Military Deterrence & Statecraft

Question 0

Deterrence vs. conflict resolution

Answer 0

Deterrence seeks to prevent the use of military force to pursue FP goals

Conflict resolution seeks to settle disputes about specific issues

Question 1

Definition of deterrence

Answer 1

In general: use of threats to persuade an individual not to initiate action

IR: use of threats of military force as retaliation against a possible outcome chosen by aggressor (can include nonmilitary threats)

Question 2

Types of Deterrence in History

Answer 2

Direct-immediate: Israel’s 1973 threats & military mobilizations against Egypt and Syria (failed)

Direct-general: Israel’s military presence in the Golan Heights region after Six Day War in 1967 to fend off Syria

Extended-immediate: in first Gulf War, when US fended off Iraqi soldiers at Kuwaiti border

Extended-general: US military in S Korea since end of Korean War to fend off North Korea

Question 3

Two ways to categorize deterrence

Answer 3

Direct - preventing act against own territory

Vs

Extended - preventing attack against another’s territory

And

Immediate - in response to pressing, short term attack

Vs

General - to prevent a crisis that results in armed conflict

Question 4

Problems in testing success of deterrence

Answer 4

We must look at indirect evidence that deterrence was the causal mechanism in preventing crisis or war

Which evidence counts? How do you rule out other factors?

*** req that if the defender capitulates to the demands of the aggressor in order to evade armed conflict, this is not a win for deterrence

Question 5

Rational Choice Deterrence

Answer 5

Potential attackers weigh expected utility of using force vs not using force

Question 6

Elements of expected utility

Answer 6

Value attached to an outcome & likelihood of attaining that outcome

Question 7

Strategies of dissuasion

Answer 7

Convince the attacker that it will be costly or unsuccessful (Schelling and Robert Powell)

And/or

Give positive inducements (concessions) (Paul Huth, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein)

Question 8

Contradiction

Answer 8

Best strategy is one in which you threaten the defender to make the cost of aggression very high, while providing enough incentives/concessions to make the status quo seem tolerable p

Question 9

Critiques of rational choice deterrence theory

Answer 9

1) cognitive and psychological biases in decision making by leaders or small groups
2) problems with command and control in the implementation of policies by military orgs

Question 10

Cognitive/psychological critics

Answer 10

Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Pat Morgan

Attackers can misinterpret the resolve or capabilities of defender

Prospect theory: it’s difficult to deter state leaders who anticipate impending damage (political or military) against the status quo

Question 11

Command and control critics

Answer 11

Scott Sagan, Bruce Blair, Barry Posen

Shifts focus from individual to org

Leaders can lose control of armies, there is an incentive to strike first, faulty early warning systems impute bad intentions to adversary

Question 12

Credibility of Conventional threats

Answer 12

Deterrence threat must be credible in order to be successful

Question 13

Elements of credibility

Answer 13

Defenders military capabilities (high costs for aggressors?)

And

Attacker’s belief that the defender has high resolve to follow through in his threat (is he resolute?)

Question 14

Importance of military capabilities in the credibility calc

Answer 14

Alexander George, Richard Smoke, John Mearsheimer, Paul Huth agree:

Flexibility, quickness, ability to deny the attacker it’s military objectives

(Esp problematic for extended-immediate deterrence bc of slow movement of forces)

Jonathan Shimshoni, Eli Liberman in same class

Question 15

Role of resolve in credibility calc

Answer 15

Not as important and capabilities because resolve is difficult to measure

Movement of military force is not necessarily aggression, or aggressor may think the interests at stake for defender deem it unwilling to risk military conflict

Question 16

Credibility of nuclear threats

Answer 16

Debated by Schelling, Jervis, Frank Zagare, Powell

More or less credible if…

• defender and aggressor have equal nuke capability?
• one state in nuclear, one not?
• the target of the nuke is military vs civilian?

Question 17

Measured reciprocation (gradualism???)

Answer 17

Strategy advocate by Huth and Russell Lang

Claim that immediate deterrence rarely results in conflict bc defenders are overly-self-conscious and attackers don’t want to be the bad guy)

“Carrots and sticks” negotiations increase chances of avoiding conflict

Also via firmness on primary issue but flexibility on other issues

(UNLESS there is a long-standing rivalry like Cold War or Israel-Palestine)

Question 18

Reputations and past behavior

Answer 18

Anne Sartori says reps matter (not good evidence)

Hopf - USSR didn’t care about US in the third world cuz it didn’t affect American security commitments in Adia and Europe

Research suggests reps and past behavior are ephemeral (identities constantly changing)

Huth, Hopf, Liberman, Shimshoni, Janice gross stein, Daryl Press

Question 19

Misperception/Miscalculation

Answer 19

Uncertainty is everywhere

Truman in N Korea in 1950 despite Chinese warnings

Usually two types: 1) overconfident attackers trying to take advantage of short term victory, 2) belief that short term gains will lead to quick and favorable settlement

Question 20

Lack of info vs hubris in aggressor

Answer 20

Hubris is more common and more salient than lack of information

Question 21

Deterrence failure

Answer 21

General consensus: the more unfavorable the leader’s assessment of status quo, the more likely deterrence will be tested or undermined

• rational: high costs are acceptable if alternative is loss of power (and if aggressor thinks high costs will arise if it waits to attack)
• psych: agree, but for different reasons

Question 22

Two acceptable conditions for threat of nuclear force

Answer 22

1) against an attacker who also hD nukes

2) against an attacker with superior conventional forces

Question 23

Conclusions from studies about Cold War crises

Answer 23

1) leaders on both sides were sedulous in avoiding nuclear forces
2) leaders did not want to consider flaunting nukes - no playing with fire
3) parties were also hesitant about build ups in conventional forces because of its potential to lead to nuke usage (gateway weapons)

Question 24

Studies of Cold War Crises

Answer 24

Betts - 12 cases of indirect threats from 1948-80

Lebow & Stein - Cuban Missile Crisis ‘62 & Arab-Israeli War of 1973

Frank Harvey - 28 crises bw 1948-1984

Question 25

Cases showing strength of nuclear weapons in immediate, not extended crises

Answer 25

General studies of major power initiation of crises leading to large-scale war

Sino-Soviet crisis behavior in 1969 border clashes and in 79 Sino-Vietnamese War

Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir border

Nuke threats better in high-tension environments than lower ones

Question 26

More research and conclusions

Answer 26

Conventional and nuclear deterrence still salient in modern FP

1) when do reputations form? How? What effect in deterrence? Empirical tests for its causal impact?
2) correct combo of threats and rewards to increase utility of status quo vs military crisis? Which strategies work under which conditions?
3) few studies on general deterrence – how does conflict emerge and erupt into war?
4) deterrence theory generally focuses on state – growing need to incorporate non-state actors

Question 27

How & to what degree do domestic factors shape state behavior?

Answer 27

Recent work suggests three ways:

1) can cause initial challenges to general deterrence
2) can constrain & shape defender’s deterrence to aggressor’s threats
3) influence attackers decision to escalate immediate confrontation into war