the people doing the honouring

The good should be up to the person experiencing it
The good should reflect our virtue
Not just being honoured, but is to merit honour
Life of being virtuous honour - being the person who deserves honour

Merely being good or possessing excellence is not enough
It’s got to be something more active and exercising those virtuous and acting virtuously

Life spend making money or merely studying is not enough either

How do we settle this
Completeness - happiness is complete
Always desirable in itself and never because of something else
Whatever flourishing is, it is always going to be something that is always most complete or most final
Self-sufficiency
It is what makes life desirable and lacking in nothing
Happiness is like this, it is the most desirable, it is not one among many

Whatever it turns out to be, this flourishing human life, it has to be both of these things

External goods - money, health, food
Without these conditions

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9
Q

Nicomachean Ethics
What does being a good human involve, and how it is achieved? What does success in life look like?

A

This question is a part of political science - how do we set things up, so people are set up for success - it’s said his work is made for future law givers

Our good is our highest end, that for which everything we choose to do is chosen
What we do everything for the sake of is happiness (eudaimonia) - it is the ultimate end - it is the most choice-worthy - the happy life is not chosen for any other reason, and it meets our needs
And the happy flourishing life must be both complete (not chosen because of anything else that is more choice-worthy and self sufficient it is a life in which all our needs are met; it’s not missing anything

Aristotle recognises that this is vague - that happiness is the chief good
Perhaps we need to look at the function of the human being to be more clear

function/work (ergon)
Characteristic activity of something
What something alone does, or what it does better than anything else

virtue/excellence (arete)
Features or properties that allow something to perform its function well
Whatever allows something to be a good instance of its kind

A good X performs the function of X well, i.e., in a way that expresses or is in accordance with the virtues of X
Eg. the knife’s function is cutting things

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10
Q

Question: is there a human function

A

something that the human alone does
Our function is going to be given by what we are

Is there a human function of human qua (insofar as, considered as) humans?
There are flute players, sculptors, craft people, the good for all these people reside in their function
Crafts peoples have jobs to do

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11
Q

Aristotle argues that the function of humans is rational activity
Aristotle focuses on the soul (psyche)

A

There are several parts/capacities that make up the human soul
Humans have nutritive and vegetative capacities, such as self-maintanence and growth
Algae only has the nutrive/vegatative capacities

There is also the sentient soul capacities - they can touch, taste, sense things, also brings with it feelings of pleasure and pain, and thus appetitive desire

And there’s rational capacities - the ability to think

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12
Q

What is it that just people do
Are humans unique in engaging in reason?

A

The function of a human being is activity of soul in accordance with reason - a good human would perform that action well - something is done well if it is done with the relevant virtues
The human good turns out to be acitivity of soul in accordance with excellence

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13
Q

Function (ergon) argument

A
  1. For any F, where F is a kind with a function, the F’s good = performing the function of F well
  2. So, if the human species ahs a function, then the human good = performing the function well
  3. The human species does have a function
  4. So, the human good - performing the human function well
  5. The human function is activity of the rational part of the soul
  6. So, the human good = performing activity of the rational part of the coil well
  7. One performs the function of an F well when one acts in accordance with the relevant function
  8. For any F, where F is a kind with a function, the F’s good = performing the function of F well
  9. So, if the human species ahs a function, then the human good = performing the function well
  10. The human species does have a function
  11. So, the human good - performing the human function well
  12. The human function is activity of the rational part of the soul
  13. So, the human good = performing activity of the rational part of the coil well
  14. One performs the function of an F well when one acts in accordance with the relevant function

This applies over the whole life - it is the activity over the whole life that is the good - it’s not something you decide to have today, it’s kind of decided at the end of the life

When he’s talking about rational activity - it’s not things just like maths and science, it includes behaving in certain ways and even having emotional responses of a certain sort

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14
Q

Human Good

A

Human good = ultimate/highest end = happiness

Human good = performing human function well = rational activity in accordance with virtues (or virtuous exercise or rational capacities)

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15
Q

However, what does he mean by the human good
What is good for humans or what humans are good for

A

What is good for X is happiness
And what X is good for is that for any F, where F is a kind with a function, the good of an F = performing the function of F well

When we talk about living, we are either talking about living enjoyably, or doing a good job of living - do these go together?
Aristotle says that there is no tension between these

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16
Q

background assumptions

A

Humans have essences (which are both discoverable and normative
Human essence is identified with human soul
Human soul consists of a set of capacities for engaging in a distinctive kind of life

