Misc torts Flashcards

1
Q

Respondent Superior

A

According to respondeat superior, an employer will be vicariously liable for tortious acts committed by his employee if such acts occur within the scope of the employment relationship.

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2
Q

Consent

A

Consent is a manifestation of willingness that some action occur. Victim gives permission for what would otherwise be tortious instead of privileged. In order to meaningfully consent to an act, π must appreciate the true nature of the intended contact.

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3
Q

Self defense

A

The use of force to protect oneself from a real or threatened attack

Generally, a person is justified in using reasonable force to prevent harm so long as they
reasonably believe that the danger of bodily harm is imminent and that force is necessary to avoid the danger.

Perfect self defense: the use of force by one who accurately appraises the necessity of and amount of force needed to repel or prevent an attack

Imperfect self defense: use of force results from a good-faith but ultimately mistaken belief that use of force is necessary. Still privileged so long as both amount of force and belief of necessity are reasonable. (Jurisdictions are split on this).

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4
Q

Defense of others

A

Defense of others allows a person to use reasonable force as defined by the circumstances to defend another person to the extent that he reasonably believes the other would be privileged to defend himself. (Note that jurisdictions are split over the effect of mistake…shoe stepping vs. RP)

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5
Q

Defense of property

A

Defense of property allows a person to use reasonable force not threatening death or serious bodily harm to protect one’s property if the intrusion on the property is otherwise not privileged. Must first ask to leave, or have a reasonable belief that asking would not do anything.

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6
Q

Recapture of Chattels

A

Recapture allows a person to act promptly to recover possession of chattel that has been taken from him tortiously, including using reasonable force to recapture chattel if he first requests that it be returned or reasonably believes request won’t be heeded.

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7
Q

Public Necessity

A

Public necessity allows a person to use reasonable force or commit some other tort to reduce a threat or risk to public if he reasonably believes that a serious threat or risk to the public is imminent

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8
Q

Private Necessity

A

Private necessity allows a person to trespass on land or chattels as the necessities of the situation demand provided there is a serious, imminent threat but this is an incomplete privilege. The party who damages property out of private necessity must compensate owner for damage. (not only for trespass but almost always is).

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9
Q

Discipline

A

A parent or someone in loco parentis may exercise reasonable force as is necessary to preserve order in the place in which the privilege is allowed (home, school bus, day care, etc.). This privilege also extends to those temporarily responsible for children.

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10
Q

Justification

A

Justification allows a person who recognizes he intentionally committed some unlawful act to be absolved of liability if it was reasonable or justified given the circumstances. BOP on D to show this.

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11
Q

Negligence

A

To establish a prima facie case for negligence, the π must prove the following elements: the existence of a duty on the part of the ∆ to conform to a specific standard of care for the protection of the π against an unreasonable risk of injury; breach of that duty by the ∆; that the breach of duty by the ∆ was the actual and proximate cause of the π’s injury; and damage to the π’s person or property.

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12
Q

Res Ipsa

A

According to res ipsa loquitur, a jury may infer P’s damage due to D’s negligence. This requires evidence that the injury ordinarily doesn’t occur in the absence of negligence, that the instrumentality of harm is within the D’s exclusive control, and that the harm did not occur from the π’s own negligence.

To be liable, must have actual or constructive knowledge that a hazard is present.

Actual knowledge: party subjectively knew

Constructive knowledge: party objectively should have known.

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13
Q

Contributory Negligence

A

A P is contributorily negligent when his conduct falls below the standard of care to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.

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14
Q

Contributory Negligence

A

A P is contributorily negligent when his conduct falls below the standard of care to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.

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15
Q

Scientific Reliability

A

Factors in determining scientific reliability (balancing, illustrative not exclusive):
Whether the scientific theory or technique employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific community
Whether the theory has been subjected to peer review
Whether the theory has been tested
Whether the error rate is acceptable (statistical analysis)
(some jx) Whether experts are testifying about matters directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions based on other works expressly for the purpose of testifying

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16
Q

Scientific Relevance

A
Determining the extent to which scientific conclusions “fit” the issues of the case
Preponderance of the evidence - Expert needs to testify that more likely than not the defendant’s conduct was the “but for” cause of the plaintiff’s harm. 
Needs a greater than 2X increase in contracting the birth defect to be considered relevant
The court has backed off a little, epidemiological studies no longer required. They can base the decision on:
Chemical similarity 
Animal testing (caused cancer in animals)—still interspecies issue
Clinical Trials (GOLD STANDARD) (reproductive effects difficult to test for because fetuses can’t give consent) 
After approval, watch for side effects and publish case study (FDA Database)
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17
Q

Substantial Factor Test

A

Ask McGarity for more info

∆’s negligent conduct is a CIF of the π’s injury if it was a substantial factor in producing the π’s harm.
Sub fac test generally overlaps with but-for test but there are situations in which courts impose liability even though there’s not a but-for relationship between ∆ ‘s neg and π’s harm mostly in the context of multiple causes like the Anderson two-fire case.

