Mind Flashcards
DUALISM 1: Substance/Cartesian: __________________________
Criticism: non-physical existence? ______________________
How cogito relates to this ________________________
Property dualism: __________________
Leibniz’s Law: _____________________________ (basis of arguments for)
Mind and body exist as totally distinct substances, the mind only having mental properties, the body only physical
Criticism: this only explains how the body exists (physically), but not how the mind can non-physically exist
Cogito ergo sum: Descartes establishing his existence as a thinking thing - his physical body later established as something seperate
Mind and body are properties of one physical substance
Leibniz’s Law states that if two substances X and Y have the exact same properties, X must = Y, otherwise this cannot be so
DUALISM 2:
Doubt & indubitability: ______________________________
Indivisibility: ____________________
naive criticism (memory etc.) _________________ - response ______
then the non-naive one (multiple personalities etc.) _____________________
Personal qualia ______________
Intentionality ______________________
Doubt and indubitability: The mind is indubitable, the body can be doubted and so they must be seperate
Indivisibility: The body is extended so can be divided into seperate parts, the body cannot because it is non-extended
A naive criticism is that mind can be divided into seperate parts like memory and imagination, Descartes responded that these are just seperate functions that one, single mind performs
Psychology however gives examples of divisible minds like multiple personalities
Personal qualia: mental states alone have these individual, unique natures - what its like to think a thought
Intentionality: likewise mental but not physical states are about something
DUALISM 3:
Mind-body problem ________________________
Interactionism (Descartes’ response) _________________________
Ryle’s argument against this _____________________
Broad’s Response ___________________
Conservation of energy problem ___________________________
Psycho-physical parallelism _____________________ , Occasionalism ________________ and Epiphenomenalism __________________(solutions to problem also)
Problem of other minds __________________________ then responses…
Argument from analogy response ______________________ Criticisms of this argument (behaviour, problem of induction) ______________________ ,
Wittgenstein’s private language response ________________________ and Strawson’s concept of a person response: ________________________
Mind-body problem: It isnt explained how the two could interact, if seperate
Interactionism however claims that althought distinct, mind and body can intermingle, in the pineal gland
Ryle argued mind and body are too different for us to understand the interaction
Broad however argued for a part-mental part-physical whole
Scientific principle of energy conservation is contradicted if mental events cause physical ones
Psycho-physical parallelism is the alternative of the mind and body simply coinciding in harmony due to God, or by chance with occasionalism
Epiphenomenalism is the view that physical events cause the mental but the mental events cannot cause the physical
Problem of other minds: dualism doesn’t prove the existence of other minds, leading to solipsism
Argument from analogy: people, similar in behaviour, are thus likely to share the quality of having minds - but behaviour isn’t uniform so can’t be generalised, and one case of my own mind would be weak induction
The private language argument is that if we have one common language for our sensations, we must all experience them the same way and thus other minds must exist
Strawson’s concept of a person: to claim others are persons means accepting they have minds - mind/body are entwined in the definition of a person
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 1:
All materialists reject _________
Human beings are purely ____________
Its benefits over dualism _________________
Behaviourism (explain ) _____________________
Hempel’s argument for hard behaviourism, Mr Jones example ____________________________
Ryle’s soft behaviourism ___________________________
Dualism and its concept of the ‘ghost in the machine’, or soul-like mind
Humans are physico-chemical beings purely composed of matter
It is more scientific, only dealing with empirical evidence, it is easier to demonstrage e.g. with mental disabilities, and it simplifies mental states to mere physical brain states
Behaviourism argues it is our outward behaviour that reveals or constitutes our mental states
Hempel argues that absolutely all psychological states can be explained purely via physiological body states, so therefore all mental states must be referred to as physical - Mr Jones feeling inferior can entirely be worked out from behaviour like flushing skin
Ryle does not give psychology such a ‘special status’, arguing that rather than behaviour we should focus on our general pattern of dispositions - what we tend to do
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 2:
Arguments against behaviourism:
It is false (necessity/sufficiency of behaviour) __________________
It is vague ____________________
Rejects/neglects qualia _____________
Non-explanatory (only observing behaviour) ___________________
Behaviour isn’t necessary to have a mind (e.g. paralytics) and not sufficient for having a mind (e.g. when our behaviour differs from thoughts)
It is vague about what detail in behaviour shows precisely what thoughts are
It denies thoughts having qualia or being unique/private
Mental events must also be observed as part of the explanation of behaviour
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 3: Eliminative materialism -
This theory against folk psychology (including Churchland) ________________________
Criticisms:
Counter-intuitive ________________
Folk psychology as a theory? __________
Folk psychology may actually be useful _______________
Whilst EM describes real physical things, folk psychology doesn’t desribe anything real and is only based on law-like generalisations, as the commonsense view of minds.