Human souls are distinctly rational, so human good is the activity of that rational part of the soul/rational activity
Aristotle says that by doing a good job, and by nature suited to do, you thereby are realising your potential, and achieving your natural goals, which is better for you than going against your natural tendencies

Conclusion so far: the excellent (virtous) exercise of disntictivly human rational capacities is what being a human consists in

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17
Q

aspects of the soul

A

One aspect of the soul is rational and one is non-rational
The non rational is the plant-like aspect of the soul (nutritive capacities)
It is also non rational is the capacity to listen to reason - the appetitive and desire part

Nutritive capacities are shared, not unique to humans
So the excellences of nutritive soul capacities are not human excellences

The rational part of the coil possesses reason and is capable of obedience to reason
On one hand, these purely intellectual things are a per of the rational part of the soul, but on the other hand, quasi-rational stuff, like desires, also counts as activities

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18
Q

there are two corresponding types of human virtues:
Intellectual and character virtues

A

Character virtues - discussed in books 2-5
Character virtue acquisition
Intellectual sort mostly both comes into existence and increases as a result of teaching
Excellence of character results from habituation
It’s a virtue to be a pleasant person to be around - harming people for no reason is bad - we all should agree on that - if you don’t, then there’s no hope for the person
When we talk about how these virtues are acquired, they are not the kinds of things we are just born with - if they are by nature, then no amount of training can change it - with humans, we can be habituated and conditioned into having a certain response to things, and that’s how virtue is developed

We become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and courageous by doing courageous things

Why we must learn by doing - you can’t have a guide book to being a good person
Your actions determine your life (actions shape the soul)
Being virtuous involves pleasure

When you first try something it’s hard, only after some experience, you start enjoying it - it’s the sign of a real expert

Problem: how can we do virtuous actions when we are not yet virtous - to become just, we need to be just (in terms of doing just things)
For id they are doing what is just and moderate, they are already just and moderate

Actually, you don’t need to be a builder, or writer, in order to build or write
Does something literate, and does it in the way a literate person does it - I would only be literate if i was able to write and did it in the way that the literate person does it

Also, craft products are importantly different from virtuous acts

Doing a virtuous act vs acting virtously - there’s a difference
If he does them knowingly, if he decides to do them, and decides to do it for themselves, and foes them from a firm and unchanging position - then that is acintg virtouslt
Know what you are doing, have chosen/decided upon, not for some ulterior motive, agent is firm and stable in action

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19
Q

Performing X actions and becoming X

A

the just person comes about from doing what is just, and the moderate person from doing what is moderate; whereas grom not doing these things no one will have excellence in the future either

Virtues activities need to be chosen for its own sake, not for some ulterior motive

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20
Q

Definition of virtue:

A

“Virtue, then, is (a) state (hexis) that (b) decides/concerned with choice (prohairesis), (c) consisting in a mean (mesotês), (d) the mean relative to us (pros hêmas), (e) which is defined by reference to reason (logos), (f) i.e., to the reason by reference to which the intelligent person (phronimos) would define it.” NE II.6, 1106b36-1107a2

Virtue is a state that decides or a state that is concerned with choice
It is concerned with the mean or the mean relative to us
State that falls under one of the three kinds:
Affections
Capcaities
A capacity isn’t something that you acquire but something that you are born with the ability to do

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21
Q

Disposition/state (hexis):

A

…the things that occur in the soul fall into three kinds, i.e. affections, capacities, and dispositions…” NE II.5, 1105b19-20 By affections I mean appetite, anger, fear, boldness, grudging ill will, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, envy, pity— generally, feelings attended by pleasure or pain; NE II.5, 1105b21-3 “..capacities are what people are referring to when they say we are susceptible to the affections, as for example with those capacities in terms of which we are said to be capable of becoming angry, or distressed, or of feeling pity..” NE II.5, 1105b23-5 “…as for dispositions, it is in terms of these that we are well or badly disposed in relation to the affections, as for example in relation to becoming angry, if we are violently or sluggishly disposed, we are badly disposed, and if in an intermediate way, we are well disposed—and similarly too in relation to the other things in question…” NE II.5, 1105b2

