Nervous shock (A)

Question 1

What did Reavis v Clan Line Steamers Ltd 1925 SC 725 tell us about secondary victimhood?

Answer 1

Could only sue for her own injuries, not for the others.
About the nature of the relationship.

Question 2

What did Bourhill v Young 1942 SC (HL) 78 tell us about secondary victimhood?

Answer 2

It is necessary to establish a relationship to the primary victim and also a situational proximity.

Question 3

How did Lord Ackner define ‘shock’ in Alcock v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310?

Answer 3

“‘Shock’, in the context of this cause of action, involved the sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind. It has yet to include psychiatric illness caused by the accumulation over a period of time of more gradual assaults on the nervous system”.

Question 4

How did Lady Paton define the mental harm requirement in Keen v Tayside Contract 2003 SLT 500 at para 54?

Answer 4

“The pursuer was exposed to one single horrific incident during which he was forces to witness the physical suffering and death of other human beings [or himself], and as a result of which he developed symptoms of psychiatric injury”.

Question 5

What does Lord Wheatley say about the mental harm element in Simpson v ICI 1983 SLT 601 and how is this supported by the judgment in Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1996] EWCA Civ 1310?

Answer 5

“It is not enough for a person to say that he received a shock or a fright from an explosion which caused normal emotional reaction with no lasting effect, and to claim on account of this ‘shock’ alone. He can only claim damages if he proves that he suffered some physical, mental or nervous injury”.

Vernon v Bosley.
- Damages may be recovered for PTSD but not for prolonged grief disorder.

Question 6

What is the three-part test for a claim of secondary victimhood?

Answer 6

1. A tie of love and affection between the secondary victim and the primary victim. (Reavis / Alcock / McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 (close tie evident, close enough proximity to immediate aftermath).
2. The secondary victim was present at the accident or its immediate aftermath (McLoughlin / Alcock / Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd 2003 SLT 1011, in a sense).
3. Psychiatric disorder was caused by direct perception of the accident or its aftermath, not merely being told about it (McLoughlin / Alcock).