Churchland argued folk psychology is funadamentally false and must be replaced by neuroscience which is far more empirical
It is counterintuitive in that it denies that we have introspection
Folk psychology is not a genuine theory so can’t be argued against in this way
Folk psychology is reasonably accurate and fits everyday language
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 3:
Identity theory -
philosopher: __________
another _________ account of mind
it ________s mental states as physical states in the __________
explain TYPE identity theory with the tootache example ________________
explain TOKEN identity theory with the water example _____________________
The principle where the simplest explanation is best __________________ and how it justifies identity theory ___________
What the philosopher argues about talk about mental and physical states _______________________________
Two strengths of the theory: (science, simplicity) _____________________
Objections:
Individual differences (why only a problem for type?) )_______________________
Multiple realisation (other species - type again?) _____________________________
Irreducibility of consciousness (non-physical aspect) ____________________
Conceivability argument (zombie world thought experiment) __________________
JJC Smart
reductive
identifies mental states as physical states in the brain (c-fibres firing)
type identity theory states that we all have the same type of mental event identifiable with one type of brain state. If 10 people visit the dentist with toothahe, all 10 have the type of toothache which has one type of brain process
In token identity theory, each particular example of the mental state is a seperate token of the type of brain state. Where water is the type, puddles, lakes and seas are tokens. With pain, tokens include my pain and your pain.
Occam’s razor - because identity theory avoids complex mental explanations
Smart argues that talk about mental states and talk about mental states refers to one thing, but each has different meaning because it is a different way of talking about the one, physical thing.
The theory is supported by empirical scientific research into the brain, and is the most straightforward of all materialist theories.
Individual differences - it may not be possible to categorise different mental states into types - my type of thought may be non-identical to yours due to different experiences - so these can only be explained as different tokens.
Multiple realisation - there are likewise differences in mental states between species due to different physiological brains - only token theory can account for these differences.
Irreducibility of consciousness - like all materialist theories, identity theory does not allow a full explanation of consciousness because it can’t solely be explained by physical states.
Brain processes are not always accompanied necessarily by consciousness - what if there were a zombie world where there are identical beings to us but who lack conscious experiences? But is this conceivable or even possible?
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 4:
Functionalism - how it conceives mind and brain (like with a computer, input/output…) __________________________
Machine functionalism:
philosopher _________________
computer software of ONE kind can be run on ANY hardware, therefore _____________________
Psycho-functionalism: areas of science it focuses on ___________ (compared to ‘folk’ views)
Teleological functionalism:
concerned with the _________ of mental states - this is why physical components develop
Strengths ( as with identity theory): ________________________
Weaknesses:
Too liberal (in ascribing mental states) - Donald running/car driving example ___________________________
Problems of qualia: inverted qualia (seeing different colours) ________________ and absent qualia (other creatures/systems that are functionally equivalent but…) ______________________
Materialism is not sufficient to explain consciousness __________________
Mind is the program, brain is the hardware. Sensory inputs are converted to behavioural outputs. The mind is therefore a function, not a substance.
Hilary Putnam developed the theory into machine functionalism, and argued that because computer software works on any hardware, psychological states can be found in any variety of physiological states of different brains.
Psycho-functionalism is based especially on cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, rejecting any ‘folk’ views of the mind
Teleological functionalism focuses on the purpose/end of mental states, as an explanation of why the physical components (brain physiology) develops
Like identity theory, functionalism is straightforward and is linked to current and ongoing scientific research.
It is too liberal in that is treats ‘functionally equivalent programs’ the same way.
Donald is running, detects pain (sensory input) and feels distressed (mental state). A car is driving, detects pressure in the wheel (sensory input) and feels distressed (mental state) - even though Donald and the car have equivalent systems, we cannot say a car feels distress - it lacks qualia/intentionality.
Inverted qualia - if one person sees red where another sees blue and both are functionally equivalent (reacting the same way to the colour but experiencing it differently) then functionalism has failed to identify differences in qualia.
It also may describe us as functionally equivalent to animals/machines despite them lacking any qualia.
Again, materialism does not explain consciousness, because of its purely physical basis.
MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM 5: Non-reductive materialism - Philosopher \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Rather than the mental being equal/reducible to the physical, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Anomolous monism - Identity of types and tokens \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Biological naturalism: Philosopher \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Non-\_\_\_\_\_\_ account There is some truth and falsity in both \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Conscious states are: ontologically subjective \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ qualitative \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ intentional \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ have spatial \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ caused by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ processes causally efficacious \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Objections: The contradiction between two theories \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ The contradiction in reductionism \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Donald Davidson
Rather than mental states being reduced/equivalent to the physical, they supervene or depend upon the physical. The mind is more complex than merely the physical brain.
Token mental events are identical to token physical events, but mental types aren’t identical to physical types.
John Searle
Non-reductive account
There is some truth and falsity in dualism and materialism
Conscious states are:
ontologically subjective - only exist within an individual’s experience
qualitative - they have a certain feel as a certain conscious state
intentional - refer to objects, other subjects and states of affairs.
spacially located - in the brain
caused by brain processes
causally efficacious- cause other effects.
contradiction in materialism and dualism - a biological process vs an irreducible subjective experience.
it attempts to be reductive and non-reductive at the same time.