  • Being virtuous is not a matter of mastering your emotions but is reflected in your response to things
  • It is a state that is concerned with choice/purpose (prohairesis)
  • Lies in a mean/intermediate state
  • This does not mean that virtue is always a medial or moderate state
  • Rather that this state issues emotional actions that are appropriate
  • All the virtues however occupy a mean state between excess and deficiencies
  • The state of one’s soul is also in this mean state
  • This is not just some objective mean but a mean that is relative to us
  • Aristotle contrast between the objectibbe and what is relative to us to show that the mean relative to each individual person is not the same and depends on said individual
  • Eg. the precise mean of food for someone else might be 20 pounds but relative to us it might be 40 pounds
  • Facts about the person doing the thing and other factors determines what the precise mean will be
  • The correct mean is determined by the reason/thinking (logos)
  • And the person possessing the intellectual virtue is called phonesis
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22
Q

Decision/choice/purpose

A

Doing an action virtously vs doing virtuous action
First if he does them knowingly
Secondly if he decides to do them and decides to do these actions for themselves.
If he does them from a firm and unchanging disposition

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23
Q

Lies in a mean/is intermediate

A

Virtue is an intermediate state
It lies between two vices - excess and deficiency
Both too much or too little are both not good

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24
Q

relative/in relation to us

A

by intermediate ‘with reference to the object’ I mean what is equidistant from each of its two extremes, which is one and the same for all
whereas by intermediate ‘relative to us’ I mean the sort of thing that neither goes to excess nor is deficient—and this is not one thing, nor is it the same for all

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25
Q

The mean that is determined by reason/thinking

A

Now, that one should act in accordance with the correct prescription (orthôs logos) is a shared view
let it stand as a basic assumption; there will be a discussion about it later, both about what ‘the correct prescription’ is, and about how it is related to the other kinds of excellence

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26
Q

Practical wisdom/intelligence

A

The phronimos - the wise person - possesses the intellectual virtue called phronêsis
Phronêsis - excellence or virtue in Deliberation

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27
Q

Phronesis

A

Action - praxis
Decision/Choice (prohairesis)
Deliberation (boulesis)
Starting from ends/goals, deliberations is the process whereby one works out how to achieve those ends or goals (Deliberations is not about which ends/goals to have)
Can think of this as represented by a “practical” syllogilism/deduction

Wisdoms, practical intelligence, prudence
Intellectual virtue that has to do with action (praxis)
What determines the right way to act as it pertains to the virtues is decided by phronesis
Ends are being determined by deliberation

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28
Q

“practical” syllogilism

A

General or universal premise - I want to heal the sick
Particular premise - eg. doing this or that will lead to this goal
Conclusion: decision (or action), eg. do this or that

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29
Q

Division of labour:

A

Again, the ‘product’ is brought to completion by virtue of a person’s having wisdom and excellence of character
for excellence makes the goal correct, while wisdom makes what leads to it correct

In our decisions there is this division of labour

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30
Q

Reasoning about what to do:

A

UP (universal premise)
X is to be done/avoided
\PP (Particular Premise)
This is X

Conclusion (Decision/Action)
Do/Avoid X

Character virtue, developed by practice, sets the ends/goals
Phonesis, developed by experience, gives the means to those ends (moral perception, eye of the soul)

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31
Q

Cleverness (deinoeteta)

A

Cleverness (deinoeteta): ability to engage in means-ends reasoning. The ability to “hit the mark”
If the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness

Phronesis requires character virtue - it is impossible to be wise without possessing excellence

Phronesis vs cleverness
Cleverness: ability to engage in means-ends reasoning. The ability to hit the mark

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32
Q

Full character virtue vs natural virtue

A

…just as in the case of that part of the soul that forms opinions there are two kinds of thing, cleverness and wisdom, so with the character bearing part there are also two, one being natural virtue and the other virtue in the primary sense—and of these, the latter does not come about unless accompanied by wisdom.”

Virtue in the primary sense/full character virtue - needs wisdom

Character virtue requires phonesis
it is not possible to possess excellence in the primary sense without wisdom
Impossible to be wise without excellence of character

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33
Q

Is virtue knowledge

A
  • Socrates thought that all the excellences are kinds of wisdom, but in so far as they are always accompanied by wisdom
  • Socrates was in a way right and in a way not right when he said that the virtues were all accompanied by wisdom or knowledge
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34
Q

Unity of the virtues:

A

Is it possible to have one virtue but not others
this is possible in relation to the ‘natural’ excellences, but in relation to those that make a person excellent without qualification, it is not possible, since if wisdom, which is one, is present, they will all be present along with it

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35
Q

Voluntary and Counter Voluntary

A

Why these notions are relevant to this study
virtue/excellence as a disposition state
Is a disposition state that has to do with decisions - how are our choices related to who we are
Virtue/excellence and vice/badness
Are objects of blame and praise - can we blamed for the characters we have - if so, it seems like we are responsible for them
These notions are often used but require conceptual clarification in order to resolve some puzzles

