MIDTERM 2 Flashcards
1
Q
What are cultural theories of politics? What claims do they make? (2)
A
Place societal values rather than material interests at the center of analysis
Claim 1: There is no such thing as objective interests - dominant identity of society shapes how people perceive their interests
Claim 2: Expect different cultures to contain different values and different ways of seeing the world (what’s best, what’s rational etc.)
2
Q
What are the levels of political culture? (3)
A
System level: Do citizens identify with the nation and accept the general form of government? (Pride in the nation, national identity, legitimacy of government)
Process level: What do you think is expected of you as a citizen? Perceptions of political rights; one’s involvement in the political process.
Policy level: What should be appropriate role of the government, govt. priorities? Should the state be “big” of “small”? Govt. policy priorities
3
Q
What is political culture?
A
Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. We have found it useful to refer to this as political culture
4
Q
What are the types of political culture? (Patterns that describe the citizen’s role in the political process) (3)
A
A participant is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects.” Involved in politics, makes demands on govt, grants support to political leaders based on performance. Democracies.
“A subject tends to be cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary.” Passively obeys the law, does not vote or actively engage in politics. Monarchies, autocracies.
The parochial tends to be unaware, or dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects.” Ignores politics and its impact on one’s life, often rural, illiterate. Traditional societies, autocracies.
5
Q
What are strengths of the political culture concept? (1)
A
Focus on individuals and their beliefs; explains variation in economic / political outcomes that cannot be explained by economic interests or institutional factors.
6
Q
What are weaknesses of the political culture concept? (6)
A
Implicit western cultural and ideological bias
Maybe culture is a product of structure and institutions (no independent effect on outcomes)
How can we measure political culture empirically? Survey questions may not be equally meaningful in different cultural contexts; national surveys disregard sub-groups
Is any society homogeneous enough for there to be a common culture?
Mechanisms by which political culture supposedly influences behavior and political outcomes are insufficiently specified and the concept becomes a catch-all explanation for what can’t be explained by other factors / variables
Can’t explain political changes, especially in one country, when culture has not changed.
7
Q
What is social identity? Author?
A
Social identity is a notion of “us” vs. “them” which varies along two dimensions:
Content and contestation
Abdelal et al.
8
Q
What is an example of a collective/ social identity? Author? (5)
A
A deep sense of rural identity rooted in the belief that rural communities are economically neglected and culturally misunderstood
The consciousness manifests as resentment toward urban areas (us v them)
Political identity can supersede economic interest when it comes to voting behaviour
low-income voters who benefit from government redistribution vote against it (conservative)
less redistribution support among middle-class voters than in comparable countries
Cramer
9
Q
What is content with relation to identity?
A
Who is in the group
Boundaries of membership, Group’s perception of itself
Group’s goals
Habitual courses of action
10
Q
What is logic of habituation?
A
Individuals who hold the identities act them out without evaluating every choice/option/decision; they act predictably.
11
Q
What is civil society?
A
A realm of organized citizen activity that is autonomous of the state
12
Q
Why is civil society important? (3)
A
Local organizations can contribute to social and economic development
Strong multi-ethnic associations can reduce ethnic conflict
Promotes democracy by providing organization behind democratic movements, (keep state office holders accountable) and by fostering democratic values
13
Q
Where does civil society come from? (3)
A
- Modernization theory: product of industrialization, led to a larger middle class with more resources to participate in civic life
- Product of liberalism: Centred on individual rights (individual activity outside state control), tolerance, and pluralism, (many groups exist, compete, and flourish)
Communist regimes had a state that dominated society (post-communist states had weak civil societies) - Institutional theories: product of the political rules of the game (laws, regulations) Different regimes have laws suppressing / protecting independent associational life (e.g. tax laws, laws on unionization, etc.)
14
Q
Explain the variation between northern and southern Italy in terms of civil community.
A
Civic community in the North
Uncivic community in the South
Difference rooted in collective action problem (CAP): everyone will be better off if everyone cooperated, but each individual has an incentive not to cooperate
(related to levels of interpersonal trust)
Two equilibriums possible:
All cooperate and we get a civic community (Northern Italy)
No one cooperates and we get amoral familism (Southern Italy)
15
Q
How do we get good governance? Author? (5)
A
Civil society creates social capital
Dense infrastructure of civic organizations (generalized trust, less free riding / collective action problems, civic community, and political trust in institutions.)
Social capital: “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”
Once reciprocity and cooperation are established, social capital develops, the process becomes self-enforcing
Social capital, which makes collective action possible in turn enables good institutional performance by the government.
Putnam
16
Q
Where does civil society come from? Author?
A
Strong civil society is a product of history (not liberalism/ industrialization)
Putnam
17
Q
What are the critiques of Putnam’s model? (3)
A
- Sweeping path dependent claim. Patterns of civic community that emerged in the 12th century persisted. The mechanisms by which civic community is reproduced over time is not clear
- Putnam bottom-up argument (state institutions shaped by civil society). Joiners have higher levels of generalized trust (could be selection effect, not causal)
Stolle and Rothstein: Effective state leads to trust, leads to civic participation, leads to stronger civil society - Some associations actually aim to create generalized distrust (KKK, Nazis, etc.)
