Midterm 2

Question 1

Dyadic Forms of Interaction

Answer 1

• Infant-Caregiver Interaction: sensitivity and preference for biological motion, especially eyes and faces, marking the onset of person engagement
• Infant Object Engagement: focus shift from face-to-face interactions to object engagement, showing less interest in coordinating engagement with people and objects

Question 2

Emergence of Triadic Interactions

Answer 2

Around 9-12 months, involving two or more individuals coordinating attention toward an object or event. Crucial for language development, social understanding, and cooperative interactions.

Question 3

Initiating and Responding to Joint Attention (IJA and RJA)

Answer 3

IJA is initiated through pointing, showing, or giving objects. RJA involves responding through point and gaze following, essential for developing attention coordination.

Question 4

Development of Gaze Following

Answer 4

Starts by 3 months with following gaze and head turns within visual field. By 6 months, can follow to more distant objects. By 12 months, prioritize gaze direction over head movement. By 18 months, follow gaze to objects outside immediate visual field.

Question 5

What are the complexities and debates surrounding the importance of gaze following?

Answer 5

Doubts on its significance for developmental processes, varying implications for language development and social understanding, unclear relationship with autism, concerns about ecological validity, and the importance of parental behaviors beyond gaze following.

Question 6

Why is joint attention considered crucial for human development?

Answer 6

Enables human cognition, implicated in language, social understanding, and cooperative interaction development. It’s foundational for shared understanding of the environment, learning from others, and building social relationships.

Question 7

Basic definition of Joint Attention

Answer 7

Joint attention involves two or more people coordinating their attention on a common object or event​​​​.

Question 8

Butterworth’s Definition of JA

Answer 8

Describes joint attention simply as “looking where someone else is looking,” focusing on the simultaneous looking aspect. (Also called simultaneous looking)

Question 9

Gernsbacher’s definition of JA

Answer 9

When one person directs his attention to another person’s focus of attention, the two people are in joint attention

Question 10

Tomasello’s Definition of JA

Answer 10

joint attention involves the knowledge that “two individuals are attending to something in common,” emphasizing a shared mental focus. Joint attention is not just about two individuals looking at the same thing; it’s about each person knowing that the other person is also attending to that thing.

Question 11

Meltzoff & Brooks’ Perspective on Gaze Following (RJA)

Answer 11

hey define gaze following as an attribution of mental life to another person, implying that following someone’s gaze is motivated by a desire to see what they see, which indicates an understanding of their focus and interest​​.

Question 12

Camaioni’s View on Protodeclarative Pointing (IJA)

Answer 12

At 12 months, protodeclarative pointing indicates that the child has a representational understanding of the adult’s attention and intends to influence it.

Question 13

What are the problems identified with Tomasello’s definition of joint attention?

Answer 13

1. It’s a challenge to discern if infants have an understanding of joint attention (can mindread the other person’s intentions) or if they are merely participating in a behavior without grasping the shared attention aspect. (rich interpretation vs lean)
2. joint attention skills appearing “rather suddenly” between 9 and 12 months as a “9-month revolution”, the notion that infants have an “insight” about other minds that leads to a rapid acquisition of joint attention skills

Question 14

Innate Knowledge Solution

Answer 14

infants are born with genetically specified modules that help them compute others’ mental states and enter into joint attention. This suggests that infants have an inborn capacity to understand the intentions and attention of others

Question 15

Apply Knowledge of Self to others Solution

Answer 15

idea of simulation and analogical reasoning. It proposes that infants begin to understand others’ mental states by first experiencing these states in their own activity and then simulating or applying this experience to others.

Question 16

Forming Theories solution

Answer 16

Infants develop an understanding of others through a theory-like process. Much like scientists, infants observe others’ behaviors and gradually construct “theories” about their intentions and mental states.

Question 17

Definition of rich interpretations

Answer 17

• Rich interpretations involve attributing a psychological understanding to infants’ joint attention behaviors, such as gaze following or protodeclarative pointing.
• These interpretations suggest that infants must understand others on a “mental” level to engage in joint attention. Meaning that infants have an adult-like or close to adult-like understanding (adultocentrism) of the psychological states that underlie acts of joint attention

Question 18

Reasons behind Rich Interpretations

Answer 18

Functional Reasoning: The argument is that infants engage in joint attention because they recognize the importance of others’ attention and intentions. Following or directing someone’s gaze, for instance, implies an understanding that seeing leads to knowing.
Problem of Other Minds: This argument stems from the philosophical issue that while we can observe others’ behaviors, we cannot directly access their mental states. Rich interpretations suggest that infants infer these states through observed behaviors, indicating a sophisticated level of social cognition.