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36
Q

Relevancy:

A
  • Asking about whether ot not an action voluntary leadas to the question on when does an action reflect a persons character and when does it not
  • Because virtues and vices are voluntary they are praise or blameworthy
  • A lot of people like socrates used these notions but they require conceptual clarification in order to resolve some puzzle
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37
Q

When is an action voluntary

A
  • Oedipus kills father, not knowing it is his father
  • You do X, not knowing X is bad for you. (Alternatively: You do X, not knowing X is wrong.)
  • Forced (false) confession
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38
Q

Criteria:

A

the “origin” (archê – principle) is “in” the agent. (Not by force)
the agent knows the particulars. (Not because of ignorance)
Whether or not we think something is voluntary depends on the nature of the case
If it is something serious then it is less likely that one will be blamed for having given in
Eg. if one’s loved ones are threatened
However, if the nature of teh case is not that serious then one might be balmed for having given in

Force is when the origins are external

“mixed” cases - for example: what is done because of fear of the greater evils
Doing such things, then, is voluntary, but just in themselves they are presumably counter-voluntary; for no one would choose anything of this sort for itself.

39
Q

Regret - is a necessary condition for something done because of ignorance to count as ‘counter-voluntary’

A

If not, we say it is non-voluntary
Obviously, nothing done because of ignorance is done voluntarily
In asking about whether something was done voluntarily or not, we’re asking about the connection between the action and the person’s character
This distinction helps to make clear why not all cases of actions done because of ignorance automatically show no connection between the character and the action

40
Q

Non voluntary

A
  • the person who has done whatever it is because of ignorance, if he feels nothing by way of discomfort at his action, has not acted voluntarily
  • in so far as it was something he didn’t know he was doing, but he has not acted counter-voluntarily, as he is not distressed by it
41
Q

Ignorance is of particulars

A

nor is ignorance at the level of the universal a cause of the counter- voluntary
but rather ignorance at the level of particular things, which are where action is located and what action is about
Eg. plagiarizing because ignorant that this counts as plagiarism vs. because ignorant that plagiarism is wrong

Aristotle thinks that if you’ve done something out of ignorance but have regretted then that is a condition for an action to count as counter voluntary
But the kind of ignorance matters
It must be ignorance of the particulates not the universals for it to be less blameworthy
When you’re ignorant about the universals then that type of ignorance does not get you off the bnook

42
Q

Voluntary

A

actions done according to your will
Actions that belong to you so they can be praise or blameworthy
Actions done voluntarily reflects one’s characters

43
Q

Non-voluntary

A

Not according to or against your will
For these actions the person has ingrained but does not have any pain or regret after the action committed that goes against their will

44
Q

Involuntary/counter voluntary

A

Acting against what you care about and your will
Actions you were forced to do or out of ignorance
The person must be sad or had regret that they did the deed against their will

45
Q

In ignorance actions

A

You are doing ana ction in a state in which you do not know all the things you need to know
Being drunk
For aristotle, this is not enough to exonerate someone from blame because it is in one’s control to be in that state or not

Because of ignorance actions:
The world decieves you and it makes it not your own action
Eg. a medical tratement that has some harmful side effects but due to scientidic knowledfe of that day they do not know all the facts to have known whether or not it was harmful or not

Negligence
Things that people should do or know about the situation
The action does reflect one’s character
Ignorance is only excsuable when we could not have expected the individual to know

46
Q

Virtues in a state or disposition

A

Virtue is not a feeling and is not a capacity
You don’t have a virtue because you feel a certain thing
It involves feelings however (to feel emotions in the right way to not overreact of underreact)
It is a disposition in which you have an inclination to do a certain thing
It is a character trait (ingrained part of your character)

47
Q

Mean

A

Mean is relative to us
The mean is in accordance with the correct reason (phronesis)
We make a practical judgement that is correct and virtue means to hit that judgement
Eg. the courageous person judges how courageous they should be
The virtues are united in this correct judgement of choosing what is most right to do
Aristotle doesn’t believe that the right action can be covered in advance in a way in which it determine for all

48
Q

The particulars:

A

who is acting, what he is doing, in relation to what or affecting what
Sometimes also with what, what the action is for, and how it’s done
the person who was ignorant of any one of these things has acted counter-voluntarily
Ignorance of particulars - Typically exonerating (provided there is regret)
For such cases, instruction, rather than punishment or blame, is appropriate.

