MODULE 28 - CERTIFICATION EXAM PREPARATION Flashcards
Regulatory compliance may require documentation, and this documentation may be inspected by authorities in the event of a public investigation.
Regulatory compliance may require documentation, and this documentation may be inspected by authorities in the event of a public investigation.
NIST Special Publication 800-86
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response is a valuable resource for organizations that require guidance in developing digital forensics plans.
For example, it recommends that forensics be performed using the four-phase process.
NIST Special Publication 800-86
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response is a valuable resource for organizations that require guidance in developing digital forensics plans.
For example, it recommends that forensics be performed using the four-phase process.
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process STEP 1
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
STEP 1 :
COLLECTION :
This is the identification of potential sources of forensic data and acquisition, handling, and storage of that data.
This stage is critical because special care must be taken not to damage, lose, or omit important data.
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process STEP 2
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
STEP 2 :
EXAMINATION :
This entails assessing and extracting relevant information from the collected data.
This may involve decompression or decryption of the data. Information that is irrelevant to the investigation may need to be removed.
Identifying actual evidence in large collections of data can be very difficult and time-consuming.
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process STEP 3
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
STEP 3 :
ANALYSIS :
This entails drawing conclusions from the data.
Salient features, such as people, places, times, events, and so on should be documented.
This step may also involve the correlation of data from multiple sources.
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process STEP 4
The Digital Evidence Forensic Process..
https://snipboard.io/mD1asv.jpg
STEP 1 - COLLECTION
STEP 2 - EXAMINATION
STEP 3 - ANALYSIS STEP 4 - REPORTING
STEP 4 :
REPORTING :
This entails preparing and presenting information that resulted from the analysis.
Reporting should be impartial and alternative explanations should be offered if appropriate.
Limitations of the analysis and problems encountered should be included.
Suggestions for further investigation and next steps should also be made.
Types of Evidence
Best evidence Corroborating evidence Indirect evidence
Types of Evidence
Best evidence Corroborating evidence Indirect evidence
Types of Evidence :
BEST EVIDENCE
evidence that is in its original state.
This evidence could be storage devices used by an accused, or archives of files that can be proven to be unaltered.
Types of Evidence :
BEST EVIDENCE
evidence that is in its original state.
This evidence could be storage devices used by an accused, or archives of files that can be proven to be unaltered.
Types of Evidence :
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
This is evidence that supports an assertion that is developed from best evidence.
Types of Evidence :
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
This is evidence that supports an assertion that is developed from best evidence.
Types of Evidence :
INDIRECT EVIDENCE
This is evidence that, in combination with other facts, establishes a hypothesis.
This is also known as circumstantial evidence.
For example, evidence that an individual has committed similar crimes can support the assertion that the person committed the crime of which they are accused.
Types of Evidence :
INDIRECT EVIDENCE
This is evidence that, in combination with other facts, establishes a hypothesis.
This is also known as circumstantial evidence.
For example, evidence that an individual has committed similar crimes can support the assertion that the person committed the crime of which they are accused.
Evidence Collection Order IETF RFC 3227
provides guidelines for the collection of digital evidence.
It describes an order for the collection of digital evidence based on the volatility of the data.
Data stored in RAM is the most volatile, and it will be lost when the device is turned off.
In addition, important data in volatile memory could be overwritten by routine machine processes.
Therefore, the collection of digital evidence should begin with the most volatile evidence and proceed to the least volatile:
https://snipboard.io/2MTuNn.jpg
An example of most volatile to least volatile evidence collection order:
1) Memory registers, caches
2) Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics, RAM
3) Temporary file systems
4) Non-volatile media, fixed and removable
5) Remote logging and monitoring data
6) Physical interconnections and topologies
7) Archival media, tape or other backups
An example of most volatile to least volatile evidence collection order:
1) Memory registers, caches
2) Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics, RAM
3) Temporary file systems
4) Non-volatile media, fixed and removable
5) Remote logging and monitoring data
6) Physical interconnections and topologies
7) Archival media, tape or other backups
Details of the systems from which the evidence was collected including who has access to those systems and at what level of permissions should be recorded.
Such details should include hardware and software configurations for the systems from which the data was obtained.