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18
Q

Lesson from Gentry v. Hereford Ranch, Inc.

A

Speculation cannot prove cause in fact.
If multiple but-for causes, testimony relevant but π must isolate the cause of the injury only where an alternative cause relieves the ∆ of liability. ∆ may point to other causes to excuse himself from liability.
∆ can try to point to other possible causes to persuade jury that it isn’t responsible. Π’s expert has to say probable, ∆’s expert just has to persuade jury that their alleged cause was not more likely than not.

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19
Q

Burden of Proof for expert testimony

A

Π’s BOP: to demonstrate through expert’s testimony by preponderance of evidence that but-for ∆’s negligence π’s harm probably would not have occurred. If so, then CIF.
∆’s BOP: doesn’t have to prove “probable” cause. Experts can merely cast doubt on π’s experts by testifying that there are many other possible causes. Can speculate.

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20
Q

General Causation

A

Whether the substance or chemical is capable of causing the particular disease which the π is seeking compensation for. Just a question of whether it is capable of causing disease in human beings generally. If not, no need to move onto specific causation.

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21
Q

Specific Causation

A

Whether the particular substance or chemical that the ∆ manufactured caused the harm to that particular π
Can be proved by testimony of doctor who examined plaintiff
Ultimately π obliged to prove both general and specific causation.
Easier to get cases resolved by multiple plaintiffs, look at general.

> 2X harm - In cases in which π’s do establish general causation, then each individual π is still going to have to prove specific causation. Π must show that exposure more than doubled the risk of contracting the disease. Courts started to interpret that as saying no π could recover unless they could show that the relative risk is greater than 2X.

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22
Q

Concurrent Causes

A

Where two separate acts of negligence combine to cause a single indivisible harm, each actor is jointly and severally liable for all of the damages. Summer v. Tice (two shots one bullet in eye)

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23
Q

Negligent Act and Unknown Cause

A

Where the negligent ∆’s conduct combines with an unknown activity/cause to bring about the π’s harm, the ∆s will be held joint and severally liable. Anderson v. Minneapolis

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24
Q

Enterprise Liability

A

Sindell Case:
If substantially all of the manufacturers that created the defective products during the relevant time are named as defendants, and it cannot be determined which manufacturer caused the precise harm complained of, the manufacturers will be held proportionately liable in accordance with their market share in the market of the good that caused the injury.

Market share split - Can be held jointly and severally liable even though only one of them could have caused the harm. Held responsible for their market share. Likelihood that a certain ∆ supplied the product that injured π calculated by ∆’s market share for the product. Each ∆ liable for proportion of judgment represented by its market share unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product causing π’s injuries. Only for torts involving drugs in which the plaintiff can join all defendants who contributed substantially to the market (varies by state). The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its product could not have caused the harm

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25
Q

Remote damages

A

∆ will not be held liable for events too remote in time or space Ryan v. New York R.R. Co.

The more proximate in time and space a ∆ is to a particular injury, the more proximate of a cause the ∆x could be

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26
Q

Eggshell skull doctrine

A

Take π as you find him, may be liable for aggravating pre-existing illnesses Bartolone v. Jeckovich

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27
Q

Foreseeability of Injury:

A

The defendant whose conduct poses risk is only responsible for the damage that is foreseeable at the time of the negligence. Wagon Mound I

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28
Q

Zone of Danger

A

A duty of care is owed only to foreseeable πs—the class of persons who were foreseeably endangered by the ∆’s negligent conduct. Someone who is not within the zone of danger from the ∆’s conduct cannot recover

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29
Q

De minimus risk

A

if ∆’s conduct presents trivial risk, not liable if harm results. Applies to low probability risks with modest consequences.

