Need To Know Flashcards
??? What items need to be checked before departure?
1.6.5 FOM Bulletins
Route briefing notes (RBN)
Aircraft technical bulletins (ATB)
3.4.10.1 Operational Bulletins (OPS) - Read before Flight
3.4.10.6 EFB Bulletins (EFB-OPS and EFB-INFO)
Flight plan crew alerts
Chief pilot information for aircraft type
6.12.3 Alcohol Consumption Prior to Flight
Flight crew members shall abstain from consuming any alcohol _____ hours of ______
12
Departure time
7.1.4 Pilot-in-Control
The acceptable method of transferring control is by stating ;
“You have control” - “I have control”
Or
“I have control” - “You have control”
7.1.7 Critical Phases of Flight
Critical Phases of Flight include all flight below _________ feet AAE,
and ___________ when the aircraft is _______
10,000
All ground operations
In motion
7.1.13 Standard Emergency and Abnormal Procedures - Only exception to PM
reading a checklist silent?
(In the case of rapid depressurization followed by an emergency descent, PIC and FO shall complete the appropriate drills)
When stabilized in the descent,
PIC shall call for the checklist (where applicable). The FO shall silently read the checklist, correcting or drawing attention to any memorized item(s) missed it actioned in error
7.1.15 Flight Dispatch Communications
All communication for agencies relating to the aircraft in flight shall be made through Flight Dispatch including communications originating from the aircraft to the agencies listed or from the agencies listed to the aircraft
- Air Canada or contracted maintenance; and
- Air Canada or contracted medical services; and
- Air Canada security or other security or law enforcement agencies; and
- Customs; and
- Aircraft handling agencies not specifically listed for routine operations.
Exceptions to the above are situations on the ground that clearly involve exceptional circumstances or Air Canada maintenance at stations that are able to provide assistance as described in the MEL Preamble.
Communications shall be established based upon the urgency of the required communication. All available transmission methods shall be considered, including VHF, HF, ACARS, SATCOM or other means. Relay through third party agencies shall be considered if appropriate.
8.1.5.2 Terrain Clearance Check
The LIDO flight planning system compares a factored engine-out level-off altitude that aircraft are capable of maintaining (based on the maximum en route performance limited weight at the waypoint) to the terrain that is within five nautical miles either side of the flight planned track.
LIDO will produce 3 possible solutions:
- TERRAIN CLEARANCE CHECK - COMPLETED WITH NO LIMITATIONS.
The aircraft can maintain a factored, level-off altitude that is at least 1,000 feet above the terrain. If Driftdown Escape Charts, Decompression/Driftdown Escape Charts or written procedures exist for that area, Flight Crew should refer the applicable chart in the event of a driftdown or decompression scenario.
- TERRAIN CLEARANCE CHECK - TERRAIN CLEARANCE REQUIRES ENROUTE ESCAPE CHARTS.
The check determines that the aircraft will not be able to maintain at least 1,000 feet above the terrain and Driftdown Escape Charts, Decompression/Driftdown Escape Charts or written procedures exist for that area.
For flights where the OFP states that terrain clearance requires escape route charts, the Flight Crew shall confirm that the applicable Driftdown Escape Chart, Decompression/Driftdown Escape Chart or written procedure is available for use during the flight.
- TERRAIN CLEARANCE CHECK-ENRTE ALT 16400 ISA TEMP P14C MTOW LIMITED 080.7 CONTACT FLIGHT DISPATCH FOR MTOW INCREASE.
The check determines that the MTOW has to be reduced to ensure that the aircraft is able to maintain at least 1,000 feet above the terrain.
The MTOW displayed in the OFP Terrain Clearance Check section is equal to the maximum en route performance limited weight plus the fuel burn to that waypoint. Flight Crews shall contact Flight Dispatch if the stated MTOW value is exceeded as a re-route may be required.
If Driftdown Escape Charts, Decompression/Driftdown Escape Charts or written procedures exist for that area, Flight Crew should refer the applicable chart in the event of a driftdown or decompression scenario.
The temperature provides the ISA deviation used to determine the level-off height (e.g., ISA +14). CARS require the Terrain Clearance Check to use a factored engine-out level-off altitude. This factored altitude can be 4,000 to 6,000 feet lower than published QRH engine-out level-off values.
In all cases, the terrain clearance check only examines engine-out driftdown scenarios and does not factor in a decompression event.
Written escape procedures may be in the form of a Company NOTAM on the OFP. Description of Escape Charts or written procedures are contained in Escape Charts - Descent Procedures Over High Terrain 15.1 - Escape Charts - Descent Procedures Over High Terrain.