Ignorance of universals - Typically not exonerating

Exceptions: when ignorance of the particulars is blameworthy
Acting because of ignorance also appears to be distinct from acting in ignorance
for the person who acts while drunk or angry does not seem to act because of ignorance but because of one of the things just mentioned, though not knowing what he is doing, but in ignorance of it

49
Q

Praise and Blame

A

We make judgements about the behaviour of other people
Actions that are voluntary - is a minimal condition of whether something is subject to praise or blame

50
Q

Aristotle makes it explicit that certain actions can be caused by appetite or emotion and still be voluntary

A

Things that children or animals do are voluntary, but children and animals don’t engage in reason - decision is not something that is shared in children and animals
Aristotle characterised virtues as ‘states that decide’ - has to do with decisions

51
Q

Decision (vs. some nearby concepts)

A

Vs. appetite/desire (epithumia)
Decision and apptite can conflict, e.g. in the strong-willed person
They make decisions but the appeteites conflict with decisions

52
Q

Wish

A

What we intend is not always what we want
We can wish for the impossible, but not decide to do or achieve it
Further, wish is more for the end
Wish is not an action, but a goal/the end, and a decision is what promotes the end

Vs. belief/judgement
It will not, then, be judgement either, since objects of judgement can be eternal or impossible, and neither are up to us

53
Q

decision/choice

A

It is a deliberation desire - for things that depend on us/are in our control
We deliberate, not about ends, but about what forwards those ends
You need to have an end then examine how to get there - eg. you don’t deliberate whether to cure a patient, when you’re a doctor, as that’s the end, you deliberate how to cure the patient

What distinguishes choice and intention from voluntary actions is that the thing you’ve decided is something that is deliberate and based on reasoning
What is wished for is the end, while what we deliberate about and decide on are the things that forward the end

Is the thing that we want, is it actually good or does it just appear good to us
If we say what we all really want is the good, then it seems like a whole lot of people don’t know what it is that they wish for and that what they wish for is wrong

54
Q

the virtous/excellent person is the standard of what is really/actually good

A

For the person of excellence the object of wish is the one that is truly so, just as on the physical level too the things that are truly healthful are healthful for people in good condition

55
Q

Are we responsible for our character

A
  • Given that we praise and vlame people for being virtuous or vicious, then yes, they must be “up to us” - if we are held responsible for them, then we should actually be responsible for it - it can’t be something we’re just stuck with, it has to be voluntary
  • the bad states that people get blamed for will be ones that depend on us
    Ignorance of hte universal - the things that you think you should do, you are wrong about
  • The vicious person has a wish that organises all their deliberation - that is for something bad - so all of their actions correspondingly will be vicious
56
Q

Analogy with bodily health

A

You become a sick person who cannot become well
If you think that somebodys character is up to them and they build their character on what they do - since they become bad, it seems like they cannot help but become more and more bad
Like the sick person who cannot become better, it was their fault at first but there’s nothing they can do about it now
It seems weird to say that they are sick voluntarily

57
Q

Aristotle thinks that actions are voluntary and states are voluntary

A

With actions, we’re in control from beginning to end, we know all the parrticulars involved
However, it’s not that somebody is just excused

If we want to say about the vicious person, that they are not responsible for their vicious character, because no one would have chosen that, then Arisotlte thinks that you have to be willing to say the same about the virtuous person, that is the vicious person does not deserve blame, then the virtous person does not deserve praise

Are we responsible for out character
Yes and no
We are jointly responsible

58
Q

Knowledge of universals

A

Eg. pointless acts of aggression are to be avoided or harming people is bad
Determined by our character, our virtuous or vicious disposition or state, which is developed by habituation or practice

59
Q

Knowledge of particulars:

A

This action is pointlessly aggressive ; this would do harm
A quasi-perceptual ability, developed through experience and over time

F is better than G, but people do G anyways because they are overcome by the pleasure of G

Knowledge is a strong thing for Socrates
To Plato, it seemed that people weren’t unified agents

60
Q

Akrasia

A

incontinence, weakness of will, lack of self-control
If we can solve the difficult issues about a subject and leave people’s views on it undisturbed, it will have been clarified well enough
Aristotle thinks that there is something right about this endoxa

61
Q

Taxonomy of States

A

Undesirable states in relation to character are of three kinds: badness, lack of self-controlm and brutishness
Vice, akrasia, beastliness
The contaties of two of these are clear enough: virtue, enkrateia, super-human
In many cases, we want to distinguish the wicked and the akratic - the akratic is not wicked, just weak-willed