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30
Q

Directness test

A

continuous unbroken sequence of events leading from defendant’s negligence to plaintiff’s harm Polemis (dropped ship plank and petrol fire)

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31
Q

Extraordinary Hindsight Test

A

∆ not liable for π’s response to negligence that is unreasonable and is highly extraordinary in hindsight to the point that it constitutes a valid superseding cause
Ex: spare tire assembly fell off back of van, father ran across dark stree to get it, hit by driver on the way back

32
Q

Cost/Benefit Analysis

A

∆ liable for remote results that ∆ should have foreseen where B < SUM(PL), Learned Hand; Wagon Mound II

33
Q

Superseding Cause

A

An unforeseeable act of a third party that causes the accident and breaks the causal link between the P and D. However, where acts of a third person intervene between the D’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.

34
Q

Unforeseeable Act of God/Force of Nature

A

The actor is liable, even for the result of an extraordinary force of nature, if the risks of that force of nature were risks against which the actor should have taken adequate precautions.

35
Q

Third-party Criminal Acts AND Exception

A

If a culpable, third-party criminal actor intervenes we won’t hold D liable for negligence. Watson v. Kentucky Railroad (gas road cigar). Foreseeable that someone would act negligently, but not foreseeable that someone would act criminally.

EXCEPTION:
Defendant brings into association with the plaintiff a person whom he knows or should know to be particularly likely to commit a crime, under circumstances creating a recognizable unreasonable risk by doing so. Hobo Jungle

36
Q

Suicide

A

Generally seen as a superseding cause that cuts off liability.

Liability for suicide following a negligent act was broadened somewhat when some courts permitted recovery if the decedent’s injury caused an irresistible impulse to commit suicide.

37
Q

The Rescue Doctrine Elements

A
  • The defendant was negligent wrt to the victim that was rescued and such negligence proximately caused the peril or appearance of peril to the person rescued
  • The peril or appearance of peril was imminent
  • A reasonably prudent person would have concluded such peril or appearance of peril existed and that rescue was necessary
  • The rescuer acted with reasonable care in effectuating the rescue
38
Q

Cardozo view/foreseeability of rescue doctrine

A

Most courts hold that so long as the harm to the victim was foreseeable (goes with first element), harm to the rescuer need not be foreseeable, although under Cardozo’s view rescuers are always foreseeable plaintiffs.

39
Q

The Rescue Doc

A

DANGER INVITES RESCUE. Allowed injured rescuer to sue the party that caused the danger in the first place McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor (holding flares, hit by car)

40
Q

Fencing Out Statutes (Texas)

A

Provided that if the π fenced his land properly there was strict liability when the animals broke through the fence. Otherwise, liability only if the owners of the animals were negligent.
Example: If cattle ate a neighbor’s grass, no liability UNLESS the rancher had built a fence and the cattle broke through the fence. You could only recover if you had built a fence.

41
Q

Fencing In Statutes

A

Require the owner of the animals to fence them in or otherwise retain them and made the owner strictly liable if they failed to do so. Possessor or owner of wild animal is subject to strict liability for harm caused by animal even if he exercised reasonable care to prevent harm.
Foreseeability required - Only liable for foreseeable harm that an animal would likely do.
Example: No liability for a cow who went into neighbor’s farm, crashed through the floor creating a hole through which the neighbor fell.

42
Q

Restatement §520 (Abnormally dangerous activities)

A
  1. Existence of a high degree of risk of harm to some person, land or chattels of others;
  2. Likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
  3. Inability of a person engaging in this activity to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care (from ∆’s perspective);
  4. Extent to which the activity is or is not a matter of common usage
  5. Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
  6. Extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes (similar to Learned Hand)
43
Q

Duty to retreat

A

ASK MCGARITY

In some cases, if a safe and reasonable retreat is available you must retreat, rather than stand and defend yourself.

  1. If the impending threat is one that would not, in the mind of a reasonable person, cause death or serious bodily harm, you may stand your ground and defend yourself and you are not obligated to use a safe and reasonable retreat.
  2. If the impending threat is one that could cause death or serious bodily injury, in the mind of a reasonable person, and there is a safe and reasonable retreat available, then:
    a. In most jurisdictions, you must:
    i. Use that escape;
    ii. Limit your actions to threats intended to cause apprehension; OR
    iii. Limit your use of actual force or confinement to something less than that intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
    b. In some ‘frontier’ jurisdictions, you may stand your ground and defend yourself and use force or confinement intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
  3. In some jurisdictions, if you are aware that the impending harm is one only negligently made by the person, you must retreat if it is safe and reasonable to do so.
44
Q

Sovereign immunity

A

Sovereign immunity: a legal doctrine whereby a sovereign or state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune to civil suit or criminal prosecution, strictly speaking in modern texts in its own courts.