8.1.6.3 Fuel Categories - ALTN Fuel is based off of?
When an alternate is required, the calculation of OFP ALTN fuel is based on a Cost Index of 0 and the distance the aircraft will travel from the threshold of the planned landing runway at the destination airport to the planned landing runway of the alternate airport via the published SID, enroute, and STAR routing. The vertical profile including the missed approach is considered in calculating fuel requirements.
ALTN Fuel may be consumed without proceeding to the alternate when, in the Pilot-in-Command’s best judgment, the aircraft can be landed safely at the destination airport. In deciding whether to proceed to an alternate or to consume a portion of ALTN in order to land at the destination airport, the Pilot-in-Command should consider the following factors at both destination and alternate airports:
The availability of more than one usable runway; and
Forecast and actual weather; and
Traffic congestion; and
Any other factors that may delay the aircraft’s landing.
Although Alternate Fuel may be consumed for purposes other than those planned for, this fuel must not be consumed routinely. Moreover, when determining fuel requirements at the flight planning stage, Flight Dispatchers and the Pilot-in-Command shall not plan to burn into this fuel.
Whenever any portion of ALTN Fuel is consumed without proceeding to the alternate, Flight Dispatch must be advised as soon as practicable, and an ASR should be filed.
8.2.5.3 Communicating Aircraft Defects
The MEL Preamble details the required Flight Crew action in the event an aircraft defect is discovered.
In all cases (ground and air) it is a CARs requirement that both Flight Dispatch and MOC be made aware of aircraft defects, that affect airworthiness in a timely manner. Flight Dispatch need not be advised of cabin defects unless they are of an airworthiness nature.
If a defect occurs prior to pushback it should be deferred under MEL and an authorization number (also known as a MDDR number - refer to MEL Preamble) obtained by contacting MOC through Flight Dispatch. If the defect cannot be deferred under MEL or requires maintenance action then MOC must be advised so they can make appropriate arrangements. If this occurs at a station where local maintenance is provided by Air Canada personnel, local maintenance may be contacted to conduct the required maintenance action.
After pushback is commenced, all communication with Maintenance shall be with MOC through Flight Dispatch. Direct communication with station maintenance regarding malfunctions or abnormals after pushback or in flight is not permitted.
When airborne, Flight Crews shall report all defects affecting airworthiness directly to MOC by using the ACARS SNAG transaction only. Flight Dispatch is copied on all ACARS messages sent via this method and all subsequent replies. An Aircraft Defect Log entry shall also be made when time permits. Communication with MOC, through Flight Dispatch, can be via VHF, PAL, ACARS, SATCOM, or ARINC.
If convenient to do so, Flight Crews may press the DFDR EVENT button or EVENT RECORD switch, on applicable fleets, whenever an abnormal condition exists. This assists Maintenance in analyzing and troubleshooting faults. If pressed, record this in the SNAG report.
8.2.19 Departure - Briefing Requirements
The following items are to be discussed and/or briefed during pre-flight (in no specific order):
Technical Status (including any relevant MEL items).
Anticipated Aircraft Configuration (e.g., thrust, take-off flap, intended use of automation including when the autopilot will be selected on, anti-ice use, APU, air conditioning pack bleed source, etc.)
AOM SID or Departure procedure.
Threat Identification and Mitigation Briefing. Beginning with the PM, followed by the Relief Pilot and/or Augment Pilot and ending with the PF, each crew member should identify any relevant threats that are anticipated during pushback, taxi, take-off and climb that pertain to their role, as well as strategies to mitigate them.
The Threat Identification and Mitigation Reference Card is intended to assist the Flight Crew in identifying relevant threats to that particular flight. The Threat Identification and Mitigation Reference Card should not be used as a checklist, and no minimum or maximum number of threats must be briefed.
Flight Crews should remain vigilant, identify and communicate any additional threats that may arise.
8.2.24 Emergency Procedures Review + Also who is PF on which days?
On the first flight of each crew cycle, after the Cockpit Check has been completed, the Flight Crew shall conduct an Emergency Procedures Review.
The review shall include:
- Use of the “Continue” Call; and
- Rejected Take-off or Ground Incident; and
- Engine Fail or Fire above V1; and
- Rapid Depressurization and Emergency Descent.
In the correct sequence each flight crew member shall verbalize the actions they are responsible for and touch or point to the applicable controls and indicators. An exception to this would be if the Flight Crew was waiting for a late inbound aircraft, and to prevent or minimize a pushback delay were able to conduct the review prior to entering the flight deck.
