Modes of Participation in Crime Flashcards
Definition: Principal
Person whose actions are the most direct and immediate cause of the AR
Abbot v R
Principals and Joint Principals
D helped hold down victim as she was stabbed, and then buried her while she was still alive
Was held that merely holding her down was acting as a secondary party, but his joining in with the burial was an act of principal
Kennedy (No 2)
Principals and Joint Principals
Any subsequent action by a human being may break the chain of causation:
D is not to be treated as causing V to act if V makes a voluntary and informed decision to act in that way over another
Macklin and Murphy’s case
Principals and Joint Principals: Jointly Causing
Were joint principles where V died from a combination of different injuries
Gnango (Principals and joint principals: Jointly Causing)
Agreement between P and D to ‘shoot or be shot at’, P shot first, in the subsequent exchange of fire P accidentally killed V
D was held guilty of the murder of V EITHER as a secondary party or principal
Principals and Joint Principals: Innocent Agents exception
There is an exception where the most immediate cause of the AR is a non-responsible human being
Non-Responsible: No MR, have a defence e.g insanity
Principal offender will then become the participant in the crime whose act is the most immediate cause of the act of the innocent agent
Michael
Principals and Joint Principals: Innocent Agents
D gave childminder bottle for baby which she had filled with poison, childminder’s 5 year of child ended up giving it to the baby
Held that D was the principal, as had acted through the agency of the innocent child
Had the childminder given the bottle, would have also been innocent as she had no mens rea
Cogan and Leake
Watkins [2010]
L set up C to rape V, C lacked MR because he believed the vicim was consenting, but L knew the victim was not
L was convicted as the principal
Harder to label L as raping V in this case?
Doctrine still applied as L had caused the rape
Pointed out that this case could now be better looked at under liability for ‘assisting and encouraging’ under the Serious Crime Act 2007
Key Provision: liability of secondary parties
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
Anyone Aiding/abetting/counselling/procuring the commission of an indictable offence is liable to be tried and punished as the principle offender
Parallel provision for summary offences: Magistrates Courts Act 1980 s.44
Maxwell v DPP for NI (HL)
D secondary party to bombing incident, indicted as principal, part he played was helping the car containing the bombers get to the target.
A hardship that can arise from these cases is that it may not be clear to the D what he is actually being charged with!
Viscount Dillhorne: It should be made clear by the prosecutor if aiding and abetting is part of the charge (should also be clear where the case it put on a Montague either-or footing)
Montague
A group of people were charged with being in possession of articles for fraud
Where it is unclear whether the D’s role was that of a principal or a secondary, the issue can be left on an alternative basis if the prosecution can assert that if the D is not liable to be convicted on one basis (e.g as principal) he must be liable on the other (secondary)
Stringer (Secondary Parties: Actus Reus)
Secondary Parties: The Actus Reus
- Aiding/abetting/councilling cases can be regarded together, but some special case law has grown around procuring
- Both assistance and encouragement can flow from acts done in advance by D, all that is needed is some connection at the time of the offence
- There is no significance in the fact that D was or was not present at the time P commits the crime
- It will become a question of fact for the jury whether D’s actions amount to assistance or encouragement. Judge may only step in if no jury could possibly reach a conclusion
A-G v Able
Secondary Parties: The Actus Reus
Either aiding or abetting can suffice.
This can occur either before or at the time of the event
L v CPS
Secondary Parties: The Actus Reus
Judges involvement in the question of whether there has been aiding or abetting should be used at the very margins
Secondary parties: Clear cases of aiding/ abetting
- D provides P with the means to commit the offence
- D actively encourages/ advises P beforehand, or at the scene
- D acts as a lookout during the offence by prior agreement, or drives P to the scene
Secondary parties: Tricky cases for aiding and abetting
- Mere Presence
- Sale/Supply of an ordinary marketable commodity for use in crime
- Does there have to be a meeting of minds?
- Where P could have committed the offence even without D’s assistance/ encouragement
Coney
Secondary parties: Mere Presence
Are the audience secondary parties at an unlawful boxing match?