Details of the systems from which the evidence was collected including who has access to those systems and at what level of permissions should be recorded.
Such details should include hardware and software configurations for the systems from which the data was obtained.
Chain of custody involves the collection, handling, and secure storage of evidence.
Detailed records should be kept of the following:
Who discovered and collected the evidence?
All details about the handling of evidence including times, places, and personnel involved.
Who has primary responsibility for the evidence, when responsibility was assigned, and when custody changed?
Who has physical access to the evidence while it was stored?
Access should be restricted to only the most essential personnel.
Chain of custody involves the collection, handling, and secure storage of evidence.
Detailed records should be kept of the following:
Who discovered and collected the evidence?
All details about the handling of evidence including times, places, and personnel involved.
Who has primary responsibility for the evidence, when responsibility was assigned, and when custody changed?
Who has physical access to the evidence while it was stored?
Access should be restricted to only the most essential personnel.
When collecting data it is important that it is preserved in its original condition.
When collecting data it is important that it is preserved in its original condition.
Timestamping of files should be preserved.
For this reason, the original evidence should be copied, and analysis should only be conducted on copies of the original.
This is to avoid accidental loss or alteration of the evidence.
Because timestamps may be part of the evidence, opening files from the original media should be avoided.
Timestamping of files should be preserved.
For this reason, the original evidence should be copied, and analysis should only be conducted on copies of the original.
This is to avoid accidental loss or alteration of the evidence.
Because timestamps may be part of the evidence, opening files from the original media should be avoided.
The process used to create copies of the evidence that is used in the investigation should be recorded.
Whenever possible, the copies should be direct bit-level copies of the original storage volumes.
It should be possible to compare the archived disc image and the investigated disk image to identify whether the contents of the investigated disk have been tampered with.
For this reason, it is important to archive and protect the original disk to keep it in its original, untampered with, condition.
The process used to create copies of the evidence that is used in the investigation should be recorded.
Whenever possible, the copies should be direct bit-level copies of the original storage volumes.
It should be possible to compare the archived disc image and the investigated disk image to identify whether the contents of the investigated disk have been tampered with.
For this reason, it is important to archive and protect the original disk to keep it in its original, untampered with, condition.
Volatile memory could contain forensic evidence, so special tools should be used to preserve that evidence before the device is shut down and evidence is lost.
Users should not disconnect, unplug, or turn off infected machines unless explicitly told to do so by security personnel.
Following these processes will ensure that any evidence of wrongdoing will be preserved, and any indicators of compromise can be identified.
Volatile memory could contain forensic evidence, so special tools should be used to preserve that evidence before the device is shut down and evidence is lost.
Users should not disconnect, unplug, or turn off infected machines unless explicitly told to do so by security personnel.
Following these processes will ensure that any evidence of wrongdoing will be preserved, and any indicators of compromise can be identified.
Threat attribution refers to the act of determining the individual, organization, or nation responsible for a successful intrusion or attack incident.
Threat attribution refers to the act of determining the individual, organization, or nation responsible for a successful intrusion or attack incident.
Identifying responsible threat actors should occur through the principled and systematic investigation of the evidence
Identifying responsible threat actors should occur through the principled and systematic investigation of the evidence
In an evidence-based investigation, the incident response team correlates Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that were used in the incident with other known exploits.
In an evidence-based investigation, the incident response team correlates Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that were used in the incident with other known exploits.
Threat intelligence sources can help to map the TTP identified by an investigation to known sources of similar attacks.
However, this highlights a problem with threat attribution.
Evidence of cybercrime is seldom direct evidence.
Identifying commonalities between TTPs for known and unknown threat actors is circumstantial evidence.
Threat intelligence sources can help to map the TTP identified by an investigation to known sources of similar attacks.
However, this highlights a problem with threat attribution.
Evidence of cybercrime is seldom direct evidence.
Identifying commonalities between TTPs for known and unknown threat actors is circumstantial evidence.
Some aspects of a threat that can aid in attribution are the location of originating hosts or domains, features of the code used in malware, the tools used, and other techniques.
Sometimes, at the national security level, threats cannot be openly attributed because doing so would expose methods and capabilities that need to be protected.
