MIDTERM 2

Question 1

What are cultural theories of politics? What claims do they make? (2)

Answer 1

Place societal values rather than material interests at the center of analysis
Claim 1: There is no such thing as objective interests - dominant identity of society shapes how people perceive their interests
Claim 2: Expect different cultures to contain different values and different ways of seeing the world (what’s best, what’s rational etc.)

Question 2

What are the levels of political culture? (3)

Answer 2

System level: Do citizens identify with the nation and accept the general form of government? (Pride in the nation, national identity, legitimacy of government)

Process level: What do you think is expected of you as a citizen? Perceptions of political rights; one’s involvement in the political process.

Policy level: What should be appropriate role of the government, govt. priorities? Should the state be “big” of “small”? Govt. policy priorities

Question 3

What is political culture?

Answer 3

Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. We have found it useful to refer to this as political culture

Question 4

What are the types of political culture? (Patterns that describe the citizen’s role in the political process) (3)

Answer 4

A participant is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects.” Involved in politics, makes demands on govt, grants support to political leaders based on performance. Democracies.

“A subject tends to be cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary.” Passively obeys the law, does not vote or actively engage in politics. Monarchies, autocracies.

The parochial tends to be unaware, or dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects.” Ignores politics and its impact on one’s life, often rural, illiterate. Traditional societies, autocracies.

Question 5

What are strengths of the political culture concept? (1)

Answer 5

Focus on individuals and their beliefs; explains variation in economic / political outcomes that cannot be explained by economic interests or institutional factors.

Question 6

What are weaknesses of the political culture concept? (6)

Answer 6

Implicit western cultural and ideological bias

Maybe culture is a product of structure and institutions (no independent effect on outcomes)

How can we measure political culture empirically? Survey questions may not be equally meaningful in different cultural contexts; national surveys disregard sub-groups

Is any society homogeneous enough for there to be a common culture?

Mechanisms by which political culture supposedly influences behavior and political outcomes are insufficiently specified and the concept becomes a catch-all explanation for what can’t be explained by other factors / variables

Can’t explain political changes, especially in one country, when culture has not changed.

Question 7

What is social identity? Author?

Answer 7

Social identity is a notion of “us” vs. “them” which varies along two dimensions:
Content and contestation
Abdelal et al.

Question 8

What is an example of a collective/ social identity? Author? (5)

Answer 8

A deep sense of rural identity rooted in the belief that rural communities are economically neglected and culturally misunderstood

The consciousness manifests as resentment toward urban areas (us v them)

Political identity can supersede economic interest when it comes to voting behaviour

low-income voters who benefit from government redistribution vote against it (conservative)

less redistribution support among middle-class voters than in comparable countries

Cramer

Question 9

What is content with relation to identity?

Answer 9

Who is in the group
Boundaries of membership, Group’s perception of itself
Group’s goals
Habitual courses of action

Question 10

What is logic of habituation?

Answer 10

Individuals who hold the identities act them out without evaluating every choice/option/decision; they act predictably.

Question 11

What is civil society?

Answer 11

A realm of organized citizen activity that is autonomous of the state

Question 12

Why is civil society important? (3)

Answer 12

Local organizations can contribute to social and economic development
Strong multi-ethnic associations can reduce ethnic conflict
Promotes democracy by providing organization behind democratic movements, (keep state office holders accountable) and by fostering democratic values

Question 13

Where does civil society come from? (3)

Answer 13

1. Modernization theory: product of industrialization, led to a larger middle class with more resources to participate in civic life
2. Product of liberalism: Centred on individual rights (individual activity outside state control), tolerance, and pluralism, (many groups exist, compete, and flourish)
   Communist regimes had a state that dominated society (post-communist states had weak civil societies)
3. Institutional theories: product of the political rules of the game (laws, regulations) Different regimes have laws suppressing / protecting independent associational life (e.g. tax laws, laws on unionization, etc.)

Question 14

Explain the variation between northern and southern Italy in terms of civil community.

Answer 14

Civic community in the North
Uncivic community in the South

Difference rooted in collective action problem (CAP): everyone will be better off if everyone cooperated, but each individual has an incentive not to cooperate
(related to levels of interpersonal trust)

Two equilibriums possible:
All cooperate and we get a civic community (Northern Italy)
No one cooperates and we get amoral familism (Southern Italy)

Question 15

How do we get good governance? Author? (5)

Answer 15

Civil society creates social capital

Dense infrastructure of civic organizations (generalized trust, less free riding / collective action problems, civic community, and political trust in institutions.)

Social capital: “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”

Once reciprocity and cooperation are established, social capital develops, the process becomes self-enforcing

Social capital, which makes collective action possible in turn enables good institutional performance by the government.

Putnam

Question 16

Where does civil society come from? Author?