CA: The audience is essential for the fight, therefore non accidental presence is evidence of encouragement, but not conclusive in itself
Clarkson
Secondary parties: Mere Presence
D came across rape being committed, stayed to watch
Held this was encouragement even though their presence was accidental as they stayed with intent of encouraging the rape
Gnango (Secondary parties: mere presence)
Where 2 people decide on a fight, can be said that they are encouraging one another
NCB v Gamble (Secondary Parties: AR)
Secondary Parties: Sale/ supply of an ordinary marketable commodity for use in crime
Devlin: all sales for a known criminal purpose are acts of assisting
Distinction to be drawn between where D knows before the transaction, and where he only finds out after the sale, but before the delivery
Delivery: property has already passed to P, so delivery would merely be refraining from a tort
Lomas
Secondary Parties: Sale/ supply of an ordinary marketable commodity for use in crime
Where D returns a tool to P which is then used for a criminal purpose, this is not assisting as the tool already belongs to P
Glainville Williams
Secondary Parties: Sale/ supply of an ordinary marketable commodity for use in crime
argued for an alternate distinction between things that are dangerous and things that are ordinary- not the law at the moment however
Stringer (Secondary Parties: Meeting of Minds)
Differs according to whether assistance or encouragement is provided:
Assistance need not necessarily involve communication- therefore no meeting of minds needed
Encouragement by its very nature involves some sort of transmission between D and P- therefore will require meeting of minds
Calhaem
Secondary Parties: Where P could have committed the offence even without D’s assistance/ encouragement?
D hired P to kill V, but P then claimed the reason he killed V was provocation
Held: There is no rule that encouraging must cause the offence, just has to be some connection
Luffman
Secondary Parties: Where P could have committed the offence even without D’s assistance/ encouragement?
Hitman, but he claimed he never really intended to kill V, was only a robbery that went wrong
Held that D could still be liable as what P ended up doing was in the scope of what he’d encouraged P to do: No MR needed on the part of P
Gianetto
Secondary Parties: Where P could have committed the offence even without D’s assistance/ encouragement?
A sufficient connecting link could be as little as D expressing approval of P’s communicated intention
Stringer (Secondary Parties: Where P could have committed the offence even without D’s assistance/ encouragement?)
There is a good policy reason for treating Ds conduct as making a contribution, even if P would have committed the crime anyway
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975)
Secondary Parties: AR: Procuring
There should be some causal link but not necessarily a meeting of minds
Rubie v Faulkner
Secondary Parties: Liability by Omission
D must have a duty: Driving instructor was held to be a secondary party where he failed to control P’s dangerous driving
Du Cros v Lambourne
Secondary Parties: Liability by Ommission
Possible if D is encouraging by his presence in circumstances where has has a power to control the principle otherwise
An owner of a car would be a secondary party where another person was speeding while he was in the passenger seat
Cassady v Reg Morris Transport
Secondary Parties: Liability by Ommission
In some cases there could even be liability through a failure to control without presence
Owner turned a blind eye to his employees breaching regulations
Ashworth and Horder (Critics)
Secondary Parties: Problems with AR
- Any contribution by the accomplice seems to satisfy liability, no matter how small
Brings about uncertainty and potential and injustice - The element of causation stemming from assistance/encouragement need only be slight
may in reality have no causal impact on P’s commission of the offence!
Liability of secondary parties: Mens Rea
Common law always requires mens rea for secondary parties even if for the principal the crime is of strict liability
2 components needed for MR:
- D must have intention/knowledge that he is assisting/encouraging/procuring P
- D must have knowledge of the essentials of Ps intended offences
Lynch
Seondary Parties: MR D must have intention/knowledge that he is assisting/encouraging/procuring P
There is no requirement that D desires the offence will happen.
However great his reluctance, he would have intended to aid and abet
NCB v Gamble
Secondary Parties: MR D must have intention/knowledge that he is assisting/encouraging/procuring P
The motive of D is irrelevant: as long he knows he is giving assistance that is enough, even if he has no criminal purpose.