Some aspects of a threat that can aid in attribution are the location of originating hosts or domains, features of the code used in malware, the tools used, and other techniques.
Sometimes, at the national security level, threats cannot be openly attributed because doing so would expose methods and capabilities that need to be protected.
For internal threats, asset management plays a major role.
Uncovering the devices from which an attack was launched can lead directly to the threat actor.
IP addresses, MAC addresses, and DHCP logs can help track the addresses used in the attack back to a specific device.
AAA logs are very useful in this regard, as they track who accessed what network resources at what time.
For internal threats, asset management plays a major role.
Uncovering the devices from which an attack was launched can lead directly to the threat actor.
IP addresses, MAC addresses, and DHCP logs can help track the addresses used in the attack back to a specific device.
AAA logs are very useful in this regard, as they track who accessed what network resources at what time.
One way to attribute an attack is to model threat actor behavior.
One way to attribute an attack is to model threat actor behavior.
The MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) Framework enables the ability to detect attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as part of threat defense and attack attribution.
This is done by mapping the steps in an attack to a matrix of generalized tactics and describing the techniques that are used in each tactic.
The MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) Framework enables the ability to detect attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as part of threat defense and attack attribution.
This is done by mapping the steps in an attack to a matrix of generalized tactics and describing the techniques that are used in each tactic.
Tactics consist of the technical goals that an attacker must accomplish in order to execute an attack and techniques are the means by which the tactics are accomplished.
Tactics consist of the technical goals that an attacker must accomplish in order to execute an attack and techniques are the means by which the tactics are accomplished.
procedures are the specific actions taken by threat actors in the techniques that have been identified.
Procedures are the documented real-world use of techniques by threat actors.
procedures are the specific actions taken by threat actors in the techniques that have been identified.
Procedures are the documented real-world use of techniques by threat actors.
The MITRE ATT&CK Framework is a global knowledge base of threat actor behavior.
It is based on observation and analysis of real-world exploits with the purpose of describing the behavior of the attacker, not the attack itself.
It is designed to enable automated information sharing by defining data structures for the exchange of information between its community of users and MITRE.
The MITRE ATT&CK Framework is a global knowledge base of threat actor behavior.
It is based on observation and analysis of real-world exploits with the purpose of describing the behavior of the attacker, not the attack itself.
It is designed to enable automated information sharing by defining data structures for the exchange of information between its community of users and MITRE.
MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for a Ransomware Exploit
https://snipboard.io/OCE1B0.jpg
MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for a Ransomware Exploit
https://snipboard.io/OCE1B0.jpg
The Cyber Kill Chain was developed by Lockheed Martin to identify and prevent cyber intrusions.
The Cyber Kill Chain was developed by Lockheed Martin to identify and prevent cyber intrusions.
HOW MANY STEPS ARE THERE TO THE CYBER KILL CHAIN?
7
HOW MANY STEPS ARE THERE TO THE CYBER KILL CHAIN?
7
Focusing on Cyber Kill Chain steps helps analysts understand the techniques, tools, and procedures of threat actors.
Focusing on Cyber Kill Chain steps helps analysts understand the techniques, tools, and procedures of threat actors.
When responding to a security incident the objective is to detect and stop the attack as early as possible in the kill chain progression.
The earlier the attack is stopped; the less damage is done and the less the attacker learns about the target network.
When responding to a security incident the objective is to detect and stop the attack as early as possible in the kill chain progression.
The earlier the attack is stopped; the less damage is done and the less the attacker learns about the target network.
The Cyber Kill Chain specifies what an attacker must complete to accomplish their goal.
https://snipboard.io/eUECVy.jpg
The Cyber Kill Chain specifies what an attacker must complete to accomplish their goal.
https://snipboard.io/eUECVy.jpg
If the attacker is stopped at any stage OF Cyber Kill Chain the chain of attack is broken.
Breaking the chain means the defender successfully thwarted the threat actor’s intrusion.
Threat actors are successful only if they complete Step 7.
If the attacker is stopped at any stage OF Cyber Kill Chain the chain of attack is broken.
Breaking the chain means the defender successfully thwarted the threat actor’s intrusion.