Answer 16

Strong civil society is a product of history (not liberalism/ industrialization)

Putnam

Question 17

What are the critiques of Putnam’s model? (3)

Answer 17

1. Sweeping path dependent claim. Patterns of civic community that emerged in the 12th century persisted. The mechanisms by which civic community is reproduced over time is not clear
2. Putnam bottom-up argument (state institutions shaped by civil society). Joiners have higher levels of generalized trust (could be selection effect, not causal)
   Stolle and Rothstein: Effective state leads to trust, leads to civic participation, leads to stronger civil society
3. Some associations actually aim to create generalized distrust (KKK, Nazis, etc.)

Question 18

How do clean state institutions produce generalized trust and social capital? Author?

Answer 18

Strong correlation between perceived effectiveness and absence of corruption in the courts, police, and army and attitudes of generalized trust

Stolle and Rothstein

Question 19

What is Gellner’s point? Who disagrees?

Answer 19

Nations are a product of modern industrial societies requiring a unified “high culture” to support a mobile, literal workforce

Smith

Question 20

What is the critique of Gellner? Who critiques him?

Answer 20

Nations are rooted in shared histories, memories, and symbols (cannot be entirely constructed)

Smith

Question 21

What is an ethnic group?

Answer 21

A group whose members share a subjective belief in a common ancestry (ascriptive characteristic(s) like race, language, religion, etc.)
Primarily cultural (no political aspirations and claims to a territory)

Question 22

What is a nation (3)? Author?

Answer 22

A community of sentiment which could which normally tends to produce a state of its own. ( Weber )

An imagined political community both inherently limited and sovereign. (Anderson)

Often but does not always, based on an ethnic group (States and nations are not always congruent) (Gellner). Some nations do not have states, some states contain more than one nation

Question 23

What is nationialism (2)? Author?

Answer 23

Ideology that humanity is divided into nations, and each nation is entitled to govern itself in its own state

“A political principle that holds that the political and national units should be congruent” (Gellner)

Question 24

What are nation-states? Examples?

Answer 24

Borders of the nation and the state are largely congruent

Frnace, Italy, Poland

Question 25

What are multi-national states? Examples?

Answer 25

More than one nation lives in a state

USSR, Yugoslavia, Canada

Question 26

What are multi-ethnic states? Examples?

Answer 26

More than one ethnic group lives in a state (but groups do not express political aspirations for self-rule)

USA

Question 27

What are stateless nations? Examples?

Answer 27

Nations without states

Basques, Catalans, East Europeans before WWI

Question 28

What are nations larger than one state?

Answer 28

Part of the nation lives outside of the state

Germans before unification, Hungarians after Trianon Treaty, Russians after 1991

Question 29

What are the types of ways nations relate to states (5)?

Answer 29

Nation-states
Multi-national states
Multi-ethnic states
Stateless nations
Nations larger than one state

Question 30

What are classical approaches to ethnicity (2)?

Answer 30

Modernization/melting pot theories: ethnic IDs are “traditional”, will disappear with modernization

Marxism: ethnicity is “false consciousness”, will disappear with communism

Question 31

What are the problems with classical approaches to ethnicity?

Answer 31

Ethnicity has not disappeared in developed industrialized societies, and in some cases re-emerged & grew in political importance.

It did not disappear after 80 yrs of communism in the USSR either and eventually contributed greatly to the system’s collapse

Question 32

What is primordialism (3)? What are it’s implications?

Answer 32

There is a basic human need to belong to a permanent group and people divided long ago by language, culture long ago

Ethnic identities are always there & are more robust and powerful than other identities

Ethnic IDs are inherent and fixed, not socially constructed

Implications: pessimistic about going away with ethnic divisions and foresees conflict in multicultural societies

Question 33

What are problems with primordialism (3)?

Answer 33

Ethnic IDs are more fluid than primordialists assume

Many ancient & deeply rooted IDs are relatively new

Multiple potential primordial attachments, why only some get picked?

Question 34

What is instrumentalism? What are its implications (3)?

Answer 34

Ethnicity is an individual strategic choice, a means to other (political/economic) ends

Implications: Ethnic identity and ethnic group membership is very fluid

Ethnic conflicts are “really” about power and money but dressed in ethnic clothing

Ethnic conflict should be less enduring

Question 35

What are problems with instrumentalism (2)? Examples?

Answer 35

Ethnic identities are more stable & enduring than instrumentalists would predict

Hard to explain why individuals would ever choose a “losing” ethnic identity

E.g. Fluctuation in indigenous ethnic identity in Canada

Question 36

What is the constructivist (modernist) view (4)? Author?

Answer 36

Ethnicity/ethnic ID is not fixed or inherent in society but constructed – a product of social, political, and/or institutional context.

Once ethnic/national identity is constructed, it is usually enduring

Conflict in multi-ethnic societies is possible but not inevitable

Modern nations formed relatively recently (~late 18th century on)

Gellner

Question 37

How did nations appear (5)?

Answer 37

Until modern period nations as we know them today did not exist (Commoners had only local/ tribal/ religious etc identities)

Nation was an elite concept, often not based on common language or culture

Emergence of modern states and economic and industrial progress calls for the creation of nations

State elites create nations through mass schooling, printing, conscription (standardized worforce/ army/ language); ideology of nationalism fosters national IDs and nations.

