More Missed Questions Flashcards
A gardener entered a garden center during regular business hours. He intended to steal some heirloom parsley plants for his garden. He noticed a display of regular parsley plants at the back of the store, but mistakenly believed they were a very valuable type of heirloom parsley. When no one was looking, he took two small parsley plants from the sales display, put them under his sweatshirt, and left the store.
At the register, there was a sign that advertised, “Like parsley? We like it so much that we grew more than we need this season! Today only, we are offering each visitor two free parsley plants from our surplus!” The gardener never saw the sign.
Burglary in the jurisdiction is defined as “entering any building unlawfully with the intent to commit a crime.” The jurisdiction follows the common-law definition of larceny. The following crimes are listed in descending order of seriousness.
Which is the most serious crime(s) of which the gardener may be convicted?
Attempted larceny only.
However, the gardener can be convicted of attempt, which occurs when a person:
- has the specific intent to commit a crime (here, larceny)
- acts in furtherance of that crime (by taking and leaving the store with two parsley plants) but
- does not complete it (the plants were free, so no larceny occurred).
Burglary requires proof that a person unlawfully entered a building, so a person cannot burglarize a building by entering an area that is open to the public at the time. And larceny requires a trespassory taking, so a person cannot commit larceny by taking property freely given by another—even if the person was unaware of this fact. However, this factually impossibility would not absolve the person of attempted larceny.
A man who worked nights was unable to sleep during the day because of the persistent barking of a neighbor’s dog. Despite repeated requests to the neighbor to address the problem, the barking persisted. The man decided to purchase a pistol to kill the dog. Unfamiliar with firearms, the man bought a pistol but accidentally bought blank ammunition. Standing in his own yard, the man fired several shots at the barking dog that was about 10 feet away in his neighbor’s yard, thinking he was firing real bullets. The dog was unharmed because the blanks were incapable of inflicting harm.
In the applicable jurisdiction, malicious destruction of property is a statutory crime. The highest court of this jurisdiction has ruled that this statutory crime requires the reckless destruction, injury, or defacement of the property of another.
Is the man likely to be found guilty of attempted malicious destruction of property?
Yes, because the man was unaware that the blank bullets would not harm the dog.
Here, the man formed the specific intent to kill the neighbor’s dog. To do so, the man purchased a pistol and fired it at the dog (acts). And though it was factually impossible for the man to kill the dog—because he unknowingly bought blanks—this is no defense to attempt. Therefore, the man is likely to be found guilty of attempted malicious destruction of property.
A defendant is guilty of an attempted crime if he/she (1) had the specific intent to commit a crime, (2) performed an act in furtherance of that crime, but (3) did not complete it. Factual impossibility is no defense to attempt.
Factual impossibility—i.e., the existence of an unknown condition that makes the unlawful objective impossible to complete—is never a defense to conspiracy.
A man was married to his childhood sweetheart, but after 20 years of marriage, they were no longer in love and the man took a mistress. One day, the man’s wife disappeared. Two months later, believing his wife to be dead, the man married his mistress at the local courthouse. However, the wife was not dead but had merely been visiting her sister abroad. When the wife returned home, she found the man married to the mistress. The man told the wife that because their religion required polygamy, being married to two women was his religious duty. The wife disagreed and subsequently reported the man to the police.
Will the man likely be convicted of bigamy?
Therefore, the man will likely be convicted of bigamy.
Bigamy is a strict liability offense that arises from the voluntary act of marrying someone while still legally married to someone else. Here, the man committed bigamy when he voluntarily married the mistress while still married to the wife. Although he mistakenly believed that the wife was dead, that mistake of fact is no defense to this strict liability crime
Mistake of fact is a defense to specific intent and general intent crimes, but it is never a defense to strict liability crimes like bigamy—i.e., the voluntary act of marrying someone while still legally married to another.
What are specific intent crimes for the MBE?
Specific intent refers to a mental state where the defendant has an objective or purpose to bring about a particular result. It requires that the defendant intended not only to commit the act but also to achieve a specific outcome or result from that act. Specific intent is often required for crimes where proving the defendant’s precise mental state at the time of the crime is essential.
Specific intent crimes for the MBE include:
- First-degree murder
- Inchoate offenses (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy)
- Assault
- Larceny
- Embezzlement
- False pretenses
- Robbery
- Burglary
- Forgery
What are general intent crimes for the MBE?