62
Q

Virtuous, action is good, feeling is good
Enkratic, action same as virtuous, feeling is bad
Akratic, action same as vicious, feeling is bad
Vicious, excessive or deficient, feeling is good

A

It’s important to distinguish these, because Aristotle argues that friendship plays an important role in the happy life, they are needed for the good life, we need to be good judges of peoples characters

The enkratic person makes a decision and sticks to it, they may have th ebase appteites, but stick to what they should be doing
The incontinent person makes a decision then abandons it

It is a lack of self-control

63
Q

Knowledge vs mere belief, is not relevant

A

this is not why people behave in certain ways
Aristotle does not deny the possibility, he wants to preserve the endoxa, he just says people act against their beliefs about what’s best, but does not want to reject that knowledge, that it cannot be dragged around by our emotions

First distinction: having vs using knowledge
For both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and he who is using it are said to know
When you are drunk or sick, you would have knowledge, but you are not using it - you know that pointless acts of aggression are not good, but you do not know that when you are drunk

Distinction: knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars
Since there are two types of premise, there is nothing to prevent someone from acting contrary to his knowledge when has both premisses but is using only the universal one, not the particular one

Universal premises
Carinogengs should be avoided
Pleasant things should be pursued
Particular premises
This is a carcinogen
This is a pleasant thing

64
Q

Can an akratic person (after repeated akratic behavious) become a vicious person - possibly on exam

A

The akratics person problem is not that they don’t know, they just can’t stick to it
The particular knowledge is not active in cases of akrasia
Again, people call the moderate type self-controlled and resistant, while some call anyone of this sort moderate, some do not
The moderate person takes pleasure in moderation, not the self-controlled

65
Q

the politician should be aiming for is happiness

A

Happiness = highest end
It’s going to require a certain amount of external goods (wealth, health, friends) - they are necessary ingredients to be happy, but not sufficient - you can still be miserable with this
What else you need is happiness
Chosen for its own sake, it’s desirable in itself
Activity - energeia

Happiness is not lacking in anything but is self-sufficient

66
Q

The point of life isn’t vacation:

A

Why can’t it always be pleasure that we pursue for its own sake?
Pleasure is not the sort of thing that we achieve something else by
Maybe the highest good is pleasant amusement
This is not what the good life could be
Happiness does not lie in amusement, to apply to oneself to serious things, for the sake of amusement appears silly and childish
You don’t work for the weekend, you relax on the weekend, so you can work in the week
We amuse ourselves to relax so we can pursue more serious things

It’s activity of the soul that expresses virtue - that is what happiness is and to achieve eudaimonia

67
Q

What is the best (rational) activity and virtue?

A

It is reasonable that this should be activity in accordance with the highest kind of excellence

68
Q

Theoretical activity seems to be the highest or the best kind of activity

A

It is the kind that corresponds to something divine within us

69
Q

Reasons for theoretical activity bring highest

A

It is also the thing in whose object are also the highest and best kind
Further, it is the most continuous, since we can engage in reflection continuously more than we can in getting things fone ehwtever they mat be
It is the most pleasant kind of activity
It is the most complete, not chosen for the sake of anything else

70
Q

Theoretical activity is most self-sufficient

A

The courageous person need not be powerless
The moderate will need the opportunity of indulging himself

The life of contemplation/study is the ultimate best life for humans

Human life is lived in common with other humans
In so far as he is a human being, and shares his life with others, he chooses to do the deeds that accord with excellence, and so he wil need such things for the purposes of living a human life

71
Q

One human good

A

Conceptions of happiness
Exclusive (intellectualist): happiness consistsics ecvlusively in virtuous theoretical activity
Inclusive (comprehensive): happiness includes both practical and theoretical activity

The life of study would be the highest kind of life in a time of complete peace and leisure, that is what we would ultimately do

But given the situation, since we live in a world that is imperfect, there are wars, there is sickness, it is important to cultivate these character virtues, otherwise we won’t be happy.

72
Q

What is understanding?