Once people start thinking of themselves as belonging to such communities, nations are born

Question 38

What is the smith Gellner debate?

Answer 38

Are modern nations formed around some pre-existing (primordial) ethnic/cultural core, i.e. a “navel”?

Smith: yes

Gellner: no. Primordial “navel” is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for modern nations to exist

Question 39

Primordialism:
How old are nations?
Where did nations come from?
Did states or nations come first?
Did nations or nationalism come first?
What is the role of language and culture?

Answer 39

From time immemorial
They are a natural phenomenon of humanity
Nations
Nations come first and when they awaken, they create nationalism
Nations are built on specific culture and language

Question 40

Constructivism:
How old are nations?
Where did nations come from?
Did states or nations come first?
Did nations or nationalism come first?
What is the role of language and culture?

Answer 40

Relatively recent
Nations are a product of modernity
States precede and create nations
Nationalism is an ideology that invents nations
The cultural basis of many
nations was created in the process of nation-building; pre-existing cultures/languages were often obliterated in this process

Question 41

Why was there a spike in liberal democracy in 1950 in Western Europe and the US right after? Author?

Answer 41

The establishment of Constitutional Courts in Western Europe after World War II

Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada.

Civil rights movement in the US after Brown vs Board of Education (USSC ruled school segregation by race unconstitutional (overturned 1896 ruling of legalized segregation). An explosion in civil rights cases followed) (EPP)

Question 42

What are the processes which brought about greater civil and political rights in established democracies?

Answer 42

Rights revolution and judicialization of politics

Question 43

What is the rights revolution?

Answer 43

Expanded litigation by civil society groups, expanded rights protection by the courts, and/or constitutionalization of rights.

All constitutions contain provisions for personal, civil and political rights, but only some contain provisions for socio-economic rights and equality rights

Question 44

What are personal rights(4)?

Answer 44

Right to life and dignity (e.g. abortion, death penalty, sexual orientation)

Freedom of religion

Right to privacy (e.g. right to secret correspondence, personal data; inviolability of the home; inviolability of the person)

Right to habeas corpus (fundamental freedoms or legal rights, as in Canadian Charter).

Question 45

What are civil rights (4)?

Answer 45

Freedom of movement (mobility rights)

Freedom of association, assembly (limited for unconstitutional, anti-systemic organizations that promote hatred)

Freedom of expression, press, conscience (hate speech exception).

Can be called democratic rights.

Question 46

What are political rights (3)?

Answer 46

Citizenship rights

Voting rights.

Also democratic rights

Question 47

What are socio-economic rights (6)?

Answer 47

Right to social welfare, work, education, healthcare, children’s rights, maternity rights

Question 48

What are equality rights (2)?

Answer 48

Minority and linguistic rights
e.g. Canada

Question 49

What is Waldron’s side of the normative debate about the constitutionalization/ judicialization of rights (5)? Why does he lose/win?

Answer 49

Waldron:
We need democratic political competition to interpret the scope of rights.

People should participate in interpreting rights and their hierarchy.

Rights are belief that ordinary people should be able to decide how to live their life and everyone is equally capable of deciding.

By delegating interpretation to unelected judges, we negate the rationale for rights.

Both ways can produce “right” and “wrong” decisions. Democratic way produces them by protecting democratic right (preferable)

Dworkin’s position has de facto won the day because rights have been constitutionalized/judicialized.

Question 50

What is Dworkin’s side of the normative debate about constitutionalization/ judicialization of rights (4)? Why does he lose/win?

Answer 50

Rights should be protected by the constitution and courts.

Must be insulated from democratic political competition.

If we entrust the community to watch them, rights of a minority will be violated.

When rights are tied to the legal system, they gain more prominence in public life.

Dworkin’s position has de facto won the day because rights have been constitutionalized /judicialized.

Question 51

What are the components of the judicialization of politics (2)? Author?

Answer 51

Global expansion of the policy-making power of judges at the expense of politicians and/or administrators

Judicial decision-making methods spread to institutions in the other two branches of government; legal discourse penetrates political discourse

Vallinder

Question 52

In what ways is there a global expansion of the policy making power of judges at the expense of politicians and/or administrators (3)? Author?

Answer 52

Courts engage more in striking down existing laws and policies

Courts deliver “strict guidelines of interpretation”, i.e. a law is constitutional only if it is interpreted as the court says

Courts signal to legislatures what laws and policies should not be passed because they wouldn’t pass constitutional muster (corrective revision process) and sometimes require legislatures and executives to find policy solutions to problems courts identify

Vallinder

Question 53

In what ways do judicial decision-making methods spread to institutions in other two branches of government; legal discourse penetrates political discourse (3)? Author?

Answer 53

Bargaining has to be in the open, not behind closed doors, as it used to be.

Judicial emphasis on ascertaining the truth trumps political emphasis on compromise solutions. So policy choices have to be presented as “the right choice”, rather than the “compromise choice”. Legal discourse is rule-laden, political discourse is interest-laden (the politically possible solution that maximizes everybody’s interests).