18
Q
How do clean state institutions produce generalized trust and social capital? Author?
A
Strong correlation between perceived effectiveness and absence of corruption in the courts, police, and army and attitudes of generalized trust
Stolle and Rothstein
19
Q
What is Gellner’s point? Who disagrees?
A
Nations are a product of modern industrial societies requiring a unified “high culture” to support a mobile, literal workforce
Smith
20
Q
What is the critique of Gellner? Who critiques him?
A
Nations are rooted in shared histories, memories, and symbols (cannot be entirely constructed)
Smith
21
Q
What is an ethnic group?
A
A group whose members share a subjective belief in a common ancestry (ascriptive characteristic(s) like race, language, religion, etc.)
Primarily cultural (no political aspirations and claims to a territory)
22
Q
What is a nation (3)? Author?
A
A community of sentiment which could which normally tends to produce a state of its own. ( Weber )
An imagined political community both inherently limited and sovereign. (Anderson)
Often but does not always, based on an ethnic group (States and nations are not always congruent) (Gellner). Some nations do not have states, some states contain more than one nation
23
Q
What is nationialism (2)? Author?
A
Ideology that humanity is divided into nations, and each nation is entitled to govern itself in its own state
“A political principle that holds that the political and national units should be congruent” (Gellner)
24
Q
What are nation-states? Examples?
A
Borders of the nation and the state are largely congruent
Frnace, Italy, Poland
25
What are multi-national states? Examples?
More than one nation lives in a state
USSR, Yugoslavia, Canada
26
What are multi-ethnic states? Examples?
More than one ethnic group lives in a state (but groups do not express political aspirations for self-rule)
USA
27
What are stateless nations? Examples?
Nations without states
Basques, Catalans, East Europeans before WWI
28
What are nations larger than one state?
Part of the nation lives outside of the state
Germans before unification, Hungarians after Trianon Treaty, Russians after 1991
29
What are the types of ways nations relate to states (5)?
Nation-states
Multi-national states
Multi-ethnic states
Stateless nations
Nations larger than one state
30
What are classical approaches to ethnicity (2)?
Modernization/melting pot theories: ethnic IDs are “traditional”, will disappear with modernization
Marxism: ethnicity is “false consciousness”, will disappear with communism
31
What are the problems with classical approaches to ethnicity?
Ethnicity has not disappeared in developed industrialized societies, and in some cases re-emerged & grew in political importance.
It did not disappear after 80 yrs of communism in the USSR either and eventually contributed greatly to the system’s collapse
32
What is primordialism (3)? What are it's implications?
There is a basic human need to belong to a permanent group and people divided long ago by language, culture long ago
Ethnic identities are always there & are more robust and powerful than other identities
Ethnic IDs are inherent and fixed, not socially constructed
Implications: pessimistic about going away with ethnic divisions and foresees conflict in multicultural societies
33
What are problems with primordialism (3)?
Ethnic IDs are more fluid than primordialists assume
Many ancient & deeply rooted IDs are relatively new
Multiple potential primordial attachments, why only some get picked?
34
What is instrumentalism? What are its implications (3)?
Ethnicity is an individual strategic choice, a means to other (political/economic) ends
Implications: Ethnic identity and ethnic group membership is very fluid
Ethnic conflicts are “really” about power and money but dressed in ethnic clothing
Ethnic conflict should be less enduring
35
What are problems with instrumentalism (2)? Examples?
Ethnic identities are more stable & enduring than instrumentalists would predict
Hard to explain why individuals would ever choose a “losing” ethnic identity
E.g. Fluctuation in indigenous ethnic identity in Canada
36
What is the constructivist (modernist) view (4)? Author?
Ethnicity/ethnic ID is not fixed or inherent in society but constructed – a product of social, political, and/or institutional context.
Once ethnic/national identity is constructed, it is usually enduring
Conflict in multi-ethnic societies is possible but not inevitable
Modern nations formed relatively recently (~late 18th century on)
Gellner
37
How did nations appear (5)?
Until modern period nations as we know them today did not exist (Commoners had only local/ tribal/ religious etc identities)
Nation was an elite concept, often not based on common language or culture
Emergence of modern states and economic and industrial progress calls for the creation of nations
State elites create nations through mass schooling, printing, conscription (standardized worforce/ army/ language); ideology of nationalism fosters national IDs and nations.
Once people start thinking of themselves as belonging to such communities, nations are born
38
What is the smith Gellner debate?
Are modern nations formed around some pre-existing (primordial) ethnic/cultural core, i.e. a “navel”?
Smith: yes
Gellner: no. Primordial “navel” is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for modern nations to exist
39
Primordialism:
How old are nations?
Where did nations come from?
Did states or nations come first?
Did nations or nationalism come first?
What is the role of language and culture?
From time immemorial
They are a natural phenomenon of humanity
Nations
Nations come first and when they awaken, they create nationalism
Nations are built on specific culture and language
40
Constructivism:
How old are nations?
Where did nations come from?
Did states or nations come first?
Did nations or nationalism come first?
What is the role of language and culture?
Relatively recent
Nations are a product of modernity
States precede and create nations
Nationalism is an ideology that invents nations
The cultural basis of many
nations was created in the process of nation-building; pre-existing cultures/languages were often obliterated in this process
41
Why was there a spike in liberal democracy in 1950 in Western Europe and the US right after? Author?