During the review assume that the
Captain is flying on odd numbered dates and the FO is flying on even numbered dates
, unless the Captain dictates otherwise.
Augment flight crew members are expected to take an active role during this review.
If an augmenting CRP or ORP joins a crew cycle after the Emergency Procedures Review has been completed a review of the relevant emergencies listed above shall be completed.
To avoid a pushback delay, review of the Rapid Depressurization and Emergency Descent drill may be deferred until the cruise phase of the flight.
It is recommended that all required memory items not reviewed during the Emergency Procedures Review should be reviewed on subsequent portions of the crew cycle.
Other Bulletins (e.g., Chief Pilot Info) may be issued periodically to suggest appropriate topics to be reviewed for a particular period, so that all emergency procedures are covered on an annual basis
8.3.6.1 Park Brake Release Policy and Electronic Signature
- Park Brake Release
The park brake shall not be released prior to the receipt of the LDF and until the ground crew and Flight Crew are ready and pushback or taxi (during open ramp operations) clearance has been received.
The LDF shall be received, reconciled and take-off performance data calculated and entered into the FMS/FMGS prior to park brake release.
- Electronic Signature
Releasing the park brake establishes an electronic signature that:
confirms the Flight Crew’s acceptance of the OFP package; and
confirms completion the Flight Deck security search per 11.4.3.3-Flight Deck Security Checks (if required); and
commences co-authority Flight Watch; and
is an acknowledgement by the Flight Crew they are conversant with all available:
a. ATBs and Operational Bulletins (OPS and EFB-OPS); and
b. AOM, FOM, and Jeppesen Route Manual amendments; and
C. RBN and Jeppesen Route Manual information pertaining to new or unfamiliar routes, countries, or airports, including Group II Pilot-in-Command Familiarization Airports (refer to 5.4.5-Airport Qualification); and
d. The Chief Pilot Info for the type of aircraft being operated.
8.3.11 Tow Forward with Engines Running
During pushback a tow forward with an engine running is not normally allowed. In a situation where an engine must be started at the gate (i.e., unserviceable APU) and airport procedures dictate that a subsequent tow forward is required, the following shall apply:
- Ground crew shall coordinate with the Flight Crew, prior to pushback, when the aircraft will need to be pulled forward and only one engine shall be started; and
- The second engine shall be started, if required, after the aircraft reaches an appropriate stop position and the park brake is set; and
- The ground crew shall ensure:
a. That the heaviest capacity push tractor for aircraft type is used; and
b. The tow forward is to be conducted at the lowest possible speeds; and
C. Turning angles shall be kept to a minimum.
If an unplanned tow forward is required after the pushback has commenced, and the ground crew is not prepared to tow forward, the ground crew will coordinate the stop and request the engine(s) shut down prior to the aircraft being towed forward.
An aircraft shall not be towed onto a gate with an engine running under any circumstances.
8.5.7 Verbal Calls and Actions Prior to and During Take-off
The following items shall be verbalized by the PF prior to take-off if not addressed in the Before Take-Off Checklist:
- V1 and V2 speeds; and
- Initial portion of the ATC clearance, by stating the first heading and initial altitude; and
- Transition Altitude if other than 18,000 ft.
The following are standard calls between the PF and PM during take-off:
- At 80 or 100 KIAS per AOM: PM “80” or “100” and PF “ROGER”; and
- At V1: PM “V1” The PM will observe the speed and complete the call by V1; and
- At VR: PM “ROTATE” The PM will observe the speed and complete the call by VR.
If the 80 or 100 KIAS call is missed the PM will call the actual airspeed speed and the PF will respond “ROGER”.
If during the take-off roll a condition or situation that may affect the safety of flight is observed, it will immediately be called out. If a reject is not required the Pilot-in-Command shall call “Continue”.
8.8.4 Cross Checks between Flight Crew Members
Cross-checks and standard calls shall be made:
- When a clearance is received to a new altitude or flight level; and
- When resetting the altimeter; and
- Passing through 10,000 feet; and
- When setting QNE per 8.8.5 - Altimeter Setting Procedure At Transition Altitude; and
- At 1,000 feet before reaching an assigned altitude or flight level.
An aircraft is cleared from 7,000 feet to FL370 in Canadian Airspace. In this example the autopilot is engaged and the PF sets the altitude selector to FL370. When the autopilot is not engaged, the PM shall set the altitude selector and the PF will confirm.