General intent refers to the intention to perform the physical act itself, without needing to prove that the defendant intended the specific result of the act. It requires that the defendant acted voluntarily and knowingly, but it does not require an intent to cause a particular outcome. General intent crimes focus on the defendant’s actions rather than their purpose or desire to achieve a specific result.
General intent crimes for the MBE include:
- Battery
- Rape
- Kidnapping
- False imprisonment
What are strict liability crimes for the MBE?
Strict liability crimes for the MBE include:
- Statutory rape
- Selling alcohol to minors
- Bigamy (in some jurisdictions)
- Traffic offenses
What type of intent is required for common law murder on the MBE?
Common law murder requires malice aforethought, which can be demonstrated through:
1. Intent to kill
2. Intent to inflict serious bodily harm
3. Reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life (depraved heart)
4. Intent to commit a felony (felony murder rule)
A woman suffered from a debilitating disease, and her husband convinced her that having sexual intercourse with him would cure the disease. The husband knew that his statement was false. Relying on this statement, the woman gave her consent, and the two had sexual intercourse. Later, the woman learned that intercourse could not and did not cure her disease, and she notified the police.
Rape is statutorily defined in this jurisdiction as “sexual intercourse with a female against her will.” The husband was convicted of rape.
If the husband appeals the conviction, how should the appellate court rule on the appeal?
Reverse the conviction, because the intercourse was not against the woman’s will.
Fraud in factum occurs when the fraud pertains to the nature of the act itself and negates a rape victim’s consent. In contrast, fraud in the inducement occurs when fraud is used to gain consent to what the victim knows is an act of sexual intercourse and does not negate the victim’s consent.
You chose: Affirm the conviction, because the husband obtained the woman’s consent through fraudulent means.
Rape is a general intent crime requiring only the intent to perform the unlawful act—i.e., to have intercourse without the alleged victim’s consent. In contrast, specific intent crimes require the intent to perform the unlawful act to accomplish a prohibited result.
A woman’s husband told her that he was divorcing her, leaving the woman distraught. The woman and her sister decided to burn down the husband’s new house while he was at work. The next day, the woman and her sister purchased the necessary supplies and drove to the husband’s house. The sister waited in the car and served as a lookout while the woman started the fire. They then drove off to avoid being noticed. Although the woman and her sister believed that the husband was at work, in fact he had stayed home sick, and he was killed in the fire. The woman and her sister were arrested and charged with both arson and felony murder.
May the woman and her sister be convicted of both arson and felony murder?
The woman and her sister may be convicted of arson OR felony murder, but not both.
Felony murder is an unintended killing that is proximately caused by and occurs during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony—e.g., arson, which is the malicious burning of another’s dwelling. In a majority of jurisdictions, the underlying felony is deemed a lesser-included offense of felony murder. As a result, when a defendant is convicted of felony murder, the underlying felony merges into that conviction—meaning that a defendant cannot be convicted of both the underlying felony and felony murder.
An accomplice is liable to the same extent as the principal for the encouraged crime (arson) and any crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of the accomplice’s conduct (felony murder)
Robbery elements
Robbery requires proof of three elements:
- The defendant committed larceny—i.e., a trespassory taking and carrying away of a victim’s personal property with the specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of that property.
- The property was taken from the victim’s person or in the victim’s presence.
- The taking was accomplished by force or intimidation.
A motion to suppress should be granted if the contested evidence was seized during an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search. A search is unreasonable if it was conducted without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.
One such exception is a search incident to arrest. This exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a person who has been lawfully arrested and the immediate surrounding areas for concealed weapons or destructible evidence. Here, after the defendant was lawfully arrested, the police conducted a thorough search of the apartment and found cocaine in his bedroom. Since the search went beyond areas immediately surrounding the defendant, this exception does not apply.
Another exception applies to exigent circumstances, under which police may act without a warrant when there is an immediate threat of harm to police or the public. It allows police to conduct a protective sweep to search for injured persons and continued threats. They also can seize illegal items that are in plain view. But once the emergency ends, the search must end unless the police obtain a warrant or another exception applies.
Exceptions to warrant requirement
* Search incident to arrest
* Administrative search
* Stop and frisk
* Plain view
* Automobile exception
* Consent
* Exigent circumstance
* Special government purpose
Mnemonic: SAD SPACES
Police may conduct a warrantless search incident to an arrest of the arrestee and the immediate surrounding areas. And the exigent-circumstances exception allows police to conduct a protective sweep to search for injured persons and continued threats.