Johnson v Youden
Secondary Parties: MR: D’s knowledge of essential matters
If D knows essential matters that constitute the offence, he need not actually know that an offence has been committed: ignorance of the law is not a defence
D does not need to know the exact target offence, but he does have to know either:
- The type of offence intended by P
- D has given P liberty to choose from a menu of offences
Bainbridge
Secondary Parties: MR: D’s knowledge of essential matters
1. The type of offence intended by P
D provided P with cutting equipment, thinking it was for cutting up for stolen goods, P actually used it to commit burglary
CA: D must know the type of offence being committed by P
Therefore if D genuinely believed P was just cutting up stolen goods, he would not be guilty
DPP v Maxwell
Secondary Parties: MR: D’s knowledge of essential matters
2. D has given P liberty to choose from a menu of offences
Guilt comes from the fact that he contemplates the commission of a number of crimes by the principal, and intentionally lends his assistance
Saunders and Archer
Secondary Parties: MR: D’s knowledge of essential matters
Knowledge of the identity of V is not essential unless P deliberately changes his plan on the specification of V
Gnango (Secondary parties MR)
P deliberately picks another victim- only P liable
P accidentally misses agreed victim and hits another- both liable
Bristow
Secondary Parties: MR:
Constructive liability may apply to both D and P for a death occurring in the course of an unlawful act
Stringer (Joint Enterprise)
Participation in a joint criminal adventure involving mutual encouragement and assistance
Characterised by solidarity with other members of the enterprise
Wide View of joint enterprises legal position:
Ormerod
There is no difference as joint enterprise cases are merely examples of the principles of secondary liability in operation
Narrow View of joint enterprises legal position:
Simester and Sullivan
Joint enterprise has different legal consequences due to the element of common purpose
Unlike other kinds of participation, only joint enterprise cases attract parasitic liability:
Parasitic Liability
Common purpose to commit crime A, but in the course of it a further offence also occurs
There is no difference between the wide and narrow views where P only commits the crime agreed upon.
Gnango (Parasitic Liability)
Endorses view that there is no difference between the wide and narrow views where P only commits the crime agreed upon.
Therefore joint enterprise may only make a difference where there is this parasitic liability
Parasitic liability arises where:
- D and P have a common intention to commit crime A
- P, as an incident of committing crime A, commits crime B
- D had foreseen the possibility rear he might do so
Appears to suggest that parasitic liability only applies no joint enterprise and not other forms of participation
R v Powell and Daniels
Parasitic Liability: Key Features
3 men went to buy drugs, something went wrong and P shot the dealer, Ds knew he had the gun
Held, if D knew P had the gun, and that he might commit murder, then the others could also be liable for murder, even if the never actually did anything to help with the act
Rahman (Parasitic Liability key features)
Parasitic Liability: Key Features
HL held that were D does not know that P intends crime B, he may still be guilty if he realised there was a real risk that the crime would occur.
A, B, C, D
Parasitic Liability: Key Features
D must not just foresee the actus reus of crime B, but also that P might commit crime B with mens rea
Willett
Parasitic Liability: Key Features
If D has no chance to form a view about crime B then he is not liable
R v English
Parasitic Liability: Key Features
D and P attacked V with wooden posts
P unexpectedly produced a knife and stabbed V to death
Was held that if D did know know about the knife and P used it to do a fundamentally different act, then D will not be a party to the killing
Lord Hutton: The principle is based on the dangerousness of the weapon
If the weapon is different to, but as dangerous as the one D contemplated P might use, then D won’t escape liability
Rahman (parasitic liability exceptions)
HL: question should be put to the jury ‘Was the weapon in a different league to the others used?
Defended the exception as protecting D where there is a radical difference between what D foresaw and what P actually did
Gamble (Criticisms of parasitic liability exception)
Does Rahman make too much of the weapon involved rather than the contemplation of what P does with it?
Ashworth (critic) (Criticisms of parasitic liability exception)
Suggested that the court merely used the exception to get around the GBH-Murder rule which it didn’t really like
Stewart and Schofield, Gilmour, Carpenter
Parasitic liability as a partial defence to murder
If P murders V but D did not agree to it, can D be guilty of manslaughter?
Suggest yes, as D can only be liable to the extent of his own MR
No comment for HL yet
Tyrell
Serious Crime Act 2007 s51(1)
Limits of accessorial liability: Victims and Parties
Girl under 16 charged as a secondary principle to D who had had unlawful intercourse with her
Court implemented The Protective Principle
She could not be party to the offence as:
1. she was the victim
2. the crime existed for her protection
Codified decision
Clarke
Limits of accessorial liability: Frustration
Getting involved to stop a crime happening may be a defence, but this would not apply to mere reluctance
Becerra and Cooper
Limits of accessorial liability: Conditions for withdrawal
- There must be a timely communication to P by D
- If the crime has already begun then more positive steps may be required in order to revert the consequences
Whitefield
Limits of accessorial liability: Conditions for withdrawal
Before crime has begun, mere communication of a change of mind about an offer to help may be enough
Conditions where D may be convicted despite the acquittal of P
- P has a defence but D does not
2. P does the act but lacks MR
Thornton v Mitchell
Conditions where D may be convicted despite the acquittal of P
D may never be convicted if there is no AR by P