Majoritarian principle (the legislative majority can push through its interests) gives way to “negative freedom” principle, i.e. legislatures now have to shelter the fundamental rights of citizens

Vallinder

Question 54

What is evidence of the juidicialization of politics (5)?

Answer 54

Constitutional Courts popping up everywhere around the world since 1945 and then after 1991.

Constitutional Courts becoming more and more powerful and relevant to policy-making process

Policy process-tracing lets us see how much legislators pay attention to constitutional argument (autolimitation process).

All executive agencies have jurists working on draft bills, decrees, acts.

Administrative tribunals popping up in every corner of the state bureaucracy to solve disputes. More adjudication, less administration.

Question 55

Why did rights revolution/judicialization happen (3)? (evolutionist theories)

Answer 55

Elections allowed Nazis in power; Communists reject strong courts; result was WWII and oppression in Eastern Europe. So maybe strong courts would enforce and protect rights the best.

Constitutional guarantees of individual rights and judicial independence. New activist judges willing to use constitutional provisions to transform society.

Gradual rise of rights consciousness in popular culture

Question 56

Why did rights revolution/judicialization happen (6)? (strategic actor theories)

Answer 56

Different political actors seek to maximize their own interests, judicialization or rights expansion is a product

Opposition:
1) ineffective executives are begging the opposition to take them to court over their bad policies;
2) decline of legislative power/ domination of the executive over parliament (party discipline), for opposition to have influence on policy-making must take government to court (parliamentary regimes)

Incumbents:
1) blame deflection mechanism for no-win policies;
2) empower the courts and make them more independent (tying hands). Goal is to constrain future incumbents

Organized interest groups (Epp 1999): these groups see that courts can be useful for getting their interests represented; litigation proliferates; judicialization and rights revolution.

Lawyers: wanna make more money, so explosion of rights petitions

Judges: what to enhance their institution’s stature and international prestige

Question 57

Explain the communist regime collapse (4)?

Answer 57

1985: Gorbachev reforms weakening the center’s domination over the outer empire (Soviet bloc) and the inner empire (USSR)

1989: Gorbachev decided against suppressing Eastern Europe which collapsed in 6 months, and soviet Union started fraying next

09/1991: Soviet elites tried to end the process by attempting a coup against Gorbachev but failed.

12/1991: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus disbanded the USSR

Question 58

Whta is Gorbachev’s impact on the USSR (5)?

Answer 58

Gorbachev became Secretary General of CPSU: March 1985

Gorbachev had a typical Soviet party cadre career: rose through the ranks of the CPSU; first Soviet leader of a post-Stalinist generation.

Something had to be done, but no sense of impending collapse. Main problems: aging leaders, corruption, declining economy, cynicism and malaise within society, stalemated war.

No sense of doom, of impeding loss of arms race to US, of economic collapse worse than the general deep dysfunction or of population pressure for democratization.

Gorbachev was NOT interested in moving away from Communism. Did not want to liberalize, but to improve the way the regime worked. Increase economic efficiency, people’s belief and enthusiasm and thus speed up development.

Question 59

What was Gorbachev’s goal and domestic reforms(4)?

Answer 59

Goal: root out mismanagement and corruption; improve economy
1) purge of corrupt bureaucrats;
2) emphasis on scientific and technological innovation;
3) a bit of price liberalization;
5) small cooperatives legalized.

Question 60

What were the results of Gorbachev’ domestic reforms (2)?

Answer 60

Not many results
1) People start driving their private cars as taxis (bad taxi service) and started very small private businesses to provide some variety in bad consumer goods situation.
2) Population seemed to perceive perestroika as just the latest fad and there was a lot of foot-dragging and skepticism.

Question 61

What is Glasnost goal amnd implementation(2)? Results?

Answer 61

Goal: convince society that perestroika is necessary and then society pushes elites to implement it through
1) freer press
2) decision to abolish censorship (Jan 87); previously banned books, films released; “blank spots” in official history start being filled.

Results:
Societal excitement grows over historical and identity discussions mostly, not really on how to fix the future.

Question 62

What was Demokratizatsiya’s goal? Implementation? Results?

Answer 62

Goal: increase legitimacy of regime by giving more real power to the legislatures at all levels, because they represent society.

How: introduce competitive (NOT multiparty) elections in 1989 to reflect debate in society

Result: with glasnost, the legislatures really become loci of intense public discussion and debate. Even though there are no parties besides the CPSU, factions appear and even if in the initial period they do not call for abolishment of Communism, their positions are ideologically diverse.

Question 63

What did Gorbachev’s reform unleash which he did not expect (3)?

Answer 63

Glasnost provokes mobilization around national identity. Initially, demonstrators didn’t want the USSR to collapse; they wanted things from the party. But glasnost altered the boundaries of what was possible.

1987-1988: Nationalism appears on agenda.

Gorbachev fears that granting one border change may trigger hundreds of others so he refuses to go down that road.

Question 64

What is the national mobilization tidal wave? What is the relationship between Glasnot and mobilization?

