Miranda Waiver Flashcards
Michigan v. Mosley (S. Ct. 1975) (Richard Bert Mosley (defendant) was arrested for robbery. Before questioning, Mosley was given the Miranda warnings and invoked his right to remain silent. The officer stopped the interrogation, and Mosley was taken to a cell. Later, a detective attempted to question Mosley about an unrelated murder. Mosley was again given the Miranda warnings, but did not invoke his right to remain silent. Mosley made incriminating statements and was charged with first-degree murder.)
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) does not bar police from subsequently questioning a suspect who previously invoked his right to remain silent, as long as the suspect’s right to end questioning has been scrupulously honored.
North Carolina v. Butler (S. Ct. 1979) (During a custodial interrogation, may a suspect implicitly waive his right to counsel?)
A suspect need not make an express statement waiving his right to counsel.
Moran v. Burbine (S. Ct. 1986) (If police misinform the defendant’s attorney or do not tell the defendant that his attorney attempted to reach him, must the court suppress a valid confession given after the defendant knowingly waives his Miranda rights?)
Where a defendant knowingly waives his Miranda rights, the fact that police misinformed the defendant’s attorney and did not tell the defendant that his attorney tried to reach him, does not require suppression of the defendant’s confession.
Arizona v. Roberson (S. Ct. 1988) (Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary and advised of his Miranda rights. Roberson replied he wanted a lawyer and this was duly noted. Three days later, while Roberson was still in custody, a different officer interrogated Roberson about a different burglary.) (Issue: Did the trial court err in suppressing Roberson’s statements when he previously invoked his right to remain silent and was later interrogated on a different crime?)
No. The Court found that in Edwards, they concluded that reinterrogation may only occur if the accused himself indicates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Because the state reinterviewed him without counsel after he invoked his right, his statements must be suppressed.
Rule: a defendant’s invocation of a right to counsel must be scrupulously respected.
Davis v. U.S. (S. Ct. 1994) (D questioned as homicide suspect. Mirandized and written & oral waiver. 1 ½ hours into interrogation D: “maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Agents seek clarification and D says he doesn’t want a lawyer. 1 hour later D says “I think I want a lawyer” and questioning stops.) (Issue: whether D’s statement “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was sufficiently clear to invoke?)
No. D did not make an unequivocal request for counsel. Rule: when suspect invokes right to counsel, all questioning must cease until (1) D is provided counsel or (2) D himself re-initiates the conversation.
However, questioning need not cease if suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal to a reasonable officer under the circumstances.
♦ Sum: Invocation must be “unambiguous” and “clear,” though s/he need not speak w/discrimination of an “Oxford don.”
Maryland v. Shatzer (S. Ct. 2010) (In 2003, a social worker reported allegations that Michael Shatzer (defendant) had abused his three-year-old son. At the time of this allegation, Shatzer was imprisoned for a different child-sexual-abuse conviction. The 2003 allegation was assigned to Detective Shane Blankenship, who went to interview Shatzer in prison. Shatzer initially waived his Miranda rights but afterwards demanded an attorney, at which point Blankenship ended the interview. The investigation was closed shortly afterwards. Two and a half years later, further details of the 2003 allegations against Shatzer were reported. Detective Paul Hoover undertook the investigation and on March 2, 2006 went to interview Shatzer in prison. Hoover obtained a written Miranda waiver and interviewed Shatzer. Shatzer agreed to take a polygraph five days later. Shatzer was again read his Miranda rights. Shatzer signed another written waiver and proceeded to fail the polygraph test. After further questioning, Shatzer confessed.)
A break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona (when a suspect invokes right to counsel, it must be scrupulously honored). 14 days is an adequate period of time for the accused to re-enter his normal life, seek advice, and to escape the coercive effects of his first interrogation.
Berghius v. Thompkins (S. Ct. 2010) (Where a defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent, does he implicitly waive his Miranda rights by making a voluntary statement to police?)
Yes. Where a defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent after fully understanding his Miranda rights, he implicitly waives his Miranda rights by making a voluntary statement to police.
“Custodial Interrogation” Under Miranda
“Questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Custody
5th Amendment Issue: The functional equivalent of an arrest: a person is deemed to be in custody if he is deprived of his freedom of action “in any significant way.”
“The substantial deprivation of liberty normally associated with an arrest.”
Implied Waiver of Miranda
(1) Proper Miranda + Voluntary/Uncoerced Statement = Invalid Waiver
(2) Proper Miranda + Voluntary/Uncoerced Statement + Understanding of Miranda = Valid Waiver
Note the particular facts of Mosley:
- Mosley asserted only his right to remain silent—not his right to counsel, and the questioning resumed:
- Two hours later
- By a different cop
- At a different location
- Regarding a different crime
Voluntary Confession
i. Voluntariness test: is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, ie has the suspect’s will been overborne by the police?
ii. The voluntariness of a confession is to be assessed from the totality of all the circumstances, taking into account both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.
iii. Government bears burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
To find coercion, there must be:
(1) improper police behavior; (2) that has caused the defendant to confess.