E.g.;
Altitude Selector Cross Check
PF : Set altitude Selector to FL370 and states “370 set”
PM : Observes altitude Selector and/or FMA for correctness (FL370) and states “Roger, 370”
Altimetry Cross check during climb
At 10,000 > PF “10,000 for 370” > PM “Roger”
Transition Altitude > PF “Standard” > PM “Standard set and cross checked”
At FL360 > PF “360 for 370” > PM “Roger”
Note:
Transition Altitude: the PF and PM shall set their respective altimeter(s) per 8.8.5 - Altimeter Setting Procedure At Transition Altitude and call out the indication displayed in the altimeter setting window as described in the AOM.
The CRP or Augment shall monitor all altitude selections and call any deviations or errors.
Altimeter settings in Europe are quoted in Hectopascals (HPa) which are equivalent to Millibars (mb) (e.g.. 1013.2 HPa equals 1013.2 mb).
Note:
If a required call is delayed, the actual indicated altitude/flight level shall be announced to accomplish the altimetry cross-check.
8.8.5 Altimeter Setting Procedure At Transition Altitude
Transition altitudes from the altimeter setting region to the standard pressure region vary from country to country and require different altimeter setting procedures.
- Canada/United States: When climbing into the standard pressure region, Flight Crew shall normally set standard pressure setting (QNE) immediately after climbing into the standard pressure region. There may be occasions where clearances are given to maintain Flight Levels just above the Transition Altitude. Flight Crew are cautioned that in these situations, it may be necessary to set QNE earlier than normal to prevent a climb above the cleared flight level.
- Outside Canada/United States: Flight Crews shall set standard pressure setting (QNE) on the altimeters immediately when cleared above the Transition Altitude (climbing and cleared to a Flight Level). When the cleared vertical profile has a specific altitude crossing restriction, the altimeter must remain set to the appropriate Altimeter Setting Region (QNH) until the crossing restriction has been satisfied or a revised altitude clearance has been issued.
If an intermediate level off below the Transition Altitude is required, the altimeter shall be reset to QNH. The standard pressure setting (QNE) shall be applied when an unrestricted climb is resumed.
Certain states require the altimeter setting to be changed at specific altitudes or flight levels. These state differences in altimeter setting procedures will be outlined in the Jeppesen 10-10 pages when applicable. (e.g., Australia, Hong Kong, Mexico.)
8.9.9 Reports to Flight Dispatch - Requirements
8.9.9.1 Requirements
Reports shall be made to Flight Dispatch whenever:
- En route or ramp arrival time varies from planned time by more than five minutes, or
- The Pilot-in-Command determines a change is necessary to the OFP en route; or
- Unexpected or significant weather is encountered; or
- A defect has been recorded in the Aircraft Defect Log. ACARS Snag messages are automatically sent to dispatch; or
- If at any point after Top of Climb, the AFOB is less than the MFOB over an OFP waypoint; or
- When position reports are required.
8.9.9.2 Position Reports to Flight Dispatch
1.
General
In order to meet Flight Watch requirements, position reports to Flight Dispatch shall be made starting within two hours of being airborne and then at intervals not greater than two hours for operations that arrive from, or depart to, areas outside Canadian and Continental U.S. Domestic Airspace.
VHF/HF ATC position reports are forwarded to Flight Dispatch from the following FIRs:
a. North Atlantic FIRs (New York, Gander, Shanwick, Iceland, Santa Maria); and
b. Pacific FIRs (Oakland, Nadi, and Fukuoka).
2.
Procedures
a. Position reports to Flight Dispatch are required and shall be sent via ACARS (preferred) or VHF/HF third party when:
Not operating within the FIRs listed above; or
When using CPDLC and/or ADS for ATC position reporting regardless of the area.
b. When operating along the OFP or revised OFP route position reports to Flight Dispatch shall include the following information;
Present position (use a DFM waypoint); and
Time over waypoint and flight level; and
Fuel on-board (FOB); and
Wind direction and speed; and
Wind component, and
Turbulence.
C. When operating on other than an OFP or revised OFP route, in addition to the above the following shall be included:
The present position based on a compulsory reporting point, and
The next compulsory reporting point and estimated time overhead, and
The subsequent waypoint (compulsory or otherwise).
