Military Deterrence & Statecraft Flashcards
Deterrence vs. conflict resolution
Deterrence seeks to prevent the use of military force to pursue FP goals
Conflict resolution seeks to settle disputes about specific issues
Definition of deterrence
In general: use of threats to persuade an individual not to initiate action
IR: use of threats of military force as retaliation against a possible outcome chosen by aggressor (can include nonmilitary threats)
Types of Deterrence in History
Direct-immediate: Israel’s 1973 threats & military mobilizations against Egypt and Syria (failed)
Direct-general: Israel’s military presence in the Golan Heights region after Six Day War in 1967 to fend off Syria
Extended-immediate: in first Gulf War, when US fended off Iraqi soldiers at Kuwaiti border
Extended-general: US military in S Korea since end of Korean War to fend off North Korea
Two ways to categorize deterrence
Direct - preventing act against own territory
Vs
Extended - preventing attack against another’s territory
And
Immediate - in response to pressing, short term attack
Vs
General - to prevent a crisis that results in armed conflict
Problems in testing success of deterrence
We must look at indirect evidence that deterrence was the causal mechanism in preventing crisis or war
Which evidence counts? How do you rule out other factors?
*** req that if the defender capitulates to the demands of the aggressor in order to evade armed conflict, this is not a win for deterrence
Rational Choice Deterrence
Potential attackers weigh expected utility of using force vs not using force
Elements of expected utility
Value attached to an outcome & likelihood of attaining that outcome
Strategies of dissuasion
Convince the attacker that it will be costly or unsuccessful (Schelling and Robert Powell)
And/or
Give positive inducements (concessions) (Paul Huth, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein)
Contradiction
Best strategy is one in which you threaten the defender to make the cost of aggression very high, while providing enough incentives/concessions to make the status quo seem tolerable p
Critiques of rational choice deterrence theory
1) cognitive and psychological biases in decision making by leaders or small groups
2) problems with command and control in the implementation of policies by military orgs
Cognitive/psychological critics
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Pat Morgan
Attackers can misinterpret the resolve or capabilities of defender
Prospect theory: it’s difficult to deter state leaders who anticipate impending damage (political or military) against the status quo
Command and control critics
Scott Sagan, Bruce Blair, Barry Posen
Shifts focus from individual to org
Leaders can lose control of armies, there is an incentive to strike first, faulty early warning systems impute bad intentions to adversary
Credibility of Conventional threats
Deterrence threat must be credible in order to be successful
Elements of credibility
Defenders military capabilities (high costs for aggressors?)
And
Attacker’s belief that the defender has high resolve to follow through in his threat (is he resolute?)
Importance of military capabilities in the credibility calc
Alexander George, Richard Smoke, John Mearsheimer, Paul Huth agree:
Flexibility, quickness, ability to deny the attacker it’s military objectives
(Esp problematic for extended-immediate deterrence bc of slow movement of forces)
Jonathan Shimshoni, Eli Liberman in same class
Role of resolve in credibility calc
Not as important and capabilities because resolve is difficult to measure
Movement of military force is not necessarily aggression, or aggressor may think the interests at stake for defender deem it unwilling to risk military conflict
Credibility of nuclear threats
Debated by Schelling, Jervis, Frank Zagare, Powell
More or less credible if…
- defender and aggressor have equal nuke capability?
- one state in nuclear, one not?
- the target of the nuke is military vs civilian?
Measured reciprocation (gradualism???)
Strategy advocate by Huth and Russell Lang
Claim that immediate deterrence rarely results in conflict bc defenders are overly-self-conscious and attackers don’t want to be the bad guy)
“Carrots and sticks” negotiations increase chances of avoiding conflict
Also via firmness on primary issue but flexibility on other issues
(UNLESS there is a long-standing rivalry like Cold War or Israel-Palestine)
Reputations and past behavior
Anne Sartori says reps matter (not good evidence)
Hopf - USSR didn’t care about US in the third world cuz it didn’t affect American security commitments in Adia and Europe
Research suggests reps and past behavior are ephemeral (identities constantly changing)
Huth, Hopf, Liberman, Shimshoni, Janice gross stein, Daryl Press
Misperception/Miscalculation
Uncertainty is everywhere
Truman in N Korea in 1950 despite Chinese warnings
Usually two types: 1) overconfident attackers trying to take advantage of short term victory, 2) belief that short term gains will lead to quick and favorable settlement
Lack of info vs hubris in aggressor
Hubris is more common and more salient than lack of information
Deterrence failure
General consensus: the more unfavorable the leader’s assessment of status quo, the more likely deterrence will be tested or undermined
- rational: high costs are acceptable if alternative is loss of power (and if aggressor thinks high costs will arise if it waits to attack)
- psych: agree, but for different reasons
Two acceptable conditions for threat of nuclear force
1) against an attacker who also hD nukes
2) against an attacker with superior conventional forces
Conclusions from studies about Cold War crises
1) leaders on both sides were sedulous in avoiding nuclear forces
2) leaders did not want to consider flaunting nukes - no playing with fire
3) parties were also hesitant about build ups in conventional forces because of its potential to lead to nuke usage (gateway weapons)
Studies of Cold War Crises
Betts - 12 cases of indirect threats from 1948-80
Lebow & Stein - Cuban Missile Crisis ‘62 & Arab-Israeli War of 1973
Frank Harvey - 28 crises bw 1948-1984
Cases showing strength of nuclear weapons in immediate, not extended crises
General studies of major power initiation of crises leading to large-scale war
Sino-Soviet crisis behavior in 1969 border clashes and in 79 Sino-Vietnamese War
Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir border
Nuke threats better in high-tension environments than lower ones
More research and conclusions
Conventional and nuclear deterrence still salient in modern FP
1) when do reputations form? How? What effect in deterrence? Empirical tests for its causal impact?
2) correct combo of threats and rewards to increase utility of status quo vs military crisis? Which strategies work under which conditions?
3) few studies on general deterrence – how does conflict emerge and erupt into war?
4) deterrence theory generally focuses on state – growing need to incorporate non-state actors
How & to what degree do domestic factors shape state behavior?
Recent work suggests three ways:
1) can cause initial challenges to general deterrence
2) can constrain & shape defender’s deterrence to aggressor’s threats
3) influence attackers decision to escalate immediate confrontation into war