Answer 64

1988-1989: many States went through national mobilization

First glasnost, then mobilization. Gorbachev instituted Glasnot because he was sure nationalism was not even a potential, let alone immediate danger.

Question 65

What characterizes the slow changes in Poland and Hungary?

Answer 65

Hungary: slow changes from above (Party allowed opposition to legally demonstrate, plan of multi-party system)
Poland: slow changes from below (general strikes, seats in the senate voted contestable)

Question 66

What is Gorbachev’s sinatra doctrine (4)?

Answer 66

1989: Eatern Europe clamoring for increased autonomy

USSR would’ve had to resort to repression to keep Central Europe in line. Gorbachev had enough problems at home and with Afghanistan to get into new invasions.

He signaled to Eastern Europe that they can do things “their way”

Eastern European communist regimes collapsed in the next few months.

Question 67

What are competing and complementary theories of communism’s collapse (5)?

Answer 67

Economic dysfunction

Western pressure

Societal pressure for democratization

Gorbachev’s reforms (glasnost, perestroika, and democratization) lifted suppression of national identity and history of memory unleashed national identity mobilization.

Gorbachev decided against rerepression and the empire collapsed as both Eastern Europe and Soviet republics fled the center.

Gorbachev subscribed to this theory. He said that he believed in the Soviet claim that class identity had replaced national identity.

Question 68

What are the theories of democratization? Authors?

Answer 68

Modernization theory, that economic development fosters democratization (Lipset)

Historical contingencies and institutions, with economic development instead as a side effect of democratization (Acemoglu et al.)

Social conditions and increasing equality (Tocqueville)

Economic inequality from a growing middle class (Ansell et al.)

Question 69

What are the communist regime legacy claims (strong and weak)? What are the mechanisms? What are examples?

Answer 69

Strong claim:
communist regime means no democracy

Weak claim:
harsh communist regime means democracy fails
milder communist regime means democracy succeeds

Mechanism: no alternative elites in the harsh regimes (demagogues, priests and colonels), destroyed cleavages, (which produced competitive politics after collapse).

Empirical test: Yugoslavia had the mildest regime

Question 70

What is the decentralized authority tradition claim? What are its mechanisms (and underspecified)? What are examples?

Answer 70

No bourgeoisie means no democracy; no market means no democracy

Mechanism: A history of accepting constraints on power means elites would accept democratic institutions
Under-specified mechanism: how would this lead to people voting Communists out of office during first elections?

Empirical test: Baltics belong to European tradition, that’s why they’re so diff from other FSU

Question 71

What is the Habsburg factor claim? What is the mechanism? What are examples?

Answer 71

Claim: Habsburg history of constitutionalism and bureaucratic rectitude means democracy

Mechanism: Elites used to accepting constraints means willing to accept democratic competition

Empirical test: Croatia and Slovakia had more serious problems during 1990s than Baltics and Poland who were part of Russian Empire (the antithesis of rule of law).

Question 72

What is the pre communist experience with democracy or statehood claim? What is the mechanism? What are examples?

Answer 72

Claim: if you had a state/democracy before, you’d have democracy afterwards.

Mechanism: as Linz and Stepan argued, having a state is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation

Empirical test: mixed results

Question 73

What are cultural and ideational explanantions of democracy (3)?

Answer 73

Religion
Claim: Protestantism=full democracy; Catholicism=some democracy; Orthodoxy=no democracy

Mechanism: Orthodoxy subordinates religion to the state, so state is omnipotent and democratic controls are alien

Empirical test: Fish shows there’s no association between Orthodoxy and failed democracy; Explanation fails to account for Russia-Belarus-Ukraine-Moldova difference

End of history (Fukuyama)
Democracy became the only game in town because communism lost the ideational debate. Can’t explain variation.

Return to Europe
Claim: More “European” culture means more democracy

Mechanism: Communism was imposed on Eastern Europe through Soviet occupation, so states rejected the regime and embraced democracy to reclaim their place in Europe.

Empirical test: correlation holds, but cannot be conclusively attributed to cultural issues or explain variation within groups.

Question 74

What is the role of the EU as a club of democracies? Author?

Answer 74

Passive leverage (Vachudova)

Claim: the greater the attractiveness of the role model, the greater the desire to emulate it. EU was attractive to post-Communist countries, so countries emulated It and democratized as a result.

Question 75

What are benefits of EU membership?

Answer 75

1) democratic stability and marker of the return to Europe many craved.

2) market access essential to the success of market-building economic reforms: without EU membership, have to adjust to EU rules to sell their products there but would not benefit from participating in rule-making.

3) regulate relations with powerful neighbours through a desirable set of clear and well-established rules.

Question 76

What are costs of exclusion from the EU?

Answer 76

1) lost FDI and other economic benefits; 2) less security;
3) less administrative reforms
The period of passive leverage lasted from 1989 to 1994

Question 77

What is the problem with passive leverage? What is empirical evidence? Author?

Answer 77

Passive leverage not powerful enough to counteract domestic obstacles to democratization; only reinforced domestic trajectories headed in right direction.

