Nash Equilibrium Flashcards

1
Q

DEFINITION: Game

A
  • A situation where an outcome arises as the result of interdependent decisions.
  • A game is a situation of strategic decision-making –> Strategy depends on decisions by other players.
  • Theoretically limitless number of players, usually small number
  • Players have different available courses of actions
  • Key: Different combinations of choices lead to different outcomes
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2
Q

Assumptions in standard game theory

A
  • Complete Information (Courses of actions, possible outcomes. which action combinations lead to which outcomes. all payoffs associated with the different outcomes)
  • Rationality (maximization of utility)
  • Common knowledge of rationality (I know, that the other one is rational and the other one knows..)

–> Goal of game theory is to model, not to give you advice

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3
Q

Pareto-inferior outcomes

A
  • Can make both better off by moving to a different (Pareto-superior) outcome
  • Can make one player better off and keep the other player’s payoff the same
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4
Q

Pareto-efficiency

A

No other outcome is Pareto-superior (Impossible, by switching to another outcome, to make one player better off without making the other player worse off)

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5
Q

Strictly Dominant strategy

A

Yields a strictly greater payoff than all other strategies regardless of the other players’ strategies

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6
Q

Weakly Dominant strategy

A

Best possible response among others

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7
Q

DEFINTION: Nash Equilibrium

A

Doing the best I can given what you are doing and vice versa (Mutual best responses)

–> Any equilibrium in dominant strategies is a NE but not vice versa

–> often, games have more than one NE, sometimes they have many

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8
Q

Assumptions Nash Equilibrium

A
  • Rationality and common knowledge of rationality
  • Ability to think strategically (.e., to put oneself in the other player’s shoes)
  • Belief that other player play’s Nash Equilibrium as well
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9
Q

Nash Equilibrium vs. Normal Equilibrium

A

NE: I’m doing the best I can given what you are doing and vice versa

Normal Equilibrium: I’m doing the best no matter what you are doing and vice versa

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10
Q

Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IEWDS)

A

Every IEWDS solution is a NE but not vice versa

–> Look if any rows / columns are dominated by any other and cross out step-by-step

Problem: Order of elimination can matter

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11
Q

NE with 3 Players

A

Player 1 & 2 as usual

Player 3 compare each cell from the first table with the second table to find the better value and underline this

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12
Q

DEFINITON: Common Consequence Effect

A
  • If you have a gamble with safe outcome (p=1), players tend to prefer this one compared to gambles with small chance of getting nothing, even though the latter game has higher EV
  • If you have two gambles, where nothing is safe, players tend to choose the one with higher EV

–> If there is a safe alternative, this is preferred (loss is weighted higher than gain)

–> If there is no safe alternative, higher EV is prefered

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13
Q

Having reached a Nash Equilibrium means that…

A

… no individual player has any reason to switch his or her strategy unilaterally

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14
Q

The guessing game

A
  • bounded rationality prevents players from fully reasoning their way to the equilibrium
  • Rational players reckon that other players are boundedly rational and best-respond to the behavior they expect from other players
  • Multiple possibiites for anticipation of other players actions

–> significant divergence in results

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15
Q

Level-k Model

A
  • Level 0: “It all looks quite random, so I’ll just guess”
  • Level 1: “I think that most people won’t have a clue what to choose and so the average number will be around 50. Two-third of that would be 33.”
  • Level 2: “Assuming that everyone thinks the average will be 50 based on random probability, I expect most choices to be located around 33. I am going to choose two-third of that, 22.”

Level 0: Uninformed random play
Level k: Best responding to level (k-1)
NE at level ∞

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16
Q
A