While on patrol one night, two officers noticed the car of a known drug dealer in the drive-through lane of a fast-food restaurant. Based on prior discussions with informants, the officers had probable cause to believe that the drug dealer had drugs in his vehicle since he regularly made drug deliveries from the trunk of his car. Noticing that the drug dealer’s headlight was out, the officers pulled him over once he left the restaurant and searched his car. The officers did not find any evidence of drugs, but they did find several illegal weapons in the trunk.
Did the officers’ seizure of the weapons violate the drug dealer’s Fourth Amendment rights?
No, as a valid application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. Officers can search any area within the vehicle where the evidence might be located, including the trunk and locked containers.
You chose an attractive wrong answer: Under the automobile exception, a search is not limited to areas that the driver can access. This limitation is present only when there is a search incident to a lawful arrest (not seen here).
A grand jury is investigating a corporation for tax fraud. The grand jury subpoenaed several types of corporate records, including emails from several of the corporation’s officers and other business papers. The subpoena was served on the corporation’s chief operating officer (COO), who acted as the custodian of the corporate records. The business papers would implicate several members of the corporation, including the COO, in criminal misconduct. Further, many of the emails written by the COO contained statements about the officers of some of the corporation’s competitors; these statements were defamatory and would likely result in civil liability if they were released. The COO filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that being forced to turn over these corporate records would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Should the court grant the COO’s motion?
You arrived at the correct answer for the wrong reasons. Look at this one again
No as to both the emails and the business papers.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects suspects in criminal proceedings from being compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence that is testimonial in nature—e.g., via a grand jury subpoena (as seen here). However, this privilege does not apply to evidence that might subject a person to civil liability. Therefore, the court should deny the COO’s motion to quash as to the emails that would subject the COO to civil liability for defamation.
Additionally, the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to individuals—not corporations. This means that when a corporation is the target of an investigation (as seen here), the custodian of corporate records (or other corporate officer) cannot refuse to produce subpoenaed documents by citing this privilege. This is true even if the documents would incriminate the custodian (or officer) personally.
Following the armed robbery of a local bank, the police identified the defendant as a suspect and brought him to the police station for questioning. As soon as they sat down in the interrogation room, the police read the defendant his Miranda rights. The defendant noted that “this seems like the kind of thing where you should have a lawyer.” The police responded that the defendant had that right. The defendant noted that he “didn’t even know a good lawyer” and dropped the issue. In response to each question, the defendant simply repeated, “I don’t know anything about it.” Frustrated, the police discontinued questioning after an hour and left the defendant in the interrogation room alone. Three hours later, the police returned and, without repeating the Miranda warnings, told the defendant that his best friend, who was also a suspect, had already told them all about the robbery and the defendant’s involvement. In fact, the police were searching for the defendant’s best friend to bring him in for questioning but had not been able to locate him. The defendant immediately blurted out, “It was all his idea. I didn’t even want to rob that bank.”
What is the defendant’s best argument that his statement was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights?
The defendant did not receive fresh Miranda warnings after the break in questioning.
Police must protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by informing the suspect of his/her Miranda rights (e.g., the right to an attorney) prior to a custodial interrogation. The suspect may then choose to specifically and unambiguously invoke those rights (not seen here) (Choice D). Alternatively, the suspect who understand his/her Miranda rights may waive those rights by voluntarily speaking to the police (as seen here).
However, when the interrogation of a suspect who has waived his/her Miranda rights is stopped for a long duration, police should re-Mirandize the suspect prior to resuming the interrogation. That is because the passage of time can possibly invalidate the suspect’s earlier waiver, rendering any incriminating information obtained after the break in interrogation inadmissible. Therefore, the defendant’s best argument is that he did not receive fresh Miranda warnings after the break in questioning.
A defendant was arrested and charged with robbery. While he was awaiting trial, an inmate in the jail in which he was housed was assaulted, and the police suspected that the defendant was involved. They brought the defendant in for questioning about the assault and provided him with Miranda warnings. The defendant said that he was willing to talk and did not ask for his attorney. He proceeded to tell the police that he had provided another inmate with information about how to obtain a weapon and believed that inmate had been involved in the assault. The defendant was later charged as a co-conspirator in the assault and sought to suppress his statement to the police. He argued that his attorney should have been present during the interrogation.
Is the defendant’s statement likely to be suppressed?
No, because the defendant did not specifically invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
The Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in two places—the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel applies when a suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings. However, this right is not automatic. A suspect must invoke this right by making a specific, unambiguous statement requesting counsel. If the suspect does not do so and answers questions after being Mirandized, then this right is waived.
