Migration and human security Flashcards
human security definition
CC threatens individual communities by threatening:
IPCC defines human security as “a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity” (Adger et al 2014)
At risk everywhere esp. developing countries.
CC threatens ind. communities by threatening:
- Livelihoods
- Political stability
- Culture
Linking human security and cc
Hard because many socio-economic factors also affecting human security but some links very well documented. CC affects these different dimensions of human security: Economic and livelihood Cultural Armed conflict State Integrity and geopolitical rivalry Migration
Some literature suggests discourse around cc downplays human security element in effort to steer conversation towards state interests rather than interests of the most vulnerable populations.
ECONOMIC AND LIVELIHOOD ELEMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY AND CC
They find that climate change poses significant risks in all these areas and conclude that material aspects of life and livelihood such as food, water, and shelter are closely coupled to weather and climate but also to multiple factors in the economy and society - difficult to attribute cc directly to human security - some major risks well documented.
It is well established that direct risks of climate change to life and livelihoods are highly differentiated by socio- demographic factors, such as by age, wealth, and gender.
There are well-established links from climate variability and change to the stability of agriculture and food security, water stress and scarcity, as well as destruction of property. Projections using various socioeconomic and climate change scenarios indicate an increase in economic and health risks, including loss of lives in all regions as well as a range of psychological stresses accompanying extreme climate events and decreased access to ecosystem resources.
Modeled and observational analysis of human exposure to climate- related natural disasters finds significant risk of large human losses, particularly in countries with significant populations in poverty.
In some cases, adaptations may entrench vulnerabilities and also have the potential to enforce inequalities (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). For example, in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the Andes, and the Caribbean, among other areas, skewed water policy allocation in some cases that favor the affluent may heighten overall livelihood vulnerabilities to climate stress.
example of livelihood assets lost and cc - Household assets such as livestock sold or lost during drought: documented examples are the 1999–2000 drought, Ethiopia, and 1999–2004 drought, Afghanistan (Carter et al., 2007; de Weijer 2007).
Simulated future climate volatility leads to reduced future production of staple grains and increases in poverty (Ahmed et al., 2009).
Changes in the viability of livestock feed crops have an impact on smallholder farmers: maize yields are projected to decline in many regions (Jones and Thornton, 2003; Section 7.4).
SEE CLIMATE JUSTICE SECTION ESP. DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE
(ADGER ET AL 2014)
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY
CULTURE - material and non-material symbols that express collective meaning. Dictates society’s relationship to environment + sig. determinant of responses to cc. Culture embedded in cc - e.g. cultural consumer patterns - influence cc. Cultural expressions for weather risk and need for adaptation to hazards. Many anthropological studies suggest that further significant changes in the natural resource base on which many cultures depend would directly affect the cultural core, world-views, cosmologies, and mythological symbols of indigenous cultures.Culture also interacts with adaptation through the way that cultural, local, and individual perceptions affect narratives of risk, resilience, and adaptive capacity.
A body of research across disciplines argues that incorporation of cultural understanding of environment, risk, and social practices increases the explanatory power of models of risk.
There are a number of anthropological studies that document how some cognitive frames do not perceive a changing climate and hence the concept of climate change itself does not have cultural resonance, whether or not the parameters of climate have been observed. There is a significant body of research that analyses community and collective action for adaptation and generally finds positive outcomes.
Further studies highlight barriers to widespread community responses that result from colonial history (Marino, 2012) and from political and economic globalization
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN SECURITY
Indigenous ppl often framed as victims of cc - Climate change poses challenges for many indigenous peoples, including challenges to post-colonial power relations, cultural practices, their knowledge systems, and adaptive strategies.- but Indigenous, local, traditional forms of knowledge are major resources for adaptation to cc. – natural resource dependent communities, inc. indigenous ppl long history adaptation to change in social / ecological conditions. Indigenous knowledge neglected in policy / research etc. Their mutual recognition and integration in Scientific knowledge increase effectiveness of adaptation.
Some raise the question whether the Western judicial system can uphold indigenous rights in the face of climate change (Williams, 2012) and that there is a need for justice that facilitates adaptation.
Lack of formal participation in international negotiations may pose risks for indigenous peoples because their perspectives are not heard
(Adger 2014)
CONFLICT DIMENSION OF HUMAN SECURITY
evidence of historical collapse of civilisations and empires during periods of climatic change. -e.g.“The timing of the collapse of the Khmer empire in the Mekong basin in the early 15th century corresponds to an unusually severe prolonged drought (Buckley et al., 2010)
These studies all show that climate change can exacerbate major political changes given certain social conditions, including a predominance of subsistence producers, conflict over territory, and autocratic systems of government with limited power in peripheral regions. but causal pathways between cc and increased conflict not fully understood as not enough research / data - historical cases not directly transferable to globalised world. (BUTZER 2012)
“Evidence shows that large-scale violent conflict harms infrastructure, institutions, natural capital, social capital, and livelihood opportunities. Since these assets facilitate adaptation to climate change, there are grounds to infer that conflict strongly influences vulnerability to climate change impacts.” – medium evidence, high agreement.
E.g. Yeman heavily dependent on food imports because cc - increase drought etc. + conflict destruction of clean water supplies and food import supplies –> crisis of human security - a combination. (Mohamed 2017)
Some research to suggest correlation between non-state conflict and changes in rainfall patterns particularly in African pastoral societies - but also lack of research and evidence.
where mitigation / adaptation methods redistribute access to resources can aggregate + create conflict. Armed conflict disrupt markets, destroy infrastructure, limits education + dev. Human capital, causes death injury to workers – decreases ability of ind., state secure credit – conflict creates poverty, constrains livelihoods – increase vulnerability to CC.
(Adger 2014)
STATE INTEGRITY AND GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY AND CLIMATE JUSTICE
Climate change → new challenges to states, challenging conditions of security and national security policies (medium agreement + evidence). Physical aspects CC e.g. sea level rise, extreme events, hydrological disruption → threat / challenge vital transport, water, energy infrastructure. Some states esp. small island and one’s vulnerable sea level rise – experiencing major challenges to territorial integrity.
Transboundary impacts of CC i.e. Sea Ice changes, shared water resources, fish stocks migration – have potential increase rivalry between states – robust institutions can manage many rivalries to limit human security erosion.
Small Island states and countries w low-lying coast – sea level rise, ocean acidification – infrastructure, settlements lost – physical integrity under threat – opening of resources through sea ice loss in Arctic – social, ec., political dimensions – Exclusive Economic Zones location affected – may contribute to conflict over natural resources / boundary locations.
E.g. Tuvalu - coral dead - sea levels encroaching threat to livelihood and territory - storms ‘swallowing the country’. The United Nations Development Programme classifies Tuvalu as a resource poor, “least-developed country”, that is “extremely vulnerable” to the effects of climate change. Porous, salty soil has made the ground almost totally useless for planting, destroying staple pulaka crops and decreasing the yields of various fruits and vegetables. Evacuation is a last resort andEducation and employment prospects on the island are limited, and the majority of young people whose families can afford it leave to study in Fiji, Australia or New Zealand – a “brain drain” that has been extensively documented.Guardian 2019)
6 WAYS TO RETHINK CC MIGRATION
Research needs to capture complex, mobile interconnected nature of cc and migration.
- Research should interrogate relationship between migration and cc, rather then assume causal effect - many other socio-economic, political and climatic factors involved – Difficult to determine influence o migration needs EXAMPLE. – MAYBE LINK TO CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND SYSTEMIC APPROACH.
- Migration as a term doesn’t capture diverse mobility strategies - e.g. temp, seasonal, permanent, short or long distances etc. - shifting focus to climate mobilities - reflects multiplicities and transformative nature of migration, its impact on place of origin, destination and transit.
- climate mobilities should be treated as new normal, rather than exception – movement and migration inherent to highly interconnected world we live in + a standard element of social life – mobility part of range of cc responses. Should ask whether cc will alter existing interconnections and human mobility patterns under different global warming and mitigation and adaptation policies, and how these are in turn shaped by existing mobilities -AGAIN LINK TO JUSTICE.
- Research should go beyond modelling and predicting climate migration - that leads to misinterpretation by policy makers - should shift research to exploring non-linear complexity of mobility in context of climate and social change grounded in evidence.
- Affected populations and indigenous knowledge should be included to build stronger understanding and knowledge base - link TO PROCEDURAL JUSTICE.
- Need shift human security focus from original locations to destination areas -its often the destination place’s response to climate mobility (policies etc.) that determine whether it becomes a humanitarian and political problem.
Policy should not dictate scientific research - research should be critical and evidence seeking so it can actively inform correct policies.
6 WAYS TO RETHINK CC MIGRATION
Research needs to capture complex, mobile interconnected nature of cc and migration.
- Research should interrogate relationship between migration and cc, rather then assume causal effect - many other socio-economic, political and climatic factors involved – Difficult to determine influence o migration needs EXAMPLE. – MAYBE LINK TO CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND SYSTEMIC APPROACH.
- Migration as a term doesn’t capture diverse mobility strategies - e.g. temp, seasonal, permanent, short or long distances etc. - shifting focus to climate mobilities - reflects multiplicities and transformative nature of migration, its impact on place of origin, destination and transit.
- climate mobilities should be treated as new normal, rather than exception – movement and migration inherent to highly interconnected world we live in + a standard element of social life – mobility part of range of cc responses. Should ask whether cc will alter existing interconnections and human mobility patterns under different global warming and mitigation and adaptation policies, and how these are in turn shaped by existing mobilities -AGAIN LINK TO JUSTICE.
- Research should go beyond modelling and predicting climate migration - that leads to misinterpretation by policy makers - should shift research to exploring non-linear complexity of mobility in context of climate and social change grounded in evidence.
- Affected populations and indigenous knowledge should be included to build stronger understanding and knowledge base - link TO PROCEDURAL JUSTICE.
- Need shift human security focus from original locations to destination areas -its often the destination place’s response to climate mobility (policies etc.) that determine whether it becomes a humanitarian and political problem.
Policy should not dictate scientific research - research should be critical and evidence seeking so it can actively inform correct policies.
(BOAS ET AL 2019)
ADAPTIVE MIGRATION - PLURALISING THE DEBATE AROUND MIGRATION AND
(BALDWIN 2017)
Pluralism and multi-dimensional approach to extend research around cc and migration.
Effectiveness of migration as adaptation strategy for an individual depends on how the state responds and if there’s adequate progressive concordance between adaptation and individual capability.”
- assertion that events like Syrian refugee crisis new normal - cc will make these crises worse and Spurr on more - simplistic assertion migration is multi-causal, irreducible to cc and mediated by a manner of social relations.
- Climate mobility multi-causal - need new framing of migration as plural - designates all encompassing nature of cc - mobility relation - it touches all aspects of political, social and cultural life - range of theoretical / methodological ways of interpreting this relation - need more politically engaged readings.
ADAPTIVE MIGRATION - PLURALISING THE DEBATE AROUND MIGRATION AND
(BALDWIN 2017)
Pluralism and multi-dimensional approach to extend research around cc and migration.
Effectiveness of migration as adaptation strategy for an individual depends on how the state responds and if there’s adequate progressive concordance between adaptation and individual capability.”
- assertion that events like Syrian refugee crisis new normal - cc will make these crises worse and Spurr on more - simplistic assertion migration is multi-causal, irreducible to cc and mediated by a manner of social relations.
- Climate mobility multi-causal - need new framing of migration as plural - designates all encompassing nature of cc - mobility relation - it touches all aspects of political, social and cultural life - range of theoretical / methodological ways of interpreting this relation - need more politically engaged readings.
- discursively climate change and migration framed around many conceptual binaries - e.g. : nature–society, local–global, inside–outside, Europe–Orient, and liberalism–militarism - need pluralism understanding to draw on politics of knowledge shaping our understanding of migration. Pluarility allows us to see how discourse marked by a range of political conceptualisations e.g. -inequality, sovereignty, responsibility, neoliberalism, citizenship, race, borders and labourand how it is caught within a tangle of temporalities–pasts, presents and futures.
- pluralism can help us see how the relation between climate change and migration is constituted by a set of under-theorised affects: antipathy (towards migrants), fealty (for one’s own), desire (to see what is not there), solidarity (with those affected) and anticipation (of the coming heterogeneity of climate change).
In short, ‘climate change and migration’ is an encompassing relation which demands to be understood in its plurality. - Migration as an adaptation to cc rather then just caused by cc.
For many years it has also pervaded the migration–development nexus in which migrants are said to be ‘agents of development’. Nowadays adaptive migration is presented as the more progressive option for conceptualising migration in the context of climate change. It tends to treat migration as central and not inimical to contemporary globalised life. It is firmly grounded in human security as opposed to national security. And infits seamlessly within the global remittance economy whose flows to developing countries had an estimated value in 2016 of nearly US$430 billion. All of which suggests that the migration-as-adaptation thesis bears some resemblance to neoliberal political rationality (Felli and Castree 2012;Felli 2012), the biopolitical dimensions of which have been the subject of much recent investigation
(BALDWIN 2017)
