Negligence Flashcards
Adams v. Bullock
- F: Boy electrocuted by uninsulated trolley line when swinging wire
- H: Reverses, for D. Injury was not reasonably foreseeable, D had taken reasonable precaution in placing the wire; no previous occurrence goes to foreseeability
- P failed to state what precaution was expected
Braun – cited in Adams
- F: live wire over vacant lot in city; insulation wears away; worker electrocuted
- Ruled for P because the injury was foreseeable since the area was highly developed and it was unlikely that lot would lie vacant – “bound to anticipate what was usual”
US v. Carroll Towing
• F: Barge breaks off, hits another ship, sinks and destroys all cargo. Deckhand not present on the ship.
• Sets “Hand formula” for precaution – B < PL
where B: burden of precaution, P: probability of injury, L: magnitude of injury
• Hand Formula assumes some level of foreseeability
Bolton v. Stone
- F: cricket case, P injured when hit by ball from pitch across the street
- Need significant risk, not just foreseeability alone – “how serious the consequences are likely to be if person is struck”
Bethel v. NYC Transit Authority
Reasonable Person Case
• F: P hurt on D’s bus when wheelchair seat collapsed under him; bus had recently been repaired but not properly inspected
• Duty of highest care no longer applies to common carriers; instead, standard of reasonable care applies
• Duty of extraordinary care dates to early railroad days, no longer relevant b/c public transportation now just as safe as private
• Establishes “reasonable person of ordinary prudence” to assess negligence
o Relies on conduct, not state of mind, of defendant
o Objective – measured against external standard, not individual D’s ability
Exceptions to Objectively Reasonable Person Rule
• Gender usually ignored (e.g. no reasonable woman vs. reasonable man)
• Physical disability sometimes considered – exculpation requires “total loss of consciousness”/control
• Bashi v. Wodarz
o D rear-ended car then drove off, then collided with P
o Argued temporary onset of unanticipated mental illness “wigged out”
o CA court says no exception for “sudden mental illness”
• Children – use reasonable child of like age, intelligence, and experience
o Dellwo v. Pearson – courts have applied adult standard to children when they engage in adult activities: e.g. 12-year-old driving a motorboat
Baltimore & Ohio RR v. Goodman
Overbearing Judge
• F: P killed on train tracks, did not stop to check the tracks
• Summary judgment – standard of conduct is clear, should be laid down by court
• Attempt to make a “rule” for negligence, rather than a standard
• Holmes believed the longer judges preside, the more equipped they are to make bright-line rules
Pokora v. Wabash RR
Permissive Judge
• F: P stops at train track, listens, doesn’t hear or see, boxcars blocked view, gets hit by train
• H: reverses Holmes’ rule from Goodman, says this is an issue for jury
• Cardozo: the world changes, judges cannot keep up
Andrews v. United Airlines
Role of Jury Case
• F: bag falls on P out of overhead bin
• Question of fact as to whether or not precautions for falling bags were reasonable
• Ultimately a jury question
• Heightened duty of care imposed on common carriers –> much more likely to go to the jury
Timarco v. Klein
Role of Custom Case
• F: P, tenant, badly cut when fell through glass door in shower in D’s apartment
• Establishes role of custom here – proof of customary practice can be admitted to jury to establish negligence of P
o Doesn’t need to be universal adoption of custom, just need relatively common
o Goes to the reasonableness of “notice” to the D
• Custom speaks to elements of negligence calculus, because it shows what’s happened before: severity of injury, foreseeability, probability of occurring, and burden of precautions
• If you can establish a custom, it can get you to the jury
TJ Hooper
Role of Custom Case
• F: Tug sank in a storm, causing loss of barges it was towing. If it had radio, it would’ve known about storm and been able to avoid
• Custom said hardly any tugs had radios and D tug owner argued that the standard of care was the custom of not having them
• Even though not custom, could still be negligent. The custom doesn’t automatically establish the standard of care. It merely goes to the question of negligence.
Martin v. Herzog
Role of Statute Case
• F: D driving on wrong side of road, but P driving without lights on after a certain hour, in violation of statute
• Lights on statute designed to prevent exactly this type of harm – thus contributory negligence bars recovery
• Court looks to the statutory intent when determining if it is relevant to negligence or not
• Violation of a statute which is intended to protect against the injury that occurred is prima facie evidence of negligence
Tedla v. Ellman
Role of Statutes Case
• F: Junk collectors walking on wrong side of road, hit from behind; walked on wrong side due to traffic and because they were pushing strollers (tried to be safer, but violated statute saying what side pedestrians are supposed to walk on)
• Court rules for P – doesn’t enforce strict observance of the statute
o Violation of statute doesn’t automatically create negligence
o Statute was for level of precautions pedestrians should take
o If violating statute was safer (less traffic), then statute doesn’t necessarily impute negligence standard – clearly not the case with Martinnever safer to violate that statute
Negri v. Stop & Shop
Slip and Fall - Constructive Notice
• F: slip and fall, baby food on floor for at least 50 minutes, evidencemess was dity
• H: Cannot dismiss as matter of law – jury question as to whether or not D was negligent, remanded
• Look to actual/constructive notice
• Constructive notice – reasonable person should have known given the amount of time that passed, and had time to remedy the dangerous circumstances
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History
- F: Slip and fall on wax paper on steps to museum
- H: No evidence that D had actual or constructive notice
- Defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for sufficient length of time prior to accident
