Midterm Flashcards
Explanations for the Ukrainian Conflict (Fomin)
- International reputation & great power politics (Держава) (NATO enlargement)
- Ukrainian domestic politics (complex ethnic identities)
- Russian domestic politics (poor decision-making, domestic support)
- Putin’s worldview (Russian empire/neutral buffer)
Mearsheimer’s Argument
Western strategy to expand NATO has triggered Putin’s red-line; Ukraine is a “de-facto member of NATO”
Timeline of the Ukrainian Crisis (Mearsheimer)
- 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit = Russian red-line
- 2014 U.S.-backed regime change –> Russian annexation
- 2021 Russian draft-treaties on Ukraine-NATO relations rejected –> war
Kotkin’s Argument
The Ukraine Crisis is predictable Russian behavior (autocracy, militarism, imperialism, suspicion); NATO has actually helped West be in a better position
War was a miscalculation (Kotkin)
Bad information pipeline due to autocracy; “силовеки” cautious of Western involvement
Beauchamp’s Argument
1) Putin believes Ukraine is rightfully part of Russia separated by historical accident
2) Ukraine’s illegitimate pro-West, anti-Russian stance is unacceptable (views Ukraine as oppressing Russian speakers; fearful of U.S.-backed regime change)
Gelman Argument
Russia invaded Ukraine due to poor autocratic decision-making errors (“pockets of efficiency (not caring about long-term costs; placement of loyal & incompetent advisors)
Marten Argument
Putin is rational even w/ the information shortage, but miscalculations are increasingly likely w/ more Western involvement
Rationality Requirements (Marten)
1) Rational actor has a set of goals that they act on
2) The actor’s goals are more or less consistently prioritized
3) The actor searches for information before taking action
Putin’s Goals (Marten)
1) Stay in control of Russia for as long as possible
2) Go down in history for making Russia great again
Causes of Information Shortage (Marten)
1) Messengers fear personal consequences of delivering uncomfortable truths
2) Putin has personally isolated himself & ignores facts he doesn’t want to believe
3) Russian leadership itself is very old & unlikely to be inventive
Why Russia is a large player in international affairs
Largest country by landmass, #1 war participator, epicenter of 20th cen. death
Security Dilemma
Anarchy, self-help & uncertain motivations –> mutual insecurity
O-D balance
More or less costly to attack vs. defend (offensive/defensive advantage); Russia = offensive advantage
O-D distinguishability
Degree to which defense can be differentiated (low vs. high distinguishability); Russia = low distinguishability
Grand Themes in Russian FP
Expansion Autocracy Prestige/Great Power status Backwardness Ambiguity of identity
Poe Timeline
- Slavs come to east-central Eurasia → Kievan Rus’ → Mongols (taxers)
[Mongols did not alter course of Russian history (did not settle/alter culture)] - Rise of Muscovy (favored by Mongols) → “gathering up” of lands
[Ivan the Great exploited backwardness to extract resources from conquered lands; Muscovite Russia not historical successor of Rus’ (location/time/Mongols)] - Gathering up of non-Russian lands (Mongols, Tartars)
- Alexander II defeats Napoleon’s army (peak Russian moment)
[Romanovs massively expand borders of Russian Empire & give legitimacy; “Russia’s competitors had empires, Russia was an empire”] - Soviet Union industrialized & developed Russia into a superpower
Poe Argument (The Russian Moment)
Distinct, different civilization to neighboring countries; stood up to empires due to…
1) Autocracy
2) Closed economy
3) Geography (inaccessible by sea)
4) Competition w/ West & threat of Europe
Timeline of Revolution–>WWII
- Bolshevik Revolution (1917)
[Appealed to minority ethnic groups by granting federal republic (SSR) status; backwardness → rapid top-down industrialization & collectivization of agriculture] - Operation Barbossa: Hitler invades the USSR on June 22, 1941
[Killed ~30 million Soviets; divisions (~10,000) wiped out in a day] - Soviets defeat Germany → bipolarity of US & USSR
Soviet post-war aims
1) Making sure Germany & Japan are kept down
2) Securing buffer zone in E. Europe (“defensively-motivated revisionist”
3) Attempting to cooperate w/ war allies (needed legitimacy & aid)
Cold War Triggers
1) Atomic power imbalance
2) Marshall Plan & NATO
3) U.S. refuses to back pro-Soviet govts; need for buffer zone
End of WWII thoughts (Pechatnov)
- USSR was devastated yet incredibly optimistic
- Belief that WWII showed ultimate success of communism (legitimacy)
- Destroyed both Japan & Germany; held military control of Europe
- New status as great power & member of Grand Alliance
Soviet post-war aims in E. Europe (Pechatnov)
- Wanted to expand to defend itself from hostile world (“Barbarossa Syndrome”)
- Believed it deserved compensation
- Attempted to appease West to negotiate new borders & German issue
Negative shift in U.S.-Soviet realtions (Pechatnov)
- Hiroshima (global balance of power shift)
- Truman Doctrine & Marshall Plan
- Stalin announces “war preparations” –> Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech
- NATO
- Sovietization of E. Europe (Warsaw Pact )
Post-war difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations (Pechatnov)
