Midterm Study Guide Flashcards
Manifest Destiny
justification for US expansion from coast to coast during Continental Era, 1776-1890s
a) rooted in idea of American exceptionalism
a. i) Winthrop: “city on a hill”
a. ii) however: racism, “White Man’s Burden,” Social Darwinism; forced mass migration of Native Americans
Monroe Doctrine
formulated in response to possibility of interference by European powers in affairs of American continents, especially when South American states were moving toward independence or had already achieved it; also formulated as a result of anti colonial sentiment due to both ideological (US experience as a colony) and economic reasons (colonialism would lead to decreased trade, because most trade would be between mother country and colony)
a) called for end to European colonization and involvement in general in the Americas
b) gave rise to “two spheres” concept in USFP by emphasizing New World v. Old World
c) similar to Washington’s Farewell Address, continued policy of non-US intervention in European affairs; however, unlike Washington’s Farewell Address, declared that US noninvolvement did not extend to Latin America
d) attempt by US to establish itself as regional power
Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine
expanded US involvement in Western Hemisphere (RC is an expansion of MD) –> now, action would be taken if the US deemed it necessary
a) US as “international police power”
b) authorization for use of force to maintain political stability and to ensure free trade in America’s backyard
Open Door Policy
in response to Boxer Rebellion in China and result of primary US concern, free trade
a) deeper significance: changing relationship between President and Congress (McKinley sent 5,000 troops in response to Boxer Rebellion without consulting with Congress first)
George Washington’s Farewell Address
provided general outline for American isolationism:
a) no factional groups (political parties)
b) no sectional divisions (East v. West, North v. West)
c) no international entanglements, especially in Europe
d) no permanent political bonds (alliances) with other countries
Regional Era
1890s-1940s
a) geopolitical position: economic powerhouse (industrial and technological revolution, MNCs) and rising military power (Mahan, all great nations throughout history had control of the seas –> build-up of modern US navy to protect commerce –> Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet”)
b) turning point: McKinley and Spanish-American War
b. i) access to strategic bases in Pacific (however, no political administration of territory) –> nevertheless, rise of anti-imperialism movement (cognitive dissonance; clash with core American values of self-determination)
c) Open Door Policy
d) Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine
e) continuing ambivalence about internationalism
Continental Era
1776-1890s
a) geopolitical position: relatively weak compared to powerful European states; surrounded by territory owned by powerful European countries
b) no entangling alliances and commitments with foreign governments
b. i) Washington’s Farewell Address
b. ii) however, US was willing to go to war to protect its economic interests (e.g. Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, War of 1812 due to British interference with US-French trade and impressment of US sailors)
c) continental expansion, justified by Manifest Destiny
League of Nations
outlined in the last of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, called for an establishment of a collective security organization that would rid the world of balance of power politics and create a new order based on universal principles
a) cooperation among states to stop warfare and regulate conflict
b) troubling to Americans at the time, because if US were to join, it would be permanently involved in international politics –> League of Nations was established for a short time, but without US membership
Wilsonianism
AKA Wilsonian idealism, was an attempt to bring US out from isolationism and onto world state as active participant
a) moral principle should be the guide to US actions abroad
b) old order, based on balance of power and interest politics, must be replaced by an order based on principles and cooperation by all states against international aggression brought about by the US
c) captured in Wilson’s Fourteen Points
c. I) Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at…
c. II) Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas…
c. III) The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among all the nations…
c. IV) Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
c. XIV) A general association of nations must be formed under specific convenience for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen”
part of Roosevelt’s post-WWII plan
a) allies in war must remain allies in peace to preserve global order (US, GB, USSR, China)
a. i) traditional balance of power politics?
b) total defeat and disarmament
c) commitment to preventing future economic depressions and to fostering self-determination for all states
d) establishment of global collective security organization with active US involvement
Truman Doctrine
a) real change in US policy manifested in response to the question of aid to Greece and Turkey (not US tradition to back governments during peacetime; after WWII, the public wanted a return to normalcy and isolationism)
b) based on the argument that (1) nations must choose between two ways of life: free and unfree; (2) threats to freedom affected US security → “we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way”; containment
c) example of US tendency to overemphasize connection between national leftist movements and Soviet backing; tendency to exaggerate Soviet threat
d) official start to Cold War
Kennan’s Long Telegram and X Article
a) inevitable conflict between US (capitalism) and Soviet Union (communism)
a. i) two inherently conflicting ideologies
a. ii) paranoid, expansionist Soviet Union (but cautious: will only expand as long as there are opportunities to do so) → need for containment
b) in memoir, meant political and economic counter-force, not necessarily military containment
b. i) however, interpreted as military containment – Why? The lesson of Munich: appeasement doesn’t work with aggressors (however, agreeing to negotiations wasn’t wrong – what they agreed to at Munich was wrong)
c) alternative viewpoint: historically, Russia concerned about attacks through exposed Western borders and access to warm water port → Soviet Union actions as a result of desire for buffer states as a way of providing protection for heartland
NSC-68
a) background: Berlin Airlift, Soviet Union testing of atomic bomb, Chinese fall to communism
b) marked change in USFP tradition
b. i) significant military spending and buildup during peacetime
b. ii) view of American democracy as a source of weakness (Soviet Union could subvert American public –> significant concern over domestic security)
c) blanket approval for “anything goes”/”ends justify the means” methods
c. ii) defense spending as the number one priority in the federal budget
Massive Retaliation
Part of Eisenhower Doctrine
Cold War Consensus
a) communism is an expansionist force that is determined to convert the entire world to its beliefs
b) communism is a cohesive monolith
c) Soviet Union is at the heart of the communist challenge
d) US is the only nation able to contain communism; containment is the most important USFP goal → massive military spending and build-up
e) appeasement/negotiations will not work
Lesson of Munich
not necessarily agreeing to come to the negotiation table, but the contents of the agreement reached after negotiating
Marshall Plan
a) formally known as the European Recovery Program
b) based on rationale that Western Europe is a key US trade partner (healthy WE economy = healthy US economy)
c) US wants politically stable Europe (would be less susceptible to subversion)
Eisenhower Doctrine
a) more aggressive rhetoric: “rollback of communism,” “massive retaliation” based on overwhelming US nuclear superiority
b) brinkmanship: going to the brink of war to bring about compliance
b. i) however, what happens if Soviet Union calls US bluff?
b. ii) US actions must be in compliance with US rhetoric
c) subscribed to domino theory: US must assist Middle Eastern states that are facing communist subversion
Tet Offensive
a) stark contrast to General Westmoreland’s PR Campaign which resulted in:
a. i) serious credibility gap
a. ii) turning point in US public opinion towards Vietnam
a. iii) loss of perception that President knows best
a. iv) questioning of the worth of US involvement in Vietnam, of US image of benevolence (breakdown of Cold War Consensus)
Dien Bien Phu
a) became clear that French were in serious trouble –> Geneva Convention
1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina
brought about by Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Conference resulted in:
a) ceasefire
b) 17th Parallel (division only temporary; to be resolved by nationwide election in 2 years)
Ho Chi Minh
a) leader of Vietnamese independence movement against French, also leader of North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam)
b) “You will kill ten of our men, but we will kill one of yours, and in the end it is you who will tire.”
Ngo Dinh Diem
a) leader of South Vietnam supported by US
b) highly unpopular; viewed by many South Vietnamese as corrupt and illegitimate
b. i) contrary to agreement reached in Geneva Conference, did not allow nationwide elections because Ho Chi Minh would win
Vietnamization
Part of Nixon Doctrine’s strategy for dignified US withdrawal from Vietnam: equip and train South Vietnamese forces while steadily cutting back on presence of US forces in Vietnam
Post-Vietnam Breakdown of Consensus
see Tet Offensive
Detente
relaxation of tensions (not the same thing as peace)
Nixon Doctrine
a) National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
a. i) the role of NSA reached new heights during this period (“Nixinger”)
b) realpolitik
b. i) “de-ideologized” the Cold War; return to Roosevelt’s thinking
b. ii) détente: relaxation of tensions (not peace)
c) US no longer has total nuclear superiority; reaching parity
c. i) strategic sufficiency concept, concept of mutually assured destruction
c. ii) SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) established ceilings for the building of nuclear weapons
d) acknowledgement of differences between Soviet Union and China → opening towards China (example of realpolitik balancing of China against Soviet Union)
e) Nixon Doctrine
e. i) acknowledgement of lesson of Vietnam War and US limits
Opening to China
a) result of Nixon administration’s acknowledgement of differences between Soviet Union and China → opening towards China (example of realpolitik balancing of China against Soviet Union)
b) possible only due to Nixon’s reputation as a hardliner against communism
Strategic Sufficiency
Part of Nixon Doctrine:
a) US no longer has total nuclear superiority; reaching parity
a. i) strategic sufficiency concept, concept of mutually assured destruction
a. ii) SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) established ceilings for the building of nuclear weapons
Mutually Assured Destruction and the Nuclear Triad
a) US and Russia both had nuclear capabilities in the form of land, sea, and air to prevent 1st strike capability
Carter Doctrine
Carter Administration (1977-1981)
a) first president to stray from containment ideology (at least in first few years)
a. i) less focused on Soviet Union
b) challenged by Iran Hostage Crisis, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan –> change in Carter’s belief system –> Carter Doctrine
b. i) US will use force in Persian Gulf, if necessary
b. ii) Increase in US defense spending
Reagan Doctrine
a) return of containment policy back to its roots
a. i) realpolitik → good v. evil
a. ii) sufficiency → superiority
b) largest peacetime military buildup in history
b. i) winnability of nuclear war
b. ii) Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) –> destabilizing
c) Reagan Doctrine
c. i) US will provide aid to anti-communist guerrilla groups (Iran-Contra Affair)
c. ii) combination of Nixon Doctrine, “rollback” (limits with a rollback vision)
NATO Expansion
a) Post-CW NATO characterized as partnership for peace
a. i) requirements for membership (no conflicts with ethnic minorities, civilian - not military - control of government) → way of transforming countries
b) however, seen by Russia as threatening move; seed for US-Russia problems
b. i) expansion of alliance initially formed to counter Soviet Union to include countries that were under former Soviet control
Clinton Doctrine
a) initial focus on economics (NAFTA)
b) national security strategy of engagement and enlargement
b. i) China: example of increase in use of soft power (encourage change in human rights policy through greater integration in international system), but not abandonment of hard power (at same time, balance against China by renegotiating US friendships with Asian countries; move in US aircraft carriers in response to Chinese threat to bomb Taiwan)
b. ii) expansion of NATO
c) emerging norm of R2P (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo)
Bush Doctrine
Sr. versus Jr.
Preemptive v. Preventative Strikes
a) policy of preemption
a. i) preemptive: legitimate use of force in self-defense against an “imminent threat”
a. ii) preventative: illegitimate use of force against an emerging – but not imminent – threat
a. iii) US is perceived as aggressor not abiding by the rules it expects others to follow
a. iv) also, a danger that other states will follow this model of preemption → increase in global conflict
b) America Unbound
b. i) sense of unrivalled power
b. ii) feeling of both vulnerability and superiority
Realism
a) old realism - core assumptions:
a. i) state-centric: states as black boxes, billiard balls (in essence, unified actors that are the most important influencers of world politics)
a. ii) rationality: states are rational actors that engage in purposeful actions after completing a cost-benefit analysis
a. iii) power: states seek power and perform calculations based on considerations of power
b) 9/11 is a contest between weak and strong in which there is no rightful universal authority
Liberalism
a) essential principle: freedom of the individual –> rights and institutions
b) liberal zone of peace; democratic peace theory
c) impudent aggressiveness
c. i) liberal states invade weak nonliteral states and display exceptional distrust in relations with powerful nonliteral states
c. ii) liberal motives for imperial aggression
d) 9/11 is a failure of the international community to include the weak and address their grievances
Constructivism
9/11 is a consequence of incompatible/insufficiently shared identities
Neoconservatism
a) good v. evil usually articulated in terms of internal characteristics of states
a. i) democracies are good; autocracies are evil
a. ii) it is in US interests to act against ideologically opposing regimes –> US should not shy away from regime change and democracy promotion
a. iii) contrast with classical realist thought, which advocated interested-based pragmatism rather than value-based approaches
b) continuance of US military superiority
b. i) the world fears US retrenchment and isolationism, not US activism and hegemony
b. ii) preponderance of power, rather than traditional balance of power, as route to peace and stability
c) willingness to use force to pursue USFP goals
c. i) “muscular Wilsonianism,” “Wilsonianism on steroids”
d) deep skepticism of ability of international law and institutions to bring about peace and justice
d. i) seen as mechanisms used by weaker states to tie down US
e) One Percent Doctrine
One Percent Doctrine
a) lesson of 9/11: take care of threats early
b) 1PD based on fear of “smoking guns turning into mushroom clouds” (Condoleezza Rice)
b. i) US cannot afford to wait and react after the fact like it did with 9/11 –> even if there’s a 1% chance, must treat it as a 100% chance
Yellowcake from Niger and Aluminum Tubes
a) example of the flimsiness of evidence used to justify 2003 Iraq War
Bureaucratic Politics Model
a) realist assumption of state unity is flawed
a. i) government politics and role theory (where you stand depends on where you sit)
a. ii) organizational process and standard operating procedures (examples: Missile tests and U2 flight during height of Cuban Missile Crisis)
b) Jones:
b. i) organizations as policy actors: an organization’s mission and essence are strong predictors of its policy stand on an issue
Jervis’ Theory about Role of Images
a) people tend to fit incoming information into their preexisting theories and images
b) people are apt to err by being too wedded to their established views and too closed to new information as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories
c) enemy images are particularly powerful
d) tendency to fit incoming information into old theories and disregard information that contradicts established images → misperceptions
Groupthink
a) critique of realist rationalism
b) Solomon Asch Experiment
c) “A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”
Attribution Theory
a) different causal analysis applied to in-group versus out-group for same actions
a. i) in-group = situational (due to circumstances)
a. ii) out-group = dispositional (due to inherent character)
b) stereotyping; reliance on images
Historical Analogies
a) used as a shortcut or substitute for analysis of new situation
b) analogical reasoning
Morgenthau Rational Reenactment
a
BRICS
a