If passive leverage explained variation, would find who did not democratize quickly did not think that the EU was that great, while who democratized thought highly of the EU. Empirical evidence largely disproves this hypothesis.

Vachudova

Question 78

What is the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession (5)?

Answer 78

Formal requirements non-negotiable, uniformly applied and closely enforced. Meritocratic process for enlargement

Stable institutions that guarantee: Democracy; Rule of law; Human rights; Minority rights; Functioning market economy that can cope with competitive pressure

Applicants invited to start accession negotiations to join EU must adopt the Acquis Communautaire (“Negotiations” are screening)

When the EU is satisfied that reforms are complete, chapter is closed. When all chapters are closed, country formally joins the EU.

EU conditionality enlargement process starts.

Question 79

What is the claim regarding EU conditionality leading to democratization through active leverage (2)? What is the mechanism (2)?

Answer 79

Claim: EU conditionality Copenhagen criteria caused democratic consolidation.

Nationalist pattern regimes resisted EU passive leverage. Liberal pattern regimes started moving towards the EU even during passive-leverage period. Active leverage made nationalist regimes abandon their resistance and democratize.

Mechanism: EU signaled that anti-democratic policies / anti-democratic govts wouldn’t make it into EU. Electorate threw govts who did not meet Copenhagen criteria. New govt followed EU conditionality. Democratic outcome.

EU’s active leverage worked by altering behavior of electorate and opposition (not govt).

Question 80

What is democratic backsliding (3)? What must we be aware of?

Answer 80

State-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions that sustain a democracy, often by democratically elected governments

Democratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions, rules, and norms.

In democratic regimes, it is a decline in the quality of democracy; in hybrid regimes, it is a decline in democratic qualities of governance.

We have to be careful not to overdetect it and thus produce false positives. Backsliding is a deterioration in 2 out of 3 democratic domains: competition, participation, and accountability.

Question 81

What are typical signs of backsliding (6)?

Answer 81

Abolition of term limits by an executive incumbent

Weaponization or attacks on the judiciary

Expansion of executive authority (rule by decree, emergency powers, etc) also called executive aggrandizement

Undermining or political takeover of accountability institutions– media council, audit office

Partisan attacks and dismantling of political neutral bureaucracy

Loss of electoral integrity (real or perceived)

Question 82

Explain the 2010 return of Fidesz to power and how it relates to backsliding.

Answer 82

April 2010, Fidesz, a center-right party that had governed before comes back to power.

Fidesz election victory not surprising given economic crisis, scandals under Socialists’ previous govt.

Fidesz won 53% of vote, but received 68% of seats, constitutional majority, i.e. could amend the constitution.

Incremental, gradual change towards lower contestation, participation and accountability

Question 83

In what ways did Orban cause democratic backsliding (8)?

Answer 83

Hungary had extremely powerful CC.
Changed appointment procedure of CC (govt party nomination), restricted the CC’s jurisdiction (struck down govt tax, govt responded by amending constitution taking away jurisdiction over fiscal policy) . Increased number of judges (packing of the CC).

Election Commission– mandate prematurely terminated. New nominations– Fidesz fills its and the non-partisan quota with partisans.

Media– Media Council, which fines media outlets not “balanced” enough.

Passed a new constitution which removed checks on PM authority. Weakened CC and restructured ordinary judiciary.

Installed a Fidesz loyalist in the presidency

Attack on independent academia. Central European University attacked through change to education law. EU protested to no avail. CEU moved to Austria

2014: Orban intends to build an “illiberal state” protecting conservative European values from liberal ones (multiculturalism, individual rights, etc. )

Elections: constant wins through gerrymandering, smaller parliament, voting rigths to diaspora Hungarians in support.

Question 84

How does the Hungarian illiberal regime demonstrate that autocracies are not all the same (4)?

Answer 84

Opposition is not jailed or harassed

Protests happen government does not suppress them violently / retaliate with legal harassment, abandons policies that triggered the protest

Individual political and civil liberties are generally respected.

Przeworski’s minimalist definition of democracy (parties lose elections) not falsified.

Question 85

Explain how the Polish rule of law shows backsliding (5)?

Answer 85

2015, Law and Justice party wins the legislative election by getting 38%

After the election, tussle over appointments to Constitutional Court. PiS takes over the court. Regular courts tighter control by Minister of Justice who has power to dismiss and appoint new court presidents (participate in disciplinary measures against judges) ; Prosecution merged with Ministry of Justice

Judge members of the Supreme Judicial Council are elected by parliament

Supreme Court is packed with new judges because of new retirement law

Mass protests over judicial reforms, but PiS goes ahead with most reforms

Question 86

What are the three different inteprretations of rule of law backsliding in Poland?

Answer 86

1) Reforms were necessary to improve justice provision. Courts were inefficient, communist-dominated, corrupt.

2) Rule of law has collapsed in Poland and Hungary; the courts are powerless and politically subservient.

3) Reforms are mainly institutional and the worrisome aspect is their cumulative effect.

Question 87

Explain the vidence for competing interpretations of the backsliding in Poland.

