Negligence: Causation Flashcards
What three questions must the court address to establish causation in negligence?
- Causation in Fact: Was the defendant’s negligence a factual cause of the claimant’s harm?
- Intervening Acts (Novus Actus Interveniens): Was there a new intervening act that broke the chain of causation?
- Remoteness of Damage: Was the harm too remote from the defendant’s actions to hold them liable?
What is the ‘but for’ test, and how was it applied in Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee (1969)?
The ‘but for’ test asks whether the harm would have occurred “but for” the defendant’s negligence. If the harm would have occurred anyway, the defendant is not liable.
In Barnett, the hospital breached its duty by failing to treat a man who later died of arsenic poisoning. However, the court held that even with proper care, the man would have died. Thus, the breach was not a factual cause of the death.
How does the court handle cases where there are multiple potential causes of harm, as seen in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority (1988)?
In Wilsher, a prematurely born baby was exposed to excess oxygen due to a hospital’s negligence and developed blindness. The court found that blindness could have resulted from five different causes, only one of which was attributable to the defendant. The claimant failed to prove that the negligence, on the balance of probabilities, caused the harm.
What is the material contribution approach to causation, as demonstrated in Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw (1956)?
In Bonnington, the claimant developed pneumoconiosis from inhaling harmful dust. The court found that the dust came from both negligent (guilty) and non-negligent (innocent) sources. The defendant was liable because the negligent dust materially contributed to the harm. A claimant need not prove the breach was the sole cause, only that it materially contributed.
This is approach in causation Is used in cases where there multiple causes. This approach was not applied on the facts of Wilsher v Essex Area Health because the claimant was able only to show that there were five different possible risk factors, each of which could have caused his damage and the defendant was responsbilble for only of those factors. The defendant had simply added to the list of risk faced by the claimant. The defendants negligence could not be shown to have made a material contribution to the claimants harm
How does the material increase in risk approach differ from material contribution, as seen in McGhee v National Coal Board (1973)?
In McGhee, the claimant contracted dermatitis after exposure to dust, which was worsened because the employer failed to provide washing facilities. The court held the defendant liable because their breach materially increased the risk of harm, even though it could not be proven that the breach directly caused the injury. This principle is now mostly confined to cases with scientific uncertainty, such as mesothelioma (Sienkiewicz v Greif (2011)).
What is an intervening act, and how does it break the chain of causation?
An intervening act (novus actus interveniens) is an event or action that occurs after the defendant’s breach, breaking the chain of causation if it is the primary cause of harm. For example, in the bonfire scenario, John’s act of adding tyres to David’s fire was reckless and broke the chain, making John liable instead of David.
How do a claimant’s actions break the chain of causation, and what principles emerge from cases like McKew v Holland (1969) and Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets (1969)?
A claimant’s actions can break the chain of causation (novus actus interveniens) if they are entirely unreasonable and unforeseeable. If the claimant acts unreasonably after the defendant’s negligent act, the defendant may not be liable for further harm resulting from the claimant’s behavior. Conversely, if the claimant’s actions are reasonable, the chain of causation remains intact, and the defendant remains liable for all subsequent harm.
Case Example: McKew v Holland (1969)
* Facts: The claimant’s leg was weakened due to the defendant’s negligence. Despite knowing the risk of collapse, the claimant descended a steep staircase without a handrail and fell, suffering additional injuries. * Decision: The House of Lords ruled that the claimant acted unreasonably by taking a foreseeable risk. This broke the chain of causation, and the defendant was not held liable for the subsequent injuries. * Principle: A claimant’s entirely unreasonable act in response to their injury can sever the causal link between the original negligence and further harm. Case Example: Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets (1969) * Facts: The claimant injured her neck due to the defendant’s negligence and was fitted with a neck brace. The brace restricted her ability to use her glasses, and she subsequently fell down stairs, sustaining additional injuries. * Decision: The court held that the claimant had acted reasonably in attempting to navigate stairs despite her limited vision. The chain of causation was not broken, and the defendant was liable for the further injuries. * Principle: When the claimant’s actions are reasonable, the chain of causation remains intact, and the defendant can be held liable for all consequences flowing from the initial negligence. Key Distinction: * Breaking the Chain: To break the chain of causation, the claimant’s actions must be entirely unreasonable and unforeseeable. * Contributory Negligence: If the claimant’s actions are careless but not unreasonable, the court may reduce damages for contributory negligence rather than ruling the chain of causation broken. Application:
Courts evaluate the claimant’s behavior in light of the circumstances, asking:
1. Was the claimant’s action a natural and foreseeable consequence of the injury?
2. Was the claimant’s behavior reasonable given their physical and mental condition?
If the answer to these questions is “yes,” the chain of causation is preserved. If the answer is “no,” the claimant’s actions may constitute a novus actus interveniens.
How do a claimant’s actions break the chain of causation, as seen in McKew v Holland (1969)?
In McKew, the claimant acted unreasonably by descending a steep staircase with no handrail despite having an injured leg. The court held that this action broke the chain of causation. By contrast, in Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets (1969), the claimant acted reasonably when further injuring herself after struggling with a neck brace, so the chain was not broken.
What is remoteness of damage, and how is it assessed?
Damage is too remote if it is not a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. In the bonfire example, Fred’s lost rent from his shed overlooking a racecourse might be deemed too remote to hold David liable, as it was not a reasonably foreseeable loss from lighting a fire negligently.
How are damages apportioned in cases of divisible injuries, as in Holtby v Brigham (2000)?
In Holtby, the claimant contracted asbestosis after exposure from multiple employers. The court apportioned damages based on each employer’s contribution to the harm. Divisible injuries allow courts to apportion damages proportionately to the defendant’s level of responsibility.
How are damages handled in indivisible injury cases with multiple defendants?
For indivisible injuries, such as a broken leg, each defendant can be held liable for the full harm. In Performance Cars v Abraham, a car already damaged in a prior accident could not claim for the same repair costs from a subsequent incident, as the harm was pre-existing.
How does the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 address liability among multiple defendants?
Under the Act, a defendant who pays full damages can seek contribution from other liable parties based on their share of responsibility. However, this apportionment does not affect the claimant, who can recover full damages from any defendant.
How do reckless or intentional actions by third parties break the chain of causation, as seen in Lamb v Camden London Borough Council (1981)?
Reckless or intentional actions are more likely to break the chain of causation. In Lamb, squatters damaged a property left unoccupied due to the defendant’s negligence. The court held the defendant was not liable for the squatter’s actions, as they were a new intervening cause.
How does foreseeability affect liability for intervening acts, as shown in Rouse v Squires (1973)?
In Rouse, a negligent lorry driver caused an accident that led to another negligent driver killing a helper. The original driver remained liable because it was foreseeable that subsequent negligence could result from the initial accident.
How does shared liability apply when multiple defendants contribute to an indivisible injury?
If multiple defendants contribute to an indivisible injury, each is liable for the full amount to the claimant, who can recover from any defendant. For example, in Rouse v Squires, both negligent drivers were held liable for the same death, and damages were apportioned between them.
