Moral Realism

Question 1

What is moral realism?

Answer 1

A moral realist believs that moral facts are mind independant, objectiv and univerrsal.

Question 2

Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism

Answer 2

Cognitivists believe that moral statements are either true or false; truth-apt about the world, and aim to describe the external world.Non cognitivists believe that moral statements are neither true or false; not truth-apt and rather express emotions/attitudes/values about the external world.

Question 3

Moral naturalism

Answer 3

1) Ontological: Moral properties are reducible to natural/physical properties. 2) Epistomological: They can be investigated emprically through science/sense-data), they arre not decided upon. Moral naturalism looks at the way the qorld is, and draws conclusion on the humans ought to act.

Question 4

Naturalistic fallacy

Answer 4

The naturalistic fallacy is the mistake of thinking that good is reducable to another porperty like pleasure/happiness. Moore argues that good is a simple and undefinable property. Like yellow, it cannot be explained in simpler terms. You cant describe yellow or good to someone who doesnt know what it is.

Question 5

Naturalistic forms of Utilitarianism

Answer 5

Benthams act utilitarianism says that a good act brings about the greatest amount of happiness for the most amount of people. Under this view good/bad is reducible to pleasure/pain, which are natural properties.

Question 6

Naturalistic forms of virtue ethics

Answer 6

The function argument derives an oughtstatement from an is statement. For example: Rationality is distinctive to humans, so a good human is one who can act accordingly to rational principles.

Question 7

Moore’s open question arguemnt

Answer 7

A closed question has one possible answer and is certain in principle; it is reducible to another term. An open question doesnt have a definite answer.

Question 8

Moral non naturalism

Answer 8

Moral non naturalists believe that moral properties are not reducible to natural/physical properties, and therefore cannit be investigated empirically

Question 9

Intuitionalism

Answer 9

Moore says that we cannot prove or demonstrate thag soemthing is good, we intuit it with a moral sense. Key views: moral realist, cognitivist, non-naturalist and intuition.

Question 10

Issue including:

Humes’s Fork

Answer 10

The two ways we can reason: -Relations of ideas: Analytic, know a priori, neccesary truths.
- Matters of fact: contingent, known a prosteriori, contingently true.
Moral claims do not count as knowledge as they fit neither category; therefore moral properties cant be real, and moral facts cant be true or false.

Question 11

Ayers verification principle

Answer 11

Statements are meaningful if they can be verified in one of two ways: 1) Analytically - true by definition or 2) Empirically - through science/sense-data. Strong verification must have empirical evidence and for weak it is enough to have evidence that it is probably true. Moral statemnts cannot describe the world, rather they experess a view on whether we approve/disagree of an action.

Question 12

Issue including:

Ayer’s verification principle

Answer 12

It may be self-defeating as the verification principle itself cannot be verified in wither way, so cannot be meaningful. We could argue that it is an example of weak verification as it seems to work well in identifying meaningful statements.

Question 13

Issue including:

Hume’s argument that moral judgements are not beliefs

Answer 13

A belief is to say that we are committed to the view that the claim is either true or false. Reasons on their own are inert, it our passions which cause us to make these judgments. Moral judgments motivate us to act, belief and reasoning do not. Therefore, moral judgments are not reasoned beliefs.

Question 14

Issue including:

Hume’s is-ought gap

Answer 14

There is not justification to say that just because soemthing is, that it ought to be that way. Searle derives an ought from an is, using the example of a promise, as you are then obligated to fulfil it. However, some argue that there is a hidden ought statment so the gap remains.

Question 15

Mackie’s argument from relativity

Answer 15

Example: There are moral differences in cultures, and there are two explintions: 1) moral values reflect values of the culture, or 2) moral values are mind-independant, some cultures just percieve them better.
Options 1 is simpler and therefore more likely, which makes it unliekly that moral facts are mind-independant, so moral realism is fake.

Question 16

Mackie’s queerness arguement

Answer 16

Moral realism caims that moral facts are mind-independant, moral facts motivate us to act. A mind-independant moral fact that could motivate us to act would be of “some strange sort”. We could learn about moral facts that motivate us by “some special faculty of moral intuition”. It is reasonable to conclude that there are no mind-independant moral facts.

Question 17

Issue including:

Queerness arguments responses

Answer 17

Moral realists could say that other types of knowledge are stange too, like math, causation and other minds. These things seem to go beyong our experience. Mackie would respons by refering to the motivational problem.