Answer 87

PiS/Orban were disingenuous:
1) Hungary ranks 4th and Poland 6th in EU on how quickly they resolve administrative cases
2) Poland’s ranking worsened since 2015.
3) Communist judges had retired by 2015.

Full collapse of rule of law interpretation is exaggerated
1) Nothing wrong with many of the institutional reforms
2) Many European countries + Canada have executive control over judicial appointments and careers, but decisionally independent judiciaries.
3) Both Polish / Hungarian judges continued to rule against the govt when fit. Poland had conflict within the judiciary between PiS / anti-PiS judges.

Question 88

What were some insitutional reforms in Poland (4)?

Answer 88

narrower jurisdiction
different retirement age
new administrative courts
big role for Minister of Justice

Question 89

What are the main lessons to take away from rule of law backsliding (3)?

Answer 89

1) The danger to rule of law comes not from institutional restructuring, but because reforms strategically pursued by incumbents (weaponizing judiciary to achieve political goals).

2) The danger is in the COMPREHENSIVENESS and CUMULATIVE EFFECT of the reforms, but no tipping point; no law and reform that is so anti-democratic.

3) Rule of law backsliding happens when there is weaponization of law

Question 90

What are backsliding theories (4)?

Answer 90

1) agency: leader preferences are driving force

2)political institutions: Some institutions are democracy producing others are eroding.

3)economic turndown: Democracy struggles with poor economic performance/high inequality/rentier states. People support backsliders because unhappy with mainstream / feel left behind by traditional parties.

4) polarization (svolik): Polarization produces backsliding because voters trade off democratic principles for partisan interests

5) Democratic norm erosion (Levitsky and Ziblatt): Backsliding happens when two norms (informal institutions) of democracy erode: Mutual toleration (accept legitimacy of political opponents) and Institutional forbearance (self-restraint): opposite of weaponization of law (don’t use the law to your advantage fully and always).

Question 91

What are the buts of backsliding theories (3)?

Answer 91

1) agency: Ignores broader context that allowed leader to come to / retain power once he reveals his authoritarian tendencies.

2)political institutions: institutions are endogenous. Many of these institutions supported democracy well before backsliding started.

3) economic turndown: Evidence is mixed and recent studies find it weak. Doesn’t apply well to Central Europe. Mechanism is unclear; why erode democracy instead of fix economy?

Question 92

What is polarization?

Answer 92

Acute political tensions and strong negative feelings towards one’s political opponents. A first step towards completely denying the legitimacy of your political opponents as political actors.
Elite polarization vs. mass polarization.

Question 93

What are examples of political institutions that cause democratic backsliding (3)?

Answer 93

weak judiciaries
easily amendable constitutions
electoral systems favoring victors

Question 94

What is theorized to have caused democratic erosion in the US (2)? Author?

Answer 94

Mutual toleration and insitutional forebearance were eroded in the US back in the 1990s.
This erosion paved the way for Trump’s emergence as a political phenomenon and for his election.

Ziblatt and Levitsky

Question 95

Explain categories of backsliding in institutions (3)

Answer 95

Erosion of Electoral Integrity: voter suppression (US), rejection of or tampering with election results (US).

Weakening of the Rule of Law/Court Independence: Attacking or politicizing courts (Poland).

Concentration of Power/executive aggrandizement: Strengthening power in the executive branch, diminishing the role of legislatures and independent boards, weakening of the norms of pluralism, accountability and independent monitoring

Question 96

What is missing in the institutional backsliding literature (3)?

Answer 96

Does not look at how ready people are to engage in turning away from democracy/acceptance of democratic erosion

To what extent do people matter for institutional democratic backsliding to happen?

What do we know about the interplay between leaders and public opinion about these changes?

Question 97

What is attitudinal democratic backsliding (3)?

Answer 97

Gradual erosion of democratic values, norms, and beliefs within a society, as reflected in the attitudes and preferences of its citizens.

Decline in public support for democracy overall, for democratic principles (rule of law, free / fair elections, civil liberties, separation of powers, mechanisms that check power)

Condoning undemocratic behavior/decline in sanctioning: Increased tolerance/ preference for authoritarian practices, fewer checks on power, less influence of opposition / debate, even limitations on civil freedoms / rights, less vigilance on democratic practices of the government.

Question 98

How can we measure attitudinal democratic backsliding (3)?

Answer 98

Vote for undemocratic candidates or parties: Real or Fictitious

Support for Democracy/non-democratic options and norms:
General Regime support
Evaluation of democracy over time
Democratic Values/Beliefs/Priorities
Support for specific democratic norm scenarios regarding the behavior of leaders
How democratic behavior by parties is

Support for actual undemocratic reforms or policies

Question 99

What are potential problems with the measures of attitudinal backsliding (5)?

Answer 99

Socially desirable to support democracy / vote for democratic candidates as opposed to blatantly undemocratic ones

General democratic support could be a valence issue (real life context)

No good over-time and comparative measures of public acceptance of democratic backsliding

Fictitious scenarios have limitations based on external validity

Conjoint experiments can rarely get at the complexity of real voting decisions

Question 100

What is empirical evidence with regards to attitudinal backsliding (3)?