A

Understanding is a basic human desire
This non practical use of our rationality that is distinctively human, we saw in some conception is the highest part of a happy, flourishing human life consists of

Posterior analytics - this work is roughly about scientific methodology and knowledge - what is knowledge, the supergood kind of knowledge and how do we get it

73
Q

Episteme is explanatory knowledge

A

when we think we know of hte explanation because of which the object holds that it is its explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise
We have such knowledge through demonstrations

74
Q

Explanations are given by demonstrations a type of syllogism

A

Here we assert that we do know things through demonstrations. By a demonstration I mean a scientific deduction, and byt scientific deduction by possessing which we understand something
Deduction, syllogism
2 premises and a conclusion
3 terms, middle, major, and minor

Syllogism is a discourse in which certain premises are precedent, and something different from these premises follow

All mammals are moratak, mortal is predicted of every mammal
All cows are mammals, mammal is predicated of ebery cow
Hence all cows are mortal, Hence mortal is predicated of every cow

75
Q

Square of opposition

A

A - universal affirmative (affirm)
E - universal negative (nego)
I - particular affirmative (affirmo)
O - particular negative (nego)

Contraties vs contradictories

Using these four types of propositions we can create a square of opposition
If every S is P, then some S is P is also true
And for some contraries, only one of them can be false, but both could also be true

For the I proposition, if you do not know if some S is P, you can look at another proposition, you could look at proposition A, every S is P, then you would know if proposition I is true

76
Q

Three conversion rules

A

A holds of no B -> B holds od no A
A holds of some B -> B holds of some A
A holds of every B -> B holds of some A

77
Q

Three syllogistic forms

A

First figure
AxM
MxB
AxB

Second figure
MxA
MxB
AxB

Third figure
AxM
BxM
AxB

X = unspecigied relationship between the subject and the predicate, which cen be replaced by A, E, I or O
M = middle term
A = major term
B = minor term

Four moods of the first figure syllogilism

The moods of the three figures

78
Q

Demonstration

A

Premises of demonstration
True
Primitive and immediate
More familiar
Prior
Explanatory
These things are demonstrative

79
Q

Truth

A

the premises have to be true, have to express what is the case, not what is false

80
Q

Explanatory

A

aristotle thinks that scientific demonstrations, are explanatory, they connect things and explain why these things are connected

Suppose you have a syllogism that is
All vines are broad-leaved
All broad-leaved plants are deciduous
Therefore, all vines are deciduous
First figure, valid syollogism - barbara is the name of that
It’s the fact that decideouseness is the cause of the plants being decideousness

Compare it with this
All vines are are dedcideous
All dcideous plants are broad-leveled
Therefore, all vines are broad-leaved

It shows that it is the case, not why it is a case

Explanatory
All planets are nearby
All nearby things are non-twinklers
Therefore, all plants are non-twinklers

Non-explanatory
All plants are non-twinklers
All non-twinklers are nearby
Therefore, all planets are nearby
This does not explain why they are nearby
Its not the reason why they are nearby, they may be how to prove it, but not explaining why it is the case

81
Q

Demonstration

A

Demonstration is of “the why”
It is not because they don’t twinkle that they are near, but because they are near that they don’ twinkle

This helps us understand that premises are prior, more familiar, and better known

82
Q

By nature/simpliciter vs. in relation to us

A

Things are prior or more familiar in two ways
To us and by nature
He associates being the better known to us are things being perceived
And things better known by nature are far away and not as able to be perceived

When we are saying that premises of a demonstrative are better known prior to a explanatory, he means as a matter of fact, not just to us

83
Q

Primitive and immediate

A

All vines are broad-leaved plants
All borad-leaved plants are leaf-shedders
Therefore, all vines are leaf-shedders
There is an explanation for why all broad-leaved plants shed, that is because they are all sap-coagulators, and sap-coagulation leads to the leaves falling

If that last premise, is just a definition, aristotle would say that these kinds of premises are primitive and immediate
Immediate means that it lacks a middle
It is the kind of proposition in which there is no other term which will explain why the terms are connected

84
Q

Understanding

A

We think we understand somedthing simpliciter

It is not even posible for what we know in this sense to be otherwise
What is known systematically therefore is by necessity
Everything that is by necessity, without qualification, is eternal, and what is eternal is subject neither to coming into being nor to passing out of being

Like character virtues, these intellectual virtues are states or dispositions
Being in these states, we can engage in these rational activities well

Knowing what is necessary or eternal - we only have knowledge in this sense about eternal truths, like 2+2=4, not things like the sky is blue today

Understanding is through demonstrations
Episteme is connected with the ability to give or understand demonstrations
Demonstrations are syllogisms or deductions, whos premises have certain features, true, primitive, immediate, more familiar, prior to and explanatory of the conclusions

85
Q

First principles of demonstrations: archai

A

To proceed from primitives is
to proceed from appropriate
principles (I call the same
things primitives and
principles). A principle of a
demonstration is an
immediate proposition, and a
proposition is immediate if
there is no other proposition
prior to it

86
Q

A syllogism is from premises are either themselves have those features or have been demonstrated from these premises