- Postwar treatment of Germany
- Western propaganda against USSR
- Future of Eastern Europe
Long Telegram Argument
- Soviet Union does not see peaceful coexistence w/ West
- Fears & expects “capitalist encirclement””; battle w/ communism inevitable
- Neurotic view of world affairs” due to “innately Russian sense of insecurity”
- Deeply suspicious of all nations; power only be achieved by total control
- USSR will attempt to expand its sphere of influence
- Comintern spreading world communism; infiltrating West
- Attempting to weaken influence of West in post-Soviet space
- Stalin understands military inferiority & is rational
- Soviet expansionism can be countered w/ containment
Cold War Debate
- Orthodox: US was deterring an expansionist USSR (containment, “Long Telegram”)
- Revisionist: USSR was deterring an expansionist US (Soviet view)
- Post-revisionist: security dilemma (desire for security, defense misinterpreted)
Underlying conditions of the Cold War
- Bipolarity
- Nuclear deterrence/arms race
- Loss of Russian ‘marchland’ advantage (rise of Asian powers)
- Soviet expansionism into Third World (Cuba, Africa, China, Vietnam, Korea)
Cold War events
- Berlin Crisis (GDR’s intellectual drainage –> Berlin Wall –> Cuban Missile Crisis)
- ‘Mature’ Cold War (proxy wars, nuclear parity, detente)
- ‘New Cold War’ (Afghanistan invasion, US embargo, “Able Archer” war scare)
Khrushchev’s final years (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- 1960 harvests dissapointing –> import grain from West
- declining living standards & ↑ interaction w/ West
- Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) largely failed
- End of terror & new cultural thaw → seeds of eventual disintegration
Brezhnev (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- Originally wanted to coexist w/ West; less dependent on ideology
- Rapid military buildup in mid-60s due to nuclear inferiority
- Prague Spring invasion to prevent domino effect → “Brezhnev Doctrine”
Detente Timeline (Savranskaya & Taubman)
- 70s nuclear parity + need for economic aid –> push for detente
- CSCE Helsinki Accords legitimized Soviet borders, yet assured human rights
- Despite SALT talks, USSR continued proxies in Vietnam & Angola
Brinkmanship (Hershberg)
Displaying confidently the nerve to risk nuclear war; i.e. pushing U.S. to evacuate W. Berlin by threatening routes to W. Germany
Nuclear status @ time of Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
U.S. = 27,300; Soviets = 3,300 (capability to destroy world in just
Explanations for Cuban Missile Crisis (Hershberg)
- Nuclear inferiority: needed to move nukes closer to U.S.
- Cuban Defense: missiles were intended to protect Castro from U.S. aggression
- Cold War Politics: wanted to swap missiles in Cuba for Turkish nukes
- Berlin: missiles in Cuba increased bargaining power in Berlin (trade)
- Communist Leadership: signal of retaking communist leadership from China
- Living Standards: nuclear deterrence → military ↓ & focus on ↑ living standards
Cuban Missile Crisis Timeline (Hershman)
- Kennedy blockades Cuba & announces quarentine to pressure Khrushchev to de-arm island (airstrike & military invasion too risky)
- “Black Sunday”: Khrushchev demands missiles withdrawn from Turkey
- Cuba gets Khruschev to remove missiles for promise to not invade island
- Crisis averted; age of relative stability (hotline, arms control, Berlin cooled)
Khrushchev-Kennedy relations (Zubok & Pleshkov)
- Khrushchev originally supported Kennedy, wanted peaceful coexistence
- Bay of Pigs immediately soured relations (Moscow tipped off Castro)
Khrushchev’s Strategies (Zubok & Pleshakov)
- Brinkmanship
- Strategic deception (hiding of nuclear imbalance; warning of new “superbomb”)
- Diplomacy (defensive line on Bay of Pigs)
Factors in Fall of USSR
- Fall of Soviet growth rate
- Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
- Gorbachev’s new thinking
- Helsinki Awards (Soviets agreed to human rights provisions)
End of the Cold War Debate
- Orthodox: containment worked
- Revisionist: Western & U.S. expansionism triumphed
- Post-revisionist: Gorbachev transcended the security dilemma
Caveats to the “Gorbachev Revolution” (Brown)
- Not the work of Gorbachev alone
- Not popular/bottom-up due to strict Soviet hierarchy
- Did not truly transform the Soviet system, only reformed
- By the time actual reforms occurred (‘88), it was too late
Perestroika (Brown)
- Needed to increase living standards
- Cut military troops; withdrew from Afghanistan
- Ended Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty
“Common Security” (Brown)
Cannot gauruntee security at the expense of someone else (U.S.) (nuclear weapons are a threat & not strength)
Implications of trust (Kydd)
- Cooperation requires a certain degree of trust between states
- Conflict is a sign that one or more states are untrustworthy
- Hegemony can promote trust if the hegemon is trustworthy
Application of trust in Cold War (Kydd)
- Soviet expansion → mistrust → failure to cooperate
2. Gorbachev’s “costly signaling” led to cooperation & end to Cold War
Proposed alternatives to NATO (Sarotte)
1) Gorbachev’s new post-Cold War pan-European security structure
2) Expansion of the Warsaw Pact into Germany
3) Reformed & reinforced CSCE
4) Rejection of all military alliances