MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIAN POLITICS Flashcards
(10 cards)
What provided the immediate stimulus for the January 15, 1966 military putsch was, according to Luckham (See Oyediran, 1979:24), the
superimposition of unfavorable environmental conditions from the civil violence in the Western Region, set off by the Regional election of October, 1965
. The coup plotters (all in the rank of Major) were led by? others were:
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu,
Onwuategu, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Chukwuma and Ademoyega, the only Yoruba
how did they conduct the coup
They struck on Saturday, January 15, 1966 by kidnapping and killing both political and military leaders, mostly of Yoruba and Hausa ethnic stock. Oluleye opines: They sprang by pulling the trigger in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna but Enugu was spared through fickleness and conspiracy (See Oluleye, 1985:27). Political analysts believe that even if the coup had been planned with the best of intentions, its outcome looked patently to the other ethnic groups, particularly in the North and West, like an Ibo conspiracy (See Oyediran, 1979:27).
how did they conduct the coup
After the killing of the Prime Minister during the topsy-turvy and the President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe could not be found, the Acting President Dr. Nwafor Orizu made a broadcast to the nation at 11.30 p.m. that he had been advised by the Council of Ministers and that they had unanimously decided to hand over the government of the Federation to the Armed Forces in view of the present situation in the country (See Ojiako, 1981:226).
The Division in the Military
The mantle of leadership fell on General Johnson Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi who was the most senior military officer, as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Military Governors were appointed for the Regions. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi for the West: Lt. Cols. Odumegwu Ojukwu and Hassan Usman Katsina for the East and North respectively while David Ejoor was appointed for the Mid-West. The new Head of State enjoyed the goodwill of the general public, even in the North the attitude was one of wait and see rather than of outright resentment. However, General Ironsi squandered his good luck and tolerability within a period of six months by his actions and inactions. Firstly, he reneged in his promise to bring the January coup plotters to justice and to worsen the situation the Ibos in the North were engaged in taunting the Northerners in public over the killing of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Oluleye (1985:32-33) posits: Every Ibo person paraded himself as Ironsi. Unwittingly, the Ibos displayed the photograph of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, in awkward position with his head under the jungle boot of Major Nzeogwu. It was displayed in homes and shops of the Ibos. Where people did not notice the photograph, they would invite their attention to it. To the Northerners they usually said, You see your papa under the foot of Major Nzeogwu .
Other allegations against Gen. Ironsi, according to Oluleye (1985:33), were that:
a) He failed to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo and other politicians in jail in line with the demands of the opposition group in the country.
b) In pursuance with Ibo ambition, he made some highly unbalanced promotions in the Army which favoured the Ibo officers and he got them appointed to key commands and political appointments as prefects.
c) He promulgated Decree No. 34 (otherwise known as unification decree ) which was a major constitutional and political issue, without consultation. The unification decree sought to abolish the federal structure of the country and replaced it with a unitary system.
• He also decreed the political parties and tribal unions out of existence.
• These actions were regarded as calculated attempts by the Ibos to dominate the other tribes in the country.
The Northern Riots of May 29, 1966
The cloud of uncertainties which pervaded the nation later descended in torrential civil disturbances in some parts of Northern provinces where the Ibos were attacked and killed. As Dudley (1973:132) observes, The Ibo were attacked not because they were Ibo but because the name Ibo had become more or less synonymous with exploitations and humiliation. It was essentially an attack on a mental stereotype. The attack which was the preliminary action to the July 29, 1966 counter-coup led to the mass exodus of the Ibos from the North and even the West back home - the East. According to Kurfi (1983:38), the clarion call in line with the general mood in the North during the disturbances was Araba or Aware (Hausa word for secession ).
The July 29, 1966 Counter-Coup
This coup d etat, unlike that of January 15, which involved civilian victims, was confined within the military circle. The soldiers of Northern origin rose to the call by Northerners to defend the honour of the Northern region by avenging the killing of Northern political and military leaders by the coup presumably masterminded by the Ibos. The Supreme Commander, General Ironsi who was on a nation-wide tour in Ibadan, and as-well-as his host, Col. Francis Adekunle Fajuyi the Military Governor of the Western Region were kidnapped and killed. Many senior military officers of Eastern origin were also killed in the putsch. This led to further migration of Ibos and non-Ibos alike from the Northern and Western parts of the country to their home land. Oluleye (1985:41), reflecting on the mood of the nation says: From the time of the kidnapping of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi on the morning of 29 July, 1966 till 30 July, the country witnessed an interregnum. The whole populace was confused until August 1, 1966 when Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon assumed the leadership of the new military government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The new Head of State, in his maiden broadcast titled No trust or confidence in a Unitary System of Government said inter alia: I had been brought to the position today of having to shoulder the responsibilities of this country and the Armed Forces with the consent of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred on the early morning of 29 July, 1966.
The country was plunged into a national disaster by the grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the Army against the public was done by elimination of political leaders and high- ranking Army officers, a majority of whom came from a particular section of the country. The last report was that he (the Supreme Commander) and the West Military Governor were both kidnapped by some soldiers. Up till now, there is no confirmation of their whereabouts. I have come to strongly believe that we cannot continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time the basis for trust and unity is not there I intend to continue the policy laid down in the statement by the Supreme Commander on 16 January, 1966 published on January 26, 1966 (See Oluleye, 1985:41).
Above was the revised version of the planned speech by the leaders of the July 29 uprising because the original intention was to seize the reins of government and then announce the secession of the Northern Region from the rest of the country (See Kurfi, 1983:38). However, the military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu was not satisfied with the new military leadership in Lagos as he contended that there were yet more senior military officers rather than Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon to succeed Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi as the new Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This marked the beginning of animosity in the military hierarchy until Odumegwu Ojukwu was forced to surrender in 1970.
The 30-Month Civil War
The brick-bat between Lt-Cols. Yakubu Gowon and Odumegwu Ojukwu continued while the latter convened a Consultative Assembly on May 26, 1967 where he delivered a long address in which he took a retrospective look at the political development in Nigeria since 1914. He, therefore, sought the mandate to declare at the earliest practicable date Eastern Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of Biafra (Kirk-Green, 1966:427-44). This prompted Gowon to address the nation on the 27 May, 1967 in which he condemned the action of the military Governor of the Eastern Region. He said that the citizens of Nigeria have not given the military regime any mandate to divide up the country into sovereign states and to plunge them into bloody disaster . He assured Nigerians that he would not run away from the onerous responsibility to keep the country as one. In the light of this, he declared a state of emergency throughout Nigeria with immediate effect and claimed he had assumed full powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government for the period of the emergency (See Oyediran cited in a Journal).
General Gowon further took the following steps as part of his programme of actions to address the emergency situation:
• Announced the reorganization of the country into twelve-state structure with new military Governors posted to each accordingly.
• Through an instrument of pardon, he released Chief Obafemi Awolowo and all the political prisoners from jail. He made Chief Awolowo the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Commissioner for Finance.
• He formed a broad-based Federal cabinet which embraced politicians and top civil servants to allow the military to concentrate on the prosecution of the war.
• He declared a military action against the Biafran Army on July 6, 1967.
These steps made General Yakubu Gowon to become popular and his government literally enjoyed legitimacy, having touched on many contending issues that bordered on the interest of the minority group and the opposition political class. Oluleye (1985:152) vividly captured the mood when he says: He had the mandate from the people right from the beginning of the war loudly proclaimed as GOWON, meaning, GO ON WITH ONE NIGERIA . The co-operation of the people by all assessments was total during his management of the military and political crises.