Threat actors are successful only if they complete Step 7.
Lockheed Martin uses the term “adversary” in its description of the Cyber Kill Chain
Lockheed Martin uses the term “adversary” in its description of the Cyber Kill Chain
FIRST STEP OF CYBER KILL CHAIN :
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance is when the threat actor performs research, gathers intelligence, and selects targets.
This will inform the threat actor if the attack is worth performing.
Any public information may help to determine the what, where, and how of the attack to be performed.
There is a lot of publicly available information, especially for larger organizations including news articles, websites, conference proceedings, and public-facing network devices. Increasing amounts of information surrounding employees is available through social media outlets.
The threat actor will choose targets that have been neglected or unprotected because they will have a higher likelihood of becoming penetrated and compromised.
All information obtained by the threat actor is reviewed to determine its importance and if it reveals possible additional avenues of attack.
The threat actor will choose targets that have been neglected or unprotected because they will have a higher likelihood of becoming penetrated and compromised.
All information obtained by the threat actor is reviewed to determine its importance and if it reveals possible additional avenues of attack.
Reconnaissance Adversary (THREAT ACTOR) Tactics
Plan and conduct research:
– Harvest email addresses
– Identify employees on social media
– Collect all public relations information (press releases, awards, conference attendees, etc.)
– Discover internet-facing servers
– Conduct scans of the network to identify IP addresses and open ports.
Reconnaissance Adversary (THREAT ACTOR) Tactics
Plan and conduct research:
– Harvest email addresses
– Identify employees on social media
– Collect all public relations information (press releases, awards, conference attendees, etc.)
– Discover internet-facing servers
– Conduct scans of the network to identify IP addresses and open ports.
Reconnaissance SOC Defenses
Discover adversary’s intent:
– Web log alerts and historical searching data
– Data mine browser analytics
– Build playbooks for detecting behavior that indicate recon activity
– Prioritize defense around technologies and people that reconnaissance activity is targeting
Reconnaissance SOC Defenses
Discover adversary’s intent:
– Web log alerts and historical searching data
– Data mine browser analytics
– Build playbooks for detecting behavior that indicate recon activity
– Prioritize defense around technologies and people that reconnaissance activity is targeting
STEP 2 : CYBER KILL CHAIN:
Weaponization
The goal of this step is to use the information from reconnaissance to develop a weapon against specific targeted systems or individuals in the organization.
To develop this weapon, the designer will use the vulnerabilities of the assets that were discovered and build them into a tool that can be deployed.
After the tool has been used, it is expected that the threat actor has achieved their goal of gaining access into the target system or network, degrading the health of a target, or the entire network.
The threat actor will further examine network and asset security to expose additional weaknesses, gain control over other assets, or deploy additional attacks.
It is often more effective to use a zero-day attack to avoid detection methods.
It is often more effective to use a zero-day attack to avoid detection methods.
A zero-day attack uses a weapon that is unknown to defenders and network security systems.
The threat actor may wish to develop their own weapon that is specifically designed to avoid detection, using the information about the network and systems that they have learned.
Attackers have learned how to create numerous variants of their attacks in order to evade network defenses.
A zero-day attack uses a weapon that is unknown to defenders and network security systems.
The threat actor may wish to develop their own weapon that is specifically designed to avoid detection, using the information about the network and systems that they have learned.
Attackers have learned how to create numerous variants of their attacks in order to evade network defenses.
Weaponization Adversary Tactics :
Prepare and stage the operation:
– Obtain an automated tool to deliver the malware payload (weaponizer).
– Select or create a document to present to the victim.
– Select or create a backdoor and command and control infrastructure.
Weaponization Adversary Tactics :
Prepare and stage the operation:
– Obtain an automated tool to deliver the malware payload (weaponizer).
– Select or create a document to present to the victim.
– Select or create a backdoor and command and control infrastructure.
Weaponization SOC Defense :
Detect and collect weaponization artifacts:
– Ensure that IDS rules and signatures are up to date. – Conduct full malware analysis.
– Build detections for the behavior of known weaponizers.
– Is malware old, “off the shelf” or new malware that might indicate a tailored attack?
– Collect files and metadata for future analysis.