8.13.2 Land and Hold Short (LAHSO)
LAHSO clearance shall not be accepted
8.18.3.2 Flight Procedures - Thunderstorm Avoidance
Avoidance of thunderstorms is the primary method for avoiding the hazards of thunderstorms. Among the methods for avoidance are:
- Circumnavigation: Flight Crews should be aware that weather radar is intended for avoidance only. Areas of steep contour gradients should be avoided by at least twenty miles for all altitudes. Refer to Weather Radar for weather avoidance; or
- On-Top Flight: Flight over the top of thunderstorms is not recommended. If necessary, Flight Crews should clear the tops of thunderstorms clouds by 5,000 feet. If there is a wind above the storm of 100 knots or more, Flight Crews should overfly the storm with a clearance of 10,000 feet. When attempting to overfly a building thunderstorm, Flight Crews should know that storms may grow at a rate of 7,000 feet per minute. Flying above 40,000 feet in an attempt to overfly the cell will put the aircraft in the realm of flight where the range between high speed and low speed buffet onset is quite small. The aircraft may not be able to successfully respond to gusts resulting in a jet upset, or
- Land or Hold: Flight Crews shall consider landing prior to destination or holding clear of thunderstorm activity; or
- Flight Planning: Coordinate flight planning with Flight Dispatch to avoid areas of severe weather. Lightning indicates the strongest areas of convection. In areas where WSI Optima radar coverage is not available, combining lightning, WSI SIGMETS, FPGs and SATrad will provide an indication of the areas of convection.
8.18.3.3 Weather Radar - Thunderstorm Avoidance - Freezing Levels.
the following guidance also applies:
- Avoid amber area echoes whenever possible; and
- Below the freezing level, avoid red area echoes by at least 10 nautical miles; and
- Above the freezing level, avoid red area echoes contoured areas by at least 20 nautical miles; and
- Avoid hooks, scallops, fingers and returns that are rapidly changing in shape by at least the above distances; and
- Select the longer ranges frequently so that weather avoidance can be planned as early as possible. Scan below the freezing level since the return is five times stronger from a liquid than from a solid; and
- When adjusting TILT, adjust by small increments and allow time between adjustments for the sweep to cover the newly selected level; and
- Flight Crews should be aware that the weather radar will not “paint” frozen dry top precipitation such as snow or hail due to low reflectivity. These low reflectivity targets are frequently accompanied by severe turbulence and should be taken into account. For this reason it is not recommended that Flight Crews attempt to over-fly or under-fly storm cells. The top of the precipitation activity is not necessarily the top of the danger area. Dangerous turbulence frequently exists at high altitude significantly above the top of the detectable precipitation; and
- Be aware of the effects of attenuation.
8.18.2.4 Injury Prevention in Turbulence
Light turbulence
°Anticipated/Unanticipated Turbulence:
- Select seat belt sign ON
- If possible, may make announcement
Moderate & Severe turbulence
°Anticipated Turbulence:
Select seat belt sign ON.
Make announcement to Cabin Crew to discontinue service, secure cabin and sit down with seatbelt and harness fastened.
Advise passengers to take their seats and fasten belts, with adequate time prior to onset of turbulence.
Advise In-Charge of anticipated timing.
Advise In-Charge when it is safe to resume duties.
°Unanticipated Turbulence:
Select seat belt sign ON.
Make directive announcement advising Cabin Crew to discontinue service and sit down immediately and for passengers to fasten seat belts (PA should include expected duration of turbulence).
Advise In-Charge when it is safe to resume duties.
8.18.8.1
Take-offs are not authorized in:
- Hail; or
- Heavy ice pellets; or
3 _______________________
- Moderate or heavy freezing rain.
10.2.5.1 Pre-Flight Critical Surface Inspection (CSI)
A CSI is a pre-flight external visual inspection of the aircraft critical surfaces and engines conducted by a flight crew member to determine if the aircraft critical surfaces and engines are contaminated.
This inspection is mandatory prior to flight when the Outside Air Temperature (OAT) is at or below _________ , regardless of the presence of ground icing conditions or visible moisture.
10°C
When determining the contamination state of the aircraft, consideration shall be given to the following:
- The aircraft may have operated in icing conditions; or
- The aircraft may have taxied on contaminated runways and/or taxiways; or
- The aircraft was pre-sprayed at the gate prior to the arrival of the Flight Crew; or
- The aircraft was previously de-iced and/or anti-iced and returned to gate without becoming airborne: or
- The aircraft wings may be cold soaked from extended periods at high altitude.
11.9.2.2 Exiting the Flight Deck - All Aircraft
The person leaving the flight deck shall:
- Ensure there are no passengers in the vicinity of the flight deck door; and
- Open the flight deck door, promptly exit, and close the door; and
- Ensure the door is closed and locked by attempting to open it from the cabin side.
The flight crew member(s) remaining in the flight deck shall ensure the flight deck door annunciator lights are not illuminated.