A

Episteme is going to have this structure
Follows from grasp of first principles that are not demonstrated
From them all of the necessary facts within a domain will follow

Science is about kinds, abstract things like that

Is understanding possible
If you have some understanding that S is P, because S is R, and R is P, don’t you also have to have understanding of those premises

Starting points of explanation are known, but they can’t be demonstrated, because then they wouldn’t be indemonstrable

Is all knowledge demonstrable
It would seeme that knowledge is not possible because we can’t get a grasp of these first principles
Aristotle says that knowledge is not demonstrable, they are known in a different way

Aristotle shows us that he is aware of this problem

If I know that it follows from the fact that triangles have interior angles equal to 180
That’s not an indemonstrable fact
The question is about the status of those first principles, and he things everybody would agree that if you don’t have knowledge on the definition of a triangle, your knowledge following from it is in a sense conditional
If you can’t grasp the primitives, you can’t follow what precedes from them

No circular demonstrations
It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be both prior and posterior to something

Not all knowledge is demonstrable
These immediate items must be indemonstrable

What is the state of disposition of the soul that knows the immediate, first principles

There will be comprehension (nous) of the principles

87
Q

Nous

A

intellect, intuition, intelligence, insight, comprehension

We have a different kind of grasp of these

There is some innate capacity that we have that begins with perception and eventually culminates in the grasp of these first principles

Perception comes about memory, and from memory we gain experience, and frome xperience, this universal comes to rest in the soul, and there it becomes a kind of principle
Talking about scientific knowledge, this is the principle of understanding, a starting point

These principles are states/dispositions of the soul by which one grasps universals

They come about from perception, as in battle, when a route has occurred, first one man makes a stand, then another does, and then another, until a position of strength is reached

Undifferentiated, unclear items that take a stand, we know these premises from epagoge, which is induction/inductive reasoning

88
Q

Categories

A

types of predication, ways of being
Gives us the tools or instruments for thinking about other things and organising our thoughts

89
Q

Common sense ontology

A

Objects
Properties
Essential - couldn’t be the object without that property
Accidental - are not essential

Property - I am a human, if I lose that property, I cease to exist
Property - I change my hair, it is a property that I persist through it

90
Q

Kategorien

A

to predicate X of Y: to “charge” or “accuse” Y of being X

Things said - forms of speech
Things said with combination
Aristotle is not just making linguistic points, but talking about what the words refer to
Cateogireis focus on things that can be combined and how they can be combined

91
Q

Things are said in combination in a variety of ways

A

What kinds of things can be said
What are the classes of things
Professor (JG) is a human, an animal, a living thing, and most general, a substance/a being
Accuse her of being 5’5 - some height - a quantity of some sort
pale - a colour - quality
A sister - a sibling - related to someone - a relation
In this room - in a building - in a place - somewhere
Here now, this afternoon - some time
Standing - in a position

These 10 categories are predicates, they are different ways of being

92
Q

Substances

A

different predicates correspond with different beings

Non-substantial beings - beings/predicates in non-substance categories

93
Q

2 kindness of predication relations

A

Said of a subject
Socrates is human, socrates izz - human is the kind of thing that socrates is
What it is
Preset in a subject
Socrates is pale - socrates hazz pallor - pale is a property that socrates has
What it’s like

Said of - izzing - when you say socrates is human, human is said of socrates
Transitive (animal said of human said of socrates)
Both the name and the definition (logos) apply

Said in - hazing - what is in something
Not as a part
No separate existence
When talking about something being in you, you aren’y saying something is ‘in’ you like in your stomach, it is not separate - if X is in Y, Y has to be a substance
The only thing that are subjects for this said in way are going to be substances

Somethings that you might predicate, accuse something else of being, say what that thing is essentially, and sauy what you accuse something else of being, say what it is like

94
Q

Said of
and
Present in

A

Said of
Y classifies x
Y says what X izz
Y is the essence of X

Present in
Y categorizes A
Y says what X hazz
Y is a property that X has

Two distinctions
Said of vs present in
Essences and accidents/attributes

particular/individual vs universal
Universal: prediable of several subjects; particulars

Properties depends on individual substances
No property like green exists, if not in a subject
Secondary substaances, like kinds and species that people belong to depend on the individuals, it is not prior to them

Primary substances are subjects for all the other things
Other things are predicated of them or are in them

Aristotle takes the predication relations as corresponiding to ontological ones
The framework here, and when we turn to the physics, is a bunch of ways to be

Only substances are able to receive contraries