– Determine which weaponizer artifacts are common to which campaigns.
Weaponization SOC Defense :
Detect and collect weaponization artifacts:
– Ensure that IDS rules and signatures are up to date. – Conduct full malware analysis.
– Build detections for the behavior of known weaponizers.
– Is malware old, “off the shelf” or new malware that might indicate a tailored attack?
– Collect files and metadata for future analysis.
– Determine which weaponizer artifacts are common to which campaigns.
CYBER KILL CHAIN STEP 3 : Delivery
Weapon is transmitted to the target using a delivery vector.
This may be through the use of a website, removable USB media, or an email attachment.
If the weapon is not delivered, the attack will be unsuccessful.
Security sensors are so advanced that they can detect the code as malicious unless it is altered to avoid detection.
The code may be altered to seem innocent, yet still perform the necessary actions, even though it may take longer to execute.
CYBER KILL CHAIN STEP 3 : Delivery
Weapon is transmitted to the target using a delivery vector.
This may be through the use of a website, removable USB media, or an email attachment.
If the weapon is not delivered, the attack will be unsuccessful.
Security sensors are so advanced that they can detect the code as malicious unless it is altered to avoid detection.
The code may be altered to seem innocent, yet still perform the necessary actions, even though it may take longer to execute.
Delivery Adversary Tactics
Launch malware at target:
– Direct against web servers
– Indirect delivery through:
– Malicious email
– Malware on USB stick
– Social media interactions
– Compromised websites
Delivery Adversary Tactics
Launch malware at target:
– Direct against web servers
– Indirect delivery through:
– Malicious email
– Malware on USB stick
– Social media interactions
– Compromised websites
Delivery SOC Defense
Block delivery of malware:
– Analyze the infrastructure path used for delivery.
– Understand targeted servers, people, and data available to attack
– Infer intent of the adversary based on targeting.
– Collect email and web logs for forensic reconstruction.
Delivery SOC Defense
Block delivery of malware:
– Analyze the infrastructure path used for delivery.
– Understand targeted servers, people, and data available to attack
– Infer intent of the adversary based on targeting.
– Collect email and web logs for forensic reconstruction.
CYBER KILL CHAIN STEP 4: Exploitation
After the weapon has been delivered, the threat actor uses it to break the vulnerability and gain control of the target.
The most common exploit targets are applications, operating system vulnerabilities, and users.
The attacker must use an exploit that gains the effect they desire.
CYBER KILL CHAIN STEP 4: Exploitation
After the weapon has been delivered, the threat actor uses it to break the vulnerability and gain control of the target.
The most common exploit targets are applications, operating system vulnerabilities, and users.
The attacker must use an exploit that gains the effect they desire.
Exploitation Adversary Tactics :
Exploit a vulnerability to gain access:
– Use software, hardware, or human vulnerability
– Acquire or develop the exploit
– Use an adversary-triggered exploit for server vulnerabilities
– Use a victim-triggered exploit such as opening an email attachment or malicious weblink
Exploitation Adversary Tactics :
Exploit a vulnerability to gain access:
– Use software, hardware, or human vulnerability
– Acquire or develop the exploit
– Use an adversary-triggered exploit for server vulnerabilities
– Use a victim-triggered exploit such as opening an email attachment or malicious weblink
Exploitation SOC Defense
Train employees, secure code, and harden devices:
– Employee security awareness training and periodic email testing
– Web developer training for securing code
– Regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing
– Endpoint hardening measures
– Endpoint auditing to forensically determine origin of exploit
Exploitation SOC Defense
Train employees, secure code, and harden devices:
– Employee security awareness training and periodic email testing
– Web developer training for securing code
– Regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing
– Endpoint hardening measures
– Endpoint auditing to forensically determine origin of exploit
CYBER KILL CHAIN STEP 5: INSTALLATION
This step is where the threat actor establishes a back door into the system to allow for continued access to the target.
To preserve this backdoor, it is important that remote access does not alert cybersecurity analysts or users.
The access method must survive through antimalware scans and rebooting of the computer to be effective.
This persistent access can also allow for automated communications, especially effective when multiple channels of communication are necessary when commanding a botnet.