In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches automatically upon the commencement of judicial proceedings and applies at all critical stages of prosecution. However, this right applies only to the specific offense(s) at issue in those proceedings—not to other crimes in which judicial proceedings have yet to commence. And though this right can be waived, a waiver cannot occur until the right has attached.
What is the function of a grand jury?
In United States v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. That is because the grand jury’s function is merely to determine whether enough evidence exists to bring a criminal charge—not to determine guilt or innocence. Accordingly, the grand jury need only hear evidence that supports the prosecutor’s side.
When may a peremptory challenge be sustained?
A peremptory challenge is an objection to a potential juror that can be raised without any reason or explanation during the jury-selection process. However, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause prohibits striking potential jurors based solely on their race, ethnicity, or sex. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test to determine if the use of a peremptory challenge was discriminatory. That test employs the following burden-shifting scheme:
The moving party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination (e.g., the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike only nonwhite jurors).
The party who exercised the peremptory challenge must then provide a neutral reason for the peremptory challenge (e.g., the strikes were based on age, not race).
If it does so, then the burden shifts back to the moving party to prove that the other party’s reason was pretextual (e.g., the prosecution struck a 21-year-old black man but not a 21-year-old white man).
Two police officers responded to a domestic-disturbance call. When the officers arrived at the home in question, they found a man and a woman screaming at each other in the front yard. One officer took the man aside, while the other spoke with the woman. The woman told the officer that she had a restraining order against the man and that he was a convicted felon who often carried a gun. The officers confirmed the restraining order and placed the man under arrest, without giving him Miranda warnings. While the man was in the back of the police car, an officer asked the man if he owned a gun. The man replied that he always keeps a gun in his car for self-protection. The officer then retrieved the gun from the man’s car, which was parked nearby.
The man was later charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. At trial, the man moved to suppress his statement about always having a gun and the gun itself, arguing that he did not receive Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by the officer.
Is the man likely to succeed in having the evidence suppressed?
Yes, as to the statement only.
A suspect’s incriminating statement during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings cannot be used against the suspect at a subsequent trial. However, physical evidence obtained as a result of the non-Mirandized statement is admissible so long as that statement was not coerced.
The Fifth Amendment requires that police provide a suspect with Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation. A custodial interrogation occurs when a defendant is in custody (e.g., under formal arrest) and subjected to interrogation. When, as here, the police fail to provide Miranda warnings, an incriminating statement made as the result of the custodial interrogation can be suppressed at a subsequent trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that physical evidence obtained as a result of a non-Mirandized statement is admissible so long as that statement was voluntary (i.e., not coerced). A statement was coerced if it was the product of physical force, threats, or psychological pressure by police.
A state adopted a “three-strikes” law imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years upon conviction of a third felony. Subsequently, an individual committed and was convicted of two felonies, for which he served a total of ten years in prison. After being released, the individual committed a third felony, which by itself carries a minimum penalty of two years in prison.
If the state seeks to apply the “three-strikes” law to the individual upon his conviction for the third felony, what is the most likely result?
The law will be upheld.
The Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. However, in Witte v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of a defendant’s prior convictions to enhance the sentence imposed for a current conviction does not violate the double jeopardy clause.
That is because the enhancement does not impose an additional punishment for the first two crimes. Instead, it imposes a stiffer punishment for a new crime to deter repeat offenders from committing additional crimes in the future. Therefore, the law will not be overturned on double jeopardy grounds
Due process requires that any fact (e.g., aggravating circumstances) that exposes a criminal defendant to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict is an element that must be submitted to and decided by the jury.
A defendant was charged with both battery and robbery of a victim. The defendant was found guilty of battery but acquitted of the robbery charge. Subsequently, the victim died from the injuries inflicted by the defendant. The defendant has been charged with felony murder of the victim. The defendant has moved for dismissal of this charge on double jeopardy grounds.
How is the court likely to rule on this motion?
Grant the motion, because the defendant was acquitted of robbery.
Felony murder is an unintentional killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. A proper conviction for felony murder requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed the underlying felony. Robbery—i.e., the unlawful taking and carrying away of personal property from the victim by force or intimidation—is an inherently dangerous felony upon which a felony-murder charge can be based.
However, a felony-murder prosecution predicated upon an underlying felony for which the defendant was acquitted in a previous trial (as seen here) is improper. That is because such a prosecution would require retrying the underlying felony in violation of the double jeopardy clause—which prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense.