midterm pol 120 Flashcards

(42 cards)

1
Q

Why do countries trade with one another?

A

Efficiency from specializing; comparative advantage

a. Absolute advantage – costs of producing goods
b. Comparative advantage (Ricardo) – efficiency
gains from specialization
c. Heckscher-Ohlin – abundant and scarce factors
of production. Implications for
supporting/opposing free trade

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2
Q

Who are the domestic winners or losers from free trade?

A

If you have an abundant factor and you are trading, free trade is great

if you have a scarce factor and you are involved in free trade, free trade is terrible

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3
Q

Why do countries restrict trade?

A

To protect domestic groups harmed by free trade; to
provide benefits for politically influential groups.

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4
Q

Tariff =

A

= a tax that is imposed by a government
on imported goods or services.

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5
Q

Quota =

A

Quantitative limit imposed by
government on the amount of a good or
service that may be imported during a period
of time.
(c) Lauren Peritz 2023

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6
Q

subsidy=

A

A sum of money granted by the
government to assist an industry or business
so that the price of a commodity or service
may remain low or competitive.

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7
Q

What is the international consequence of a trade
barrier?

A

If country A has a tariff, it often hurts country B and it can
be inefficient.

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8
Q

How is free trade is an international collective action
problem?

A

Mutual incentive to restrict; collective benefits if everyone
liberalizes trade. Prisoner’s dilemma.
– Solve collective action problem with a free trade TREATY

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9
Q

ABSOLUTE advantage

A

when it can produce a unit of a good with less
labor (or another input) than another country can.

ex US produces 2 computers with $100 inputs
– Brazil produces 1 computer with $100 inputs
– US has an Absolute advantage in producing computers

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10
Q

COMPARATIVE advantage

A

if the opportunity cost
of producing that good in terms of other goods is lower in that country than it is in
other countries.
* Example:
– US produces 2 computers OR 10 pairs of shoes with $100 inputs
– Brazil produces 1 computer OR 10 pairs of shoes with $100 inputs.
– US has comparative advantage in computers: 2 computers:10 shoes = 1:5
– Brazil has comparative advantage in shoes: 1 computer:10 shoes = 1:10

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11
Q

Heckscher-Ohlin

A

A country will have a comparative advantage in, and thus will tend to export, those goods whose production requires the intensive use of the factor of production that that country
has in relative abundance.

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12
Q

H-O Implications

A

What happens if I own the abundant factor of production and my country allows free trade?
– (unskilled) worker in Bangladesh
– Farmer in US

What happens if I own the abundant factor of
production and my country allows free trade?
– (unskilled) worker in Bangladesh
– Farmer in US
* Free trade is GREAT!
– Bangladesh: worker wages go up*
– US: price of cotton goes up

What happens if I own the scarce factor of
production and my country allows free trade?
– (unskilled) worker in US
– Farmer in Bangladesh

What happens if I own the scarce factor of
production and my country allows free trade?
– (unskilled) worker in US
– Farmer in Bangladesh
* Free trade is TERRIBLE!
– US: worker wages go down
– Bangladesh: price of cotton goes down

Owners of abundant factors should promote free
trade.
– Owners of scarce factors should oppose free
trade.

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13
Q

Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A

in a country that specializes in production of a given
good, the owners of the relatively abundant factor of
production in that country will experience a gain in
their returns and real incomes as a result of trade
liberalization, and the owners of the relatively scarce
factor of production will sustain a drop in their
returns of real incomes

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14
Q

International Cooperation Problem

A

International collective action problem of
FREE TRADE is like the canonical Prisoner’s
Dilemma
1. Collective benefits from cooperating on free trade
2. Individual incentive to “cheat” = restrict trade
+ Uncertainty about what the other country will do

Countries collectively benefit from free trade.
– Mutual gains from specialization according to
comparative advantage
2. A single country can benefit from a trade barrier,
provided all other countries maintain open trade
– Individual countries sometimes want to restrict trade
(e.g. sugar quota helps US)
– Trade barriers by country A hurt country B
* Specifically: hurt foreign producers (e.g. Mexican farmers
who export sugar to US)

Countries are UNCERTAIN about what their
trading partners will do.
* How do they solve this problem? Reduce
uncertainty.
– Create a free trade agreement
* clearly establishes standards
* provides enforcement

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15
Q

What are some ways that countries restrict trade?