The establishment of Constitutional Courts in Western Europe after World War II
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada.
Civil rights movement in the US after Brown vs Board of Education (USSC ruled school segregation by race unconstitutional (overturned 1896 ruling of legalized segregation). An explosion in civil rights cases followed) (EPP)
42
What are the processes which brought about greater civil and political rights in established democracies?
Rights revolution and judicialization of politics
43
What is the rights revolution?
Expanded litigation by civil society groups, expanded rights protection by the courts, and/or constitutionalization of rights.
All constitutions contain provisions for personal, civil and political rights, but only some contain provisions for socio-economic rights and equality rights
44
What are personal rights(4)?
Right to life and dignity (e.g. abortion, death penalty, sexual orientation)
Freedom of religion
Right to privacy (e.g. right to secret correspondence, personal data; inviolability of the home; inviolability of the person)
Right to habeas corpus (fundamental freedoms or legal rights, as in Canadian Charter).
45
What are civil rights (4)?
Freedom of movement (mobility rights)
Freedom of association, assembly (limited for unconstitutional, anti-systemic organizations that promote hatred)
Freedom of expression, press, conscience (hate speech exception).
Can be called democratic rights.
46
What are political rights (3)?
Citizenship rights
Voting rights.
Also democratic rights
47
What are socio-economic rights (6)?
Right to social welfare, work, education, healthcare, children’s rights, maternity rights
48
What are equality rights (2)?
Minority and linguistic rights
e.g. Canada
49
What is Waldron's side of the normative debate about the constitutionalization/ judicialization of rights (5)? Why does he lose/win?
Waldron:
We need democratic political competition to interpret the scope of rights.
People should participate in interpreting rights and their hierarchy.
Rights are belief that ordinary people should be able to decide how to live their life and everyone is equally capable of deciding.
By delegating interpretation to unelected judges, we negate the rationale for rights.
Both ways can produce “right” and “wrong” decisions. Democratic way produces them by protecting democratic right (preferable)
Dworkin’s position has de facto won the day because rights have been constitutionalized/judicialized.
50
What is Dworkin's side of the normative debate about constitutionalization/ judicialization of rights (4)? Why does he lose/win?
Rights should be protected by the constitution and courts.
Must be insulated from democratic political competition.
If we entrust the community to watch them, rights of a minority will be violated.
When rights are tied to the legal system, they gain more prominence in public life.
Dworkin’s position has de facto won the day because rights have been constitutionalized /judicialized.
51
What are the components of the judicialization of politics (2)? Author?
Global expansion of the policy-making power of judges at the expense of politicians and/or administrators
Judicial decision-making methods spread to institutions in the other two branches of government; legal discourse penetrates political discourse
Vallinder
52
In what ways is there a global expansion of the policy making power of judges at the expense of politicians and/or administrators (3)? Author?
Courts engage more in striking down existing laws and policies
Courts deliver “strict guidelines of interpretation”, i.e. a law is constitutional only if it is interpreted as the court says
Courts signal to legislatures what laws and policies should not be passed because they wouldn’t pass constitutional muster (corrective revision process) and sometimes require legislatures and executives to find policy solutions to problems courts identify
Vallinder
53
In what ways do judicial decision-making methods spread to institutions in other two branches of government; legal discourse penetrates political discourse (3)? Author?
Bargaining has to be in the open, not behind closed doors, as it used to be.
Judicial emphasis on ascertaining the truth trumps political emphasis on compromise solutions. So policy choices have to be presented as “the right choice”, rather than the “compromise choice”. Legal discourse is rule-laden, political discourse is interest-laden (the politically possible solution that maximizes everybody’s interests).
Majoritarian principle (the legislative majority can push through its interests) gives way to “negative freedom” principle, i.e. legislatures now have to shelter the fundamental rights of citizens
Vallinder
54
What is evidence of the juidicialization of politics (5)?
Constitutional Courts popping up everywhere around the world since 1945 and then after 1991.
Constitutional Courts becoming more and more powerful and relevant to policy-making process
Policy process-tracing lets us see how much legislators pay attention to constitutional argument (autolimitation process).
All executive agencies have jurists working on draft bills, decrees, acts.
Administrative tribunals popping up in every corner of the state bureaucracy to solve disputes. More adjudication, less administration.
55
Why did rights revolution/judicialization happen (3)? (evolutionist theories)
Elections allowed Nazis in power; Communists reject strong courts; result was WWII and oppression in Eastern Europe. So maybe strong courts would enforce and protect rights the best.
Constitutional guarantees of individual rights and judicial independence. New activist judges willing to use constitutional provisions to transform society.
Gradual rise of rights consciousness in popular culture
56
Why did rights revolution/judicialization happen (6)? (strategic actor theories)
Different political actors seek to maximize their own interests, judicialization or rights expansion is a product
Opposition:
1) ineffective executives are begging the opposition to take them to court over their bad policies;
2) decline of legislative power/ domination of the executive over parliament (party discipline), for opposition to have influence on policy-making must take government to court (parliamentary regimes)
Incumbents:
1) blame deflection mechanism for no-win policies;
2) empower the courts and make them more independent (tying hands). Goal is to constrain future incumbents
Organized interest groups (Epp 1999): these groups see that courts can be useful for getting their interests represented; litigation proliferates; judicialization and rights revolution.
Lawyers: wanna make more money, so explosion of rights petitions
Judges: what to enhance their institution’s stature and international prestige
57
Explain the communist regime collapse (4)?
1985: Gorbachev reforms weakening the center’s domination over the outer empire (Soviet bloc) and the inner empire (USSR)
1989: Gorbachev decided against suppressing Eastern Europe which collapsed in 6 months, and soviet Union started fraying next
09/1991: Soviet elites tried to end the process by attempting a coup against Gorbachev but failed.
12/1991: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus disbanded the USSR
58
Whta is Gorbachev's impact on the USSR (5)?
Gorbachev became Secretary General of CPSU: March 1985
Gorbachev had a typical Soviet party cadre career: rose through the ranks of the CPSU; first Soviet leader of a post-Stalinist generation.
Something had to be done, but no sense of impending collapse. Main problems: aging leaders, corruption, declining economy, cynicism and malaise within society, stalemated war.
No sense of doom, of impeding loss of arms race to US, of economic collapse worse than the general deep dysfunction or of population pressure for democratization.
Gorbachev was NOT interested in moving away from Communism. Did not want to liberalize, but to improve the way the regime worked. Increase economic efficiency, people’s belief and enthusiasm and thus speed up development.
59
What was Gorbachev's goal and domestic reforms(4)?
Goal: root out mismanagement and corruption; improve economy
1) purge of corrupt bureaucrats;
2) emphasis on scientific and technological innovation;
3) a bit of price liberalization;
5) small cooperatives legalized.
60
What were the results of Gorbachev' domestic reforms (2)?
Not many results
1) People start driving their private cars as taxis (bad taxi service) and started very small private businesses to provide some variety in bad consumer goods situation.
2) Population seemed to perceive perestroika as just the latest fad and there was a lot of foot-dragging and skepticism.
61
What is Glasnost goal amnd implementation(2)? Results?
Goal: convince society that perestroika is necessary and then society pushes elites to implement it through
1) freer press
2) decision to abolish censorship (Jan 87); previously banned books, films released; “blank spots” in official history start being filled.
Results:
Societal excitement grows over historical and identity discussions mostly, not really on how to fix the future.
62
What was Demokratizatsiya's goal? Implementation? Results?
Goal: increase legitimacy of regime by giving more real power to the legislatures at all levels, because they represent society.
How: introduce competitive (NOT multiparty) elections in 1989 to reflect debate in society
Result: with glasnost, the legislatures really become loci of intense public discussion and debate. Even though there are no parties besides the CPSU, factions appear and even if in the initial period they do not call for abolishment of Communism, their positions are ideologically diverse.
63
What did Gorbachev's reform unleash which he did not expect (3)?
Glasnost provokes mobilization around national identity. Initially, demonstrators didn’t want the USSR to collapse; they wanted things from the party. But glasnost altered the boundaries of what was possible.
1987-1988: Nationalism appears on agenda.
Gorbachev fears that granting one border change may trigger hundreds of others so he refuses to go down that road.
64
What is the national mobilization tidal wave? What is the relationship between Glasnot and mobilization?
1988-1989: many States went through national mobilization
First glasnost, then mobilization. Gorbachev instituted Glasnot because he was sure nationalism was not even a potential, let alone immediate danger.
65
What characterizes the slow changes in Poland and Hungary?
Hungary: slow changes from above (Party allowed opposition to legally demonstrate, plan of multi-party system)
Poland: slow changes from below (general strikes, seats in the senate voted contestable)
66
What is Gorbachev's sinatra doctrine (4)?
1989: Eatern Europe clamoring for increased autonomy
USSR would’ve had to resort to repression to keep Central Europe in line. Gorbachev had enough problems at home and with Afghanistan to get into new invasions.
He signaled to Eastern Europe that they can do things “their way”
Eastern European communist regimes collapsed in the next few months.
67
What are competing and complementary theories of communism's collapse (5)?
Economic dysfunction
Western pressure
Societal pressure for democratization
Gorbachev’s reforms (glasnost, perestroika, and democratization) lifted suppression of national identity and history of memory unleashed national identity mobilization.
Gorbachev decided against rerepression and the empire collapsed as both Eastern Europe and Soviet republics fled the center.
Gorbachev subscribed to this theory. He said that he believed in the Soviet claim that class identity had replaced national identity.
68
What are the theories of democratization? Authors?
Modernization theory, that economic development fosters democratization (Lipset)
Historical contingencies and institutions, with economic development instead as a side effect of democratization (Acemoglu et al.)
Social conditions and increasing equality (Tocqueville)
Economic inequality from a growing middle class (Ansell et al.)
69
What are the communist regime legacy claims (strong and weak)? What are the mechanisms? What are examples?
Strong claim:
communist regime means no democracy
Weak claim:
harsh communist regime means democracy fails
milder communist regime means democracy succeeds
Mechanism: no alternative elites in the harsh regimes (demagogues, priests and colonels), destroyed cleavages, (which produced competitive politics after collapse).
Empirical test: Yugoslavia had the mildest regime
70
What is the decentralized authority tradition claim? What are its mechanisms (and underspecified)? What are examples?
No bourgeoisie means no democracy; no market means no democracy
Mechanism: A history of accepting constraints on power means elites would accept democratic institutions
Under-specified mechanism: how would this lead to people voting Communists out of office during first elections?
Empirical test: Baltics belong to European tradition, that’s why they’re so diff from other FSU
71
What is the Habsburg factor claim? What is the mechanism? What are examples?
Claim: Habsburg history of constitutionalism and bureaucratic rectitude means democracy
Mechanism: Elites used to accepting constraints means willing to accept democratic competition
Empirical test: Croatia and Slovakia had more serious problems during 1990s than Baltics and Poland who were part of Russian Empire (the antithesis of rule of law).
72
What is the pre communist experience with democracy or statehood claim? What is the mechanism? What are examples?
Claim: if you had a state/democracy before, you’d have democracy afterwards.
Mechanism: as Linz and Stepan argued, having a state is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation
Empirical test: mixed results
73
What are cultural and ideational explanantions of democracy (3)?
Religion
Claim: Protestantism=full democracy; Catholicism=some democracy; Orthodoxy=no democracy
Mechanism: Orthodoxy subordinates religion to the state, so state is omnipotent and democratic controls are alien
Empirical test: Fish shows there’s no association between Orthodoxy and failed democracy; Explanation fails to account for Russia-Belarus-Ukraine-Moldova difference
End of history (Fukuyama)
Democracy became the only game in town because communism lost the ideational debate. Can’t explain variation.
Return to Europe
Claim: More “European” culture means more democracy
Mechanism: Communism was imposed on Eastern Europe through Soviet occupation, so states rejected the regime and embraced democracy to reclaim their place in Europe.
Empirical test: correlation holds, but cannot be conclusively attributed to cultural issues or explain variation within groups.
74
What is the role of the EU as a club of democracies? Author?
Passive leverage (Vachudova)
Claim: the greater the attractiveness of the role model, the greater the desire to emulate it. EU was attractive to post-Communist countries, so countries emulated It and democratized as a result.
75
What are benefits of EU membership?
1) democratic stability and marker of the return to Europe many craved.
2) market access essential to the success of market-building economic reforms: without EU membership, have to adjust to EU rules to sell their products there but would not benefit from participating in rule-making.
3) regulate relations with powerful neighbours through a desirable set of clear and well-established rules.
76
What are costs of exclusion from the EU?
1) lost FDI and other economic benefits; 2) less security;
3) less administrative reforms
The period of passive leverage lasted from 1989 to 1994
77
What is the problem with passive leverage? What is empirical evidence? Author?
Passive leverage not powerful enough to counteract domestic obstacles to democratization; only reinforced domestic trajectories headed in right direction.
If passive leverage explained variation, would find who did not democratize quickly did not think that the EU was that great, while who democratized thought highly of the EU. Empirical evidence largely disproves this hypothesis.
Vachudova
78
What is the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession (5)?
Formal requirements non-negotiable, uniformly applied and closely enforced. Meritocratic process for enlargement
Stable institutions that guarantee: Democracy; Rule of law; Human rights; Minority rights; Functioning market economy that can cope with competitive pressure
Applicants invited to start accession negotiations to join EU must adopt the Acquis Communautaire (“Negotiations” are screening)
When the EU is satisfied that reforms are complete, chapter is closed. When all chapters are closed, country formally joins the EU.
EU conditionality enlargement process starts.
79
What is the claim regarding EU conditionality leading to democratization through active leverage (2)? What is the mechanism (2)?
Claim: EU conditionality Copenhagen criteria caused democratic consolidation.
Nationalist pattern regimes resisted EU passive leverage. Liberal pattern regimes started moving towards the EU even during passive-leverage period. Active leverage made nationalist regimes abandon their resistance and democratize.
Mechanism: EU signaled that anti-democratic policies / anti-democratic govts wouldn’t make it into EU. Electorate threw govts who did not meet Copenhagen criteria. New govt followed EU conditionality. Democratic outcome.
EU’s active leverage worked by altering behavior of electorate and opposition (not govt).
80
What is democratic backsliding (3)? What must we be aware of?
State-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions that sustain a democracy, often by democratically elected governments
Democratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions, rules, and norms.
In democratic regimes, it is a decline in the quality of democracy; in hybrid regimes, it is a decline in democratic qualities of governance.
We have to be careful not to overdetect it and thus produce false positives. Backsliding is a deterioration in 2 out of 3 democratic domains: competition, participation, and accountability.
81
What are typical signs of backsliding (6)?
Abolition of term limits by an executive incumbent
Weaponization or attacks on the judiciary
Expansion of executive authority (rule by decree, emergency powers, etc) also called executive aggrandizement
Undermining or political takeover of accountability institutions– media council, audit office
Partisan attacks and dismantling of political neutral bureaucracy
Loss of electoral integrity (real or perceived)
82
Explain the 2010 return of Fidesz to power and how it relates to backsliding.
April 2010, Fidesz, a center-right party that had governed before comes back to power.
Fidesz election victory not surprising given economic crisis, scandals under Socialists’ previous govt.
Fidesz won 53% of vote, but received 68% of seats, constitutional majority, i.e. could amend the constitution.
Incremental, gradual change towards lower contestation, participation and accountability
83
In what ways did Orban cause democratic backsliding (8)?
Hungary had extremely powerful CC.
Changed appointment procedure of CC (govt party nomination), restricted the CC’s jurisdiction (struck down govt tax, govt responded by amending constitution taking away jurisdiction over fiscal policy) . Increased number of judges (packing of the CC).
Election Commission– mandate prematurely terminated. New nominations– Fidesz fills its and the non-partisan quota with partisans.
Media– Media Council, which fines media outlets not “balanced” enough.
Passed a new constitution which removed checks on PM authority. Weakened CC and restructured ordinary judiciary.
Installed a Fidesz loyalist in the presidency
Attack on independent academia. Central European University attacked through change to education law. EU protested to no avail. CEU moved to Austria
2014: Orban intends to build an “illiberal state” protecting conservative European values from liberal ones (multiculturalism, individual rights, etc. )
Elections: constant wins through gerrymandering, smaller parliament, voting rigths to diaspora Hungarians in support.
84
How does the Hungarian illiberal regime demonstrate that autocracies are not all the same (4)?
Opposition is not jailed or harassed
Protests happen government does not suppress them violently / retaliate with legal harassment, abandons policies that triggered the protest
Individual political and civil liberties are generally respected.
Przeworski’s minimalist definition of democracy (parties lose elections) not falsified.
85
Explain how the Polish rule of law shows backsliding (5)?
2015, Law and Justice party wins the legislative election by getting 38%
After the election, tussle over appointments to Constitutional Court. PiS takes over the court. Regular courts tighter control by Minister of Justice who has power to dismiss and appoint new court presidents (participate in disciplinary measures against judges) ; Prosecution merged with Ministry of Justice
Judge members of the Supreme Judicial Council are elected by parliament
Supreme Court is packed with new judges because of new retirement law
Mass protests over judicial reforms, but PiS goes ahead with most reforms
86
What are the three different inteprretations of rule of law backsliding in Poland?
1) Reforms were necessary to improve justice provision. Courts were inefficient, communist-dominated, corrupt.
2) Rule of law has collapsed in Poland and Hungary; the courts are powerless and politically subservient.
3) Reforms are mainly institutional and the worrisome aspect is their cumulative effect.
87
Explain the vidence for competing interpretations of the backsliding in Poland.
PiS/Orban were disingenuous:
1) Hungary ranks 4th and Poland 6th in EU on how quickly they resolve administrative cases
2) Poland’s ranking worsened since 2015.
3) Communist judges had retired by 2015.
Full collapse of rule of law interpretation is exaggerated
1) Nothing wrong with many of the institutional reforms
2) Many European countries + Canada have executive control over judicial appointments and careers, but decisionally independent judiciaries.
3) Both Polish / Hungarian judges continued to rule against the govt when fit. Poland had conflict within the judiciary between PiS / anti-PiS judges.
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What were some insitutional reforms in Poland (4)?
narrower jurisdiction
different retirement age
new administrative courts
big role for Minister of Justice
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What are the main lessons to take away from rule of law backsliding (3)?
1) The danger to rule of law comes not from institutional restructuring, but because reforms strategically pursued by incumbents (weaponizing judiciary to achieve political goals).
2) The danger is in the COMPREHENSIVENESS and CUMULATIVE EFFECT of the reforms, but no tipping point; no law and reform that is so anti-democratic.
3) Rule of law backsliding happens when there is weaponization of law
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What are backsliding theories (4)?
1) agency: leader preferences are driving force
2)political institutions: Some institutions are democracy producing others are eroding.
3)economic turndown: Democracy struggles with poor economic performance/high inequality/rentier states. People support backsliders because unhappy with mainstream / feel left behind by traditional parties.
4) polarization (svolik): Polarization produces backsliding because voters trade off democratic principles for partisan interests
5) Democratic norm erosion (Levitsky and Ziblatt): Backsliding happens when two norms (informal institutions) of democracy erode: Mutual toleration (accept legitimacy of political opponents) and Institutional forbearance (self-restraint): opposite of weaponization of law (don’t use the law to your advantage fully and always).
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What are the buts of backsliding theories (3)?
1) agency: Ignores broader context that allowed leader to come to / retain power once he reveals his authoritarian tendencies.
2)political institutions: institutions are endogenous. Many of these institutions supported democracy well before backsliding started.
3) economic turndown: Evidence is mixed and recent studies find it weak. Doesn’t apply well to Central Europe. Mechanism is unclear; why erode democracy instead of fix economy?
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What is polarization?
Acute political tensions and strong negative feelings towards one’s political opponents. A first step towards completely denying the legitimacy of your political opponents as political actors.
Elite polarization vs. mass polarization.
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What are examples of political institutions that cause democratic backsliding (3)?
weak judiciaries
easily amendable constitutions
electoral systems favoring victors
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What is theorized to have caused democratic erosion in the US (2)? Author?
Mutual toleration and insitutional forebearance were eroded in the US back in the 1990s.
This erosion paved the way for Trump’s emergence as a political phenomenon and for his election.
Ziblatt and Levitsky
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Explain categories of backsliding in institutions (3)
Erosion of Electoral Integrity: voter suppression (US), rejection of or tampering with election results (US).
Weakening of the Rule of Law/Court Independence: Attacking or politicizing courts (Poland).
Concentration of Power/executive aggrandizement: Strengthening power in the executive branch, diminishing the role of legislatures and independent boards, weakening of the norms of pluralism, accountability and independent monitoring
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What is missing in the institutional backsliding literature (3)?
Does not look at how ready people are to engage in turning away from democracy/acceptance of democratic erosion
To what extent do people matter for institutional democratic backsliding to happen?
What do we know about the interplay between leaders and public opinion about these changes?
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What is attitudinal democratic backsliding (3)?
Gradual erosion of democratic values, norms, and beliefs within a society, as reflected in the attitudes and preferences of its citizens.
Decline in public support for democracy overall, for democratic principles (rule of law, free / fair elections, civil liberties, separation of powers, mechanisms that check power)
Condoning undemocratic behavior/decline in sanctioning: Increased tolerance/ preference for authoritarian practices, fewer checks on power, less influence of opposition / debate, even limitations on civil freedoms / rights, less vigilance on democratic practices of the government.
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How can we measure attitudinal democratic backsliding (3)?
Vote for undemocratic candidates or parties: Real or Fictitious
Support for Democracy/non-democratic options and norms:
General Regime support
Evaluation of democracy over time
Democratic Values/Beliefs/Priorities
Support for specific democratic norm scenarios regarding the behavior of leaders
How democratic behavior by parties is
Support for actual undemocratic reforms or policies
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What are potential problems with the measures of attitudinal backsliding (5)?
Socially desirable to support democracy / vote for democratic candidates as opposed to blatantly undemocratic ones
General democratic support could be a valence issue (real life context)
No good over-time and comparative measures of public acceptance of democratic backsliding
Fictitious scenarios have limitations based on external validity
Conjoint experiments can rarely get at the complexity of real voting decisions
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What is empirical evidence with regards to attitudinal backsliding (3)?
Evidence that it’s happening more in the US than in Europe
Evidence that it’s happening among young people the most
Evidence that it’s driven by increasing acceptance of authoritarian practices more than a decline in support for democracy
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What is populism (3)?
Parties and movements that argue that the elites are untrustworthy, the people are underrepresented, and the political system is corrupt.
Perceives society as having only two homogenous and antagonistic groups.: The pure people verus the corrupt elite.
There are no socio economic cleavages
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What are the types of populism (3)? Examples? What is the controversy in the third one?
Left-leaning populism: redistribution and state control of resources (nationalization), prosecution of corrupt officials, privileging local investors. Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany
Right-leaning populism: emphasizes law and order, nativism, immigration threats, and globalized threats to the nation. Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, AfD in Germany, Reform Party in UK, Trump's GOP
Technocratic populist: claims the people will benefit if the state is run as a firm, without politics, only through business competence (technocrats are elites). ANO in Czechia, Macron initially, Trump initially, 5-star movement in Italy.
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Why should we be concerned about populism's rise (3)?
Defining “the people” leads to exclusion (minorities) and a reduction of their rights. Rule by majority without minority rights guarantees.
Those who disagree with populists are framed as traitors to “the people”
Popular rule is seen as unmediated and direct, so when in power, tend to attack accountability institutions (courts, media). Easy to paint courts as "representing elites"
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When did populism first take off? Mainly where?
90s
Eastern Europe
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How does populism transform party systems (3)? Author?
In Europe, competition has shifted from horizontal to vertical axis, due to bottom-up (patronage, inequality, neoliberalism, EU democratic deficit) and top-down factors (insufficient representation by mainstream parties, political entrepreneurs shape attitudes).
Produces ethnopopulist parties (focused on immigration) not only intensify competition on the vertical axis, they upend party system when in power. Attack counter-majoritarian institutions (courts, media regulators, electoral process watchdogs, audit chambers). Democratic backsliding.
Left populist parties (inequality) and centrist populists (technocracy) become accustomed to democratic politics once they gain power
Vachudova
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What is far right (5)? How is it different from populism?
Ideological position that’s on the bottom of the GAL-TAN ideology matrix
nativism (non-native are threats)
authoritarianism (ordered society)
Traditional values (religion, state-mandated values)
Could also be populist, but not necessary
Strong well developped ideology.
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What is the debate about the causes of far-right growth (6)? Author?
Protest vs support (vote because protest establishment parties, or support)
Economic anxiety vs cultural backlash
Global vs. local
Leader vs. organization
Normal pathology vs. radicalization of the mainstream
Role of the media
Mudde
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What is the interaction between the far right (radical right) and mainstream (3)?
Possibilities for mainstream parties’ action :
1) adversarial strategy:delegitimize by ostracizing it, marginalizing in the media, using full extent of the law to prosecute them for hate speech, etc.
AfD in Germany; Vlaams Block in Belgium; Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands; Revival in Bulgaria; AUR in Romania
2) accommodation strategy: including them in coalition and taming them by forcing them to move to the center or signal national unity.