Answer 100

Evidence that it’s happening more in the US than in Europe

Evidence that it’s happening among young people the most

Evidence that it’s driven by increasing acceptance of authoritarian practices more than a decline in support for democracy

Question 101

What is populism (3)?

Answer 101

Parties and movements that argue that the elites are untrustworthy, the people are underrepresented, and the political system is corrupt.

Perceives society as having only two homogenous and antagonistic groups.: The pure people verus the corrupt elite.

There are no socio economic cleavages

Question 102

What are the types of populism (3)? Examples? What is the controversy in the third one?

Answer 102

Left-leaning populism: redistribution and state control of resources (nationalization), prosecution of corrupt officials, privileging local investors. Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany

Right-leaning populism: emphasizes law and order, nativism, immigration threats, and globalized threats to the nation. Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, AfD in Germany, Reform Party in UK, Trump’s GOP

Technocratic populist: claims the people will benefit if the state is run as a firm, without politics, only through business competence (technocrats are elites). ANO in Czechia, Macron initially, Trump initially, 5-star movement in Italy.

Question 103

Why should we be concerned about populism’s rise (3)?

Answer 103

Defining “the people” leads to exclusion (minorities) and a reduction of their rights. Rule by majority without minority rights guarantees.

Those who disagree with populists are framed as traitors to “the people”

Popular rule is seen as unmediated and direct, so when in power, tend to attack accountability institutions (courts, media). Easy to paint courts as “representing elites”

Question 104

When did populism first take off? Mainly where?

Answer 104

90s

Eastern Europe

Question 105

How does populism transform party systems (3)? Author?

Answer 105

In Europe, competition has shifted from horizontal to vertical axis, due to bottom-up (patronage, inequality, neoliberalism, EU democratic deficit) and top-down factors (insufficient representation by mainstream parties, political entrepreneurs shape attitudes).

Produces ethnopopulist parties (focused on immigration) not only intensify competition on the vertical axis, they upend party system when in power. Attack counter-majoritarian institutions (courts, media regulators, electoral process watchdogs, audit chambers). Democratic backsliding.

Left populist parties (inequality) and centrist populists (technocracy) become accustomed to democratic politics once they gain power

Vachudova

Question 106

What is far right (5)? How is it different from populism?

Answer 106

Ideological position that’s on the bottom of the GAL-TAN ideology matrix

nativism (non-native are threats)

authoritarianism (ordered society)

Traditional values (religion, state-mandated values)

Could also be populist, but not necessary

Strong well developped ideology.

Question 107

What is the debate about the causes of far-right growth (6)? Author?

Answer 107

Protest vs support (vote because protest establishment parties, or support)

Economic anxiety vs cultural backlash

Global vs. local

Leader vs. organization

Normal pathology vs. radicalization of the mainstream

Role of the media

Mudde

Question 108

What is the interaction between the far right (radical right) and mainstream (3)?

Answer 108

Possibilities for mainstream parties’ action :

1) adversarial strategy:delegitimize by ostracizing it, marginalizing in the media, using full extent of the law to prosecute them for hate speech, etc.
AfD in Germany; Vlaams Block in Belgium; Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands; Revival in Bulgaria; AUR in Romania

2) accommodation strategy: including them in coalition and taming them by forcing them to move to the center or signal national unity.
In 1999, the People’s Party formed a coalition with Freedom Party in Austria; In Finland, Centre Party includes Finns party in coalition; Draghi cabinet in Italy includes Lega Nord; Papademos cabinet in Greece includes Popular Orthodox Rally

3) co-optation strategy: competitive and does not offer coalition, seeks to co-opt their electorate by stealing some of RRs proposals:
Fidesz and Jobbik– confrontation, but Fidesz stole lots of policies from Jobbik

4) neutral strategy: mainstream just ignores, does not attack them, but also does not seek to tame / co-opt electorates.

Question 109

What is the response from the Radical right behaviour towards mainstream?

Answer 109

confrontation, perennial opposition, avoid governing even if given a chance

confrontation, but seek governing opportunities, if not through coalition-building in national parliament, then at municipal level

seek to transcend their niche and expand electoral reach to ultimately govern

Question 110

What are theoretical predictions about effects of interaction between RR and mainstream (6)?

Answer 110

Adversarial strategy is essential for neutralizing RR, otherwise it grows

Co-optation and accommodation legitimize RR and make it stronger

Co-optation and accommodation sap legitimacy and strength from RR

If RR is more protest-vote-driven, then co-optation and accommodation will kill them, but adversarial strategy will bolster them

If RR is more ideologically-driven, adversarial strategy will undermine them for different reasons, accommodation will strengthen them, because it will legitimize their ideas and accommodation could go either way.

In EE, where the mainstream is particularly delegitimized, accommodation and co-potation will undermine RR more than adversarial strategy.

Question 111

According to Mudde, why did Georgescu vote for the far right?

Answer 111

To protest against the mainstream parties that have been governing