A

Trade barriers include tariffs, subsidies and quotas.
* Trade barriers typically benefit a specific set interest
group or industry (e.g. farmers, steel manufacturers

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16
Q

Which interest groups are best at getting trade
protection from their government?

A

Groups that mobilize and act collectively
– Groups that spend money on lobbying

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17
Q

Increasing exposure to trade can hurt some groups.
They are likely to mobilize and demand trade
protection.
– Does this lead to class conflict or urban-rural conflict?

A

Depends on the factor endowments.

18
Q

When developing countries democratize, they are
likely to adopt more liberal trade policies. Why?

A

Expansion of the selectorate increases demand for trade
liberalization.

19
Q

Many kinds of trade barriers

A

Tariff
– Production Subsidy
– Import Quota
* Often, trade barriers advantage certain groups (e.g.
farmers, steel manufactures) at the expense of other
groups (e.g. taxpayers, foreign producers).

20
Q

Domestic Collective Action

A

Public goods
– Non-excludable – goods no one can be prevented
from consuming for free.
* E.g. national defense, law and order, public radio…
lobbying by an interest group
* Free-Rider problem
– Non-excludability creates incentives to “free-ride”
– When people free-ride, the desired good is under-
produced or not produced at all.

21
Q

Solutions to the Free Rider Problem?

A

Exclusivity: Smaller groups are better at
overcoming free-rider problem.
* Lower organizational costs
* Bigger impact of individual’s contribution
2. Privileged Groups: Some members benefit more
than others.
* Benefits are concentrated so members that gain most may
provide good even if others free ride.
* E.g. oligopolistic (concentrated) industries

22
Q

Collective Action & Demand for Foreign
Economic Policy

A

Interest group politics
– Government policies that benefit a group do not
differentiate between individuals in that group.
* E.g. tariff of steel imports or a subsidy to sugar growers.
* Political influence
– Explains why producers tend to be organized while
consumers are not.
– Explains why government faces strong pressure for
protection from import-competing industries but
weak pressure from consumers.

23
Q

Preferences + Political Influence à Policy

A

Domestic winners and losers from trade
– Reflect factors of production
– Generates preferences
* Who has more political influence?
– Group that can better overcome collective action
problems

24
Q

Rogowski (1987)

A

Q: What are the political effects of increasing
exposure to trade?
* A: Increasing exposure to trade affects
political cleavages (who allies with whom).
The particular cleavages depend on relative
factor abundance.