Question 19

Lean Interpretations (Alternative)

Answer 19

Proposes that infants engage in joint attention behaviors before they fully understand them. These behaviors develop gradually, and a more complex understanding of others evolves within the context of social interactions​​.

Question 20

The problem of “Other Minds”

Answer 20

philosophical issue that while we can observe others’ behaviors, we cannot directly access their mental states. The main challenge is how infants bridge the gap between their own mind (1st-person perspective) and others’ minds (3rd-person perspective), transitioning from perceiving just the “surface behavior” to understanding the “underlying mental states”

Question 21

Meltzoff’s theory about infant communication

Answer 21

• Based on neonatal imitation; infants are born with an understanding that others are “like me”
• For instance, when an infant imitates an adult smiling, they can introspect on the relationship between their bodily state (the action of smiling) and their associated mental state (the feeling of happiness).
• By seeing others as “like-me,” infants can make inferences about the mental states of others based on their own experiences. This imitation is taken as evidence that infants can relate bodily actions to mental states and thereby attribute similar states to others.

Question 22

Vygotsky’s sociocultural Theory

Answer 22

higher cognitive functions originate in social interactions and are internalized through a process of scaffolding, where more capable others (such as parents or caregivers) provide a framework for the child to learn and develop skills.

Question 23

Vygotsky’s sociocultural Theory’s critiques

Answer 23

• Explains protoimperative pointing (to request), but does not explain protodeclarative pointing (for attention) or answering/asking questions. Idea being that protodeclarative comes before protoimperative.
• “Pointless” pointing, which typically begins around 3 months of age. The child uses their index finger in a way that is linked to interest or attention, often exploring with their fingertips. This behavior is not yet social as children will point even when they are alone.
• caregivers interpret their infant’s non-communicative pointing as an invitation to engage with their infant around that content. Over time, infants learn to anticipate caregivers’ responses to their pointing and develop a shared understanding of what pointing means.

Question 24

features of language are present or missing in the animal communication systems covered

Answer 24

1. Reference: animals use specific signals to refer to different entities or events in their environment. For example, vervet monkeys have distinct alarm calls for different predators, which function similarly to words in human languages by referring to specific threats. (This feature is present but not to the complex extent as in humans)
2. Displacement: It is explored through the example of honeybees’ waggle dance, which communicates the location of food sources distant in space and time from the hive. This suggests a form of displacement, although it may be limited compared to human language.
3. Creativity: The capacity for generating new messages or understanding new combinations of signals is questioned within the context of animal communication. The document raises doubts about animals’ ability to create and understand new meanings to the extent humans can with language.

Question 25

Norm Chomspky’s view

Answer 25

• emphasizes the creative and productive aspect of language, meaning that using a finite set of rules and words, humans can produce an infinite number of sentences (Limited words + rules = unlimited possible sentences)
• Syntax is unique to human language
• The LAD (Language Acquisition device) is a theoretical construct explains how humans have the innate ability to acquire language.

Question 26

First Round of Chimp Language Wars

Answer 26

• Washoe: The Gardners worked with Washoe chimpanzee, teaching her a modified version of ASL. Washoe learned over 100 signs and reportedly combined them in novel ways, such as “water bird” to supposedly describe a swan.
• Koko: Patterson worked with Koko the gorilla, who learned over 1000 signs and used signs to communicate complex ideas and emotions.
• Nim Chimpsky: Terrace’s project with Nim aimed to see if the chimp could learn to construct sentences using ASL. While Nim learned many signs, Terrace concluded that Nim’s communications were often repetitive and lacked spontaneous syntactical structure.
• weren’t recording all the occurrences
• focuses on split word view: teaching words (their label) and not the meaning behind it (more than knowing the name i.e. understanding the function of an item)
• going based on the assumption that by teaching them labels they understand the meaning behind it

Question 27

Second Round of Chimp Language Wars

Answer 27

Second round focused more on comprehension rather than just production of language:
Kanzi: Savage-Rumbaugh’s work with Kanzi, a bonobo, used a lexigram board to communicate. Unlike previous studies, Kanzi was exposed to the lexigram board and spoken English from a young age without formal training. Kanzi demonstrated a strong understanding of spoken English and could follow complex instructions. This approach suggested that language comprehension and the use of symbolic communication could emerge from immersive and interactive environments, challenging the idea that syntax is the only hallmark of language capability in apes.