45
Q

Litigation immunity

A

lawyers are not liable for most torts that occur in the trial process.

46
Q

Employer Immunity

A

Under most circumstances, an employee who is injured on the job cannot file a tort claim against his employer or co-employees even if they were negligent and their negligence caused his injuries. Employer liability is instead covered by the separate system of Worker’s Compensation.

47
Q

State/Governmental Immunity

A
  1. cannot sue the state except (1) on constitutional grounds or (2) where the state has specifically sanctioned it.
    - If the state creates the courts, they can set limitations on suit
    - State must proactively allow itself and its subsidiaries to be sued and under what circumstances.
48
Q

Duty of Police

A

Police have a duty to the public at large to provide general safety and services. The police do not, however, have a duty to any one individual. However, a special duty is created when police authorities begin the process of aid, and this duty may give rise to liability when damage results from negligent performance of this duty.

49
Q

Loss-of-Chance Theory

A
  • Doc messes up and 𝚷’s chance of survival is reduced by some amount; courts take three approaches to remedy
  • Traditional/ Majority approach - Chance of survival w/o the negligence must be >50% to bring a claim; all or nothing reward. Damages can have two approaches: either % of the chance lost,
  • Smith v Providence Health approach-
    (middle road); treats the lost chance of survival as a tortious injury itself, and rewards damages as a % of the chance lost.
50
Q

Collateral source rule:

A

D cannot have damages offset by whatever part of P’s injury was paid for by P’s own insurance.

D is liable for whatever costs are incurred, whether or not they are directly paid for by P.

51
Q

Distinction between release and covenant not to sue

A

Release: gives up entire right to bring a suit. Based on common law understanding of right to sue as a “property” which was then transferred away through a promise not to sue. Whoever settled and paid for the release “purchased” and then “possessed” the
right to sue in this case.

Covenant not to sue: merely a contractual promise between two parties not to sue that particular party in exchange for payment. If distinction is accepted, then not all Ds are released and P can still bring suit
against other defendants.

52
Q

Mary Carter settlements

A

When plaintiffs enter into settlements with one or some defendants but proceeds to trial against other defendants, with the expectation that the settling defendant pays only a minimum payment that may be offset by the recovery; it is generally expected in these
agreements that settling D’s further involvement in the trial will assist P.

53
Q

Original tortfeasor doctrine

A

The common law doctrine providing that a wrongdoer who negligently injures a person is considered the proximate cause of, and may be held jointly and
severally liable for, any subsequent injuries the victim may suffer as a result, such as negligent
medical treatment rendered for the original injury.

54
Q

HYPO: a car hits A and leaves him in the street. A bicycle then runs over A’s arm while he’s in the street. A then goes to the hospital and is negligently treated by a doctor, resulting in an aggravated injury. Who is liable for what harm?

A

● Doctor - only the aggravation of the injury
● Bicyclist - only the injury to the arm (why isn’t he liable for doc negligence?? Was he not the prox cause?)
● Driver - everything in the chain of events

55
Q

Economic benefit test:

A

if someone is present on the land of another for a purpose related to the economic benefit of the landowner, that person is an invitee

Ex. a patron in a store

56
Q

Essential purpose test

A

If someone is present on the land of another, especially public land, by general or specific invitation for the purpose for which that land is designated, that person is an invitee

Ex. a person visiting a public park

57
Q

Shopkeeper’s privilege

A

A privilege permitting a shopkeeper to detain a person or
investigate the ownership of property if the shopkeeper reasonably believes that the person has stolen or is attempting to steal store merchandise, as long as the detention takes place in a reasonable manner for a reasonable time.

58
Q

Arrest without a warrant

A

(Rights of a citizen more narrowly restricted than that of an officer)

Either an officer or a citizen may arrest without a warrant to prevent a felony or a breach of the peace that is being committed or reasonably appears about to be committed in his presence.

An officer may make an arrest if he has info that affords reasonable grounds for thinking that a felony has been committed and that he has the right person.

The citizen may arrest without a warrant if a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable grounds to suspect the person arrested; but his authority depends upon the fact of the crime, and he must take the full risk if none has been committed (in other words, he better be right).

For a past breach of the peace that is not a felony, an officer or citizen may arrest without a warrant only if the offense was committed in his presence and he is in fresh pursuit.