add rural conflict and class conflict

25
Liberalization of Trade Policy
Why have developing countries adopted more liberal trade policies? a. Economic crisis b. International pressure c. Political leaders d. Democratization Milner and Kubota (2005)
26
Liberalization of Trade Policy: Milner & Kubota’s Explanation
Democratization i. Transition to democracy means previously disenfranchised groups become voters ii. These new groups of voters benefit from trade liberalization iii. Political leaders need support so they liberalize trade policy to ensure survival
27
Could some other thing be causing both democratization and trade liberalization? * What prompted democratization in the first place
Economic crisis – International pressure – Ideology
28
International Investment
Bilateral investment treaties, credible commitment B. expropriation risk in democracy v. autocracy C. and trade
29
incentives: Why do “host” countries sign bilateral investment treaties? Why do “home” countries sign bilateral investment treaties?
bring in jobs & money, Sending governments (investors’ home country) sign BITS to help corporations based within their borders -tax revenue & prevent capital flight
30
what is expropriation ?
Expropriation occurs when a public government agency takes private property for a purpose deemed to be in the public interest private property can be owned by both entities both within and outside the country Risk of expropriation deters foreign investors example Cuba confiscated property from US companies
31
Bilateral investment treaties are commitments to provide a safe investment environment. – Why is the commitment credible? * Why is foreign direct investment at risk of expropriation?
bilateral investment treaties - International agreements between countries that establish terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one country in the jurisdiction of another. What do BITs cover? * Expropriation * Legal treatment * FDI admission * Settlement of disputes
32
What are some features that make a “host” country a safe environment for foreign direct investments (FDI)?
Democratic institutions, checks and balances. – Strong property rights. – Rule of law
33
Why do we see more expropriation of FDI by autocracies than by democracies?
Some autocratic leaders have greater incentive to expropriate and face fewer constraints
34
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Agreements between countries that establish terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one country in the jurisdiction of another.
35
Expropriation
occurs when a public government agency takes private property for a purpose deemed to be in the public interest - examples - seizure and redistribution of land - nationalization of oil industry
36
Elkins Guzman & Simmons (2006)
Argument BITs proliferated because host countries are competing with each other for limited supply of FDI from rich countries. How? BITs are credible commitments to treat foreign investors fairly. Why are BITs credible commitments? a. Clarify – BIT raises ex post cost of reneging on contracts by reducing the ambiguity of host government’s obligations b. Obligation – BIT raises ex post cost of reneging by formalizing legal arrangements which states are bound to follow under international law c. Enforcement – BIT raises ex post cost of reneging by establishing enforcement mechanisms including arbitration tribunals which award monetary damages. Key findings: – Developing “host” countries sign BITs with industrialized countries to attract foreign capital – strong evidence for competition mechanism; host countries rush to secure advantage over one another * Criticisms of research: – Some BITs between pairs of developing countries don’t fit story – Hard to account for broader political and cultural environment
37
Expropriation Risk & Institutions
“Host” countries especially want to attract foreign capital. * There is risk host countries may expropriate foreign investment. * Does the risk depend on domestic institutions? * MNCs want to reduce risk. Do they avoid investing in places with “bad” institutions?
38
How does government make credible commitment to follow the rules?
“Tying hands” through: * Executive constraints * Checks and balances * Party competition Democracies - Many political constraints Autocracies - Few political constraints
39
Li (2009
Does the severity of expropriation risk depend on domestic institutions? * Expropriation risk depends on domestic institutions: – Democratic host governments à lower risk – Autocratic host governments à higher risk MNCs want to reduce risk. Do they avoid investing in places with “bad” institutions? * MNCs should avoid investing in autocracies and pursue investments in democracies.
40
Democracy and FDI
Developing countries especially want to attract foreign capital. Risk of expropriation. * Severity of the risk depends on domestic institutions – political constraints help protect property rights – Democracy à low risk – Autocracy à high risk * leaders with long v. short time horizons * Rational MNCs avoid investing in places with “bad” institutions. – Selection bias strengthens Li’s findings
41
Trade and Security
Countries create trade agreements to set common rules for trade policy and resolve the international cooperation problem (PD) * Trade agreements have broader diplomatic goals like international security. how? – direct path = bargaining, diplomacy – indirect path = economic interdependence (c) Lauren Peritz
42
Mansfield & Pevehouse (2000) theory
Indirect path * Trade agreements (PTA’s) help countries maintain low tariffs * So countries trade more which brings economic benefits (recall comparative advantage) * Economic benefits reduce chance of military conflict among trade partners – conflict jeopardizes economic benefits; more to lose! Direct path * Countries create trade agreements with dispute settlement mechanisms * Resolve economic disputes before they escalate and damage political relations * Provide forum for bargaining and negotiation = cooperative norms Evidence lends support to both mechanisms 1. For states that do not belong to the same PTA, more tradeà slightly lower risk of military conflict (economic effect) 2. For states that belong to PTA, more trade à much lower risk of military conflict (diplomatic effect) Criticism: Reverse causality (c) Lauren Peritz