Question 28

Critiques of the language wars

Answer 28

• Lack of Spontaneous Syntax: He argued that apes, including his own subject Nim Chimpsky, did not spontaneously use syntax in a way that resembled human language, indicating that the ability to form grammatical structures might be unique to humans.
• Cueing by Experimenters: Terrace pointed out that experimenters might unintentionally cue apes to use certain signs, casting doubt on the authenticity of the apes’ understanding and use of signs.
• Imitation Rather Than Understanding: He suggested that much of what was interpreted as linguistic ability could instead be mimicry or the result of operant conditioning, rather than a genuine understanding of language.

Question 29

implications of research on animal communication for theories of human language

Answer 29

• Challenge to the uniqueness of human language: If animals can learn aspects of language, it suggests that human language may not be as unique as previously thought.
• Rethinking language evolution: Understanding animal communication could offer insights into how human language evolved.
• Innateness debate: Animal communication research could impact the debate on whether language is an innate human ability or whether it develops from more general cognitive capabilities.

Question 30

What are constraints and what’s their need?

Answer 30

• Constraints are necessary for children to learn the meanings of new words because these constraints help manage the inherent complexity and ambiguity in language learning.
• The “indeterminacy of translation” or the “Gavagai” problem illustrates this challenge: a child might hear a new word and have to figure out its meaning from potentially infinite possibilities of interpretations.
• Constraints simplify this process by limiting the range of possible meanings a new word can have.

Question 31

What constraints have been proposed?

Answer 31

• Whole Object Assumption: Children assume that a new word refers to the whole object rather than its parts or properties. This helps children learn the names of objects but requires additional constraints to decide to which objects a new word applies.
• Taxonomic Assumption: This constraint means children assume that words refer to objects of the same kind rather than to objects that are merely related thematically. This aids in categorization and the learning of category names.
• Mutual Exclusivity Bias: Children tend to assume that each object has only one label. This bias is useful for learning new words for both entirely new objects and for differentiating parts or features of known objects. It necessitates the integration with other constraints like the whole object assumption to effectively learn about parts of objects.

Question 32

What are the limitations of, and arguments against, the constraints approach?

Answer 32

• its primary focus is on the learning of object labels. The approach is less effective in explaining how children learn words that are not directly linked to concrete objects, such as verbs, abstract nouns, and function words like “please” or “think”. This limitation suggests that while constraints may be helpful for a subset of vocabulary acquisition, they do not fully account for the diversity and complexity of language learning.
• presupposes a certain order of word learning that may not always reflect actual developmental patterns. For instance, it assumes that children learn the names of whole objects before learning the names of their parts. However, there can be instances where a child learns a part name (“tail”) before learning the name of the whole object (“dog”), challenging the universality of constraints like the whole object assumption.
• It does not account for the social context of language learning. Children rely on social and pragmatic cues from their caregivers and the environment to navigate word meanings, suggesting that word learning is also a socially mediated process. This interplay between constraints and social cues indicates that language acquisition is not solely a product of innate biases but is also significantly influenced by the child’s social environment.

Question 33

Tomasello’s social pragmatic approach

Answer 33

• Core principle: argues that word learning is not about mapping words to objects in a one-to-one correspondence (as suggested by the constraints approach). Instead, it’s about understanding what the speaker intends the listener to focus on within a given situation.
• Words are used to invite others to share a particular experience or understanding of something, which means there is no static relationship between an object and a word. For example, the word “dog” can refer to the animal in various ways depending on the context and the speaker’s intent, such as “pet,” “Rover,” “burden,” “animal,” or “stray.”
• Evidence Supporting the Approach: Tomasello conducted experiments showing that children use their understanding of the social situation to infer the meanings of words. For instance, 24-month-old children were exposed to either object-biasing or action-biasing conditions. When later asked to identify a “modi” (a made-up word) in a comprehension test, their interpretation of “modi” as either an object or an action depended on the context they were previously exposed to. This demonstrates that children rely on social cues and their understanding of the context to learn words, rather than purely on innate constraints.