59
Q

Reasonable person, and RP Standard

A

A person who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment that society requires of its members for the protection of their own and others’ interests.

Standard: actions that deviate from that which one would expect the reasonable person to do are negligent.

60
Q

To prove malpractice you need:

A
  1. Expert testimony of what the standard is

2. Behavior that is so grossly negligent that layman would have no difficulty recognizing it.

61
Q

Elements of informed consent claim:

(and def of material risk).

A
  1. Defendant physician failed to inform patient adequately of a material risk before securing
    his consent to the proposed treatment
  2. If he had been informed of the risks, he would not have consented to the treatment
  3. The adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact occur and he was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment

Material risk: anything that would reasonably cause a patient to reconsider the treatment; generally speaking, anything with a high enough probability of occurring or grave enough consequences.

62
Q

Therapeutic privilege

A

Full disclosure would upset and overall be detrimental to the patient. Usually limited to situations when a patient is pathologically fearful or anxious.

63
Q

Common carrier

A

A person or company that transports goods or passengers on regular routes at set rates; at common law, considered to be responsible for the safety of the people or goods and liable for harm that comes to them.

64
Q

Degrees of Care

A

Level of care required will obviously vary according to the riskiness of the activity engaged in.

  • As danger increases, actor is required to exercise increasing degrees of caution
  • Those who deal with things that are known to be dangerous, like explosives or electricity, must exercise greater caution than someone merely walking down the street
  • Higher duty of care for those who have accepted special responsibility for someone, like
    a common carrier
65
Q

Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its violation is
excused when:

A

a. the violation is reasonable because of the actor’s incapacity
b. he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance
c. he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply
d. he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct
e. compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others

66
Q

Effect of Res Ipsa

A
  1. It warrants an inference of negligence which the jury may draw or not as their best judgment dictates
  2. It raises a presumption of negligence which requires the jury to find negligence if defendant does not produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption
  3. It not only raises such a presumption but also shifts the burden of proof to the defendant who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was
    not caused by his negligence
  • None of these three possible effects binds the jury to enter a verdict for the plaintiff making a RIL showing.
67
Q

Discovery doctrine/rule:

A

The statute of limitations begins to run from the moment the injury is discovered, not the moment the injury-causing action occurred.

68
Q

Continuing torts

A

the principle that a tort continuing or repeating overtime is treated as a whole such that the statute of limitations begins to run not when the tortious conduct begins but when it ends (an abusive relationship).

69
Q

Liability for Municipalities

A

Governmental capacity: if acting as subdivisions of the state, then local governments with immunity

Proprietary capacity: if acting as corporate bodies (e.g., driving vehicles), then no immunity.

70
Q

Intent

A

An actor intends the consequences of his conduct if his purpose in acting is to bring about the consequences or if he knows with substantial certainty that these consequences will result.

71
Q

Mistake Doctrine for Intentional torts

A

If person intends to do act that is an intentional tort, making a mistake does not count as a defense. Ranson v. Kitner (mistaking dog for wolf)

72
Q

What can cut off SL?

A

Voluntary assumption of a known risk

Unforeseeable act of god

Injuries from risks that SL was never meant to protect from

73
Q

Attorney Standard of Care

A

Have the skills, exercise good faith in their judgments about things like settling cases, and must exercise due care.

74
Q

Duty of Doctor

A

Duty to warn other of dangerous illness (including mental illness where patient might kill)

Counter argument:
(1) the unfairness of the burden because a doctor may not be able to tell that a patient is dangerous and

(2) the detrimental effect such duty to warn will have on doctor-patient relationships

Response to CA:

  1. The doctor only has the duty when he knows (as he did in this case) or reasonably should have known; professional standard will be applied, and doctor will not be penalized for reasonably not knowing
  2. The doctor-patient privilege has already been dealt with on this exact issue by the legislature, who have found that the privilege exists at all times EXCEPT in cases on imminent danger
75
Q

HYPO: A, a law student, overhears B saying he wants to kill McGarity. Does A have a duty to warn McGarity?

A
  • No legal duty
  • No special relationship exists between either A and B or A and McGarity
  • A has no way of evaluating whether this is a credible threat
  • A has not assumed care for either B or McGarity
76
Q

Is there a general duty to warn?

A

No. An exception to the general rule that there is no duty to warn exists when the parties are in a special relationship. If there is a special relationship, then there may exist a duty to warn if the facts establish sufficiently foreseeable harm.