In 1999, the People’s Party formed a coalition with Freedom Party in Austria; In Finland, Centre Party includes Finns party in coalition; Draghi cabinet in Italy includes Lega Nord; Papademos cabinet in Greece includes Popular Orthodox Rally
3) co-optation strategy: competitive and does not offer coalition, seeks to co-opt their electorate by stealing some of RRs proposals:
Fidesz and Jobbik– confrontation, but Fidesz stole lots of policies from Jobbik
4) neutral strategy: mainstream just ignores, does not attack them, but also does not seek to tame / co-opt electorates.
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What is the response from the Radical right behaviour towards mainstream?
confrontation, perennial opposition, avoid governing even if given a chance
confrontation, but seek governing opportunities, if not through coalition-building in national parliament, then at municipal level
seek to transcend their niche and expand electoral reach to ultimately govern
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What are theoretical predictions about effects of interaction between RR and mainstream (6)?
Adversarial strategy is essential for neutralizing RR, otherwise it grows
Co-optation and accommodation legitimize RR and make it stronger
Co-optation and accommodation sap legitimacy and strength from RR
If RR is more protest-vote-driven, then co-optation and accommodation will kill them, but adversarial strategy will bolster them
If RR is more ideologically-driven, adversarial strategy will undermine them for different reasons, accommodation will strengthen them, because it will legitimize their ideas and accommodation could go either way.
In EE, where the mainstream is particularly delegitimized, accommodation and co-potation will undermine RR more than adversarial strategy.
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According to Mudde, why did Georgescu vote for the far right?
To protest against the mainstream parties that have been governing. There are also arguments for support, economic anxiety and the role of the media
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Who is Grogescu? What kind of candidate is he (5)?
Romanian president
Both populist and far right (Mudde, Vachudova)
Romanian people are good, elites are bad and corrupt
Traditional values: religion, family, nationalism (Romania First)
Protectionist/statist economic policy
Conspiracies and mysticism: anti-vaccine, climate change denial, world government conspiracy, aliens, no war in Ukraine, etc.
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What is evidence for support of Georgescu (3)?
Georgescu was one of two far right candidates in the top-4 and the Constitutional Court banned one far-right candidate from contesting the election.
These facts suggest that there is support for far-right ideological positions in the electorate.
If the core issue is protest, rather than support, why don’t we see multiple far left candidates benefiting from a protest vote as well?
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What is the economic argument for a vote of Georgescu? Counter?
Inflation has been high, so perhaps Romanians are worried and anxious and that’s why they rejected mainstream parties
Romania’s economy has been booming for 22 years under the governance of the mainstream parties. Romania has had the highest growth in Europe, why should the mainstream parties not be rewarded for this
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What is the evidence for the role of the media for Georgescu's breakthrough?
Social media is unregulated
Trust in traditional media has declined significantly everywhere
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How to use election to relate it to readings of class (3)? (Reaction to result and what it tells us about romanian democracy)
Since the result was announced, spontaneous protests for democracy. Attitudinal democratic vs institutional democratic backsliding. Bartel: democratic backsliding comes from elites, not people.
Romanian institutions have mobilized to investigate violations of campaign finance laws through massive TikTok campaigns (no evidence of institutional democratic backsliding).
After results, two lower ranked candidates complained to Constitutional Court alleging campaign violations and fraud of two top vote getters. The court rejected Georgescu complaint but upheld Lasconi complaint and ordered a recount of the votes.
Supporters argue Constitutional Court is protecting the integrity of the electoral process.
Opponents argue Constitutional Court is becoming weaponized by incumbent PM’s party (Socialists). Ciolacu came in third, so a recount may make it possible for him to go into the second round, instead of Lasconi
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WHat does the debate of Romanian court decision entail?
1) judicialization of politics (Tate and Valinder) and a powerful constitutional court has become a characteristic of today’s democracies and in Romania
2) if the Court is weaponized and trust in its decisions declines, there is a danger of a political fight over control of the court and rule of law backsliding may ensure, like in Poland in 2015.
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How do we know if Democracy has died?
Dangers in not noticing and overblowing the death of democracy. Three conditions should be met :
1) Consistent and successful executive aggrandizement
2) Contested sovereignty that increases polarization (contestation of what political regime should look like causes hatred of the other)
3) Dominant party engaging in backsliding, winning two consecutive elections (Huntington two turnover test, can't be sure until after incumbents lose 2 times, here it's about win).
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What is illiberal turn versus an illiberal swerve? What are examples of illiberal turn and swerve? Author?
When there is a turn, no going back. Swerve is push and pull between backsliding and recovery.
Turn: Hungary since 2020
Swerve: Poland 2015-2023, Slovakia, 2024-?, US 2016-2020, 2024-?
Bustikova and Guasti
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Explain a coup according to scholarly understanding. What is the popular understanding? What is the result?
A coup needs to include a set of perpetrators from within the state, target the sitting executive. Employ tactics that are illegal, overt, and supported by the use or threat of force.
Insurrections, impeachments, resignations (depending on how they are coerced) are not coups.
Coups are alleged to have occurred more than political scientists believe. This enables polarization through competing claims that other side wants to “end democracy”
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What is a coup before and now?
Coup meant before the military saving the people from something.
Now means the sudden takeover of power has nothing to do with democratic wants, and democracy dies. But the definition changes.
Changing definition of “coup” over time and divergence between popular usage and scholarly understanding
